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Abstract 
Africa is poor in the midst of plenty.  Though multiple causes and reasons may be claimed for 
Africa’s shrinking state of development, disruptive effects of colonialism takes forefront. Present-day 
Africa is literally free but colonial footprints are still apparent in the borderlands. The study pinpoints 
how natural borderline development was thwarted by the infamous Berlin Conference of 1884 -1885. As 
result, people, ethnic groups, nations and nationalities have been disintegrated. Ethnic disintegration and 
arbitrary colonial boundaries lines have been source of unavoidable intra and inter state conflicts in 
Africa. Ironically, in fear of opening “Pandora’s Box” that would further unlock unmanageable conflict, 
founding fathers of OAU have decided to abide by the colonial boundaries “whether they are good or 
bad” in Cairo Resolution of 1964, thereby suppressing Kwame Nkrumah’s vision of forming United Sates 
of Africa by removing colonial boundary lines. The study argues that Africa has missed the best 
opportunity that would avoid boundary conflict that constitutes 90% of African interstate conflicts. 
 This study proves deficiencies of the Cairo Declaration of 1964 that has honored colonial 
boundaries, as boundaries between independent African States taking Ethio-Eritrean boundary as case 
study. The Ethio-Eritrean boundary meant to be defined by the three successive colonial treaties of 1900, 
1902, and 1908 that were concluded between Italy, Ethiopia and Great Britain, but the actual boundary 
line never been drawn on the ground and cannot be define in accordance with the awkward terms of the 
treaties. Any attempt for strict application of the elusive treaty wordings exacerbates the complexity, 
confusion and ultimately fuels up conflict.  
The study focuses on resolving the current impasse between Ethiopia and Eritrea by drawing an 
acceptable boundary line through constructive dialogue. A true and acceptable boundary line cannot be 
drawn simply on the basis of elusive colonial treaties, but through constructive and honest dialogue.  
Drawing a line of separation is not a goal by itself, but it would perpetuate peace, create good 
neighborhood, and contribute for rebuilding sense of brotherhood by avoiding animosity and mistrust.  
Peaceful coexistence, coupled with effects of globalization, therefore, would stimulate economic and 
political integration that would ultimately remove restraining effects border walls. This will effectuate 
AU’s Border Program that aims to change the nature of borders from barriers to bridges thereby enable 
everyone to freely move all over Africa once again.  
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 1 
CHAPTER ONE 
  INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Background 
  Africa is the first home to mankind1, and believed to be the source of ancient 
civilization.2 Emerging archeological evidences and remnants of ancient civilization prove 
Africa’s early innovative acumen and progress.3  Moreover, Africa is endowed with 
hardworking people, fertile land, and untapped natural resources.4 Ironically, Africa houses 
most of the world’s poorest nations that frequently look for external aid.5 This is an issue that 
claims diverse socio-economic and political causes and reasons. 6  
  Devastating effects of colonial policy and resultant recurrent intra and inter state 
conflict that has been common in Africa takes forefront position among the variables that have 
engendered Africa’s shrinking development.  Since independence in 1960s numerous African 
states have been enduring violent conflicts that claimed lives of huge number of people and 
consumed resources amounting to billions of dollars.7 States and intergovernmental African 
                                            
1 The oldest modern human fossil was discovered in Ethiopia. See Cook Clive, Discovery of Earliest Homo 
Sapiens Skulls back “ out of Africa” Theory BSF, http://www.bradshawfoundation.com/herto_skulls.php 
(Accessed: 10/28/13). 
2 Gollin Michael remarks, “During ancient times technical and cultural leadership moved from Africa to Europe 
and then during [the] middle ages to Islamic societies and China….”  (Emphasis added). GOLLIN MICHAEL, 
DRIVING INNOVATION: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STRATEGIERS FOR A DYNAMIC WORLD, 
13(2008). 
3 Archeological facts and remnants of ancient civilization prove Africa’s early progress (take for instance the 
famous Egyptian Pyramids, 2000 yeas of old churches that were curved from a single stone in Ethiopia, places 
and ancient cities some to mention). Some regard Africa as “ The cradle of civilization and the origin of human 
society.” See, http://library.thinkquest.org/C002739/AfricaSite/LMEgyptAncient.htm (Accessed: 10/28/13) 
4 See,Kaberuka Donald,  Africa’s Mineral Wealth: A Blessing or A Curse?  http://www.afdb.org/en/ (Accessed, 
10/28/13). 
5 See, Walker Emily,  What we’re Reading: How can Africa move away from aid dependency? ONE (May 2, 
2013), http://www.one.org/us/2013/05/02/what-were-reading-how-can-africa-move-away-from-aid-
dependence/ (Accessed 10/28/13). 
6 Acemoglue and Robinson, “ Why is Africa poor?”  http://scholar.harvard.edu/jrobinson/publications/why-africa-
poor (Accessed, 12/12/2013). 
7 Stelios Michalopolulos & Elias Papaloannou, The Long-run Effects of the Scramble of for Africa Working Paper 
17620 NATIONAL BUREAU OF RESEARCH (November 2011),  http://www.nber.org/papers/w17620 
(Accessed on 12/10/13); See also Richard A. Griggs, Boundary and War in Africa in 1935: IBRU BOUNDARY 
& SECURITY BULLETIN, 64-68 (1997). 
 2 
institutions appear not proactive enough to avert conflict and save lives.  Needless to say living 
standard of common people has been steadily deteriorating.  
  Imaginary boundary line that was drawn during the scramble for Africa is often blamed 
for triggering recurrent conflicts in Africa.8  Colonial boundary is characterized as “imaginary” 
because it was a simple ingenuity of “powerful” people that were far away in Europe and 
unfamiliar with the African reality. Lord Salisbury affirms artificiality of African boundary 
stating:  
 We have been engaged … in drawing lines upon maps where no white men’s feet 
have ever trod; we have been giving away mountains and rivers and lakes to each 
other, but we have only been hindered by the small impediment that we never 
knew exactly where those mountains and rivers and lakes were.9 
 
  Needless to say, crafters of African borders have partitioned the continent in total 
disregard of local conditions, geographic, ethnographic, linguistic and cultural compositions.  
In the words of Radie Berketeab, “…the scramble for Africa surgically divided the future 
nations … using pencils and rulers without paying any consideration for […] differences.”10 
Colonial powers never worried about the interest of Africans nor concerned about negative 
consequences of arbitrary border creation. They simply ventured on dividing Africa and 
African people in a way avoiding “war” among Europeans in getting their own share of 
Africa.11 The people who never visited Africa remotely partitioned it even without taking time 
                                            
8 President Chadly of Algeria views colonial boundaries as “delayed action bombs left by colonialism.” See J.R.V. 
PRESCOTT, POLITICAL FRONTIERS AND BOUNDARIES, 254(1987). [emphasis added).  See also Azure 
Gilman, The violent Legacy of Africa’s Arbitrary Borders, http://freakonomics.com/2011/12/01/the-violent-
legacy-of-africas-arbitrary-borders/ (Accessed, 12/10/2013). 
9 S. N.  LALONDE, DETERMINING BOUNDARIES IN CONFLICTED WORLD; THE ROLE OF UTI 
POSSIDETIS 106 (2002). Salisbury’s statement of 1890 quoted by Judge Ajibda in Territorial dispute ( Libya v. 
Chad) 6 ICJ Rep. 53 (1194). See also 12:5 EJIL 867 – 889 (2001). 
10 Redie Bereketeab, The Complex Roots of the Second Eritrea-Ethiopia Wars: Re-examine the Causes, 13 AFR. 
J.  INT’L AFF.  21, 15 - 59(2010). 
11 Stelios Michalopolulos & Elias Papaloannou, supra note 7. 
 3 
to get some basic information from Africans, explorers or missionaries who had worked for the 
great powers.12   
  Arbitrary colonial boundary has been breeding a ‘painful seed’ that has been generating 
terrible memories in almost all over Africa. Colonial boundaries have split communities, ethnic 
groups and families that have been living together from the time immemorial and still wish to 
live together with their ethnic kinsmen.13 In East Africa, for instance, it is not uncommon to 
have a family in Somalia, Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea or Djibouti, especially in border regions.  
Afar ethnic group is divided into Eritrea, Djibouti, and Ethiopia. Half of the Nuer ethnic groups 
situated in Gambella region of Ethiopia and the rest in South Sudan, Luo ethnic group has been 
dispersed in Kenya, Uganda, South Sudan, Ethiopia, and Tanzania.14  Similarly, “Maasai have 
been partitioned between Kenya and Tanzania [….]”15 Ethnic disintegration and resultant 
unending conflict is not only features of East Africa. It is an incurable “colonial disease” that 
has spread all over Africa. A study reveals 177 (40%) ethnic groups in Africa were split by the 
arbitrary boundary.16 Some of the ethnic groups were divided among six states. Ethnic split 
into two to four states is very common. 17  
  Divided ethnic groups often ignore boundary line and crave to socialize with their 
peers across the border. This obviously results in interstate conflict or regional war.18 
Amaral, remarks, 
                                            
12 Id. at 3. 
13 After decolonization, Africa was plagued gaining with endless territorial or border-induced conflicts.  Lalonde 
supra note 9 at 119. 
14 Kidane Mengisteab, Relevance of Regional integration in the Greater Horn Region, in KINDANE 
MENGISTEREAB & REDIE BREKETEAB (eds.) , REGIONAL INTEGRATION, IDENITY AND CITIZENSHIP 
IN THE GREATER HORN OF AFRICA, 8(2012).  
15 Stelios Michalopolulos & Elias Papaloannou, supra note 7. 
16 Id, at note 1. 
17 Luo ethnic group scattered in six Eastern African Countries, see Kidane Mengisteab supra at note 14. 
18 See, William Zartman, Bordering on war: The Clear Marking of Boundaries between African Nations can Help 
Prevent Costly and Debilitating Border Conflicts, FOREIGN POLICY (May 1, 2001), 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2001/05/01/bordering_on_war?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=ful
 4 
 … many groups do not identify themselves with the states in which they live.  Some 
of them belong to the group split by international boundaries which do not conform 
to their cultural distribution. Others are minorities seeking either a degree of political 
autonomy within the existing states, or total separation. Beneath the surface are 
always problems related to the actual meaning of international boundaries.19 
 
  The arbitrary borderline has impeded free movement of people and restrained resource 
sharing. Before creation of the divisive borderline, Africans used to move freely and shared 
common resources. It was their nation, land, and resources that nature offers to all Africans.  
Consequently, tribal herdsmen freely moved wherever their cattle moved in search for greener 
pasture. The artificial borderline, however, has been restraining this natural movement and has 
been source of recurrent conflict. Sporadic conflicts have been surfacing in all corners of 
Africa.20 Gilman comments, “ The arbitrary borders of an entire continent have caused untold 
bloodshed and misery that could have been avoided.”21 Similarly, Michalopoulos and 
Papaloannou note, “ […] partitioning has led to ethnic struggles, patronage politics, and 
spurred civil conflict and under development.”22 The researchers further argue that, “ […] civil 
conflict is concentrated in the historical homeland of partitioned ethnicities […and] causality 
and durations […] is higher approximately by 25% in areas where partitioned ethnicities reside 
[….]”23 
  In addition to splitting inter-related people and tearing the fabric of communal life, 
artificial boundary is hard to clearly mark on the ground.24 As pinpointed above, crafters of the 
borders were not versant with topographic and socio-economic conditions of Africa, but rushed 
to partition the continent drawing an elusive boundary line. This has made demarcation process 
                                                                                                                                          
l (Accessed:10/2/13).  See also Adeleye Oyeniyi, Conflict  and Vilolence in Africa: Causes, Sources and Types, 
TRANSCEND MEDIA SERVICE (February 28, 2011), www.transcend.org” (Accessed:10/28/13). 
19 Ilidio do Amaral, New Reflections on the Theme of International Boundaries” in Clive H. Schofield (ed.) 
WORLD BOUNDARIES, I GLOBAL BOUNDAREIS. 17(1994). 
20 Stelios Michalopolulos & Elias Papaloannou supra note7. 
21  Azure Gilman supra at note 8. 
22 Stelios Michalopolulos & Elias Papaloannou supra note7. 
23 Id. 
 5 
hard or impossible, or any attempt to demarcate colonial delimitation assumed to create a new 
“brand” of conflict. A study conducted by the African Union reveals that before 2007 only 
25% of African boundary was actually demarcated.25 Due to Africa’s new approach, in 2010 
this figure rose by 10%.26 Residents of unmarked boundaries have been living in a way their 
ancestors had been living for centuries.  It appears possible to imagine that these people never 
thought that they were living in a territory that belonged to a foreign nation, nor in a territory 
that belonged to another ethnic group. When they find themselves belonging to a state that they 
never supposed to, or when they learn that they were about to split from their kinsmen a 
devastating conflict arises. This calls for the need to rebuild a mutually acceptable boundary 
line with less restraining effect.27 There is no question in need to redraw boundary line, but 
there is no consensus in modus operandi.  
  At the end of 1950’s, before the formation of Organization of African Union (OAU), 
there was revisionist movement that aimed at redrawing African boundaries in a way uniting 
disintegrated ethnic groups.  S. N. Lalonde notes, “ Boundary readjustment, and even 
abolition, was seen as a desirable prelude to the formation of regional groupings based on 
cultural. Linguistic, and religious affinity that would eventually become African common 
wealth.”28 The Movement held continental conference in Accra, Ghana and called for 
“abolition or readjustment of colonial frontiers...”29 
  Pan African activists were fully aware of the horrific effects of arbitrary colonial 
boundary and envisioned to redraw African borders, but the movement itself vanished after the 
                                                                                                                                          
24 Peter Collier, Boundary Demarcation between British and Portuguese Colonial Territories in East Africa 
AFRICANA STUDIA, No. 9 237, 223 - 238(2006).  
25 AUBP, Draft Progress Report on the Implementation of the African Union Border Program 6(2012) 
http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/auc-com-report-aubp-09-05-2012.pdf  (Accessed: 12/12/13).  
26 Id.  
27 Ilidio do Amaral supra note 19  
28 Lalonde supra note 9 at 116. 
29 Id 
 6 
formation of OAU due to fear of unmanageable conflicts that thought to “kill” the then young 
continental organization- OAU.30 The very motive of the founding fathers of OAU was to 
devise an African umbrella organization that can facilitate continental integration.  Thus, with a 
view to maintain territorial integrity of Africa, founding fathers of OAU starting from the 
heydays of continual organization have relied on the international law principle of territorial 
integrity norm. Reliance on territorial integrity norm thought to keep undivided Africa.  
Moreover, it appears that the Latin American policy of Uti possidetis had some influence in 
Organization of African Union’s stand to cherish status quo ante. But the reality of Africa was 
totally different from conditions in Latin America. First, substantially a single European power 
colonized Latin America and the whole continent considered to be one nation. After 
independence regional boundaries were taken as international boundary. The African situation 
was different. Africa was partitioned by numerous European superpowers that had conflicting 
colonial policy. Colonizers had their own multifarious interests and they had been competing 
for African resources. 
  Despite tragic consequences, founding fathers of OAU decided to respect colonial 
boundary line on actual date of independence.31 Founding fathers of the then continental 
organization did not like to open “Pondera’s box” in fear of further conflict. This stance may 
be taken as the only viable option at the formative stage of OAU in order to calm down 
looming conflict scenarios, but it is still a “disease” that never been effectively diagnosed and 
cured. Communities and ethnic groups have been suffering because of unfair and unrealistic 
colonial policy on boundary delineation. Border related conflict is not uncommon in all corners 
of Africa. Unending border related conflict in the Horn of Africa calls for special attention. 
                                            
30 Immediately after decolonization, while Pan Africanism was at high point, redrawing African boundaries would 
have been easier, but Africa has missed the best moment that would have facilitated African political integration 
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Though borderline facts and issues are unique and demand varied resolution strategy, the Horn 
Africa case, especially current border related tension between Ethiopia and Eritrea would 
explain effects of colonial border policy in Africa.  
  The Horn of Africa has been suffering from unending current and potential intra-
national or international boundary conflicts. There is unresolved tension between Ethiopia and 
Eritrea, South Sudan and Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia, Eritrea and Djibouti, Somalia and 
Kenya. As a result of unresolved boundary related conflicts, residents of border regions endure 
extensive suffering.32  Ethiopia and Somalia had undergone shattering effects of wars of 1970s.  
Thousands lost their lives, massive property destroyed and billions of dollars was spent to 
purchase lethal machine guns and further enriched former colonial masters.33  Huge number of 
people fled to neighboring countries.  On top of loss of life and property, the distrust and 
antagonism has left scars of animosity among neighboring states.  34 
  Shortly, after seceding from Ethiopia, Eritrea wrestled with multiple border related 
wars.35  The boundary war between Eritrea and Yemen, Ethio-Eritrean boundary conflict of 
1998 – 2000, boundary conflict between Djibouti and Eritrean not only left permanent scars, 
but also subjects of these states endure unresolved tension.36  The people of Horn of Africa 
                                                                                                                                          
that would absolutely avoid boundary induced conflicts.  
31 Ilidio do Amaral supra note 19 at 20.  
32 See Malcolm N. Shaw, Peoples Territorialism and Boundaries 3 EUR. J. IN’T L. Law,  478, 478 - 507(1997). 
33  Grggs rightly observes, “… African colonial boundaries are also the causes for high economic costs. … due to 
border disputes African countries purchase armaments and sometimes the expense is equivalent to the foreign 
aid they are receiving.” Griggs, Richard, A. The Boundaries of an African Renaissance. IBRU BOUNDARY 
SEC. BULLETIN, 66(1997), quoted in Wondwosen Teshome, Colonial Boundaries of Africa:  The case of 
Ethiopia’s Boundary within Sudan, 9ACADEMIC REV. 337 – 367 (2009).  
34 Rose Hebert notes, “Although the fighting has stopped, politically Ethiopia and Eritrea seem destined to 
maintain a cold  war and complete economic separation for the foreseeable future.” See Ross Hebert, The End 
of the Eritrean Exception? SOUTH AFRICAN INST. OF INT’L AFF. COUNTRY REPORT, No. 8 2(2002); 
Similarly, Redie Bereketeab observes,  “ Although the fighting has stopped, politically Ethiopia and Eritrea 
seem destined to maintain a cold war and complete economic separation for the foreseeable future.”Bereketeab, 
supra note10.  
35 Goitom Gebreluel & Kjetil Tronovell, Ethiopia and Eritrea: Brothers at War No More www. Aljazeera.com  
(December 08, 2013). 
36 Hebert, supra note 34. 
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pursue uncertain future as a result of potential conflict situation assuming the conflict would 
erupt again at any moment. The undefined boundary between the new African states, South 
Sudan and Sudan has been problem not only to the region, but disturbs regional peace and 
security. 37  
  The Ethio-Eritrea boundary best explicates challenges of the colonial boundary.38 After 
seceding from Ethiopia, Eritrea sought certain territories that were never regarded as part of 
Eritrea ever but were marked in a colonial map and vaguely stated in the colonial era treaties. 
Residents of these villages and towns never assumed they have been living on an “alien” land.  
After five years of secession Eritrea, presumably driven by some economic and political 
motives39, moved to occupy villages and towns that were under Ethiopian administration. The 
war claimed 70,000 – 100,000 lives and loss of billions of dollar worth of property.  For almost 
two years OAU, and international community wrangled to convince Eritrea and Ethiopia to end 
war and negotiate to resolve the border conflict.  Until defeated at Badme and its troops 
removed by force, Eritrea turned deaf ear to OAU’s Framework Agreement, Modalities of 
implementation and Technical Arrangements.  After losing ground in all war front, Eritrea 
finally declared acceptance of OAU’s peace initiative. OAU’s Framework Agreement required 
the boundary dispute to be resolved in accordance with the pertinent colonial treaties and 
principles of international law.  
  The arbitration tribunal, Eritrea Ethiopia Boundary Commission (hereinafter EEBC) 
attempted to resolve the boundary conflict by applying the colonial treaties of 1900, 1902 and 
                                            
37 Id.  
38 Running for 651 miles (1,047 km.), the Eritrea – Ethiopia boundary extends from the boundary tripoint with 
Sudan on the Takkaze Rier in the north west  to the tripoint with Djibouti in the southeast.  See Gideon Biger, 
The Encyclopedia of International Boundaries (1995). (The Jerusalem Publishing House Ltd: Jerusalem). 
39 It is generally believed that the Ethio-Eritrea border war was motivated by undisclosed soio-economic and 
political motives. Details of the possible causes of border conflict are dealt in Chapter 6 of this Study. See 
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1908 treaties that were concluded between Italy and the then tribal Ethiopian king (Menelik 
II).40 The Boundary Commission repeatedly submitted that the treaties and accompanying 
maps lacked clarity.41 There was no consensus in nomenclature of rivers that were supposed to 
mark the supposed boundary line.  Deceptive acts and manipulations that were exerted by 
colonial agents have further complicated boundary setting.42 On top of this, there was 
communication barrier.43 The treaties were concluded when Ethiopia lacked expert assistance 
and the country ruled by tribal kings that were not versant with international law. The treaties 
were not only obscure and lacked details but also favored the colonial power for no 
consideration. More over, the Boundary Commission attempted to fill treaty lacunae by 
reading maps that were drawn by the Italian cartographers who unilaterally mapped border 
regions. This presumably took some Ethiopian ethnic groups that never supposed themselves 
belonging to Eritrea.  
  The current Ethiopian map reveals how colonial masters mislead uneducated tribal 
chiefs taking all the red sea regions that were barn at the time and not habitable. For European 
powers, however, the red sea shores were very strategic sights to control international 
                                                                                                                                          
Seyoum Yohannes Tesfay, Eritrea-Ethiopia Arbitration: A Cure Based in Neither Diagnosis nor Prognosis, 6:2 
MIZAN L. REV.  172  – 185, 163- 199,  (2012).  
40  Hebert, supra note 34. 
41   Paragraph 4.3 of  EEBC award states, “Article 1 delimits the boundary from the frontier with Sudan in the 
west to a point in the east the exact location of which is a matter of dispute.”  EEBC Decision Regarding 
Delimitation of the Border between The State of Eritrea and The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Para 
4.3. at 31.  
42 Id at para 4.7 on page 33 states, Emperor Minilik of Ethiopia at first sought a frontier considerably to the north 
of the Mareb- Belesa- Muna line, but eventually agreed in 1900 to keep to that line (in exchange for payment of 
5,000,000 Lires) 
43 For example Wuchale Treaty of 19th century was drafted both in Italian and Ethiopian languages. The Ethiopian 
King, Minilik II, simply relied on the Ethiopian language (Amharic version), but the Italian version did not 
match with the Amharic version. Italian version Article 17 of the treaty stated that Ethiopia could make foreign 
relation only through Italy while the Amharic version of the same Provision stated that Italy could cooperate 
with Ethiopia in making foreign relation. Finally the Ethiopian King resided the treaty and a massive war broke 
out in which white men for the first time defeated by black men.in battle of Adwa.  This is an historic battle.  
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passageway.44 Though few miles away from red sea, Ethiopia today is landlocked as a result of 
mischiefs by the colonial powers. 
  The Ethiopian government initially refused to honor the arbitral award claiming the 
decision parted not only ethnic groups but also families. Due to international pressure, Ethiopia 
later accepted the award but insisted discussion before demarcation in order to create lasting 
peace by making the boundary realistic. The Eritrean government, on the other hand, has 
declined dialogue and has been requesting Ethiopia to surrender regions awarded by EEBC. As 
a result, border residents of both states endure not only unsettled future, but also pursue life in 
state of tension.  The cause of Ethio- Eritrean war at face value termed as border conflict but it 
was a cover up for the hidden political and economic motives.45 To build long lasting peace 
therefor motives behind the conflict should be addressed.  It is “imperative to understand the 
underlying motive behind [the conflict].”46 
  At this point it appears almost impossible to reunite the divided ethnic groups under a 
single political authority in their traditional shape, but it is possible to facilitate free integration 
of the divided nations in a way akin to the pre-colonial situation. For example, Ethiopian 
Somali population were freely interact with their kinsmen in main land Somalia, Kenya or 
Djibouti, there would be no reason for Somalia to fight for reunion of divided Somalis. If their 
right to freely move, pasture their cattle and use trans-border resources, there will be no 
reasonable ground that will instigate conflict, at least as a result of boundary line.  
                                            
44 Italy bought land from a tribal chief chief’s from Eritrea and finally took its administration. It drew Eritrean 
boundary taking all the area surrounding Red Sea port. France bought land from a chief in Djibouti and finally 
contracted with the then King of Ethiopia later and held it for 99 years.  Somalia was partitioned among three 
super powers: Great Britain, France and Italy.  The scar is visible currently. We have Somalis in Ethiopia, 
Somalis in Djibouti and Somalis in Kenya.  Afar, a big ethnic group, divided between Ethiopian and Eritrea. 
Some western Ethiopian people got their ethnic parts in South Sudan.  
45  For detailed discussion on motives behind Ethio-Eritrean boundary conflict  see Tesfay supra note 39. 
46 Alexander Attilio Vadala.  Major Geopolitical Explanation of Conflict in the Horn of Africa NORD – SUD 
aktuell 627, 627 - 634 (2003).  
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  Realizing adverse effects that elusive colonial boundary lines in Africa, in 2007 African 
Union set up African Union Boundary Program (hereinafter AUBP).  AUBP is regarded as an 
“imaginative program for the management of inter African borders, aimed not only promoting 
peace, security and stability but also at facilitating the socio-economic integration of … 
Africa.”47 AUBP thus gears toward achieving of two important goals:  working toward 
promoting peace security and stability, and promoting and facilitating integration of Africa. 
Given elusive nature of colonial boundary lines, and animosity and hatred as a result of 
divisive colonial hands that are still alive all-inclusive integration of Africa appears 
unimaginable. A playground, thus, has to be leveled before attempting to create United States 
of Africa.  In this regard AUBP’s objective of building peace, security and stability by assisting 
and encouraging AU Member States to redraw an acceptable borderline and complete 
demarcation process is vital. Attainment of AUBP objectives is up side journey, but it is 
possible. Effort that have been exerted so far and attention given to the very disease that makes 
Africa’s future uncertain is appreciable, but AUBP has long way to go.  As pointed out above 
currently only 1/3 of African boundary is clearly defined. It is understandable that Africa is 
crawling with multifaceted socio-economic and political evils that need to be tackled, 
prioritizing border problem would solve lion’s share of Africa’s socio-economic evils. 
  This study suggests possible ways to cure the effects of destructive seeds that were 
sawn by colonial powers in partitioning Africa. The best approach that will certainly settle 
Africa’s impending border issue is political integration by creating United States of Africa – 
“the Gadafi illusion.”  Ideally it sounds an innovative idea, but due to external pull and internal 
push make the agenda of creating one nation “Africa” appears “daydream.” The other, 
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possibly, viable option is regional integration. This plan appears appealing because regions 
have already started some preliminary works for regional integration. For instance, East Africa 
Economic Community has been moving to issue common currency, free trade, free movement 
of goods and services, one passport that will take economic and ultimately political integration.  
Similarly, West Africa Economic Community has been aggressively working toward political 
integration of Member States. The third possible option is forming joint border commission 
that will investigate all border points and assess any potential ground fro dispute and settle it 
by drawing acceptable boundary line. Neighboring states should not wait until border issue 
surfaces. The Joint Border Commission may be permanent and responsible to report to its 
respective states but work by drawing common agenda. This is a proactive approach that would 
mitigate destructive effects of elusive colonial boundary.  AUBP encourages all Member States 
of AU to form a joint border commission in consultation with neighboring states and redraw 
elusive borderlines. The current wide spread conflict in all corners of Africa, however, has 
limited AUBP’s proactive agenda. Thus, at this time, AUBP has been fully embarked on 
resolving current border disputes by assisting demarcation of borders.  
 
1.2.  Statement of Problem 
   In last 1950s, after a number of African nations got independence, African intellectuals 
and Revisionist Movement spearheaded by Kwame Nkrumah worked to redraw African 
boundaries in a way it coincides with geographic, ethnographic, cultural lines and ultimately 
create United States of Africa thereby making divisive colonial boundary line past history. 
                                                                                                                                          
47 German African Border Project ( GABP), From Barrier to Bridges,  (May 2009) hhttp://www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/340666/publicationFile/3720/GTZ-GABP-Broschuere.pdf (Accessed on:  
01/13/14). 
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However, founding fathers of OAU have trashed Kwame Nkrumah’s agenda48 of revising 
boundary lines in fear of opening Pandora’s box that would, supposedly, mess Africa with 
unmanageable boundary conflicts. It was not only fear of conflict that had dictated founding 
fathers to “acknowledge the sanctity of colonial boundaries.” Some of the founding fathers had 
their own interest to control territories of partitioned ethnic groups or remain in power that they 
would lose had the boundary been redrawn in way uniting partitioned ethnic groups.49  
  The decision to maintain colonial boundary, however, did not stop boundary conflict as 
it was thought. Devastating boundary wars and conflicts have been so common in all over 
Africa since heydays of OAU.50  Vague colonial boundary laws and policies have been causing 
violent conflicts and unstoppable wars that sow animosity among African brothers. Boundary 
issues are very sensitive and can easily and quickly flare up into armed confrontation have 
been consuming lives of tens of thousands of Africans in short span of time. 
   Ethio-Eritrea boundary conflict has generated the most devastating conflict in 21st 
Africa. The war suddenly erupted, and took lives 70 – 100,000 people, resulted in destruction 
vast amount of property, displaced millions from their original territories and strained 
                                            
48 President Nkrumha observed that the rampant boundary justified for political unity stating, “Only African Unity 
can heal this festering sore of boundary disputes between our various States.” See Lalonde supra note 9 at 117.  
49 One of the proponents of adherence to colonial boundary was Ethiopia’s Haile Selassie I who remarked to 
accept colonial boundaries whether they were “good or bad.” See Tomas Bartos, Uti Possidetis, Quo Vadis? 18 
AUST. YBIL 56, 37-68 (1997).  Similarly the then president of Madagascar, President Tsiranana  remarked:  
 […]it is no longer possible, nor desirable to modify the boundaries of Nations, on the 
pretext of racial, religious or linguistic criteria… indeed, should we take race, religion or 
language as criteria for setting our boundaries, a few Stares in Africa would be blotted out 
from the map. ( Lalonde supra note 9 at 117. 
The president of Mali and Mauritania had there own private interest to keep colonial boundaries. (Id.) Morocco 
had claimed Mauritania as historical part of Morocco.  It is plausible that Emperor Haile Selasse’s motive was 
to escape from annexation of territories of Ethiopian Somalis to Somalia.  Somalia and Morocco openly 
supported revisionist movement with a view to reunite with divided kinship. In failure of OAU to redraw 
African boundaries, and finally due to OAU support to the claim of Western Sahara, Morocco suspended its 
membership to OAU until now.  Somalia remained as OAU Member State but it objected to the OAU’s 
decision to recognize colonial boundary line.  
50 Before the signature on OAU’s charter actually “dries up”, in early 1964 a devastating border war erupted in the 
Horn of Africa between Ethiopia and Somalia, and in north between Morocco and Algeria.  This had motivated 
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relationship of brotherly people.  Invoking colonial treaties, Eritrea claimed certain borderland 
territories that were under Ethiopian control for centuries. This resulted in bloodshed and 
confrontation that is still unsettled. The war was formally ended by the Algiers Agreement of 
December 12, 2000, but the dispute is pending.  
  The Ethio-Eritrean boundary was defined by three successive colonial treaties of 1900, 
1902, and 1908. Terms of the treaties were extremely vague to set a clear and acceptable 
boundary line on the ground. As the supposed boundary line was not demarcated, local people 
were ignorant of not only the supposed boundary line, but also the existence of boundary 
treaties. Borderland residents continued to live in the area, as their forefathers used to live. 
Attempting to resolve the Ethio-Eritrean border dispute, EEBC time and again pointed out that 
Ethio-Eritrea treaties were exceedingly vague. Confronted with unsolvable condition, the 
arbitration tribunal had resorted to unilateral colonial reports, notes, memorandums and third 
party maps that were not known to Ethiopia. This has further complicated boundary setting and 
the boundary line that was defined by EEBC remained unacceptable to Ethiopia as it would 
further divide families, towns, villages, and ethnic groups that have been living together for 
centuries. Some of the villages that were never claimed were awarded to Ethiopia and villages 
that were never been under Eritrea or Italian control were allotted to Eritrea.  
  Ethiopia argues that demarcation on the basis of the current arbitral award would not 
bring a lasting solution, and has been insisting for bilateral dialogue with Eritrea with a view to 
settle all issues with Eritrea once and for all. Eritrea, on the other has refused to accept 
Ethiopia’s stance and has been demanding for strict enforcement of EEBC’s delimitation 
decision. For about four years both States had stopped cooperation with EEBC that prompted 
                                                                                                                                          
founding father’s of OAU to expressly declare acceptance of colonial boundaries “whether they are good or 
bad,” in First Summit of OAU, in 1964.  
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for declaration of virtual demarcation, which has further complicated the matter. Ethiopia 
regards EEBC’s virtual demarcation as a legal fiction that cannot resolve the conflict. Eritrea, 
on the contrary, views the border dispute was resolved, and demands Ethiopia to surrender the 
claimed territories. However, as the boundary line is not yet marked on the ground, the actual 
line of separation remains elusive. Borderland residents now pursue uncertain future, expecting 
a devastating war to erupt at any moment.  
  The other perplexing task that may vitiate the possibility of resolution of border dispute 
is the fact that it compounded by other issues that cannot be legally claimed. This means, there 
is high possibility for border issue to appear as a bargaining leverage. In the case of Ethiopia, 
and Eritrea, the government of Eritrea provoked boundary war after Ethiopia failed to accept 
Eritrea’s economic and investment requests that would enrich Eritrea at the expense of 
Ethiopia.  The boundary issue was not an immediate cause of the 1998 devastating war. Even 
the Eritrean government did not plan to cause a full pledged war. Eritrea, supposedly aimed to 
pressurize Ethiopia to negotiate economic and investment issues under threat of border issue, 
but Ethiopia took forceful occupation of Badme and its environs as invasion and formally 
declared war in lieu of sitting for negotiation. In some case, therefore, a mere attempt to 
resolve border conflict may not create a lasting peace and normalize relationship. Resolution of 
border dispute may demand settlement of other socio-economic issues that may activate 
unsettled border issues. Mere reliance on colonial boundary laws or policies may not be helpful 
to recreate brotherhood and normalize relationship. The arbitration award is not only difficult 
to implement, as it is tainted with unsolved side issues, but also it is unacceptable to the border 
residents. This calls for the need to search for another alternatives in order to avoid another 
destructive war and create peaceful in the region.  
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  The complications of Ethio-Eritrean boundary demarcation reveal deficiency of African 
border policy and calls for the urgent need to revision OAU’s policy of maintain colonial 
boundary as it was on the actual date of independence. In some cases, there is no clear drawn 
boundary line to maintain. In other case, it becomes hared to mark the point of separation in 
line with the term so colonial border treaty, as facts on the ground do not match with treaty 
wordings. Inadequacy of African colonial boundary system, thus, should be cured by urgent 
remedial action to avoid or mitigate border related conflicts in Africa.   
 
1.3.  Significance of the Study 
  The study attempts to show the fallacy and inefficacy of African boundary delineation 
laws and policies that is based on arbitrary and divisive colonial boundary setting rules. The 
study not only shades light how colonial boundary system has strained close relationship 
between Ethiopians and Eritrean, but suggests how to rebuild historic relationship and 
normalize relationship thereby enhance welfare of the two brotherly people.  Consequently, 
instead of relying on colonial boundary laws and policies, the study suggests the need to 
strengthen the ongoing venture of AUBP to redraw African boundary in a way acceptable to 
local people with a view to remove divisive colonial footprints from African borderlines.    
  The study appreciates historic justification for border creation, but suggests for change 
of border in way accommodating changed circumstances and needs of the new generation in 
this highly interconnected and interdependent global phenomenon. Removing border walls will 
allow free movement of people, good and services. The policy of removing border walls is not 
a new concept – it is being applied in Schengen Area of Europe. Given destructive effects of 
terrorism, mass immigration, sovereignty issue, and the need to safeguard the interest of 
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domestic people from overwhelming foreign labor forces, open border policy may appear 
unrealistic, but possible and will better enhance wellbeing of new generation.   
  After all, border system is not a natural phenomenon, but it is man’s creation that meant 
to safeguard the interest of certain group of people that termed as ‘insiders’ from incursion of 
outsider that viewed as “others”.  Nowadays, on account of globalization the classification as 
“insiders” and “others” has been steadily diminishing. Today, criminals in any corner of globe 
can perpetrate that act of crime stationed at far location bypassing strong border walls without 
being detected by border guards. Borders, in effect, fail to serve their traditional role – 
containing ‘others”. Moreover, “others’ may not necessarily be outsiders, but all bad people 
(cyber criminals, terrorists, illegal transactions and so forth). In the era of globalization, the 
best way to contain “others,” therefore, is not defining traditional borderlines nor erecting huge 
border walls, but building strong relationship and global cooperation and coordination among 
nations and nationalities is the best tools to control and contain “others.”  
  The study suggests African Union to further strength AUBP in its effort to delimit and 
demarcate elusive colonial border in a way acceptable to all in give and take basis. This is not 
to permanently separate Africans from their kinsmen, but a temporary solution to building 
lasting peace.  AUBP’s venture is a conflict prevention strategy. It is less expensive and not 
difficult to attain in comparison to costs that may be incurred in resolving actual dispute. The 
study proves that investment in AUBP will bear a good fruit to Africa in short and long run. 
The study adds some practical and theoretical underpinnings to the on going African Union 
Border Program in its effort to prevent potential disputes by drawing a clear boundary in Africa 
and build good neighborhood with the ultimate goal of changing African border from barriers 
to bridges.  
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   In the case of Eritrea and Ethiopia, border delineation is not a goal but itself, but it is 
an important step to create good neighborhood and normalize relationship to rebuild 
brotherhood.  The study shows that EEBC’s legalistic approach cannot help to attain the goal 
of normalization of relationship.  Ethiopia and Eritrea should sit together and reach at 
negotiated settlement. This will definitely help build cooperative spirit that will change borders 
from barriers to bridges. A borderline that serves, as bridge would allow free movement of 
people, goods and services while filtering and restraining “others.” 
 
1.4.  Methodology  
  As an applied research, which targets at resolving an actual social problem, the study is 
interdisciplinary in nature and legalistic in approach. The Study affords due regard not only to 
multiple geopolitical, anthropological, and sociological considerations, but also maintains, the 
traditional role of doctrinal legal research method in critical stages.  Accordingly, the Study 
assesses a range of global boundary setting norms, international law doctrines vis-à-vis 
boundary setting, some important decisions of international tribunals, pertinent resolutions of 
global and regional organizations, pertinent colonial treaties, international conventions, 
national boundary delimitation and demarcation rules, policies, practices, procedures, and 
boundary related dispute management systems. Steps taken to resolve the 1998 boundary 
conflicts between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and numerous arbitration attempts are given special 
attention. 
   The efficacy of current African border laws, policies, and institutional setup to manage 
recurrent and unending border conflicts that frequently claim human lives and economic 
resources is critically examined.    
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  The study considers publicly available data from official web pages of African Union, 
specifically AUBP, decisions of EEBC, ICJ, U.N and African states.  To authenticate the 
reliability and accuracy of data, the author has consulted a number of book, journals, (print and 
internet sources) both in international and African boundary making doctrines.  
1.5.  Coverage and Study Design 
  The study does not assess the entire African boundary conflict or conflict situation. It 
specifically addresses the Ethio-Eritrean boundary conflict as case study, which is not largely 
different from other African border conflicts that arise from colonial manipulations.  After 
making necessary adjustment to suit prevailing socio-economic and political situation, findings 
and suggestions posed to Ethiopia and Eritrea boundary conflict may be referred in effort to 
resolve other border related conflicts elsewhere in Africa.  
  With a view to address the anthropological root of boundary system in general, chapter 
two of the study briefly summarizes the creation of boundary system in general. Accordingly, 
Chapter two highlights the nature of boundary system in general. Boundary/Border is not a 
natural phenomenon but man’s creation. Man is responsible for its creation and alteration, and 
finally suffers, as a result of border conflicts. Modern state boundary system was born in 
Europe and exported to the rest of the world during colonization, or the idea was imported 
from Europe. The art of traditional system of bordering was developed and finally in the verge 
of demise/change by the process of debordering or rebordering.  The study of historical 
emergence, function and nature of boundary system in general in Europe appears vital to study 
African border and border related problem to get some help, and solve boundary issues.  
Chapter two attempts to show a brief overview of the significance of borders for peacekeeping 
and security, its historical emergence, its meaning and nature. The chapter thus supplies a 
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theoretical guide that would assist in illuminating how to manage the current border tension 
between Ethiopia and Eritrea and find out a lasting solution to avoid potentially looming 
conflict and thereby set a working norm for the rest of Africa. The current conflicting view 
regarding demise of border or change of its nature from barrier to bridge or point of contact is 
briefly mentioned. Chapter two is a mix of multidisciplinary concepts involving political 
geography, political science, sociology and international law.  
Chapter Three explores legal rules, principles and theories pertaining territorial or 
boundary delineation. A party invoking a right on territory or intending to set a boundary 
between two neighboring territories should prove title over the territory. Part I of this Chapter 
accordingly, briefly deals with the traditional modes of acquisition of title to territory and the 
prevailing legal rules or international authorities governing the determination of title to 
territory. In resolving territorial or boundary issue, especially when the boundary issue arise as 
a result of colonial boundary, the principle of uti possidetis is often invoked in international 
tribunals. With a view to assess the implications and application of the principle of uti 
possidetis to resolve African boundary conflict and in particular the current territorial and 
boundary conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, theoretical background and the current status 
of the principle of uti posssidetis in international law and it relevance to African boundaries is 
outlined. The principle of territorial integrity is another important principle of international law 
that African states often invoke to avoid separation and promote peaceful coo-existence.  
The application of territorial integrity norm, while keeping territorial integrity of a 
given state prohibits invasion and separation. The Principle appears conflicting with self-
determination and secession. This part assesses how to reconcile the apparent contradiction. 
Lastly the process and phases of international boundary making is briefly stated. This Part is 
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very essential as it directly addresses the processes and rules governing the actual boundary 
making.  International boundary making involves four important phases.  If all the phases are 
correctly and peacefully executed, aligning with local factors such as human and geographic 
factors, it is believed that the boundary will be acceptable and stable, thereby building 
international peace and security 
 Chapter Four summarizes African border regime.  It attempts to point out how 
colonialism disrupted African border development and planted its divisive rule that has 
separated families, ethnic groups and built a border wall that hampered rights of people, 
nations and nationalities to live with their kinsmen and use resources wherever it was available 
in accordance with African mores.  This Chapter pinpoints how the Pan African movement 
worked toward removing colonial boundary system and the end of revisionist movement after 
formation of OAU.  The revisionist movement that spearheaded by Pan Africanist, Kwame 
Nkrumah of Ghana had aggressively worked to redraw African boundaries with the ultimate 
goal of forming United States of Africa. The agenda of redrawing African boundaries was 
dismissed by the founding father of OAU. Though it is often mentioned that founding fathers 
of OAU have opted to respect colonial boundary setting rules and policies in fear of opening 
Pandora’s Box, the supposed fear was motivated by the desire of the founding Fathers not to 
lose territory or people therein.  Chapter four attempts to shows the problems of affording 
sanctity to the colonial boundary and suggests for redrawing African boundary with a view to 
create good neighborhood until the nature of borders changed from barriers to bridges thereby 
realizing the ongoing mission of AUBP. 
 Chapter Five explores the historic link between Ethiopia and Eritrea.  Ethiopians and 
Eritreans are basically one people. There is no basic difference between Tigrinya highlanders 
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of Eritrea, which is majority in Eritrea, and the people of Tigray region of Ethiopia. Both speak 
Tigrinya, are members of Orthodox Church, have common culture and intertwined by marriage 
and other cultural links. Eritrean Western Regions and low residents are Muslims and have 
their kinsmen on Ethiopian side too. That is why President Isias Afework, before outbreak of 
border war remarked, it was not possible to build a restraining wall between Ethiopia and 
Eritrea.51  But numerous socio-economic causes triggered sudden outbreak of the apparently 
border war in May 1998. 
 The last Chapter examines how the border war was flared up unexpectedly and 
subsequent consequences.  After eruption of border war numerous international and regional 
actors attempted to stop the war and convince both sides to the negotiation table but all efforts 
could not succeed. As a result, devastating war erupted in all direction that took lives tens of 
thousands from both sides. After Ethiopia regained all of its occupied territories, Eritrea 
declared its intention to accept OAU’s Framework Agreement.  Accordingly an agreement on 
Cease Fire and Cession of Hostilities was signed and an arbitration tribunal was constituted. 
Due to elusive nature of colonial treaties, the decision of arbitration tribunal remained 
unacceptable. The two brotherly nations are still locked up in unsolvable deadlock. Finally, 
research findings, conclusionary remarks are briefly summarized 
 
                                            
51 TEKESTE NEGASH & KJETIL TRONVOLL, BROTHERS AT WAR: MAKING SENSE OF THE 
ETRITREAN-ETHIOPIAN WAR, 10(2000). 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 The Creation and Nature of Boundary System 
 
2.1. The Significance and Implications of Boundary 
 
 
A sovereign power can exert its full authority within the bounds of a territory in which it can 
stretch its mighty hands to regulate, control and defend its subjects. Territoriality and sovereignty 
are closely associated concepts, as one can invoke all the effects of sovereignty within a defined 
(bounded) territory.1 Put differently, sovereignty can be exercised within a territorial space that is 
marked by a point or line called boundary.  Boundaries are outer edges of a territory within which a 
state can exercise exclusive power.2 Boundaries, therefore, are intrinsically linked to the space they 
split from the wider global space in which authority over things and people therein can be claimed. 
Thus, “ […] borders demarcate state’s sovereignty [which…] starts at its borders and ends at its 
borders.”3 Hence, every territorial state needs a defined boundary because, “[… it] is the beginning 
of every order and every thing.”4 
 
                                            
1  Stanley Waterman, Boundaries and the Changing World Political Order, in CLIVE  H. SCHOFIELD (ed), GLOBAL 
BOUNDAIRES, 1WORLD BOUNDARIES, 23(1994)., Sir Thomas Holdich, in his early 20th century notorious 
book, Political Frontiers and Boundary Making, remarks, “ The territorial limit, of any community state or 
nationality […] is usually a fair indication of the distance from the central seat of control that the arm of the law can 
reach.” (THOMS H. HOLDICH, POLITICAL FRONTIERS AND BOUNDARY MAKING, 31(1916)). According to 
Krukoski, “Territory is the surface, limited by boundaries over which the nation exerts its sovereignty.” See  William 
Krukoski, Frontiers and Boundaries (Jose Krukosi, trans.), http://info.lncc.br/artigoi.html. Last accessed 11/13/14. ) 
In very limited circumstances sovereignty can be claimed beyond territorial limit. According to Caporaso, “ States 
and Corporations attempt to extend their authority outside their own territory.”  (James A. Caporaso, Changes in the 
Westphalian Order:  Territory, Public Authority and Sovereignty, 2 INT’L STUD. REV. 6 (2000)).  
2 VICTOR PRESCOTT & GILLIAN D. TRIGGS, INTERNATIONAL FRONTIER AND BOUNDAIRES, LAW, 
POLITICS AND GEOGRAPHY, 140(2008). 
3 GBARIEL POPESCU, BORDERING AND ORDERING THE TWENTY –FIRST CENTURY, 14(2012). 
4 Ruben Zaiotti, Cultures of Border Control, PhD THESIS, DEP’T OF POL. SCIE. U. TRONTO (note 45) 44(2008), 
https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/.../Zaiotti_Ruben_200811_PhD_Thesis. (Last accessed 01/21/15). As Jennings 
state, “The defintion of statehood itself has the possession of a more or less defined territory as a necessary element.” 
See I.R.Y. JENNINGS, ACQISIITON OF TERRITORY IN LAW, 2(1963).  
 24 
As borders of national territory signal the limit of the scope of power, it is significant for the 
subjects and the sovereign power.5 After all, “ [b]order making is a power strategy that uses 
difference to assert control over space by inscribing difference in space.”6  This assumption has 
inspired border scholars to view a territory as a ‘bordered power-container’.7 Similarly, 
illuminating the nexus between boundary and authority, Richard Griggs, comments, “Just like 
smoke indicates fire, boundaries indicate power.”8  To Griggs, “ Boundaries could be defined as the 
very shape of power.” 9  Endorsing Griggs assertion, Donna and Wilson remark, “Borderlands are 
sites and symbols of power.”10  Prescott and Triggs, make almost an identical assertion pinpointing 
the interface of territorial boundary and sovereign competence.11 In contemporary sense, boundary 
is “ the firm and inherent attribute of [a] state.” 12  
On the same token, Ruben Zaiotti observes, “ Territoriality – the control of a defined surface 
of the globe - and sovereignty […] are two of the key principles defining the modern geopolitical 
vision.”13 A sovereign power is exclusively competent to declare compelling laws to regulate 
subjects within the limits of the territory, to enforce laws or adjudicate and punish lawbreakers 
exclusively. Needless to say, in normal course of things, a sovereign loses his/her might outside the 
bounds of a territory that he/she controls. This is because “ … sovereignty over land defines what 
                                            
5 Vladmir Kilossove & James Scott, Selected Conceptual Issues in Border Studies, BELGEO  5(2013), 
http://belgeo.revues.org/10532, accessed 02/11/15. 
6 Popescu, supra note 2 at 20.  
7 RUBEN ZAIOTTI, CULTURE OF BORDER CONTROL, 46 (2011).  
8 Richard A Griggs, Boundaries and War in Africa in 1995, I IBRU BOUNDARY & SECURITY BULLETIN 
77(1995). 
9 Id. 
10 DONNAN & WILSON, BORDER, FRONTIERS OF IDENTITY, NATION AND STATE, 1(1999), quoted in 
Andrei Cusco, From an imperial Borderland to a “European Frontier”, History, Politics and the Ambiguity of 
Belonging (The Case of Bessarabia/Moldova, 
www.geo.hunter.cuny.edu/courses/.../Frontiers%20and%20boundaries.p... (Accessed on 10/25/14). 
11 Prescott and Triggs, supra note 2.  
12 OSCE,  Applied Issues in International Land & Boundary Delimitation/Demarcation practices, A seminar Organized 
by the OSCE Borders Team I Cooperation with Lithuanian OSCE Chairmanship (31 May – 1 June 2011). 
http://www.osce.org/cpc/85263?download=true (accessed 03/28/15). 
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constitutes a state.”14  Thus, “Borders represent the very essence of statehood,” as a defined border, 
reveals the scope of authority of territorial state in the international system.15 
Boundaries or territorial limits of a given nations should, therefore, be unambiguously set. 
Delineation of an exact point of boundary is “[…] necessarily an outcome of determination of 
territorial sovereignty [… and….] typically defines the jurisdictional reach of the state. ”16 Thus, 
borders enlighten the beginning and end of control and power.   Consequently, “All political 
systems need some minimum definition of where the boundaries of authorities lie, and a mechanism 
for their maintenance and reproduction.”17 
Francis Ikone, in his brief article entitled, Africa’s international borders as potential sources 
of conflict and future threats to peace and security”, highlights the compulsory nature of defined 
boundary for effective function of a state as follows: 
In the modern state, well-defined borders are not only a key element of the definition of 
statehood…. Legitimate governmental objectives cannot be clarified or implemented unless the 
territory where such authority is to be exercised can be defined and understood. [….] While 
unconsolidated borders, combined with ineffective political institutions and incomplete 
nationalist projects, have been recipes for instability and conflict, the establishment of more or 
less stable borders has been identified as a precondition for the building of stable 
governments and states.18 
 
An obscure boundary limit obviously results in elusive territory, which in turn, generates confusion 
in the scope of sovereignty.  Residents of tenuous territory may defy orders of an ‘’ostensible 
sovereign’’ that may result in lawlessness and engender conflict. By implication, therefore, a 
defined territory is one of the indispensable elements constituting an effective State with a 
                                                                                                                                                 
13 Zaiotti, supra, note7 at 45. 
14 Briant Taylor Sumner, Territorial Disputes at the International Court of Justice 53 DUK. L. J. 1779 (2004). 
15 Zaiotti, supra note 7 at 2. 
16 Prescott &Triggs, Supra note 2.  
17 Zoiatti, supra, note 7 at 45. 
18 Francisco N. Ikome, Africa’s International Borders as Potential Sources of Conflict and Future Threats to Peace and 
Security ISS No. 233   2(2012). 
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sovereign organ that is conferred with irrefutable power over the subjects in the territory.19 Thus, 
international boundaries indicate the limits of territory at which “ … the arm of the law can reach or 
the jurisdiction of each state….”20 Sumner accordingly remarks, “ The benefit of having territory [ 
is …] great [as long as ] state borders are clear, because a state’s boundaries must be well defined 
for the modern state to function.”21 A territory may be assumed clearly defined when its borderlines 
are undoubtedly marked and largely uncontested.22  
A defined territory enables the sovereign to discharge its traditional functions of maintaining 
peace and security efficiently.  The State, thus, can deploy its border guards to defend the territory 
and safeguard its citizens from foreign aggression within the limits of its territory. Moreover, a 
clearly set borderline affords the sense of security by discouraging unauthorized intrusion into the 
territory thereby enhancing stability. In medieval times, boundaries served, as checkpoints to 
scrutinize illegal exist and unauthorized entry. Some medieval cities built boundary walls that had 
limited gates in which only those permitted could get access. The gates also served as a check point 
for regulating exit out of the city.   In case of unauthorized border crossing a clearly set border 
enables subjects in the secured border to take protective measures including use of force.  
                                            
19 As stated in Montevideo Convention, among other things, a state as a person of international law, should possess a 
defined territory. (MONTEVIDEO CONVENTION ON RIGHT AND DUTY OF STATES Art. 1 (1933). In some 
cases the “territoriality” element of statehood may be blurred when two or more organs claim territory; however this 
does not mean a contested territory has no sovereign at all. The Arab – Israel territorial conflict can be taken a good 
example.  According to Professor Philip Jessup, despite Arab claims, Israel has satisfied “doctrinal elements of 
statehood as early 1948.”; See also WILLIAM R. SLOMANSON, FUNDAMENTAL PERSPECTIVES ON 
INTERNATINAL LAW 56(4th ed.: 2003). 
20 A.O.CUKWURAH, THE SETTLEMTN OF BOUNARIES DISPUTES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 9(1967). 
21 Briant Taylor Sumner, supra note 14. 
22 This does not, however. mean every inch of borderline must be precisely delineated, nor uncontested. It rather means 
there should be a basic territory with the possibility of clear delineation. See North Sea Continental Shelf Case ( 
Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany v. Netherlands) I.C.J. Reports 132 Para 46 
(1969). At the formative stage of Israel, even today, most of the boundaries of Israel are not well settled as 
neighboring countries contested the limits of Israel territory, but the State of Israel was formed and admitted to the 
membership of UN. Similarly, “Albania was recognized by a number of sates in spite of a lock of settled frontiers.” 
For the purposes of formation of a state the law simply requires “.. a reasonably stable political community and this 
must be in control of a certain area. “ see JAMES CRAWFORD, (ed.), BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC 
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In this regard, historically, boundary wall had served defensive functions as “foreign 
interlopers [within a defined boundary] move at their peril.” 23  In the modern era, international law 
authorizes states to take actions against any actual or provocative measures that may threaten the 
security of a territory.24  Self-defense can be exerted against actions of another power if the 
provocative act targets people, property or territorial integrity of the defender. A claimant of self-
defense, therefore, should prove that it launched the act of self-defense to prevent aggression within 
the bounds of its territory. For instance, in our case study, Eritrea sent armed personnel to the area 
that was administered by Ethiopia and resided by Ethiopians who have been residing in the 
contested areas for centuries. The unauthorized intrusion of armed men provoked the conflict. 
Ethiopia considered the unauthorized incursion as aggression, but neither Boundary Commission 
nor the Security Council, apart from EECC clearly designated the Eritrean act as aggression. 
Ethiopia’s initial use of force appears to meet the definition of self-defense. (For details see Chapter 
Six page 293ff). 
Territorial boundary is man’s creation, but its sanctity is well accepted in several versions of 
the Bible. It is assumed a curse to mess a boundary limit either by destroying boundary marks or 
illegal expansion of one’s limit of land. The Book of Deuteronomy states, “Though shalt not 
remove thy neighbour’s landmark, which they of old time have set in thine inheritance, which thou 
shalt inherit in the land that the LORD thy God giveth thee to possess it.”25 
Samuel Finer attempts to reveal mental state of an ideal man vis-à-vis defined territory and 
boundary setting in state formation.  Finer makes a powerful illustration stating,  “ Tell a man today 
                                                                                                                                                 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 128 -129(8th ed.: 2012). Thus, for existence of a state fully uncontested, frontiers is not a 
requirement though it is important for effective function of sovereign power. 
23 Prescott & Triggs, supra, note 2 at 139. 
24 UN Charter Art. 2 (4). 
25 Deuteronomy Xix, HOLY BIBLE, NIV (2011). 
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to go and build a state; and he will try to establish a definite and defensible territorial boundary and 
compel those who live inside it to obey him.’’26 
According to Douglas Johnston “…political boundaries are a psychological necessity even 
in the absence of a direct military intrusion into a group’s living space.”27  Sense of security and 
stability not only makes governance easier, but also it is pivotal for maintaining global peace and 
security thereby enhance wellbeing of everyone. Diener and Hagen highlight the nature of boundary 
as follows: “We live in a very bordered world.  The daily news is filled with controversies 
concerning the political, cultural, and economic borders that crisscross the Earth’s 
surface.”28[Emphasis mine]. The learned authors further remark, “ Borders are central features in 
current international disputes relating to security, migration, trade and natural resources.” 29 
A defined boundary also offers subjects with the autonomy and home feeling. 
Belongingness is a natural character of human being.  A tribe or an ethnic group normally trusts its 
fellow group member and strives to maintain intimacy in a territory that is not freely and easily 
available to a stranger. This natural character of human being builds some kind of inherently rooted, 
but hidden boundary line or encourages construction of notoriously visible boundary.30 Douglas 
confirms this attitude of human being suggesting, “boundaries are essential to human autonomy 
because they serve to institutionalize our separateness from others, even our closest neighbors.”31  
Similarly, Diener and Hagen remark, “ Territoriality […] serves as a social mechanism […] 
deriving the process of defining what is ‘ours’, in opposition to what is ‘theirs’.” To them, “ By 
                                            
26 Samuel E. Finer, State building, state boundaries, and border control, SOCIAL SCIE. INFO. 13 (4-5) 9 - 126(1974),  
http://ssi.sagepub.com/content/13/4-5/79.extract , last accessed on 12/29/14. 
27 DOUGLAS JOHNSONT, THE THEARY AND HISTORY OF OCIAN BOUNDARY – MAKING 12(1988). 
28 ALEXANDER C. DIENER & JOSHUA HAGEN, BORDERS: A VERY SHORT INTROUDCTION, 1(2012). 
29  Id. 
30 David Newman, The Lines that Continue to Separate us: borders in our borderless world, 30 PROGRESS IN 
HUMAN GEOGRAPHY 147, 143 -161 (2006). http://phg.sagepub.com/content/30/2/143 (Accessed: 4/11/16 ). 
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demarcating and defending territory, groups control specific spaces and resources in an effort to 
regulate extraterritorial practices, such as entry and exit, and intraterritorial practices, such as social 
hierarchies and governance.”32  
To Janique Dubois the expression “territoriality” encompasses broader connotation, which is 
more than a literal meaning of the term, holding emotional or symbolic value. Emotional 
significance of territoriality appears valid to assert the significance of territories having no current 
apparent economic importance.  For example, desserts (barren lands) currently may have no, or 
lesser economic value but embodies stronger emotional implications, which may even supersede 
economic considerations. Thus, to Dubois territoriality is a concept linked with “ […] property, 
boundary and jurisdiction. 33 In the words of Dubois: 
 […territoriality] does not simply refer to national borders or lines on a map. Rather, it 
expresses a relationship between land, people and identity [….] Territoriality is characterized 
as a process through which places are created to “satisfy both the material requirements of life 
and the emotional requirements of belonging – of placing oneself both in time and space”. A 
relational understanding of territory takes into account the symbolic as well as the functional 
roles [that] geographical areas encompass.34 
 
Emotional and symbolic significance of a territory makes border related conflicts hard to 
resolve. Ruben Zaiotti, rightly remarks, “ […] borders are powerful symbols of identity and 
historical continuity, both for the state as institution and for the peoples they contain.”35The Ethio – 
Eritrea border conflict best explains the emotional implications of economically insignificant land.  
Commenting on Ethio-Eritrea war, the Economist cited a quotation,“ Two bald men fighting over a 
                                                                                                                                                 
31 Douglas supra, note 27 at 12. 
32 Diener & Hagen supra note 28 at 6. 
33 Janique Dubois, Beyond Territory: Revisiting the Normative Justification of Self-Government in Theory and 
Practice. THE INT’L INDIGENOUS POLICY J. 2(2) (2011). http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol2/iss2/1 
(Accessed: 9/29/14). 
34 Id. 
35 Zaiotti, supra note 7 at 2.    According to Paasi, bounded territorial space identifies people and serves as their 
historical symbol. See, Anssi Paasi, The Changing Discourses on Political Boundaries – Mapping the Backgrounds 
Contexts and Contents, in HENK VAN HOUTUM, et al (eds.) BORDERING/ ORDERING SPACE, BORDER 
REGION SERIES. 20 (2005). 
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comb”.36 [Emphasis mine]. The expression portrays an idea that the two countries were fighting for 
a trifling barren land, which in economic terms does not justify for the expensive and destructive 
war. But to the people of Ethiopia and Eritrea the disputed village, Badme, was more than a 
‘comb”.  Badme never been under Eritrean control and no Eritrean regarded it as part of Eritrea 
territory, apart from the current Eritrean government.  Ethiopians used to live in the village of 
Badme from the time immemorial. Residents of Badme never heard about the elusive treaty that 
was concluded in Addis Ababa between Emperor Minilik II and Italian colonial power.  Eritrea on 
the other hand claims Badme has been Eritrean land since colonial treaty of 1902 in accordance 
with the Cairo Resolution of OAU, which  is akin to doctrine of uti possidetis juris Spanish Latin 
America.   
For both nations the dispute over Badme appears more than a simple border issue. It involves 
the question of supremacy and has renewed the old ethnic issue. Northern Ethiopian region, Tigray 
and Eritrea, are power rivalries and often battle for superiority. Eritreans consider them superior to 
to Tigray people though both speak the same language, almost the same culture and religion. Thus, 
it appears the battle for supremacy, which entails emotional consideration, supersedes economic 
and human cost that the war has consumed. On top of this, residents of Badme consider the disputed 
border as expression of identity. They have been living in the vicinity for centuries peacefully. If 
Badme is surrendered, residents should leave their village and resettle in Ethiopia or Eritrea, 
depending upon their choice, which is not simple to decide. 
In some cases, border issue demands the need to balance competing interests with a view to 
maintain peace and stability.  In geographic terms some authors view this internal and external 
                                            
36 The Economist, in June 11th 1998 issue labels the border war as “ Two bald men fighting over a comb.” The 
Economist further sums,  “Both Ethiopia and Eritrea  are, … two poorest countries in the world …[but fought]… 
for a few square miles of barren mountain where a few thousand souls barely scratch a living. The whole border is 
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pressure as “centrifugal and centripetal forces”. In the words of Douglas,  “ … a state is dependent 
for its survival on the preservation of a balance between centrifugal and centripetal forces....”37 
Subjects of a sovereign state pressurize the government to safeguard their interest against 
competing external forces and maintain social and cultural wellbeing while non-subjects compete 
for resources and opportunities that are necessary for survival.  As Diener and Hagen, rightly 
remark, “ … social groups instinctively seek territorial control to secure resources necessary for 
survival. This suggests humans are subject to perpetual ‘survival of the fittest’ and deny access to 
competing groups.”38 
  The border between United States and Mexico is a good illustration to demonstrate the 
internal and external pressure on the government. Border issue, in United States, is not uncommon, 
especially in election seasons.  During presidential campaign, Governor Perry of Texas said:  “This 
violence will not stand [….] If Washington won’t stand to secure the border, as the governor of Texas, I 
will.”39(Emphasis added). The enactment of numerous immigration legislations, law enforcement 
institutions, and customs and border protection efforts exhibit the government’s battle to maintain 
balance between exterior and interior forces. 
  When the scope of limit of boundary is contested the pressure on the government is so 
intense as both internal and external forces rationalize their resentment on economic, social and 
cultural grounds. Though there is no active governmental boundary related conflict between 
Ethiopia and Sudan, border residents on Ethiopian side often protest against the Ethiopian 
government asserting the government negotiated to surrender a portion of Ethiopian farm land. 
                                                                                                                                                 
now a battle zone, and the two countries are war footing.”  See http://www.economist.com/node/134580 
(Accessed: 10/17/14). 
37 Douglas, supra note 27 at 13. 
38  Diener & Hagen, supra note 28 at 5. 
39 Aman Bethlja, THE TEXAS TRIBUNE, August 8, 2014, http://www.texastribune.org/2014/08/08/speech-perry-
vows-secure-border-spread-red-state-p/  (Accessed:  02/11/15). 
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Sudanese farmers on the other hand exert armed conflict against Ethiopian farmers claiming that the 
land belonged to them. There is an elusive colonial treaty that was never applied on the ground (not 
demarcated). The two governments have established a boundary commission and have been 
working to settle the issue amicably, but border residents of both countries are not satisfied by what 
their respective governments have been doing.40 
Boundary related issue is an old one, but it is still a “disease” that never been “treated well 
and cured” to the extent of banishment. Human being, in history, has experienced numerous 
destructive border motivated wars but all efforts could not end it.  Causality of border war appears 
out number victims of fatal diseases or natural catastrophe. Scientists often succeed in finding 
vaccine for killer diseases. Today, the world is safe from some of the old time devastating diseases 
and the race to invent medicine for fatal diseases like Ebola, HIV and cancer is so high. Huge 
campaign is being made to eradicate those killer diseases.   But since the emergence of human 
boundary, human being has been suffering, but no effective solution was devised to safeguard 
victims of border conflict.  In some cases, destructive effects of border wars supersede effects of 
HIV or cancer. Violent border conflicts destroy thousands of lives in short span of time. For 
instance, in two years border war (1998 – 2000), Ethiopia and Eritrea lost about 100, 000 lives.41 
Since World War II human being experienced numerous border conflicts, and embroiled by 
destructive wars.  Vast number of nations is still in confrontation and huge military personnel and 
killer machines are ready to release hot fire on the crowd of borderland people. Border related 
conflicts are very sensitive and often end up in armed confrontation.  
                                                                                                                                                 
 
40 See Tisepiso Mncina, Sudan border demarcation causes Ethiopia Unease, http://www.afrol.com/articles/28964 Accessed on 
10/19/14 
41 Kevin Hamilton, Beyond the Border War: The Ethio-Eritrean Conflict and International Mediation Efforts, 11 J. 
PUB. & INT’L AFFAIRS- PRINCETON 119, 113 – 136 ((2000) 
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Most, if not all, medieval international or intergovernmental wars had the issue of territory 
one way or another. Boundary conflict was common in primitive communities, as rulers often 
wished to have more territory and people as manifestation of power.  In present state boundary 
conflicts appear never ending, unless national and international agencies honestly work with full 
determination to end it by defining borders or changing the nature of borders from barriers to 
bridges rather than lines of separation. Christianity supports sanctity of borders but it has no binding 
effects and powerful nations often disregard Deuteronomy 27:17, which proclaims: “Cursed be he 
that removed his neighbors landmark.” (Deuteronomy 27:17).  Though the validity may be disputed 
at present, the expression, “ Good fence makes good neighbors (Robert Frost, Mending Wall),” 
appears still valid.   
Recurrent African territorial violation does not imply that medieval Africa did not have 
territorial boundary at all.  Though elusive and in some cases difficult to précises locate, as it was 
not drawn in modern senses, medieval Africa had its own indigenous kind of territorial boundary. 
Every tribe or ethnic groups had their own land with known boundaries that they could exclude 
others. Though there was no map or clearly defined frontier, in modern sense, each tribe, ethnic 
group, nations and nationalities had their own land with known boundary which was marked by 
natural features of land like mountain, in most cases rivers, lakes or forests. Ethiopia, for instance, 
has several nations and nationalities that currently constitute one political entity. The territorial 
limits of borderland tribes or ethnic groups that make up Ethiopia considered as Ethiopian 
boundary.  
In ancient times, it was not uncommon to build border fences of city-states. Though not 
affording the traditional function of excluding “other”, the Harar city border wall in Ethiopia is still 
alive.  The city of Harar was fenced with 5 gates that serve now as one of the tourist attraction sites. 
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In other areas, though the periphery not fenced like the City of Harar, there was boundary known to 
the local people. Unfenced borders were crossable in belief that God has created passage. Border 
residents, though they were aware of the facts that they crossed a boundary line and entered into the 
land of someone else only in merely exercising their right of passage. This was based on the belief 
that God has created lines even in human body (lines in human body in which blood transported). 
Thus, everyone had unlimited access unless expressly prohibited or fenced to restrict the access.   
In this increasingly globalized contemporary world, territoriality and boundary may appear a 
shrinking or obsolete phenomenon, but facts on the ground and emerging global security concern 
demand construction of strong barriers and dictate for firm vigilance and scrutiny in all borders of 
contact. Thus, in the era of globalization too, borders may be used as protective tools against threat 
of security and unauthorized immigration, which may have adverse impact in keeping peace and 
security. In the words of Gabriel Popescu, 
Recently borders have been taken on heightened significance in an era of globalization. They 
are central to the profound changes globalization in generating in the way people and 
societies relate to space at the outset of the twenty first century. If during the early 1990s 
globalization pressures on state borders led some to envision the emergence of a borderless 
world (debordering). By early 2000s it became clear that borders were retaining their 
significance albeit under new appearances (rebordering). Despite unprecedented opening up 
to various globalization flows, borders are far from fading away.42  
 
Borders are also significant for smooth working of globalization by filtering undesired 
actors and facilitating free movement of “good” people, goods and services or the actuality of a new 
type of border that can enhance friendship, and contribute for building lasting peace and security. 
Global economic inter-dependence will effectively work in friendship atmosphere where peace 
prevails over conflict. It may appear awkward to talk about the significance of border while 
working for its destruction. Border related disputes are extremely potent to generate armed 
conformation, and hence it is almost impossible to deborder unless friendship atmosphere prevails 
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by delineating mutually acceptable border lines and build good fences that can create good 
neighborhood. Global peace and security smoothens interdependence and would facilitate the 
emergence of truly borderless world. According to Prescott and Triggs, “Boundaries are the line of 
physical contact between states and provide opportunities for cooperation and risks of discord. 
“43The old maxim “ Good Fences Make Good Neighbor”, really works to establish a smooth 
relationship and mutual co-existence which is vital for building sustainable friendship and 
ultimately transform boundaries from barriers to bridges for peaceful interaction and integration. 
2.2. The Origin and Nature of Boundary 
 
2.2.1. How boundary system was created? 
All human beings are “created free”, and endowed with a full liberty on earth.44 As 
prescribed in the Sacred Books, God conferred men with utmost freedom to freely move anywhere 
and enjoy almost all the fruits of earth.45  Thomas Holdich, in his seminal book entitled, Political 
Frontiers and Boundary Making remarks, “ Nature knows no boundary lines.” 46 Similarly, Gabriel 
Popescu, acclaims, “Nature does not offer compelling rationales to justify the creation of borders 
between places.”47 An African boundary researcher, Cukwurah paraphrases this view stating, 
                                                                                                                                                 
42 Popescu supra, note 3 at 23. 
43 Prescott & Triggs, supra  note 3 at 5. 
44 In Christianity, the ideal truth is everyone has got freedom to decide his/her destiny though it is not advisable to 
pursue a root that ultimately would end up in hell. Christians believe that God gave human being the freedom to 
pursue their way in direction they think good, including bypassing God’s laws. The violator, however, is expected to 
harvest fruits of his/her free actions (Galatians 6: 7 – 10 ).  As stated in the Deuteronomy 30:19 “Man” has utmost 
freedom to choose life or death, heaven or hell or blessing or cursing.  According to Tanveer Hussain, The Quran also 
stipulates almost an identical point on Man’s free will.  “ The Quran says, “ Do whatever you will; there is absolutely 
no compulsion in the Deen” Tanveer Hussain, The Quran, Determinism and Free will, 
http://www.academia.edu/902712/The_Quran_Determinism_and_Free_Will, (Accessed 7/30/14). 
45 Take, for instance, the case of nomads who moved and lived in any part when needed. To them, the earth and assets it 
hold belonged to human being in common and when needed anyone could use it. Nomads assume unlimited freedom 
of movement irrespective of man-made barriers. This character of nomads is also visible even in the modern world. 
Ethiopian nomads, for example, often bypass the international boundary between Ethiopia and Kenya. Following 
pastureland and water nomads travel irrespective of national or international boundary. They often class with law 
enforcement agencies or permanent settlers. 
46 THOMAS H. HOLICH, POLITICAL FRONTIERS AND BOUNDARY MAKING 2(1916). 
47 Popescu, supra, note 3 at 20. 
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“Nature Abhors Boundaries.”48  Cukwurah further suggests, “ On the whole, human factors were 
primarily responsible for the creation of […] boundaries and for their variance [….]”49 It is true that 
human being has crafted boundaries with a view to exclude “other”; frequently ventured to alter it 
with the motive to expand territorial limits. Needless to say, the battle for territorial expansion often 
causes animosity and tension among neighboring nations.  
Naturally, thus, there was no limit or barrier that meant to impede movement. According to 
Diener and Hagen, medieval people, “[…] lived within small brands of nomadic foragers known as 
hunter-gatherers whose migration [was…] patterned by changing seasons and environmental 
conditions that affected availability of food and other resources.”50 Hence, ancient people freely 
moved anywhere they wished provided they earth could accommodate they by supplying things to 
eat and offering conducive climate.51   
This absolute freedom, presumably, encouraged nomadic way of life, which is still apparent 
in some societies.52 Nomads often disregard boundaries, like birds and natural beasts. In search for 
better way of life and abundant resources for themselves and their cattle, nomads unless impended 
by topography or other man-made hurdles, often move, ignoring boundaries.53  As protective 
measure against attack by wild beasts ancient people moved in small groups for “hunting, fishing, 
                                            
48 Cukwurah, supra, note 20 at 12. 
49 Id. at 14. 
50 Diener & Hagen, supra, note 28 at 19. 
51 Omar Abubakar Bakhashab, The Legal Concept of International Boundary, 9 JKAU 34 (1996).  
52 According to a study conducted by African Development Bank, today nomads constitute 6% of African population 
and can be found in 20 African countries.  See http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001405/140562e.pdf last 
accessed 7/28/14.   Today there are about Tens of million of nomads globally. Africa, Middle East, South West and  
Central Asia houses millions of nomads.  See also Saverio Kratli, Education Provision to Nomadic Pastoralists Dec. 
2000),  http://www.uni-oldenburg.de/zef/cde/OMDE%20Fall%202003/Technology/Nomads/Kraetli.doc. (Accessed 
7/28/14).  
53 Bakhashab, supra, note 51; Ancient movement of people may be analogized with present migration of birds or other 
wild animals. Birds freely migrate depending on the weather condition and availability of minimum requirement of 
life. Though present wild beast have some kind of restriction, they migrate if the place they situated is not secure or in 
search of water and food.  Nature created man to enjoy full freedom but it man or mans action that brought 
limitations.  
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pasture and simple tillage in their earliest form.”54 The choice of route for migration was not a 
predetermined one.   Migrating people simply avoided natural barriers like mountains, lakes, huge 
rivers, unmanageable thick forests, dangerous wild beasts, and moved until they got food for 
themselves or greener pasture for their cattle.55  If the nomads or migrants by chance landed at an 
area that had been already occupied by another group, the new comers and the original settlers 
clash. The winner expelled the looser and strengthened its ownership of the land and resources on it 
and set its own boundary.  As there was no binding rule yet, self-help was the only way of 
protecting ones interest. Social Darwinism best explains how a stronger fitted to a situation and a 
weaker wiped out.  
The unimpeded movement was curtailed by the emergence of powerful groups that 
effectively safeguarded their private land holding and its resources. This has discouraged frequent 
migration, and hunting steadily replaced by agriculture. This has facilitated the emergence of 
private property.56 Private land holding coupled with human civilization necessitated imposition of 
certain limits on the freedom of movement. John Lock’s assertion of origin and rationale for private 
property appears to confirm this fact.57   Locke justifies personal nature of property in his notorious 
philosophy called Labor Theory.  He asserts, “ Though the Earth [… is ] common to all Men, yet 
every Man has a property in his own Person. This no Body has any Right to but himself.”58 
[Emphasis added]. Thus, involvement of one’s labor either by occupying master-less land and 
                                            
54 Cukwurah, supra note 20 at 13. 
55 Id. 
56 Regarding the exact point of emergence of private property there is divergence of idea.  See Scott A. Beaulier and 
David L. Prychitko,  Disagreement over the emergence of private property rights:  alternative meanings, alternative 
explanations (2006),  http://www.gmu.edu/depts/rae/archives/VOL19_1_2006/3-Beaulier_Prychitko.pdf (Accessed 
7/28/14). 
57 John Lock confirms communal property nature of earth.  To Lock, “ God gave the world to men in common.”  (John 
Lock, Two Treatise on Government §25 (1821). http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch16s3.html. 
See also STANDARD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/property/ 
(Accessed 7/28/14).  
58 Id.    
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resources on it, or improvements on the land or its resources rendered fruits of labor personal, and 
no one could claim it, other than the person who had invested his labor. The restriction that was 
imposed as a result of one’s personal belonging (private property) has, supposedly, created 
borderline that cannot be freely crossed by an unauthorized person.  Accordingly Lock concludes:  
“The Labour of [.. man’s] body, and the Work of his Hands, we may say properly his. 
Whatsoever, then he removes out of the State that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath 
Mixed his Labour with , and joyned to it something that is his own, add thereby makes it his 
Property.  It being by him removed from the common state Nature placed it in, it hath by this 
labour something annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other men.”59 (Emphasis 
added). 
 
 It is true that the emergence of private property by itself cannot curtail ordinary movement 
of people but it has evidently restricted free enjoyment of resources that the earth offers. Thus, a 
person who invested his labor either by occupying a master-less property or improved it could 
deprive a stranger to use the resources already occupied or improved.  Excluding others by setting 
limits is one of the important consequences of ownership, which makes unwelcomed intrusion 
trespass.60  
According to Diener and Hagen, ancient societies, though lived in a nomadic way of life, 
had territory that they claimed “theirs”.61 They kept moving back and forth and periodically vacated 
a given spot, but this did not mean abandonment. In the words of Diener and Hagen:  
 “[… ] pre-historic humans possessed surprisingly elaborate territorial arrangement. Rather 
than wandering aimlessly, hunter-gatherer groups likely operated within relatively stable 
local regional foraging ranges or what might best described as networks of foraging sites.  
These networks were shaped by extended kinship or alliance relationships, religious beliefs, 
and ecological conditions.” 62 
 
Hunter-gatherer groups had invested labor and considerable energy in clearing forests and 
paving ways for the effective utilization of natural resources. Even if they knew that they would 
                                            
59 Id.  
60 Needless to say, an Unauthorized crossing of the line hoodwinks ownership and illegal. The owner can enforce 
his/her ownership right either using law enforcement agencies, if any, or take self-help measures.  
61 Diener & Hagen, supra note 28 at 19. 
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move from the spot, depending on the situation, pre-modern men had endeavored to make life 
relatively confortable and deserved protection against trespassers. This plausibly accords with 
Locke’s Labor Theory, and thus, the law should safeguard fruits of their labor by setting boundaries 
to avoid or restrict unauthorized intrusion.  
Boundary system starts at individual landholding and goes to national political boundary.63 
The first kind of boundary is the one that separates neighbors, be it, individual or community.  As 
quoted by Krukoski, Castillos Goycochea  observes:  
The first boundary was traced on the ground by the first being that understood his position in 
face of his neighbor's. From individual property it passed to the collective sovereignty, i.e. to 
the household, from the household to the city, from the city to the province, and from the 
province to the country. Everything has limits, lanes, fences, walls or some other designation 
that defines the characteristics of the material possessions, of some being, be that a man 
or a social entity.64 
 
Territorial limits of medieval societies had been very porous and often difficult to locate. 
Moreover, boundaries were set on the basis of sufficiency of resources, and subjectively on need 
basis or on condition of inhospitality of a territory or a given region or obstacles that make border 
crossing impossible or difficult such as rivers, mountains and deserts.65 Even though an exact limit 
of a boundary may not be easily noticed, it is undeniable fact that pre-modern societies had 
territories that exclusively belonged to the society in common in which any member moved freely. 
Strangers were not allowed to collect fruits from privately held territories, advance permission from 
the group.  It is rightly remarked:  
Although it is tempting to think of ancient hunter – gatherers groups as nonterritorial since 
clear borders seem absent among their modern  - day counterparts, these early group most 
likely featured complex strategies for regulating membership, territory, and resources that 
intermingled notion of exclusively and reciprocity contingent upon animists religious 
practices, kinship customs, and resources availability. 66 
                                                                                                                                                 
62 Id. at 1. 
63 Oscar J. Martinez, The Dynamics of Border Interaction, in Clive H. Schofield (ed). WORLD BOUNDRIES: 
1GLOBAL BOUNDARIES, 7, 1– 14 (1994). 
64 William R. M. Krukoski, Frontiers and Boundary,  http://info.lncc.br/artigoi.html (Accessed 11/13/14).  
65 Id. 
66 Diener & Hagen, supra note 28 at 21. 
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For the purposes of exclusive use of fruits of the territory some ancient societies had exerted 
efforts to demarcate their territories by investing “  […] considerable energy in claiming and 
maintaining exclusive access to specific hunting and foraging areas.”67 Though not free from doubt 
and lacked precision, medieval societies had used various mechanisms signaling limits of their 
boundary and protected their territorial limit. For instance: 
… the Tsimshian, coast Salish, and many other groups in North America Pacific Northwest 
developed intricate social systems focusing on ownership of and access to resources sites. 
Although punishment for trespassers could be sever, property-owning lineages were expected 
to share their bounty through ritual celebrations. The Veddah peoples of Sri Lanka also 
marked and rigorously safeguarded specific territories. Each band was expected to be self-
sufficient within its own hunting areas, and trespassing was strictly prohibited in nearly all 
circumstances.  In areas lacking an obvious natural features, the Veddahs would carve 
symbols into tree trunks to mark the border. 68 
 
As pointed out elsewhere, some ancient societies, had shared resources of their territories on 
reciprocity basis. 69 To this group of pre-modern people, friendly aliens could enter into their 
territories and gather fruits provided they get permission form the group who claim the territory. 
Members of the group could freely gather fruits in their territory without the need to seek 
permission.  Members had option to gather resource and use privately or share it with the 
community. There was a system of private ownership of the fruits gathered though the territory 
belonged to the group.   
The practice of delineating territorial limits (boundary) by using landmarks had originated in 
medieval times. The landmark need not be a given point but a kind of zonal area that was 
inhabitable or could not be used due to natural inconveniences. For instance, “ Aboriginal ranges 
                                            
67  As pointed out by Diener and Hagen, the Veddahs carved symbols into tree trunks to mark the border. See Diener & 
Hagen, supra, note 28 at 20. 
68 Id. 
69 The Kung bands of Southern Africa and Aboriginal groups in Australia shared resources with adjacent kinship 
provided they sought permission and on the basis of reciprocity. Id.  
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were bordered by buffer areas, which were used infrequently and apparently not claimed by any 
group. “70 
To sum up, medieval form of boundary setting was different from a kind of boundary that a 
modern man can fairly imagine. Pre-modern societies “ … tended to conceive of these things and 
arrange social and political space in ways that differ from contemporary ideals and expectations.”71  
The restrictive borders served as “… a means to assign things to a particular spaces and regulate 
access into and /or out of specific areas.  This innately social and political process links to the idea 
of ownership or rightful and permanent possession of land.”72  In the contemporary sense territorial 
limit of ancient men appears ambiguous and prone to conflict. Personal or communal land 
boundaries were not precisely set. This however, does entail absence of boundary. Ancient societies 
knew territories belonged to them though strangers could not easily notice a precise location of the 
boundary. Moreover boundary setting was subjective as a private person or community unilaterally 
decided limits of their holding on the basis of sufficiency of resources that the territory could afford 
or on condition of sheer distance or ability of the person or tribal group to safeguard the territory. 
2.3. Terminology and Basic Concepts 
2.3.1. Boundary, Border and Frontier:  Distinct or Similar? 
Words express idea and belief in concise form. Cognizance of an exact meaning of a term, 
hence, is vital to appreciate an underlying phenomenon. The terms boundary, border, and frontier 
often appear synonymous, even though they are not identical in all senses. Though the dictionary 
meaning of the terms is not similar, repeated use of the terms interchangeably has made the 
distinction “invisible.”73 Synonymous use of terms, which are in fact not identical in all features, 
                                            
70 Diener & Hagen, supra, note 28 at 21. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 6. 
73 Prescott & Triggs, supra, note 2 at 11. 
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causes confusion and compounds the complication to already hostile environment in which 
contesting parties vigorously fight to make use of all possibilities for the purpose of playing a zero 
sum game.  
The meaning afforded to the terms has been changing from time to time depending upon 
their significance. Francis Ikome attests this view stating, “Like many other social science concepts, 
the notion of boundary or border has historically shifted in definition.”74 Understanding of the terms 
and their socio-political significance and changing nature appears vital to fully address problems 
having some kind of nexus to boundary.   
In this part we will briefly examine the nature and distinction, if any, and similarity between 
the words boundary, border and frontier. Ultimately, we will explore the importance of boundary in 
virtually “borderless world.”   
In the technology age, where distance has become immaterial, boundary wall may appear 
obsolete. Consequently it may seem pointless to explore meaning of words like boundary, border 
and frontier. However, the growing religious fanatic group and the resultant 9/11 terrorist attack and 
the web of immigration demanding safe haven and the need to curb unauthorized border crossing 
has necessitated building new fences and allocation of huge budget for border guarding. The issue 
of border and bordering has been important more than ever. More ever, an exact territorial limit of 
most former colonies of Africa is not well settled and some parts of Africa has been experiencing 
border tension. Colonial treaties and border delineation accords that express the terms boundary, 
border or frontier are still applicable and may be presented to prove limits of contested territory.  
                                            
74 Ikome, Supra, note 18.  According to Michele Comelli et al, “ The Concept of borders has a long history in the social 
sciences, having been analyzed though historical, socio-economic, anthropological and political lenses.” (Michele 
Comelli, et al.  From Boundary to Borderland: Transforming the Meaning of Borders through the European 
Neighborhood Policy. 12 EURO. FOREIGN AFF. REV.  204 (2007).  
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Ascertaining ambiguities of the terms, therefore, is helpful to find an amicable solution to border 
issues.   
  Andrei Cusco portrays terminological perplexities regarding the notion of boundary and 
related terms as follows:  
The conceptual difficulties and terminological confusion reigning within the field of “border 
studies” are notorious. [….The expressions] borders,” “boundaries” and “frontiers” are often 
interpreted as nothing more than equivalent designations of limits between states that, 
though they may convey certain symbolically charged messages, are essentially legal and 
jurisdictional linear markers of the extent of a state’s territory. Though scholarly debate has 
generally added useful discriminations and nuances to this undifferentiated “common 
usage,” the picture is by no means clear in all cases.75 
 
Gabriel Popescu notes similarity between the notion of boundary and related terms, apart 
from taking the words “boundary” and “border” simply to mean territorial lines of division.76  This 
supports Prescott and Triggs who further remark,  “The term boundary, frontier and border are 
often used as synonyms in conversation, in newspapers reports and in television and radio 
broadcasts.”77 
In addition to the terminological confusion and ever changing meaning vis-à-vis variable 
social system, the notion of boundary and related terms had served diverse functions78 According to 
Diener and Hagen, medieval people like nomadic bands, city-states, and empire had varied beliefs 
and practice in organizing boundary.79  The learned authors lucidly put, “ Given differing 
economic, cultural, political, and environmental contexts, it should not be surprising that groups in 
                                            
75Cusco, supra, note 10. 
76 Gabriel Popescu, Encyclopedia of Geography, http://knowledge.sagepub.com/view/geography/n115.xml   (Accessed: 
10/25/14). 
77 Prescott and Triggs supra note 2 at 11. The following excerpt was taken from an online dictionary which purports to 
define the terms boundary, border and frontier but appears not helpful to distinguish the terms as follows: 
“…Boundary, in reference to a country, city, state, territory”…. Occasionally, it also refers to a physical feature that 
marks the agreed upon line separating two political units…Border is more often used than boundary in direct 
references to a political dividing line; it may also refer to the region (of, for instance, a country) adjoining the actual 
line of demarcation… Frontier …denote or describe the portion a country adjoining its border with another 
country….” (Webster’s College Dictionary, (Random House Inc. 2010), 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/boundary   Accessed: 11/20/14 
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different parts of the world and in different times [have] developed varied approaches to territory, 
borders, and governance’’80 In the medieval period control aspect of boundary walls as was the 
main motivating factor to restrain movement of people, as labor was very crucial at the time. As 
Diener and Hagen put, “.. ancient governments were more focused on controlling the movement of 
people than controlling actual territory since labor supply was the key factor….”81 At a time where 
periodic war with neighboring states had been common, and killer machines were not invented, 
fighters with their arrow were pivotal. Hence, controlling human movement was critical rather than 
territorial guarding.  Labor supply was also extremely needed for agriculture that was done 
absolutely with human labor. As a result, walled borders served as important tools for exit and 
access control. Diener and Hagen, remark that this assumption explains why ancient states, 
“generally satisfied with the relatively vague borders.”82 
Nowadays, the distinction between the terms boundary and frontier is not debatable.  Clear 
distinction between the terms was gradually developed in 19th and 20th century.83  Experts in the 
field progressively identified the difference between “boundaries and frontiers by distinguishing 
between a linear and a spatial concept, shifting from place to process and in the meaning and 
                                                                                                                                                 
78 See Ikone, supra note 18 at 2. 
79 Prescott & Triggs, supra, note 2 at 35. 
80 Id.  
81 Id.  
82 Diener & Hagen, supra note 28 at 35.   Prescott also remarks, “ Many states tried to mark their frontier in some way.  
The Great Wall of China served not only to exclude nomadic barbarians, but also to restrict the number of Chinese 
who adopted a modified agricultural system that made them are difficult to control from the Chinese Capital…” 
Romans built Walls in order to exclude barbarians. (Prescott & Triggs, supra note 2 at 33). The barbarians north of 
the Roman wall also built earth works to delimit the edge of their territory.  Similarly, walls and ditches formed the 
first or last line of a system of defense in depth. The counterparts of the Chinese and Roman walls could be found in 
part of Africa in 19th century.  The practice of digging ditches in traditional Ethiopian chiefs was common. The 
Wolaita Kingdom dag ditch delineating its territory adjacent to Hadya and Sidama land. The borderline, however, 
was not kept.  As a result of continuous clash with Hadya people the Kingdom of Wolayta further went beyond the 
limits of the initial ditch.  As pointed out by Victor Prescott , the Beiber gives the dimensions of the ditches as 6 
meters in width and 3 meters in depth; The ditch dag by the Kingdom of Kaffa was used to safeguard the Kingdom 
against Oromo attack. Prescott & Triggs, supra, note 2 at 33. 
83 Cusco, supra note 10 at n(3). 
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surmised that the terms boundary and frontier are not synonymous.84  In the following Section we 
will briefly explore meaning and nature of the terms and concepts. 
    
 2.3.2.   Boundary:  Meaning, Nature and Scope 
In traditional sense, the notion of “boundary” meant a point of limit that one’s freedom of 
movement may be restricted with a view to safeguard property or other interests of another person 
or group of persons. The interest holder may use restraining signals (either artificial or natural) to 
preclude an unauthorized intrusion. Conventionally, thus, the term ‘boundary’ connotes, “ […] 
Imaginary or real lines that divide two pieces of land from one another [….] ”85 It is “a line that 
marks limit of an area.”86   
Eminent English international lawyer, Brownlie describes the notion of “boundary” in its 
functional approach.  To Brownlie boundary is “ an alignment, a line described in words, in treaty 
and/or shown on a map or chart, and/or marked on the ground by physical indicators.” 87 Brownlie’s 
approach appears precise and relatively modern style that reveals an operational meaning of the 
term ‘’boundary’’.  This definition also underpins the processes of making boundary. Black’s Law 
Dictionary, defines the term boundary as, “ …every separation, natural or artificial which marks the 
confines or line of division of two contiguous estates, [in which] trees or hedges may be planted, 
ditches may be dug, walls or closures may be erected, to serve as boundaries.”88 This definition 
appears to connote the term “boundary” as a line of division of a private property. This line of 
connotation of the term “boundary’ is not absolutely wrong but confines its contours only to private 
land boundary. In international Law sense, the notion of boundary is more than a line separating 
                                            
84 Prescott & Triggs supra, note 2. 
85 Francisco N. Ikome.  Africa’s International Borders as Potential Sources of Conflict and Future Threats to Peace 
and Security.  233 INST. SEC. STUD. 2(2012). 
86  Oxford Dictionary, www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/…/boundary last accessed 9/25/14; Prescott and Triggs, supra 
note 2 at 12 
87 IAN BROWNLIE, AFRICAN BOUNDRIES – A LEGAL AND DIPPLOMATIC ENCYCLOPEDEA 3 (1979). 
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private property.   
According to Brownie, a boundary line may be “ […] established by law, treaty, or accord 
or practice that marks the limit of a political unit’s territory.”89   An ordinary legislative act may 
create a boundary between two or more political entities. For instance, most state boundaries in 
Ethiopia were created by legislative enactments that were passed by the Ethiopian parliament.90  
Treaty is the most usual method of creating international boundary.  An exact beginning and end of 
two adjacent territories often described in the treaty. Some colonial era treaties, however, lack 
precision as the parties may not actually know the limits of spot described in the treaty and facts 
included in the treaty may no sharply congruent with the actual fact on the ground. Moreover, the 
balance of power between negotiating parties may not match and a weak party either coerced or 
consented to an unfavorable terms as a result of some form of vices. A vitiated consent renders the 
validity and enforceability of the treaty questionable.  Ethio-Italian boundary treaties explain how 
the then Ethiopian tribal chief was ignorant of all the facts while consenting to unfavorable terms of 
three treaties that never been demarcated or known to the border people for centuries.  Though 
vague and need supplementary agreement or map, three boundary treats were signed between 
Ethiopia and Italy with regard to Ethiopia and Eritrean boundary. Still now, it is very difficult to 
implement the treaties as the terms of the treaties did not coincide with physical features of the area 
described in the treaty, and if implemented could divide families and ethnic groups.  Similarly a 
number of treaties were signed between Ethiopia and Great Britain that were meant to delineate 
Kenyan and Sudanese boundary.  Setting boundary by the instrumentality of treaties is the most 
                                                                                                                                                 
88 HENRY CAMPBELL, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 147 ( 2nd ed. 1910). 
89 Hunter College, City University of New York,  Frontiers and Boundaries, (A Power point present (slide show) 
(2011), http://www.geo.hunter.cuny.edu/courses/geog334/Frontiers%20and%20boundaries.pdf (Accessed on 
01/27/15) 
90  Proclamation No. 7/ 1992, Negarit Gazeta 51st year, NO 2 ( Addis Ababa: Transitional Government of Ethiopia, 
1992), a Proclamation to provide for the Establishment of National Regional Self –Government, has formed the 
current Ethiopian regional states and their boundaries.  
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common and amicable form boundary making.   
Boundary line may also be determined by an accord until two or more contesting organs 
sign a legally binding treaty. An accord is a result of preliminary negotiation by an executive organ 
to stop a prevailing atrocity until a final action is taken. It is just a simple agreement that may or 
may not reach to the status of a treaty. Treaty, on the other hand, is a legally binding document that 
needs ratification in accordance with the law of two political organs.91  In the medieval period 
nations had followed some kind of practice in setting boundary line. The most usual method was 
applying natural features of land to designate the end of territory.  Rivers, mountains, march lands, 
forest are the most usual ways of setting boundary line.  
To sum up, the notion of boundary implies limits or confinement beyond which one cannot 
freely pass.  It may be the end of national territory or the last point of private land. The expression, 
‘boundary’ may also connote the limit beyond which another phenomenon commences.  
Nowadays, the term “boundary” assumed to hold a wider connotation including national and 
international aspects encompassing all the processes, institutions, and resources that may be 
categorized as border.  
To mark boundary, manmade restraining schemes, such as boundary wall, or natural 
barriers, like mountains, rivers, lakes, deserts, forests or even big recognizable trees, may be used. 
Ancient forms of boundary making practices are still applied in some societies in Africa. For 
instance, some indigenous communities in Ethiopia, plant trees to mark land boundaries. The 
practice of planting tree that can easily grow on the agree boundary point and cannot dry even in 
                                            
91  For instance, Camp David Accord was entered between Israel and Egypt to end atrocities in 1978 and in 1979 a 
legally binding treaty was signed between two countries. See ENCYCLOPEDEA BRITANNICA, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/91061/Camp-David-Accords     (Accessed 9/29/14).  
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dry season is a common practice in the Southern Ethiopia.92  Use of natural barriers as sign of ones 
private holding or limits of territory of a given tribe is also so common.  
The most common form of natural barrier are: river, mountain, lake, ocean, desert any other 
point, including big rocks that can be clearly referred and cannot be easily avoided with a view to 
usurp ones private holding. Before 1920s zones or areas with some sort of width were taken as 
boundary. Natural zones that are used to delineate limits of territorial holding are known as 
marchlands.  A desert or large area covering forest, desert, huge hills or mountains were used as 
sign denoting ones limit of territory 
2.3.3. Border 
  The terms “boundary” and “border” often viewed synonymous and not easy to distinguish, 
if not impossible at all. Nowadays, the ongoing trend is to use the terms interchangeably.93 
However, some argue that the contour of two notions is not absolutely congruent stating, the notion 
of “boundary” means a geometric line that separates two or more bounded territories while the term 
“border” denotes borderland, which includes border regions.94  A borderland is a geographic area in 
close proximity to state border consisting all lands even hold by private person, ethnic, tribal groups 
                                            
92 For example, in Wolayta region of Ethiopia farmers plant a special kind of tree called “ Maxua”.  The basic purpose 
of this tree is separating two neighboring land. It is a normally taken as Maxua was planted by two neighboring 
residents. People of Wolayta never cut or do any thing on this plant if it was planted in the middle of two adjacent 
land. It is assumed as a curse to misplace or avoid it unless both neighboring residents agree.   
93  Gabriel Popescu in his lucidly research book entitled, “Bordering and Ordering the Twenty – first century: 
Understanding borders”, uses the word “border” to mean boundary. Similarly, Comelli, et al tend to equate the term 
“ border” with the notion of “boundary” when resident of two bounded territory are really separated and not 
cooperative or inter dependent. (See Popescu supra note 3) As a result, Comelli et al tend to define the term border 
in two senses as follows: “The border can be merely an area of division and demarcation or alternatively of contact, 
exchange and integration.” If the states of neighboring territories have smooth and cooperative relationship and 
subjects of both states easily cross line of separation, borders are regarded as points of contact where the line of 
separation simply serves as barrier, then the nature of border changes into boundary. Thus, the learned authors apply 
the term “border” in the sense of boundary or in the sense of borderland, which is point of contract.  See  Comelli et 
al, supra note 74. 94 Prescott & Triggs, supra, note 2 at 12. 
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or even by regions or state that situated near the boundary.95  It appears thus imperative to cognize 
an exact meaning of critically important words to address border related issues. Are the terms 
“border” and “boundary” really synonymous, or do they possess some distinguishable features that 
may be taken vital? For the purpose of clarity and with a view to accurately perceive idea 
represented by the words, sufficient assessment of, possibly, an exact meaning appears vital. 
The International Boundary Commission (IBC) of Canada and United States Boundary 
Commission remarks the illusiveness of distinction between border and boundary as follows:  “The 
border is a boundary, and a boundary is a quirky entity. Like an entity out of Flatland, it only exists 
in two dimensions - it has length and height, but no width.” 96  [Emphasis added].   It is true that a 
border is an area or a spot proximate to the dividing line (the boundary), but that may not 
necessarily mean the two notions are synonymous. Stephen Okhonminia, expresses the notion of 
border as “ […] external [lines] of states which have legal significance [.…]”97 This assertion is not 
helpful to distinguish the term “border” from the notion of “boundary”, as boundary also may be 
taken as an external line having legal effects.  
So what is an actual perceivable distinction between the terms border and boundary?  If the 
two terms are one and the same, why we have these two nebulous words? As has been pointed out 
above, the International Border Commission of Canada and United States takes border as boundary 
stating, “ The border is a boundary…”98 This gives us an impression that the two terms are similar. 
If border is a boundary, then boundary is also border.  
                                            
95 Stephen Okhonminia, shares this view stating, “ Borders refer to external borders of states which have legal 
significance…”  See Stephen Okhonminia, States without Borders: Westphalia, Territoriality under Threat, 24  J. 
SOC. SCIE.177  (2010). See also Popescu supra note 3 at 20. 
96 Peter Sullivan et al, The Canada-United States boundary : The next century,  Available at: 
http://www.internationalboundarycommission.org/docs/ibc-2009-01-eng.pdf  (Accessed: 01/15/15). 
97  Okhominia, supra, note 95. 
98 Sullivan et al supra note 96.  
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On the other hand, close reading of some of the literature in the field affords an impression 
of disparity between the terms “border” and “boundary”.  Though Comelli et al explicitly define the 
term “border” in two sense depending upon the nature of relationship between the neighboring 
states, the distinction between boundary and border can be imagined. To Comelli et al, a boundary 
is a line of separation that serves as barrier. This kind of border delineation is practiced when border 
crossing is not easy. When the limits of two bounded territories serve as point of contact and free 
movement of people is unrestricted, it take the form of border. That is why Comelli et al suggest 
transforming EU’s border from boundary to borderland.99  The expression “borderland” is not an 
independent citatory but it is a “gray” area between the two bounded territories, which is more than 
a line of separation.100  The expression, “… EU’s border from boundary to borderland” thus 
suggests the quest to transform lines or points that separate EU member States from barrier to 
points of contact. While the former is a boundary in traditional sense, the later is border or 
borderland.  In a way holding both meanings, Comelli et al, regard the term “border” as, “[…] an 
area of division and demarcation or alternatively of contact, exchange and integration.”101 Henk 
Van Houtum makes almost an identical observation as follows: 
 …the balance in the present boundary/border studies, is now leaning towards border studies. 
More precisely, boundary studies (where the border is) and border studies (how the border is 
socially constructed) have in fact grown apart, have become detached from each other to 
become separate subfields [….] There is hardly, and much to my regret, any overlap between 
the two sub- fields anymore.102 
 
  Though Houtum, uses the terms boundary/border at the same time, suggesting for change of 
boundaries studies to border studies which points varied meaning of the terms. Houton further 
                                            
99 Comelli et al, supra note 74 at 204. 
100 The idea of borderland can easily be perceived after dealing with the meaning of frontier. Michele Comelli et al 
regard the line of separation as boundary or frontier in traditional sense. To Michele and Comelli et al the nature of 
border will be changed from boundary or frontier to borderland. This makes the meaning of boundary and border 
distinct because boundary can disappear but border will not as its nature will be changed to borderland. 
101 Comelli et al supra, note 74. 
102   Henk Van Houtum,  The Geopolitics of Borders and Boundaries, 10 GEOPOLITICS 674(2005). 
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remarks that the term ‘border’, “ … has now understood as a verb in the sense of bordering.”103  
Houtum discloses anthropological distinction between the terms boundary and border stating, 
“…boundary generally means the social spatially constructed differences between cultures/ 
categories and a border generally stands for a line demarcated in space.”104 Thus, anthropological 
sense of the terms “boundary” and “border” is utterly different from political senses.  
According to Prescott and Triggs, the expression, “border” or “borderland” denote, “ […] 
zones of indeterminate width that form the outermost pars of a country, that are bounded on one 
side by the national boundary.”105 The learned authors had ventured to find out meaning of the 
terms provided by Lapradelle who called zones that are regarded as border or borderland as le 
voisinage which means neighborhood, vicinity, nearness, neighbors.106 Lapradelle also applies the 
terms le territoire limitrophe which means “neighboring or bordering area.” 107 In this conception 
the term border does not necessarily mean an area of land or a point dividing neighboring territories 
but an area near the dividing line (boundary).  Supposedly, a bordering area is a territory that 
belongs to the neighboring states – not an area separating neighboring territories. Thus, both or all 
the neighboring territories have their own bordering land, which definitely belongs to them. 
To political geographers and experts in the field of border sociology, the terms “boundary” 
and “border” are distinct.108 The former connotes a line separating two or more territories, while the 
latter is a gray area adjoining the boundary.  In other words, a border is a borderland near the 
boundary line. For example, an area of land that belongs to United States and controlled by the 
                                            
103 Id 
104  See Id at n (4)  
105 Id 
106 Id. 
107 Id 
108 Ladis K. D. Kristof, The Nature of Frontiers and Boundaries, 49:3 ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN 
GEOGRAPHERS  269, 269 - 282(1959). 
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United States border guards is a United States border or borderland as it is situated near to the 
United States boundary line that may or may not be fenced.  
Finally, Professor Pratt, Director of Research, International Boundaries Research Unit, 
Durham University, makes a vivid distinguishing points stating: 
‘Boundary’ is usually used in reference to the line which divides the territory or maritime 
space of two State, while a ‘border’ is what has to be crossed in order to enter a state. 
Sometimes they coincide exactly, but it is more common for the border to include 
infrastructure such as immigration checkpoint, customs facilities fencing and patrol roads 
which extend beyond the boundary; and in the case of international air-and seaport, the 
border may be located hundred of kilometers from the boundary. A boundary is essentially a 
line of definition while a border is usually a more complex entity comprising several lines 
and /or zones, whose primary function is the regulation of movement of people and goods.109  
 
According to Professor Pratt, thus, a border is a broad term sometimes comprises of 
boundary, zones, infrastructure that may be used to regulate movement of goods and person from a 
given state into another. Where there is no entrance, checkpoint, bridge or barrier of some kind, or a 
station of border guards, the border is a boundary.   Thus, it is possible to distinguish the two terms, 
“ border” and “boundary”, but in practice, the distinction is immaterial as both of the terms used 
interchangeably in most authorities and there is no clear binding stance.  In this work, therefore, 
unless otherwise, clearly stated, the expression, “border” may be taken to mean “boundary”.   
 
2.3.4. Frontier 
An unlimited area of land that has served as boundary is termed as frontier.  When a frontier 
was taken as boundary, an exact point of separation of neighboring nations or nationalities were 
tenuous. Though it may be possible to know the location and direction of nations or nationalities 
that were divided by a zone called frontier, in the contemporary sense, locating an exact point of 
                                            
109   Martin Pratt, Defining International Boundaries: Concepts, Aims, and Approaches, Applied Issues In International 
Land Boundary Delimitation/Demarcation Practices, A Seminar Paper Organized by the OSCE Borders Team in 
Cooperation with the Lithuanian OSCE Chairmanship, 31 May  - 1 June 8(2011). 
http://www.osce.org/cpc/85263?download=true accessed 02/19/15. 
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separation is a perplexing task. Confusion regarding the limits of ones possession has been source 
of conflict, flared up destructive war. Is there any actual and perceivable distinction between the 
notions of border, boundary and frontier? 
In common usage it is not unusual to connote the term, “frontier” to the expressions 
“boundary or border.”110 Andrei Cusco remarks, “ As is the case with other similar concepts […] 
‘border,’ ‘boundaries’ and ‘frontier’ are often interpreted as nothing more than equivalent 
designations of limits between states [….] ”111  One of the early boundary theorist, Friedrick Ratzel 
rejects,  “[… ] the wisdom of drawing a sharp distinction between a linear boundary and a border 
zone or frontier.”112 To Ratzel, a territory can be grouped into three zones: outer, middle and inner 
zones.113 He regards the outer and middle zones as frontiers.114  
Nowadays it is almost universally accepted (at least by political geographers and 
international lawyers) that the term “frontier” is undoubtedly distinct from the notions of, “border” 
or “boundary”.115 Prescott and Triggs remark, “ A boundary is a line while a frontier and a border 
are different kinds of areas.”116 Thus, it is not hard to discern the exact nature of “frontier” and its 
distinction from the two interrelated terms: “border” and “boundary”. While boundary is a line, 
border and frontiers are an area of land that separates two territories.  
The practice of using “frontier”, as a region in between two territories or states was vanished 
in early 20th century117, but even after origination of the notion of “boundary” – which is a line 
dividing two territories – the term “frontier” was conceived synonymous to the term “boundary”.118  
                                            
110 Ladis K. D. Kristof, supra note 108.  
111 Cusco, supra note 10. 
112 Johnston, supra note 27 at 292. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
115  Cusco  supra note 10. 
116 Prescott & Triggs, supra, note 2 at 12 
117 Id. at 1. 
118 Johnston, supra note 27 at 3. 
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Only in 1920s a clear distinction between the two expressions was settled.119  Today, “the linear 
nature of a boundary and zonal character of a frontier “ is almost universally accepted.120  Holdich 
strongly warns against alternate use of the terms “boundary” and “frontier” stating, “ There is no 
excuse for geographers who use the term “frontier” and “boundary” as synonymous.”121 The term 
boundary refers to a line that sharply divides territories, while frontier is more than a point or a 
line.122 Deborah Popper remarks, a frontier as an “outer part of a territory”.123  It is true that a 
frontier is a region beyond one’s territory, but the expression, “outer part of a territory by itself does 
not explain the exact nature of the term frontier.  
A region or a zone that may be termed as “frontier” may take several forms. It may be a 
natural barrier having some sort of space and situated in the middle of two disjointed territories. 
The region or zone my have occurred naturally without deliberate action of two or more 
neighboring States but simply chosen by the States as a limit of their territory. A frontier, thus, may 
be any “unfavorable environment, deserts, heavy dissected uplands, thick tropical rain forests and 
the like.”124  
Literally, the term frontier suggests what is in the front. Kristoff views the notion of frontier 
as “an area which was part of a whole […] area of which was ahead of the hinterland.” 125 Kristof 
further remarks that a frontier “[…] often called the foreland or borderland, or march.” 126  
According to Kristof a frontier is an outer-oriented part of a territory.127 In this assumption, a 
frontier is an area of land having width and depth and situated in between two neighboring 
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120 Id. 
121 Holdich, supra note 46 at 23. 
122 Cukwurah, supra note 20 at 11. 
123 Deborah E. Popper, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GEOGRAPHY,  
http://knowledge.sagepub.com/view/geography/n115.xml  (Accessed 10/25/14). 
124 Prescott & Triggs, supra, note 2 at 27. 
125 Ladis K. D. Kristof, supra note 108. 
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territories having their own political authority.  In short, a frontier is a zone or a region separating 
two states.  
A frontier was, technically, a no man’s land (terra nullius) and it was a territory frequented 
by bandits who fled strong arms of governments.128  It was, supposedly, an area of land that may 
not be contested or claimed by anyone of the neighboring states.  In medieval times, for various 
reasons, a region between two or more nations, tribes or ethnic groups could be terra nullius. The 
most usual reason was inhospitality of the region for human habitation. Medieval people generally 
opt out an area or a region if it was a desert with harsh weather condition that could not be 
endured.129 It could also be a region fairly dangerous or impossible to get access or make use of it. 
Thus, it could be a mountain, lake, or even a thick forest that was considered difficult to make use 
of it or hard to walk through it. Any unclaimed region (whatever the reason may be), supposedly, 
regarded as a mark to designate an end of one’s territory or a beginning of another territory. A 
clearly visible, but unclaimed region, had been chosen by states, tribal, ethnic or national groups to 
signal separation of territorial holding.130 
Being free from human habitation and government control, a frontier had served as a hiding 
place for lawbreakers and rebels.  As a result, neighboring States commonly negotiated to patrol 
and expel unauthorized habitation to safeguard their common interest. Though frequent patrol may 
be conducted in accordance with the terms of negotiation, the region did not formally belong to 
anyone of the states, nor it was a common territory. 
                                                                                                                                                 
127 Id. at 271.  
128 Prescott and Triggs observe, “ … frontiers were not controlled by either side.  They provided refuges for outlaws. 
The frontiers might have been patrolled on a irregular roster to ensure that no forces were using them to build camps 
from which attacks could be launched.” (Prescott & Triggs, supra, note 2 at 12.  
129 In absence of a technology that can help to overcome harsh weather condition, it appears a right decision to choose 
simply a moderate region. On top of this, it was not hard to find out a suitable region at a time where few people 
possess vast area of land. 
130Bakhashab, supra note 51. 
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The other perplexity with regard to the term “frontier” is its double meaning. The term 
“frontier’’ may also connote a separating zone of settled and unsettled regions of a territory.131 
Settlement frontier may be further divided into primary and secondary.132 According to Prescott and 
Triggs, “ Primary settlement frontiers exist where a state is taking possession of its territory for the 
first time.”133 It is a frontier “that represents the zonal limit of political authority.”134 It separated the 
territory that the state has acquired from indigenous people and controlled by the political authority. 
In secondary settlement frontier sense there could be multiple frontiers in a given state or nation. 
Zonal nature of frontier, however, makes both senses common. 
 A political frontier is a region or zone that separates two independent states. This is a region 
that is situated between two neighboring countries. Lord Curzon identifies political frontiers on the 
basis of their function. The term, “frontier” in both senses (in the sense of political frontier and 
settlement frontier) is understood to mean a zone or region that physically separates two different or 
assumedly different territories.135 Simply put, the nature and function of settlement frontiers and 
political frontiers is almost identical – separating varied space. The obvious difference is the fact 
that settlement frontiers separate villages or settlement regions while political frontiers divide two 
or more states.136  
Some city states, empires or national states had exerted efforts to mark their frontiers by 
erecting huge walls, in most spots surrounding their territories. The famous Chinese and Roman 
                                            
131 Prescott & Triggs, supra, note 2 at 23. 
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133 Id. The learned authors illustrate primary settlement frontier as the westward expansion of American Sovereignty 
through its territory in North America.  Secondary settlement frontier separates settled and uninhabited regions of 
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134 Id at 25. 
135 Cusco, supra note 10 at 2. 
136 Detailed discussion on settlement frontiers is outside the scope of this study, which primarily ventures with issues 
involving international boundary.  
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walls were some of the notorious testimonies.137 The Harrar city wall of Ethiopia is a live 
illustration.  
When time goes on the function of frontiers changed from frontiers of separation to frontiers 
of contact.138 If frontiers were set, as a result, of threat of aggression, the end of threat would 
change the purpose of the frontier; and hence, the separation aspect of frontier changes into point of 
contact. Contact may be explained in terms of trade relationship between the people of two 
territories bounded by the frontier. The frontier may serve as site of tourism or cultural exchange 
point.  
Frontiers may also be designed for the sole purpose of military defense.  In this case, a 
certain area of land that is suitable for defense may be used for constructing watchtowers and 
warning signals and inhibited by frontiersmen.  For example, “ The German Kingdom was 
protected from the Slavs and Magyars by a series of marches stretching from the Baltic Sea to the 
Adriatic Sea.”139 The two contending states may also create a frontier by agreement. The states may 
create either buffer states or simply buffer zones. A buffer state is an independent political entity 
situated in between the competing states. In this case a third nation whose boundary is accepted by 
both of the states as end of their territorial holding. This was practically possible during the era of 
colonization. For example, Britain and Russia agreed to take an Afghanistan territory as a buffer 
state that two states overstretch their hands for more territories.  Some colonial powers devised 
another form of frontier called neutral zone. The function of neutral zone was almost identical to 
the buffer state. It is simply a territory or zone that set by two or more states for the purpose of 
avoiding dispute. Neutral zone is not terra nullius, it is a commonly held territory, and may be 
                                            
137 Prescott & Triggs, supra, note 2 at 33. 
138 Id. at 34. 
139 Id at 36. According to Prescott and Triggs, “ One of the most enduring marches in Europe was created in 1578. After 
the defeat of the Magyer army by Turkey at the battle of Mohacz in 1526 the Turks controlled most of the 
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partitioned after the purpose is met or no more security threat.140 Buffer zones (be it a buffer state or 
a neutral zone) was a temporary solution to potential threat to peace and stability. 
To sum up, a frontier is not simply a line or a point of separation of territories but it is a 
zone or a region having width and length of its own and commonly practiced centuries ago.141  
Border delineation through “frontier” was so common in the medieval times where it was not 
possible to locate an exact point or to draw a clear line of separation of two neighboring states.  
Natural zones that are noticeable and can easily signal limits of territory were served as frontiers.  
Uncertainty regarding an exact of limits of a frontier and the need for more land for 
increasing population, coupled with human civilization that enabled use of previously inhospitable 
region, caused conflict among bordering States.  On top of this the yearning for greater power 
increased the demand for larger territory, as the wider the territory, the greater the scope of power 
of the sovereign. As Prescott and Triggs confirm this assertion stating, “ The general impression is 
that as states separated by frontiers extend their territory, the unclaimed land diminishes.” 
Eventually property disputes [arose]….”142 The drive for more territory, supposedly, had 
encouraged powerful nations to wage war against neighboring state, and frontiers served as war 
fronts or starting points for territorial expansion. This has, presumably called for frequent territorial 
disputes. Lord Curzon’s notorious statement that has been widely cited in most border related 
literature illustrates the sensitive nature of frontiers. In the words of Lord Curzon, “Frontiers are 
indeed the razor’s edge on which hang suspended the modern issues of war and peace.”143 
[Emphasize mine]. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Hungarian plain…. As a defense against the Turks Ferdinand of Austria created a march called the Militaargrenze 
(Military Frontier)” 
140  For example, in 1965 and 1973 Kuwait and Saudi Arabia partitioned their former joint neutral zone on land. The 
resources of the former neutral zone and the marine areas attached to that zone were owned in common. Id. at 37. 
141 Prescott & Triggs, supra, note 2 at 1. 
142 Id. at 34 
143  Id at 5 n (7)  
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A successive attempt to settle the ever-mounting dispute has necessitated the emergence of 
delimited boundary with a clearly set and noticeable boundary marks.144 Moreover, the emerging 
technological innovation has enabled man to cope with unfavorable environment, be it harsh 
weather or impenetrable forest to turn an area into “heaven on earth, which in turn outdated the 
potency of secondary settlement frontier.145  
 
2.4. Creation of International Boundary 
 
2.4.1.  Brief Overview of Emergence of Borders in the Medieval World 
As attempted to pinpoint elsewhere, the origin of boundary system goes back to the moment 
at which private landholding was began,146 but international boundary was a later advent. Medieval 
societies lacked national or international boundary, as there was no government or State.147 Life 
was so simple and properties were owned either privately or communally.  
The territory of a given tribe or community was simply a set of territories held by 
individuals and ethnic groups. It appears, therefore, safe to suppose that the beginning and the end 
of territory of ethnic members was territorial limit (boundary) of tribes constituting the group. 
When ethnic groups join together (either voluntarily for collective defense or forcefully annexed to 
the powerful ethnic group) and form a national state that had jurisdiction over all the groups, then 
                                            
144 Id at 34 . In most cases frontiers normally diminish and turn into point of contact instead of point of separation but at 
least one situation of frontier ended up with expansion. It occurred in Hashtadan on the borderland of Afghanistan 
and Persia, southwest of the great northward bend of the Hari Rud of Koshan.  
145 Prescott and Triggs point enormous situations in which technological innovation assisted to turn harsh regions into 
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but the invention of drilling machines facilitated use of underground water. Similarly the Mallee scrub region of 
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cleared and became good farmland for wheat.  Prescott & Triggs, supra, note 2 at 28. 
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147 Mark W. Zacher, The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the Use of Force, 55 INT’L 
ORG. 216, 215 – 250 (2001). 
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national boundary was created. The emergence of nation states has necessitated the emergence of 
international boundary, which sets a limit in between two or more nation states. Bakhashab 
confirms this conception stating, “… early history of boundaries [reveals…] prescriptive limits of 
various units and these units were unified into national states with known boundaries or transferred 
by treaty as units from state to state.“148  Tough there is no consensus regarding an exact cause and 
a definite time of the emergence of modern state system, it is largely believed that a centralized 
state system was appeared in late middle ages.149  
The shifting of hunter-gatherers into farming and permanent settlement demanded leaders 
who are responsible for the overall governance and security of the medieval people that used to live 
in group. Productivity and the emerging civilization had enhanced military power of chiefs and 
kingships that turned hunter-gathers system into city-states relatively with certain territorial limits. “ 
A city-state is a sovereign polity encompassing a relatively small area consisting of an urban core 
and surrounding farmland.”150  
The advancement of agricultural output and the progress in the military capability had 
enabled stronger city-states to conquer and annex the weaker ones in search for more territory or for 
collecting taxes. Therefore, the greater the territory of a state, it was assumed that the wealthier the 
sovereign. The practice of acquisition of territory by conquer had continued until 19th and early 20th 
century as one of the norms of international law and one of the foreign policies of Europeans.151  As 
a result, territorial war was a common phenomenon.152 Moreover, sovereignty over a territory had 
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150 Id at 22. 
151 This was the period in which most African nations were colonized by the European Super powers in accordance with 
the terms of negotiated at the Berlin Conference 1884.  
152 Zacher supra note 147 at 217. 
 61 
been changing, as the defeated city-state loses the territory and the winner annexes the defeated 
one.153 
“The legitimacy of territorial conquest […] ”154 as a means of acquiring territory, and the 
ensuing takeover of weaker city-states and kingdoms created another important institution known as 
Empire.  An Empire was a combination of set of city-states and administrated by a political organ.  
It is bigger in the scope of territory and comprised more population. According to Diener and 
Hagen, “An empire is a sovereign political entity usually governed by a hereditary monarch, and 
spanning several different regions and peoples which had not traditionally been under single 
ruler.”155 
The Axumite Empire, for example, was so powerful in the northern Ethiopia. It had 
controlled substantial territories surrounding the city-state irrespective of their continental location. 
There were several other African empires that had existed in Africa before European colonization. 
To mention few: Ancient Egypt’s pharaoh Akhenaten whose capital city was Amarna, the Ghana 
Empire, the Mali Empire, the Songhai Empire, the Aksia dynasty are some of the strong empires in 
Africa.156 Territorial limits of almost all the empires were not certainly marked.  Nebulous character 
of territorial limits of Roman Empire caused historian to surmise that Roman Empire had no 
international boundary.157 It was supposed that the territorial limit of constituent units (city states 
that constituted Roman Empire) was taken as territorial limits of the Empire. The territory of the 
Empire was also so wide and not precisely delineated. “The Roman boundaries were mostly the 
division of the Roman provinces or of smaller governmental or administrative units of the 
                                            
153 Conquest was one of the ways in which a territory could be acquired legally. In old days, a stronger nation could 
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Empire.”158  Thus, it appears safe to suggest that the Empire did not manage and control boundary, 
as it was the power of administrative units. On the other hand, numerous authorities indicate the 
territorial limits of Roman Empire was precisely delineated. According to Diener & Hagen, “ The 
Roman Empire appears to embody the ideals of a highly centralized empire with clear external 
borders.”159Precisely noticeable monuments were erected to indicate territorial limit of Roman 
Empire.160  
Empires, like city-states, were often in the state of war and authority over territories had 
been shifting, as a defeated empire loses all or a part of its territory and the winner expands bounds 
of its territory – setting a new boundary. Thus, a powerful empire used to forcefully annex smaller 
ones with a view to expand its territory thereby expanding its territorial limits or creating a broader 
tax source and enhancing the scope sovereignty. As a result, authority over a given territory had 
been shifting.161  Aggression and forceful acquisition of territories of neighboring empire and city-
states, whenever needed, rendered delineation of a precise territorial boundary meaningless.  
Due to elusive nature of medieval territorial limit (the boundary) and the expansionist policy 
of powerful city-states, empire and nation states, early interstate territorial limit was vague and 
“characterized by overlapping jurisdiction.”162 As a result, it was not simple enough to precisely 
locate an exact limit of a boundary, and the uncertainty, presumably had generated recurrent civil 
and international war.  
Territorial limit of ancient Axumite Empire (in current Ethiopia), for instance, best explains 
the elusiveness of medieval territorial limits. As witnessed by historians, ancient Ethiopia was much 
bigger than the current territorial limit. Various sources indicate that medieval Ethiopia had 
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included the whole Horn of Africa and extended up to the port of Yemen.163 The Axumite Empire 
of Ethiopia had controlled northern Ethiopia, Eritrea, northern Sudan, southern Egypt, Djibouti, 
Western Yemen, and southern Saudi Arabia, totaling 1.25 million square kilometers, almost half the 
size of India.164 Lack of civilization (administration by illiterate tribal chiefs, absence of fast 
communication channels, outdated transportation system, poverty, ignorance and Christian beliefs 
that disregarded some parts of the ancient Ethiopian Muslim land) had blinded tribal chiefs not to 
bother for the then unfavorable regions and desert lands with harsh weather condition when 
Europeans settled there or when missionaries and explorers paved ways for colonization.165  
European powers apportioned parts of territories of medieval Ethiopia into Italian Eritrea, 
Djibouti (previously French Somali land), Somalia, Sudan and the current Ethiopia. Though 
Ethiopia was never formally colonized, apart from the five years of brief Italian occupation, its 
territorial integrity had been severely inflicted by aggressors.  Territorial acquisition, initially, 
appears to be peaceful with subtle motive and then after building their basis European agents used 
all means to take territory, including trickery or corrupt tribal chiefs or in case of refusal wage open 
war against the people that were armed with spear and arrow.166  
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165 It is generally regarded that tribal chiefs had no interest in desert lands that were not suitable for farming. 
Supposedly there was no interest for uninhibited desert lands surrounding ocean boundaries. The current Ethiopian 
border clearly depicts this conception. Italy used all means to convince ignorant uneducated tribal chief of the time 
and convinced to sign a treaty surrendering all Red Sea coastal land.  France leased Djibouti, the remaining portion 
of the border that could take Ethiopia to Red Sea and Ethiopia remained as landlocked country though Red Sea is 
situated within 100 miles.  This compelled Ethiopia to pay millions of dollars for using the port of Djibouti and 
other nearby ports.  The current and the future Ethiopia generation will always pay cost as a result of ignorance and 
deceit of the European powers.   
166 Italy for example paid substantial sum of money to Minilik II to get his consent to sign a treaty that granted a portion 
of contested land to the then Italian colony of Eritrea. The trick during the signature of Wuchale treaty between 
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In the Ethiopian case, Italian missionaries and merchants acquired a parcel of land from 
tribal chiefs in Eritrea and latter claimed the whole territory of Eritrea as part of Italian colony.  
Djibouti was leased to French for 99 years, though never returned back to Ethiopia and practically 
never considered as part of Ethiopian territory since the lease.  
 
2.4.2. Modern Nation State System and Delineated International Boundary 
 
Nation state is the advanced form of social organization that has emerged as a result of 
multifaceted economic, social and political progress. Successive socio economic changes such as:  
increased agricultural output, invention of specialized goods and the provision of efficient services, 
including long distance trade and social interaction, had fueled advancement of cities, and 
emergence of powerful craftsmen and merchants.167 Advancing cities disrupted feudal system 
thereby creating an opportunity for new political system – nation state.168  The emergence of nation 
states has facilitated the creation of a clearly defined boundary among nations.169 It is generally 
viewed that, “ [t]he modern state system first emerged in Europe and spread to the rest of the world 
through colonization.”170  
In the feudal Europe, territorial limit (boundary) of constituent nations states was not 
precisely defined, and authority over the territories had been overlapping.171  The highly centralized 
                                                                                                                                                 
Ethiopia and Italy was a source of war in which white men for the first time in history was defeated by black men. 
Article 17 of the treaty had varied meaning in the Ethiopian language and in Italy. The Italian version stated that 
Ethiopia can make any foreign relation through Italy where as (the Amharic) stated that Italy can assist Ethiopia 
when it makes foreign relation. The Italian version took Ethiopia’s sovereignty in which Ethiopia cannot make 
relationship with foreign power unless Italy so authorizes. The Amharic version simply stipulates assistance that 
Ethiopia may not necessarily require.  
167 Diener & Hagen supra, note 28 at 39. 
168 James A. Caporaso, Changes in the Westphalian Order: Territory, Public Authority and Sovereignty, 2 INT’L 
STUD. REV. 1(2000).   
169 Thus understanding of the historical background of state formation appears vital for understating boundary related 
issues and appreciate the role of boundary and territoriality in increasingly global system.  
170 Zaiotti supra note 7 at 2. See also Diener & Hagen supra a note 28 at 37. 
171  Popescu, supra note 3 at 32. It is generally believed that due to power and territorial competition, wars and conflict 
were common and hence the winner takes control of territory and residents until further action was taken either other 
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feudal system that had controlled several empires, as a result of coercive and recurrent wars, could 
not meet the demands of the changed socio-economic system. The powerful and ideologically deep 
rooted feudal system did not simply gave a way for nascent socio political system, but had been 
forced by the longest and destructive war that Europe endured for 30 years.172 The war ended as a 
result of tough and arduous negotiation that was held for years. The negotiation resulted in far 
reaching consequences that have furthered the progress of international law and rendered significant 
contribution to the global socio-political movement; inter alia, it leveled a ground for clearly 
defined territorial boundary at which exclusive sovereignty can be exerted.  
In Europe, the coming into existence of clearly marked boundary system was an innovative 
indigenous process.173 Other continents, apart from barren land of Antarctica, had their own system 
of boundary, which was not well defined, but it was disrupted by the European colonization and not 
developed to the fullest level – “died before maturity.”174 Therefore, the historical beginning of a 
clearly defined international boundary and the sovereign nation state system was the 17th century 
Peace of Westphalia.175  
It is believed that the Accord of Westphalia has contributed to the prevalence of better 
international peace and introduced mutual co-existence in Europe.176 With this view in mind, the 
Congress of the Westphalia relentlessly ventured to devise a precisely defined boundary within 
which a sovereign power can exercise exclusive authority, as a ‘’a basic rule of co-existence.” 177    
Supposedly, the maxim, “Good fence makes good neighbor” had influenced the Westphalian 
                                                                                                                                                 
competitor or by an organ who lost the war. More over, Feudal system had created two layers of authorities: The 
king and local chiefs. The king controlled territories and ordinary people ordinary while actual administration was 
left to the local chief who paid allegiance to the king.  The day-to-day business and actual control was left to the 
local chiefs who are either loyal to the king or appointed by the king.  
172  Popescu, supra note 3 at 34. 
173 Prescott & Triggs, supra, note 2 at 52. 
174 Id. 
175Diener & Hagen, supra note 28 at 37. See also Zacher, supra a note 147. 
176 James A. Caporaso, supra note 168 
 66 
Congress as a viable remedy to circumvent recurring conflict for territorial expansion and 
dominance. In the words of Zacher, 
In these early centuries of the Westphalia order territory was the main factor that determined 
the security and wealth of states, and thus the protection and acquisition of territory were 
prime motivation of foreign policy. Most wars, in fact, concerned the acquisition of territory, 
and most of these wars led to exchanges of territory; this practice continued until the middle 
of the twentieth century. These practices were reflected in the legal norm concerning the 
legitimacy of conquest.178 
 
To sum up, the treaty of Westphalia has generated remarkably overwhelming consequences 
to Europe and offered significant contribution to the global socio-political system in general.179 It 
ended one of the longest and destructive wars that perished lives of millions of people and 
destruction of huge amount of resources.180 The war was backed by complex motives of enormous 
actors: religion, power competition, personal fame and the desire to control more territory. It was 
very costly and the longest war ever held at the time. The treaty of Westphalia that ended the war 
often praised for fruition of vital international law doctrines such as the principle of sovereignty of 
states, territoriality, and autonomy of states.  
The other glaring consequence of the negotiation was the emergence of new independent 
states: Netherlands and Swiss.  Netherlands got independence from Spain and Swiss gained 
independence from Austria. Some countries like Sweden gained territories and cash compensation. 
Most importantly, the treaty resulted in clear boundary between rival European powers.  Ultimately, 
                                                                                                                                                 
177 Zacher, supra note 147. 
178 Id.at 217 
179 William H. McNeil  The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community (1991), 828p.\par 
http://histclo.com/essay/war/peace/wp-west.html  Accessed on 7/10/14. The war begin in 1618 in which the Holly 
Roman Empire rose against France, the German Princes and princes lings against he emperor and each other and the 
France against the Habsburgs of Spain. The Swedes the Danes the Poles. The Russians the Dutch and the Swiss 
were all dragged in.   
180 The peace of Westphalia ended 30 years war that began in 1618. Negotiation took extra-ordinary long time. The 
discussion on participants of congress took two months.  
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“European states gradually acquired the ability to demarcate the precise limits of their sovereign 
territories.”181  
2.4. 3. Globalization and Changing Nature of Border:  Is Borderless world Possible or         
          Desirable? 
 
The maxim, “Good fences make good neighbors,”182 was supposedly coined to illustrate the 
traditional functions of border walls in which no one can get into a fenced territory without securing 
consent because unwelcomed intrusion results in legal consequences – trespass which entails 
criminal and civil consequences. A neighbor cannot trespass into his/her neighbor’s property 
bypassing a fence. A good neighbor is expected to seek permission before entering into “other’s” 
land. As a “good fence” bars an illicit crossover into the neighborhood property, the assumption is 
that the fence has turned all the neighboring people to good ones. Put differently, it was assumed 
that no one can bypass a “good fence”, and hence, everybody around a fenced land/ territory is 
supposed a good person.  
In the era of globalization (which may not respect a good fence), the construction of a huge 
border wall may not necessarily secure a bounded territory and create “good neighborhood”.  
Tough border walls may impede some form of unauthorized border crossing, traditional border 
walls are powerless to guard against “invisible intruders” that can easily transcend a well-cemented 
border wall while the perpetrator hiding at a remote distance. As a result, some argue that in the 
contemporary world, which is increasingly characterized by global way of life, the traditional 
function of border wall is on the verge of being obsolete thereby facilitating the emergence of 
                                            
181 Diener and Hagen, supra note 28 at 41. 
182 Robert Frost, in his early 20th century infamous poet, “ Mending Wall” stated the phrase, “Good Fences make good 
neighbor.” The poet is available at:  http://allpoetry.com/Mending-Wall  (Accessed 01/30/15). The expression 
“Good fences make good neighbor,” may still be relevant in some cases, generally viewed as impairing intimacy as 
two neighboring people cannot easily see each other and understand what was going on behind the fence. The fence 
practically bars closeness and the possibility of being good neighbors is questionable. Were the West and East 
German good neighbors in the era of Berlin war? North and South Korea, for all practical purposes, are behind a 
psychological fence. Are they really  good neighbors? 
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borderless world.183 If the emergence of borderless world is an inevitable fact, African border issue 
in general and the border tension between Ethiopian and Eritrea, in particular, will be settled when 
the global phenomenon eliminates the very border. This Section briefly assesses whether borderless 
world is really possible and all traditional border walls may be dismantled like the tumbled Berlin 
wall. 
Nowadays, a single company can provide almost identical services (products), in almost all 
the corners of the globe, introducing similar systems, processes and culture. The proliferation of 
multinational companies and resultant trans-boundary transaction, coupled with other effects of 
globalization, has been fueling the widespread speculation of the elimination of borders. Borderless 
world, in turn means, territorial sovereignty would be insignificant, as global actors appear more 
powerful and rapidly moving toward controlling the whole global phenomena. This increasingly 
global way of life has potency to penetrate all forms of boundaries thereby making traditional 
border functions “out dated.”  In other words, traditional border walls may not effectively guard 
against all forms of external incursion and impede unauthorized contacts and transactions. In the 
words of Gabriel Popescu, “ [...] globalization related developments have challenged the exclusive 
bundling of sovereignty, territory, identity, and borders claimed by territorial states.” 184  
Several actors and factors are lumped under the rubric of globalization. Global financial 
services ( For instance, Visa, MasterCard), transnational corporations that work around the world, 
like. Google, Yahoo or e-business corporations like eBay or Amazon can knock all doors (assuming 
in a democratic nation internet censorship is unconstitutional) bypassing the restraining barriers of 
border walls offering identical products and services throughout the globe. Similarly, the ever-
                                            
183  John Akokpari, You Don’t Belong Here, Citizenship, the state & Africa’s Conflict (Reflections on Ivory Coast), in 
THE ROOT OF AFRICAN CONFLICT, THE CAUSE AND COST  96 ( Alred Nhema & Paul T. Zeleza (ed) 2008).  
See also Miles Kahler, Territoriality and Conflict in an era of Globalization, 
http://irps.ucsd.edu/assets/014/6738.pdf  (Accessed: 02/10/15). 
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changing communication and transportation technology has avoided barriers of distance thereby 
making the world reachable to all at a given time.   
Global economic institutions like IBRD (the World Bank), IMF, UNDP, WTO are most 
powerful international organizations that can subtly dictate territorially sovereign states to act in 
some way. 185Though most developing nations consider these mighty institutions as promoters of 
western ideology, they have no better choice other than complying with their demands thereby 
making sovereignty at stake.  Environmental issue is another case that concerns everyone for acts 
and facts happen everywhere. Global community cannot keep quiet while a given nation or 
company disrupting nature by polluting the earth, as climate change has impact on life of everyone. 
Concerned international agencies, thus, can ignore well-fenced boundary, and indirectly dictate the 
perpetrator to stop environmentally destructive acts or require the victims to be compensated. 186 
  Now a day, gross human rights violations and genocide are viewed as international crimes 
conferring universal jurisdiction that can supersede the protection of sovereignty and territorial 
boundary. 187 The doctrine of universal jurisdiction entitles every nation that has incorporated 
                                                                                                                                                 
184 Popescu supra note 3 at 47. 
185 David Held and Anthony McGrew, Globalization, http://www.polity.co.uk/global/globalization-oxford.asp 
(Accessed on 02/10/15).  
186 Take for example the case of International Boundary Association or the Oakland Institute that has “waged war” 
against Ethiopia with a motive to stop Ethiopia dam construction on Omo river arguing the construction would have 
negative effect on the only desert lake - Lake Rudolf ( aka Lake Turkana) and would destroy some native plants and 
reduce the level of water to the indigenous  South Omo people who depend on the River Omo.  Initially, the African 
Development Bank promised to finance the project but due to active battle waged by the international NGO, the 
Bank finally changed its plan and refused to grant funding. Now the project on last phase of completion by the 
Ethiopian government budget and getting some help from China, it took long time than previously planned.  For 
details see International Rivers, Ethiopian Dam Threaten to Turn Lake Turkana into “ East Africa’s Aral Sea” 
January 9, 2013;  Available at: http://www.internationalrivers.org/resources/ethiopian-dam-threatens-to-turn-lake-
turkana-into-east-africa-s-aral-sea-7786 last visited 02/06/15. 
187 NATO and multinational involvement of during the so called Arab Spring in Libya to oust the long time dictator, 
Mohamed Gadhafi, has supersede territorial boundaries of Libya and pierced the veil of sovereignty under the guise 
of protecting the people of Libya for humanitarian reasons or curbing the widespread violation of human rights as 
the Gadhafi regime bombed the protesting its own citizens near Benghazi  
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human rights norms into national law to prosecute a person suspected of grave human right 
violation anywhere in the globe posing a threat to state sovereignty and national borders.188  
African states consider International Criminal Court as a threat to national sovereignty and 
attempted for mass withdrawal from its membership.189 The International Criminal Court is a 
multinational organization having universal jurisdiction to punish perpetrators of crimes against 
humanity such as genocide. Territorial sovereignty or national borders cannot impede ICC 
prosecutor to indict suspected persons including top public officials of member nations or anyone 
including residents of non-member states if the case is referred by the Security Council.190  
On top of these global phenomena, the issue of transnational terrorism has been a notorious 
challenge to state border and sovereignty.  Al-Qaida neither respects state boundary nor its 
sovereignty. Its very motive was to remove sovereign states and establish its own state, which is 
ruled by a strict version of Sharia law. For instance, Al-Qaida in Afghanistan frequently ignores 
Afghan-Pakistan boundary and terrorize civilian and challenge efforts of government of Pakistan 
and allies including United States. In Afghanistan Al-Qaida appears more powerful than the formal 
elected government.  In Somalia, the Al- Qaida affiliated group – the al-Shabaab – controls 
substantial portion of Southern Somalia and act as a defacto government having its sown court, 
police and public administration. Al-Shabaab, not only terrorizes Somali people, but also has built a 
terrorist cell in Kenya and frequently repeated disregarded Kenyan border and violated state 
                                            
188 Popsecu, supra note 3 at 57. 
189 See Jacey Fortin, The Continent Versus The Court: African Union Deliberates  Withdrawal From The ICC, 
International Business Times, October 11, 2013 http://www.ibtimes.com/continent-versus-court-african-union-
deliberates-withdrawal-icc-1422434 (Accessed: 02/06/15). 
190 ICC, however, openly challenged in Africa as it is viewed as pursuing only against Africans.  The indictment of 
Sudanese president, did not work as most African nations were not willing to apprehend him.  ICC does not have its 
own police force that can enter into Sudan and arrest President Al Bashir. The Indictment of Kenyan President Uhuru 
Kenyatta is finally dismissed due to mounting pressure from African States and difficulty of collecting evidence.  
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sovereignty.191  It carried out the act of terrorism in Uganda killing more than 70 civilians in 
revenge of Ugandan government for sending peacekeepers to Somalia though subsequent attempts 
were foiled.192 Other neighboring countries, including Ethiopia and Djibouti are always in target, as 
the terrorist group can easily bypass the porous border and commit the act of terrorism.193 Al-
Shabaab made several attempts in Ethiopia dispatching suicide bombers. Similarly, currently, Boko 
Haram has been a great challenge, not only to Nigeria, but also to other neighboring nations like 
Cameroon, Chad and Niger. It carried out the act of terrorism in Cameroon and Niger defying 
sanctity of borders and state sovereignty.   Boko Haram may not stop the act of terror in the West 
Africa but viewed as a challenge to the whole Africa. That is why the African Union has decided to 
send 7500 strongly armed personnel to battle Boko Haram in its session in Addis Ababa.194   
As succinctly put by one author, “Al-Qaida is commonly described as a network of 
networks formed by loosely associated groups, dispersed, decentralized and without a clear 
hierarchy of command.”195 The emergence of terrorist groups inflicts boundary system in two ways. 
First the terrorist group infringes the inviolability of borders by disregarding its sanctity by 
“jumping “over the fence.  The other effect of terrorism is the action states take on boundary. With 
a view to tackle the act of terrorism states tighten borders by deploying more aggressive border 
guards and reforming immigration laws and allocating huge budget for border protection. After 
                                            
191  For instance, “Al-Shabaab warns tourists to stay away from Kenya as it claims responsibility for deaths.”  See The 
Telegraph, June 16, 2014.  The terrorist group declared that Kenya was a war zone and tourists visiting Kenya were 
in peril.  
192 Eastern Africa Center for Constitutional Development, A Preview of key  Events across the region. (KCK Annual 
Report 11(2011). Available at: www.kituochakatiba.org/…/kituo%20ch… last visited 0202/15). 
193 Aaron Maasho, Suicide bombers die in the failed plot at Ethiopia football match, REUTERS, October 14, 2013. 
Available at: uk.reuters.com/…/uk-Ethiopia-bomb-idU… last accessed 02/03/15. According to Reuters, the Two al-
Shabaab agents were died while getting prepared to explode bomb in the Addis Ababa Stadium during soccer game 
between Ethiopian and Nigerian national teams. The bomb went off and killed the two agents at the residence where 
they stayed before the agents able to kill mass number of people in the stadium.  Had their plan succeeded it would 
have been a devastating tragedy.  
194 Vincent Nwanma, Africa troops to join Boko haram fight. Is Nigeria’s army all in? CHRISTIAN SCIENCE 
MONITOR, February 2, 2015. 
195 Popescu supra note 3 at 6. 
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9/11 most nations including United States have declared stringent procedures for issuing entry visa 
and have been conducting aggressive check up in the airport. Gabriel Popescu states:  
U.S. response to al-Qaida has been marked by an inability to think outside the framework of 
state borders. Not accidentally, the first actions taken after September 11, 2001, has been the 
closing of the U.S. borders implying that these territorial lines could restore the 
violated sense of security many people felt.196 [Emphasis added] 
 
Tightening border security or closing borders has been creating burden to legitimate 
travellers and people in general by inflicting huge impact on privacy, as border guards have to 
check all items and personality using modern scanners. The reliance on border as a best solution to 
guard nation against the threat of terrorism has necessitated the construction of border wall more 
than ever and allocation of huge budget for border protection and border law enforcement.   
Cyber crime is another transnational issue that cannot be protected by well-guarded borders. 
Nowadays, it is not impossible to attack vital resources situated in San Francisco without the 
perpetrator’s physical presence in the United States or in the nearby regions. A terrorist, hiding 
elsewhere in the globe, can stretch destructive hands that may not be easily detected by border 
guards or curtailed by border walls.  Similarly, a cyber-thief, residing at a far distance, can get 
access to bank accounts without physically crossing borders, or a terrorist at a remote location can 
disrupt utility plants at any part of the world. Therefore, it appears logically correct to suppose that 
traditional border walls are being obsolete as “bad neighbors” are emerging despite well-built 
border walls.  
Nowadays, it is not uncommon to hear cyber attack and data breach or identity theft ranging 
from retail stores like target to highly protected banks to government database. The current cyber 
attack on computers of Sony Entertainment depicts the potential of remote attack, which can bypass 
any form of fence. Hackers, allegedly from North Korea, have disrupted Sony Film show (The 
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Interview) in the holiday season sending threatening warnings which prompted investigation by FBI 
and close attention by high ranking authorities of United States, including the President. 197  Sony’s 
PlayStation was also attacked in August 2014 and  “forced offline by a cyber attack…”198 Though 
no evidence is publicly available, and repeatedly denied, it is generally speculated that North Korea 
was behind the attack.199 It has also been usual to notice a threat or actually cyber attack from a 
group known as Anonymous. There is a sense of insecurity on information on the net. In most 
cases, it is not simple enough to notice an exact venue from which the attack springs or the actual 
perpetrator, though some perpetrators disclose their identity under the cover of pseudo names.  
  It is also believed that due to the evolving modern communication and transportation 
technology, the world is getting closer by diminishing the traditional barriers of distance. This 
appears introducing culture mingling, which would destroy culture-based boundary. If the shield of 
“otherness” is pierced through “closeness” and “oneness” that may emerge as a result of high 
interaction and culture blend, the purpose and likelihood of separation by a boundary seems 
unlikely while “otherness” has effectively faded.  Put other way, it is hard to draw a line that can 
successfully divide an emerging cultural similarity. As a result, “ Many scholars, politicians, 
                                                                                                                                                 
196 Id at 60. 
197   On Nov. 24 Hackers, known as “#GOP.”, or  “The Guardians of peace, “ allegedly beached Sony Pictures 
Computer Network. They threatened Sony Entertainment Network posting warning message on the company’s 
computers. FBI launched investigation and claimed North Korea was behind the attack. United States, as a result, 
threated to take retaliatory measures against North Korea ,which denied the allegation. As reported on BBC, “ A 
skull appeared on commuter screens along with a message threatening to release data “secrets” if undisclosed 
demands wee not met.” BBC News, Nov. 25, 2014,  www.bbc.com (Accessed 4/21/16). The hacking scandal will 
cost the studio at least $200 million. The attackers further stated, “ Warning:  We ‘ve already warned you, and this is 
just the beginning.” 
198 British Broadcasting Corporation News, Technology, Nov. 25, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-
28925052 (Accessed on 02/11/15). 
199 Tal Kopan, US. Says North Korea behind Sony hack, Politico, (Dec. 12, 1994), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2014/12/fbi-north-korea-sony-cyberattack-113703.html (Accessed 02/11/15). See 
also Jonathan Aberman, Commentary:  Lessons in national security from the Cyber attack on Sony and The 
Interview, The Washington Post, (Dec. 23, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/capitalbusiness/lessons-
in-national-security-from-the-cyber-attack-on-sony-and-the-interview/2014/12/23/3a2913b6-8a26-11e4-8ff4-
fb93129c9c8b_story.html  (Accessed 02/11/15).  
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business leaders, and activists believe that globalization’s promotion of interaction and integration 
is rapidly eroding the importance of nation-states and their borders.”200  
Thus, if the purpose of border wall was simply to serve as barrier, the evolving globalization 
seems to render border walls out-of-date. This entails the emergence of borderless world as a 
factual necessity. Thus, it seems not completely wrong to surmise the fact that globalization will 
eventually cause, “[…] deterritorialization of the system of territorially sovereign states, which in 
turn will lead to the fading away of state borders.”201  Can we thus conclude that in the era of 
globalization and technology age, the deliberations of Westphalian Congress202 will virtually faded 
away?    
Despite trans – border effects of globalization, states, rely on borders and border walls to 
guard the bounded territory against extra-territorial effects that may be viewed as threat to national 
security.  Enormous nations have been constructing strong border walls and watch towers that are 
equipped with modern surveillance equipment with a view to curb terrorism, unauthorized extra-
territorial transactions, and control illegal human mobility. Since the emergence of Muslim 
fundamentalist group, and the 2001 terrorist attack of United States, global powers have been 
bolstering border protection; have reformed immigration laws and have strongly armed border 
guards and/or have enhanced institutional capacity of border protection agencies. This includes the 
strict control of immigration which in turn demands the need to build strong border fences, training 
and deploying powerful border guards, intensifying air and sea port control, promoting and 
                                            
200 Diener & Hagen, supra note 28 at 60 
201 Popescu, supra note 3 at 25. 
202  It is pointed out somewhere else above that state sovereignty and clearly defined boundary are the most important 
findings of the Westphalian Congress.  
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deploying consular persons, visa restriction, and enactment of stringent immigration legislations, 
strict immigration procedures and control203, building huge controlling towers, and so forth.    
United States has been erecting a huge border wall in Mexico border since 1990s.204 Frank 
Clifford observes, “The fence along the U.S.–Mexico boundary has helped reduce the flow of 
[undocumented] immigrants, but the human and environmental toll has been enormous.”205 The 
2006 Secure Fence Act has authorized United States to construct modern and very expensive border 
wall with a view to curb unauthorized border crossing, foiling terrorist acts and preventing drug 
trafficking. The fence covers 1/3 of United States – Mexico Border across California, Arizona, New 
Mexico and Texas.206   Several immigrants have lost their life while attempting to jump over the 
fence. Despite human, environmental and economic cost, the Fence has been hampering easy 
border crossing. Secure Fence Act of 2006 clearly reveals the significance of border fences and 
downplays the assumption of fading away of territoriality and sovereignty.207 
                                            
203 Since 9/11 United Stated enacted several immigration legislations and strengthened institutional set up. For instance, 
in 2002 President Bush passed Homeland Security Act with a view to make United States Save from terrorists using 
Homeland Security as watchdog, which costed United States more than $589 billions since 2001.  Ted Hesson, Five 
Ways the Immigration System Changed After 9/11, Abc New Sep 13, 2012.  Most nations including developing 
world have enacted anti terrorist acts and all border guards are in high alert. Some of the developing nations, 
allegedly miss using antiterrorist legislations for stifling dissent. “Others” has been emerging as foreigners, 
especially people having Arab background or those who adhere strict version of Islamic system watched and 
followed by intelligence and law enforcement.  
204 Frank Cliford. The Border Effect, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, (September 18, 2012)  
205 Id. 
206 Id. See also Stephen Dinan, Border Fence in the eye of the beholder, THE WASHINGTON TIMES (June 24, 
2013. Available at: http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jun/24/border-fence-eye-beholder/?page=all last 
accessed 01/30/15. 
207  The General Section of Secure Fence Act of 2006 states as follows. “Not later than 18 months after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall take all actions the Secretary determines 
necessary and appropriate to achieve and maintain operational control over the entire international land and 
maritime borders of the United States, to include the following— (1) systematic surveillance of the international 
land and maritime borders of the United States through more effective use of personnel and technology, such as 
unmanned aerial vehicles, ground-based sensors, satellites, radar coverage, and cameras; and (2) physical 
infrastructure enhancements to prevent unlawful entry by aliens into the United States and facilitate access to the 
international land and maritime borders by United States Customs and Border Protection, such as additional 
checkpoints, all weather access roads, and vehicle barriers. […]In this section, the term ‘‘operational control’’ 
means the prevention of all unlawful entries into the United States, including entries by terrorists, other unlawful 
aliens, instruments of terrorism, narcotics, and other contraband.” ( Section 2 of Secure Fence Act of 2006 H.R. 
6061). 
 76 
The Secure Fence Act of 2006 supposedly has attracted Saudi Arabia to take the same 
measure of border fencing.  The initial plan was to fence only the Iraq border to control the 
movement of Islamic militant around Saudi –Iraq border but the late king Abdulla changed the plan 
to cover the whole Saudi Arabia border. As reported on Aljazeera,  “In 2009, Riyadh signed a deal 
with European aerospace and defence contractors EADS to secure the Iraq border, but with 
increasing fears over infiltration by anti-government groups and al-Qaeda, the interior ministry 
expanded the scope to cover all the country's borders.”208  
  It is not only United States or Saudi Arabia, but also several other nations have either 
reformed their immigration systems or built border walls with a view to curb dangerous effects of 
terrorism. According to Prescott and Triggs, India has been fencing its border with Bangladesh and 
Pakistan; Pakistan, similarly has started to close its border with Afghanistan by a huge border wall; 
Iran has been constructing a border wall on Pakistan border.  The border between Israel and 
neighboring nations has been source of clash between Israeli security forces and Palestinians.  To 
mitigate security problem, Israel has either constructed border walls either in the West Bank, Gaza 
and Egypt.  China, Greece, Kuwait, Morocco, Spain, Thailand, Uzbekistan and United Arab 
Emirates have started walling their border. Some of these borders, especially Israel borders walled 
before 9/11 but border constructing and wiring has been intensified since the 2001 terror act. 209 
Thus, despite the mounting pressure and uncontrollable effects of globalization, the 
objective reality on the ground proves the “inviolability” of the traditional boundary system. 
Gabriel Popescu, shares this view stating, “The borderless-world thesis [… ] presents a simplistic 
                                            
208 Aljazeera, Saudi unveils 900Km fence on Iraq border,  September 6, 2014, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/09/saudi-unveils-900km-fence-along-iraq-border-
201496154458789238.html   (Accessed  on 01/30/15). 
209 Prescott & Triggs, supra, note 2; Ruben Zaiotti also suggests that, “ Events such as the terrorist attacks of September 
11, 2001, in the United States and long term trends such as the growth in “unmanaged’’ flows of people and goods 
worldwide, have drawn attention to the vulnerability of the current international system based on territorially 
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and idealized vision of globalization[….[f]ar from fading away, […] more territorial borders fall 
apart, the more various groups around the world cling to places, nations, and religion as markers of 
their identity.” 210  Similarly, Ruben Zaiotti, remarks that a “ […] discussion about a “borderless 
world” brought about by globalization have turned out to be premature.”211 [Emphasis added].  Our 
national identity, values and culture, common resources are territorial in nature and cannot be easily 
altered with the advance of digital technology. Zaiott further remarks, “ While globalization 
processes might have rendered [borders] less visible and politically salient, borders have maintained 
a pivotal role in defining who can move what, where and when around the world….[b]orders thus 
still matter”212 [Emphasis added].  
 Hence, boundary walls, coupled with other forms of protective measures, can still serve the 
function of filtering “others.”  Global responses to the deadly disease, Ebola, in West Africa, for 
instance, appear to suggest how states quickly resort to borders to exclude “others” with a view to 
guard their subjects. In fear of effects of tragic disease, Ebla in West Africa, most nations including 
some African states have closed their border to the people and extra-territorial transactions from 
three West African nations – Liberia, Seirra Leone, and Guinea.  Australia declared visa denial to 
people from Ebola affected nations. Canada followed the Australian stand.  Some African countries 
were also quick enough to stop flight to or from Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone. . This is a recent 
happening that depicts the impracticability of borderless utopia.  
With regard to borders and border walls the world is experiencing two conflicting situations. 
The uncontrollable nature of globalization that appears to make traditional border functions 
meaningless and the interests of territorial states and governments to protect their subjects against 
                                                                                                                                                 
defined political units.... highlighted the lasting relevance of borders in the system’s management and protection.” 
(Zoiatti, supra, note 7 at preface). 
210 Popescu, supra note 3 at 25. 
211 Id.  
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invisible intruders by closing borders or restricting border contacts and mobility are the two 
conflicting realities that the modern socio-political system has to tackle. As pinpointed above, states 
strongly rely on borders walls to control extra-territorial threats and human mobility. Reliance on 
border walls and widespread construction and border guarding indicates the continued significance 
of borders and border wall. Equally important is, the effect of globalization on borders. It is not 
simply pointless to reconsider the efficacy of borders and border walls to resist the threat of 
globalization and global actors that can easily bypass well cemented border wall.  In keeping 
national and international peace and security, thus, the contemporary world is confronted with two 
contradictory situations. Now the question is how to reconcile these conflicting realties? 
The three international relation theories would be of some help to the changing global 
situation and interest of territorial states to address these conflicting facts.  The most important 
international relation paradigmic approaches that often cited in dealing with changing global 
phenomena vis-à-vis security and sovereignty are: realist, globalist and constructive approaches.213  
Realist approaches basis its approach on state security and sovereignty over other competing 
powers. Realist approaches is built by Hobbesian approach, which considers everyone as a threat, 
and the best solution for survival is to gain more power than rival power.214 Thus, realists believe 
that greater power is necessary to maintain peace and security and survive as a sovereign entity.215 
Routke remarks, “ Each state must relay on its own resources to survive and flourish....There is no 
                                                                                                                                                 
212 Id.  
213  Ann – Maire Slaughter, International Relations Principal Theories, 
https://www.princeton.edu/~slaughtr/Articles/722_IntlRelPrincipalTheories_Slaughter_20110509zG.pdf (Accessed 
02/07/15). See also Ambersagen, Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism in International Relations, 
http://ambersagen.hubpages.com/hub/Realism-Liberalism-and-Constructivism-in-International-Relations Accessed 
on  02/07/15. 
214  Ambersagen supra note 211.  
215 Ahmet Kaya, The Impact of EU Securitization Process on the Border Framework of Turkey, PhD Dissertation, 
Graduate School, the State University of New Jersey,  41 (2012).  
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authoritative impartial method of settling … dispute – i.e. no world government – states are there 
own judges, juries, and hangmen and often resort to force to achieve their security interests.”216  
Liberalist approach (aka globalist approach)217 on the other hand builds its theory on 
cooperation and interdependence of global actors for common good.  Thus, foreign policy should be 
designed centering cooperation and altruism.218 For Liberals global peace and security depends 
upon the extent of collaboration and global alliance prevailing among states. According to this 
approach thus,“… common ideas can lead states into interdependence and to remove […] threat to 
sovereignty.”219 It proclaims unity and cooperation the only ways for peaceful co-existence. 
International agencies, like United Nations, regional organizations like European Union, African 
Union and so forth facilitate the common bond beyond narrow territorial limits. Liberalists believe 
that the world is complexly interdependent and tied through international trade, economic, social 
and moral interconnections that are regulated by international law.220  In a cooperative work, while 
keeping individuality of states, there is no zero sum game. This is a win-win approach that 
considers all thoughts and interests based on common deliberations that involve all global actors 
“working through international organizations and according to international law.”221  
The third paradigmic approach is constructivism. Some scholars argue this is not a theory 
by itself, like Realities and Liberal approach, but ontology.222 It considers social situations to derive 
conclusions governing world phenomena.  Social situations, like societal history, norms, beliefs are 
important tools to explain state behavior. Constructivism appears in midway between the two 
                                            
216 John T. Rourke, International Politics on the World Stage, 21 (12th ed. 2007) 
217 Ahmet supra note 213. 
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219 Ambersagen supra note 211. 
https://www.princeton.edu/~slaughtr/Articles/722_IntlRelPrincipalTheories_Slaughter_20110509zG.pdf (Accessed 
02/07/15). 
220  John, supra note 214 at 23. 
221 Id. 
222 Ambersagen supra note 211. 
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former approaches. Like Realism it recognizes state sovereignty.  According to this approach, “ 
State sovereignty has profound influence that precedes any cost- benefit analysis that states may 
undertake.” Like liberalism it regards the role of non-state actors in global phenomenon.   
Constructivist approach affords greater autonomy and independence to international 
institutions stating that they can act in their own right without the influence of sovereign states.  To 
constructivism, transnational institutions not merely serve as tools for dissemination of state 
ideology but they act even against the state that created them or to which they belong. According to 
Rourke, constructivist approach is an interactive process between various actors including states, 
international agencies, individuals and groups.223 To constructivism, thus, international actors and 
their mindset is the most important. They decide who they are, insiders, outsider (others), their 
political identity and their spatial border and their state. The actors have inherent power to select 
who may associate with them or who cannot, being enemy or strange.224  This pradigmic approach 
appears to cure the “flaws’ of realist and liberal or globalist approaches – the two extreme ends.  
Constructivist’s mixed approach appears helpful to redress the apparent contradiction in 
effects of globalization on borders and interest of territorial states to keep security by relying on 
border walls.225 While states have high interest to maintain territorial sovereignty and security 
(realist theory) relaying on border walls, globalization appears to ignore it (globalist or 
constructivism paradigm).  Total closure of borders and the emergence of borderless world 
(absolutely open borders) are neither desirable, nor feasible scenarios. This demands a middle line 
                                            
223 Rourke, supra note 214 at 30. 
224 Ahmet, supra note 213.  
225 Constructivist approach reconciled the two extreme ends by holding some important points from realist paradigm 
and liberal/globalist paradigm.  It accommodates both concepts and designed its own separate approach.  The 
current territorial state tendency to bar mobility via huge border wall barrier and invisible intruders that can bypass 
the border wall or other global actors, like multinational companies that abhor border wall can be solved by 
designing a working solution to address the contradictory global reality vis-à-vis borders.   
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approach that can mitigate undesirable effects of the two extreme ends by mixing important points 
from both approaches and design an independent theory (paradigm).  
Sociologists and border experts, accordingly, suggest for the transformation of borders from 
barriers to bridges, from line of separation to the point of contact, and from scene of antagonism to 
the zone of cooperation.226  
The transformation of borders from barriers to bridges makes the notion of “border” more 
than a physical mark or barriers that signal the end or beginning of a territory. Borders are supposed 
to play a greater role by serving as bridges or linking channels that facilitate mobility. In this 
regard, borders can stimulate cooperation and mutual co-existence instead separating.227 The term 
“border” thus involves: processes, institutions, resources that meant to regulate and promote cross-
border transactions and relationships. It encompasses the entire processes vis-à-vis a boundary. 
Gavrilis confirms this view stating:  “On maps, boundaries appear as static legal divisions between 
sovereign states. In reality, they are complex institutions that make political claims about who and 
what may cross the line.”228   A mixed approach does not absolutely eliminate borders as globalist 
paradigm claims or does not close borders for security causes but the existing borders will be 
rebordered (changed into channels of interaction, cooperation and integration). 229 The change in 
the nature and function of border, thus, cannot be termed as its demise. 
As the prevailing global reality is not sharply uniform, the nature and kind of border may 
change with the change of “mishap” that a border wall is expected to tackle, or rebordering may 
                                            
226  Illidio do Amaral, New Reflections on the Theme of International Boundaries, IN Clive H. Schofild (ed). WORLD 
BOUNDARIES: 1 GLOBAL BOUNDARIES, 16 (1994). 
227 Separated people cannot be genuinely “good neighbors”.  They are aliens having no contact at all. Co-existence and 
friendship avoids differences and it makes easy to find out solution even difference happen during the contact.  
228 Gavrilis, supra note 185 at 14. 
229 Take, for instance, the Ethio-Kenya border.  The border at Moyale connects the Ethiopian city of Moyale with 
Kenyan counterpart.  There was no impediment for nationals of both countries. In some cases, either Ethiopians or 
Kenyans don’t understand being Kenyan or Ethiopia.  Of course both are brotherly people who were parted by a 
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depend upon the nature and kind of global actors and factors that the new border has to 
accommodate. In this regard Martinez remarks, “Conditions in borderlands worldwide vary 
considerably because of profound difference in the size of nations-states, their political 
relationships, their level of development, and their ethnic, cultural and linguistic configurations.”230 
To accommodate varied situations borders may be classed into different categories. Borders may be 
grouped on the basis of political situation, the level of economic development or ideological 
disparity among the neighboring nations. The border between United States and Mexico reveals 
socio-political disparity between the two neighboring states.  The prevalence of a huge economic 
gap between United States and the neighboring Latin America has attracted influx of immigration 
for better way of life in the United States. This undoubtedly creates enormous economic burden and 
security threat to the people of United States, which demands multidimensional efforts to restrain 
unauthorized border crossing.  
Categorization of borders demands thorough borderland study that will enable states to 
design an appropriate border that would suit to the prevailing socio-economic and political 
situation. With this view in mind Martinez proposes four possible models of borders.231 The first 
model is alienated borderland. It is strictly controlled and generally closed kind of boundary. 
Crossing this kind of boundary is almost impossible for some category of people due to political, 
religious or cultural animosity prevailing between neighboring nations. The current Ethio-Eritrean 
boundary falls under this category.  No Ethiopian or an Eritrean is legally permitted to cross the 
Ethio-Eritrean boundaries.  Despite tight control, Eritrean refugees bypass the perilous border that 
could possibly cost life. As United Nations report reveals, “Over 200 Eritrean refugees are crossing 
                                                                                                                                                 
border. The border between two countries is well settled and demarcated.  No confusion or contest. Both Ethiopia 
and Kenya now working in the same project like road construction, power sharing and peacekeeping.  
230 Martinez, supra note 63 at 1.    
231 Id. at 2. 
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the heavily fortified and dangerous border into neighbouring Ethiopia daily….”232 As Martinez 
illustrates, “ Warfare, political disputes, intense nationalism, ideological animosity, religious 
enmity, cultural dissimilarity, and ethnic rivalry constitute major causes of alienation.”233 
The second category of border is co-existent borderland.  This is a kind of border in which “ 
stability is an on and off proposition.”234 Thus, it is not actually closed, but its openness depends 
upon situation. However, until some restraining situation happens, borderland people of both states 
can cross the border as long as co-existence is not hampered. The third category is interdependent 
borderland. This is substantially an open border having no cause for imminent closure, or openness 
is not attached to any known condition that may happen subsequently. Thus, “stability prevails most 
of the time.”235  This is a kind of border between two friendly nations, which are economically or 
culturally interdependent. Subjects of both nations can cross boundary without any barrier, in some 
cases just by simply proving their identity. The Ethiopian, and the Republic of Djibouti border 
appears the kind of interdependent border. Ethiopians can enter Djibouti without the need to get 
visa.  
The fourth and final category is integrated borderland. This is a kind of border in which the 
bordering people are functionally merged though they are subjected to distinct political sovereign.  
Borderlands may merge without serious economic restrictions. The strong relationship between 
Ethiopia and the Republic of Djibouti appears moving toward economic integration.  Bordering 
people both in Djibouti and Ethiopia can own properties in either of the counties. Bordering people 
are ethnically and culturally similar. In most cases, borderland people speak the same language and 
experience identical way of life. Daily mobility of goods and people from one country to the other 
                                            
232 Aljazeera,  October 29, 2014, Available at: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/10/spike-eritreans-fleeing-
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is so high.236  Simple peaceful co-existence, free mobility of border people and economic 
cooperation by itself is not enough to pronounce full merger of two nations.  In the words of 
Martinez, “Integration between two closely allied nations is most conducive when both are 
politically stable, militarily secure, and economically strong. Ideally the level of development is 
similar in both societies.”237    
Finally, borders cannot simply remain stagnant as “bounded territorial containers” while 
their very purpose keeps on changing.238 The meaning, nature, and significance of border has been 
changing to cope with the changing world.239.   The conception “borders as lines of separation or 
barriers” appears giving way to borders as processes and institutions comprising various factors and 
actors.  As George Gavrils succinctly put in his book The Dynamics of Interstate Boundaries, 
“Borders are institutional zones, not lines of separation between states.”240 To Gavrils, borders are 
complex institutions that comprise various actors and processes that involve in managing borderline 
transactions and contacts.241   
The current European Union border illustrates varied border culture as the old national 
border was rebordered without affecting territorial sovereignty and security. Nowadays, EU 
members and some non-members experience two kinds of borders:  an internal border that allows 
free mobility (internal border) without the need to show passports, and a border serving as barrier 
(the external border).  The internal border effectively serves as bridge by facilitating free movement 
of persons and goods. The external border is a traditional form of border that requires stringent 
security checkup and visa requirement.  
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236 The president of Republic of Djibouti expressly stated for both political and economic integration of two countries 
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237 Martinez supra note 63 at 5. 
238 Diener & Hagen, supra, note 28 at 59. 
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Ruben Zaiotti highlights the evolution of European border cultures from Westphalia to 
Schengen.242  We have seen the historical emergence of Wesphalian border culture that is credited 
for innovation of clearly defined border system. Schengen initially was started by bilateral 
agreement between few European states, but now incorporated into the EU and all member states 
apart from United Kingdom and Ireland are party to the treaty that adopted Schengen to  EU border 
policy.  Currently Schengen has 26 members. Most of the signatories to Schengen are EU member 
state apart from few non-EU member states. The rationale behind Schengen is allowing free 
movement of goods and services – just like a single nation.243 The adoption of Schengen into EU 
has created two border systems.  
In conclusion, in the technology age, it is not uncommon to notice the “fiction “of vanishing 
nature of borders and lessened effects of state sovereignty.  A number of states, on the contrary, 
have been erecting huge border walls and/or have reformed or working to reform restrictive 
immigration laws and boost institutional capability that can withstand extra-territorial effects of 
globalization. These are the two conflicting scenarios that call for an effective solution. It is 
practically impossible to eliminate all forms of borders with a view to facilitate free mobility of all 
categories of people and goods without any form restriction. Unfiltered mobility would enable free 
movement “enemies”, unchecked entry of destructive goods like explosives, bombs, guns, and so 
forth. Unrestricted access would jeopardize security, and make state sovereignty practically 
meaningless as it cannot control and guard its subjects and things in the territory (after all there will 
be no limit on territorial space).  
Therefore, a theory suggesting for the possible emergence of borderless world appears 
simply a utopia that can never happen.  Various research works and the prevailing national and 
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international reality simply prove the possibility of reterritorization and rebordering – changing the 
existing borders with a view to accommodate all interests and tackle threats. According to Popescu, 
“ Globalization can be understood in terms of reterritoralization and rebordering dynamics.”244 In 
reterritorization and resultant rebordering, geographical locations may be restructured, and borders 
will have new importance and role.245 This may seem by itself a challenging solution but it is 
feasible and desirable. The new border walls will be designed in a way it would allow free mobility 
of friendly (good) people by filtering terrorists (the enemy, strangers or others). It is true terrorist 
are also human beings having no special mark that can facilitate filtering as “terrorists” but close 
global cooperation and information exchange among states would assist to tackle “bad people”.246  
  Globalization and resultant global interdependence provides solutions to tackle its evils. 
Take, for example, the case of Boston Marathon bombers. Russia had information about the 
bombers and their link to possible terrorists groups and passed the information to CIA247.  In the 
words of Cartalucci:  
…Russian investigators contacted the FBI at least as early as 2011 in regards to Boston 
Marathon bombing suspect Tamerlan Tsarnaev, and again just 6 months before the Boston 
attacks. Additionally, it is now revealed that both the FBI and CIA had Tsarnaev on at least 2 
terrorist watch lists, contradicting previous FBI statements that the case was “closed” after 
not finding “any terrorism activity, domestic or foreign.”248 
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Different theories indicate the fact that globalization creates strong global alliance among 
states.249 This strong global alliance and cooperation would facilitate information exchange or 
travel data access which will allow border guards to filter people that may be grouped under 
“enemy” or “others”. In Boston case, for instance, the Russian information assisted, at least, to 
make the Suspects in the watch list though both FBI and CIA did not stop happening of the 
destructive incident. This supposedly happened because of the current weak alliance between 
Russian intelligence and United States counter parts. It is rumored that Russia did not reveal some 
vital text messages that would have enabled FBI and CIA to restrain the suspects.250 But in fully 
globalized system, greater alliance, cooperation and friendly environment will prevail thereby 
facilitate free flow of information to facilitate the free mobility of people and goods.  
  This approach mixes both Realist and Globalist (Liberal) paradigmic approaches of 
international relation.  In line with the Realist theory, territorial sovereignty and security will be 
respected though a new type of border system will be “built” to fence changing territories.  
It seems a perplexing task to filter “others”, but it is possible.  Trained border guards that are 
armed with latest technology can filter unauthorized persons and goods from global database and 
information available from other friendly nations, and close border walls to harmful people and 
transactions. This is an emerging phenomenon that is not widely practiced in all corners of the 
globe, and may look like the already existing border. But the new border (rebordered border) is well 
tailored to suit varied territories in a given state. For instance, cyber borders are completely 
different from borders baring physical mobility of goods and services, as cyber territory is not 
physically visible, as its global actors are also not visible when they cross the border. It is just a 
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mental imagination and psychological border that has ability to curtail unwanted invisible mobility 
(the Others).  
The current territory will be reterritorized depending upon the nature of mobility and the 
kind of border that can effectively guard the territory. The main distinction between the rebordered 
border and the old one is that the new border will allow free and quick mobility of most people “ 
the insiders” which are normally regarded as “good people”.   It will allow also quick and free 
mobility of allowable goods and services.  The new border thus requires some kind of information 
or a list of exceptional category of unallowable kind of the people, goods and services.  
With regard to cyber border, the current Chinese government practice is a good illustration.  
China negotiated with Internet giants, Google and Yahoo and opened its borders on condition that it 
can control certain information and key words including e-mail addresses of dissents.251  Lyombe 
Eko et al remark: “Google and other US Companies have … to satisfy local political exigencies, 
obey national rules, abide by cultural expectations and yet remain good US Corporate citizens.”252 
(Emphasis added). Google and Yahoo have developed a software (Firewall) that can filter unwanted 
data from Internet flow to China on condition to enter into Chinese cyber territory. As China 
control its space and technologically can close its border to Google and Yahoo, it is publicly 
regarded the two global giants bent their knees to China with objective of getting access to huge 
Chinese market trading off privacy of Chinese clients and closed the cyber border of China to 
                                                                                                                                                 
250 Daniesl Politi, Russia Withhold “Crucial Information on Boston Bomb Suspects From FBI and CIA, SLATEST 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2013/05/11/boston_marathon_bombing_russia_withheld_tamerlan_tsarnaev
_text_messages.html accessed 02/09/15.  
251 Lukas Feiler, Outages of Critical Information Infrastructure Under EU and US law, Transparency Versus Secrecy, 
15 Journal of Internet Law (3) 1(2011). 
http://www.academia.edu/5589741/Google_This_The_Great_Firewall_of_China_and_the_IT_Wheel_of_India 
accessed 02/09/15. 
252 Lyombe Eko et al, Google is the Great Firwall of China, the IT Wheel of India, Google Inc., and the Regulation, 15 
J. INT’T L. Journal 1(2011). 
http://www.academia.edu/5589741/Google_This_The_Great_Firewall_of_China_and_the_IT_Wheel_of_India 
(Accessed 02/09/15). 
 89 
“undesired’’ channels. The Chinese government is a gatekeeper of Chinese cyber border. According 
to Eko and et al, “ The Chinese government has created a closed national internet that it protects 
with censorious architecture of information technology, regulatory agencies, internet Service 
Providers, and an internet police squad.”253 Therefore, by prescribing conditions, China reborderd 
its Internet space. Though it is not a good experience, Ethiopia followed Chinese footsteps and 
banned some Internet sites that were designed by dissents and Ethiopian diaspora. One can view 
opposition sites like “Ethiopian Review, Ethiomedia, ESAT TV and so forth outside Ethiopia but 
the sites are blocked in Ethiopian cyber territory. Thus, Ethiopia has also rebordered its old border 
to suit the changing global phenomenon. The same rule can be used to cyber crimes, cyber terrorists 
and unwanted cyber transactions.   
Cyber territory illustrates how states can deterritorize the traditional territory due to 
globalization and reterritorize and reborder it to facilitate quick mobility and control unauthorized 
or undesired person, transaction or activity.  Cyber territorization does not, however, mean simply 
internet censorship or implemented only in dictatorial regimes or developing economies, but it can 
be used anywhere to control any kind of social evil like terrorism, tax evasion or cyber crime.  
States can also reterritorize their territories and reborder it depending upon global phenomenon and 
societal objectives. Terrorist may be denied access to a territory or denied visa or may be detained 
and deported on the basis of available information.254 As globalization presumes friendship, 
collaboration and border interaction, though some may still cross borders, there will be ample 
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possibility for apprehension assuming globalization will create friendship and peaceful coexistence 
that will facilitate information exchange.  
Thus, in the era or globalization either borders or territorial state will not vanish, but the 
prevailing territories may be deterritorized and reterritorized into new shape depending upon 
compelling effects of globalization to allow quick and free mobility while controlling (filtering) 
unauthorized persons, goods and transactions. The control aspect is an exception whereas, the 
general rule is free and quick mobility of goods and services. The new border will facilitate high 
interaction among bordered people thereby transforming borders from barriers to bridges. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
International Law and Territorial Boundary Delineation Norms 	  	  
3.1.   Introduction 
 
States are the most important subjects of international law, and it is inconceivable to 
imagine the existence of a State without some form of territory, as “[t]erritoriality is one of the 
fundamental tenets of sovereign statehood.”1  In a way of manifestation of sovereignty, a state 
exercises control over people and activities in a defined territory.2 Thus, territoriality and 
boundaries are “[…] the key element[s] how states are defined [….]”3 As international law, 
basically comprises of rules and principles governing the conduct and relationship of States, 
regulating territorial relationship of States is one of the primary objectives of the international law.4  
  It is generally viewed, and experience so far proves, that conflict over territory and 
boundary takes lion’s share of international conflicts.5  As states and territorially are so intertwined, 
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Art. 3(b) of the Constitutive Act of African Union, defending sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of 
member states is one of he primary of objectives of AU.  The Act in Art. 4(b) expressly declares that borders existed 
on achievement of independence shall be respected.  Art. V of League of Arab Sates Charter prohibits use of force 
and requires member states to respect territorial integrity of member States.  
5    SUZANNE LALONDE, DETERMINING BOUDNARIES IN A CONFLICTED WORLD THE ROLE OF UTI 
POSSIDETIS, 3(2002). Mark Zacher also witnesses this point quoting John Vasquez who says, “ Of all the issues 
over which wars could logically be fought, territorial issues seem to be the ones most often associated with wars. Few 
interstate wars are fought without any territorial issues being involved in one way or another.” See  Mark W. Zacher, 
The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the Use of Force, 55:2 INT’L ORG. 216, 215 – 250 
(2001).  
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the former often aspire to expand its territory to assert more power by expanding the playground.6 
This often generates conflict that international law has to address. It is also a proven fact, especially 
in Africa, that a simple territorial or boundary disagreement can quickly flare up into armed 
confrontation.7 The case of Ethiopia and Eritrea attests this assertion. The two nations were so close 
before the sudden eruption of the boundary conflict and things turned down overnight. In the short 
span of time, the Ethio-Eritrea war consumed tens of thousands of lives, destroyed enormous 
resources and spoiled, not only peaceful coo-existence, but also disturbed regional peace and 
stability. Therefore, by creating a smooth territorial or boundary relationships, among states, 
international law endeavors to play a significant role in global peace building and peace keeping.8 
The right to territory arises either from “legally significant acts” that are recognized by the 
international law or treaties concluded by states.9 International law not only sets requirements for 
the creation of nation states and describes the scope of their authority over a territory, but also it 
serves as an authoritative tool for resolving actual or potential international disputes. Moreover, 
international law doctrines and practices play a pivotal role in the interpretation of bilateral treaties, 
if dispute arises on the title to territory or in defining a precise limit of territory.  
This Chapter reviews some significant international law principles that are central in the 
determination of territorial boundary dispute, or that can guide resolution of border disputes. Before 
dealing with issues involving boundary or attempting to resolve boundary conflicts, we have to 
ascertain whether a state claiming sovereignty over a given territory bounded by the contested 
border has some kind of control or has title to the main land (the territory) that it desires to set a 
boundary. With this view in mind, this Chapter explores a brief overview of some of the relevant 
                                            
6   SURYA PARKASH SHARMA, TERRITORIAL ACQUISTION, DISPUTES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
2(1997).  
7 Lalonde, supra note 5.   
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international law norms and practices of delineating territorial land boundaries. Accordingly, this 
chapter briefly assesses some specific international law doctrines relating to territoriality, 
sovereignty, acquisition of title to territory, the stages of boundary making, the principles of uti 
possidetis juris, territorial integrity norm that may often invoked in resolving international 
territorial and boundary disputes.  
 
3.2. Territoriality and State Sovereignty 
As has been briefly pointed out in the preceding chapter, territorial boundary signifies the 
extent of the sovereignty of a state, as a sovereign power can exercise its exclusive authority within 
the bounds of a defined territory.   The concept of exclusive territorial sovereignty, a defined 
territory and equality of nation states, are international law norms that are contributed to the world 
by the Westphalian Congress of 1648. In spite of mounting assertion that territoriality, territorial 
sovereignty and even if the nation state are fading away and giving way to uncontrollable effects 
globalization and global actors, this assertion cannot hold ground for various causes and reasons. It 
is true that global actors can transcend traditional border walls without being detected by border 
guards or cannot be contained by huge and wired border walls, but the changing nature of borders 
from barrier to bridges and building a strong global cooperation can filter network of powerful 
extra-territorial or intra - territorial forces and contain them while facilitating free global mobility in 
line with the dictates of globalization.   
In the era of globalization, states will still remain sovereign in their defined territory, 
safeguard the people in the territory they control, and maintain territorial integrity against an 
“unregulated global actors”, like terrorists, cybercriminals or external aggression. States will have 
                                                                                                                                                 
8  Abdul G. Koroma, The Binding Nature of the Decisions of the ICJ in Marcelo Kohen and Laurence Boisson de 
Chazournes (eds.)  INTERNATIOANL LAW AND THE QEUST FOR ITS IMPLEMENTAITON, 431, 439 (2010).   
9 JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, 218 (8th ed. 2012).  
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power to restrain global activities that can pass their borders by filtering unauthorized actors and 
illegal transactions while facilitating mobility of acceptable persons and transactions. Globalization 
creates interdependence and necessitates collaboration among nations. The cooperation would 
enable states in their endeavor to filter undesired persons and contain harmful acts and transactions.  
There is no legal obligation to cooperate, but it is a necessary consequence of globalization 
to maintain peace and stability while facilitating modern life. For instance, Russia has cooperated 
with United States by informing terror tendencies of Boston Marathon bombing suspects.  On the 
basis of the information FBI and followed up the suspects and blacklisted them by listing the 
suspects in the terror database though mere blacklisting did not restrain the bombers. For a reason 
not known United States agencies failed to contain the suspects by they inflict the act of terrorism. 
No one has dictated Russia to supply the crucial information, but it did by its own volition with the 
interest to follow up and contain potential terrorists.  Recently a suspected terrorist who attempted 
to hurt passengers on high–speed Thalys train was known to Spanish intelligence and was tipped to 
France even before the actual commission of the act of terrorism, though the terrorist was not 
restrained before attempting to carryout the terror act.10 But the most important point here is global 
cooperation can thwart or mitigate adverse effects of globalization and protect sovereignty and keep 
territorial integrity. United States has been aggressively assessing potential terror act either in 
African or elsewhere and has been issuing possible terror act warning to alert states with a view to 
avert terrorism.   Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Tanzania have been using information supplied by 
United States.  Each State needs to cooperate to fight the global evil.   
Global cooperation, therefore, does not tarnish sovereignty, nor eliminates boundary or 
renders the concept of territoriality nonsense.  States are always at liberty to close their borders for 
                                            
10 Mark Townsend and Kim Willsher, France train shooting: Europe on high alert after attack by armed gunman, THE 
GAURDAIN, Aug 23 2015,  
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any length of time with a view to contain an act specifically relevant to individual nation. For 
example, in early September 2015, some EU members decided to reinstitute border control with a 
view to mitigate illegal migration. Hungary has been busy in constructing new fences and has 
enhanced institutional and legal authority of border guards.  Similar actions are being taken by other 
European Union Member States to curb migration influx.  The migration influx has posed a great 
threat on Schengen, as there is fear that all EU member States would close their border moving 
back to the pre-Schengen era. “Chancellor Angela Markel of German has warned that Schengen 
would fall apart if Europe cannot agree how to manage migrant crisis.”11 Thus, globalization and 
transnational nature of global actors cannot change territoriality, border, and state sovereignty in a 
defined portion of global space, or abolish international law. The effects of globalization, however, 
will change the nature of borders, which in turn, will enhance cooperation between states, thereby 
redefine the contours of international law. Contrary to the speculation regarding falling nature of 
some of the important international law principles that were passed by the Peace Accord of 
Westphalia like nation sate, territorial sovereignty, and equality of states will remain intact albeit 
transformation of borders to suit the changing transnational situation.  
As sovereignty, principally, can be invoked within the limits of defined territory, 
territoriality and sovereignty are strongly interrelated.12 Territorial sovereignty, however, does not 
simply mean power over land or space within the limits of a defined boundary, but it has strong 
nexus to the people within the territory, their relationship, interaction, and needs, as territory defines 
and shapes peoples identity, culture and values.13 Consequently, a sovereign organ is not only 
                                                                                                                                                 
      http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/22/europe-high-alert-french-train-attack (Accessed: Sep.  16, 2015). 
11 See Patrick J. Lyons, Explaining the Rules for Migrants: Schengen & the Dublin Regulations, N.Y. Times, Sep. 17, 
2015. Also Available at,  http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/17/world/europe/europe-refugees-migrants-
rules.html?_r=0; ( Accessed 4/21/16). For detailed discussion on effect of globalization, sovereignty and boundary 
see Chapter two of this work.  
12 II.R.Y JENNINGS, ACQUISITON OF TERRITORY IN LAW, 2(1963). 
13 Sharma supra note 6 at 4.  
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vested with an exclusive right and power over territory and people in it, but also has to discharge 
duties to the people in the territory.  
A sovereign states has duty to “to protect the rights of other states.”14 ICJ while addressing 
the issue of legal ties of sovereignty between Western Sahara, the Kingdom of Morocco and 
Mauritania has stressed the legal ties between State sovereignty and people in the territory in which 
sovereignty can be claimed.15 The State has an exclusive authority to make laws, adjudicate 
disputes, or punish violations with a view to discharge its traditional function of statehood. 
Therefore, the notion of sovereignty is conferred not only to reap its benefits (power and rights), but 
also has to discharge its responsibility to the people in the geographic area where sovereignty can 
be exercised.  
After brief overview of the issue of state sovereignty, territoriality, and globalization, now 
we will explore the determination of the scope of territory and boundary. In order to study the 
correct territorial edge (the boundary) the study of international legal norm involving territoriality 
appears pivotal.  
 
3.3. Determining Title to Territory 
As has been pointed out above, any issue over boundary or a territory is very sensitive, as 
territoriality defines one’s identity and values.  In conflict over territory, where the disputants 
contest for a given tract of land, one can also notice tension as a result of strong public pressure, 
animosity, and mistrust among citizens of both contesting nations who have been enduring 
unsettled conflict. In an endeavor to resolve territorial dispute the first crucial step is determination 
of title to territory. A tribunal or arbitration team to which settlement of territorial conflict was 
entrusted should take time to investigate evidences, and has to make a thorough field research to 
                                            
14 MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 279(1991). 
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findout an actual titleholder. Contest to title of a territory or conflict over the precise limits of 
neighboring territory is a regular proceeding of international tribunals. About one-third of cases 
disposed by international tribunals including International Court of Justice (ICJ), one way or the 
other, deal with territorial or boundary dispute.16  
Claim over boundary line, and dispute over title to territory are not exactly identical issues 
though in some cases both of the issues my overlap. For instance, the dispute over Badme between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea appear to involve both issues, albeit, often the conflict is labeled as boundary 
dispute. The expression, boundary, connotes a line of separation of two or more sovereign states, 
whereas, territory implies a space different from a line having its length and width. The village of 
Badme is not simply a line. It is a small town or a village in which thousands of residents dwell. 
Thus, it is a territory. The initial issue was title over the town of Badme. Then the issue of unsettled 
boundary over the entire Ethio-Eritrea borderland arose.  The Ethio-Eritrea conflict, thus, involves 
conflict over boundary and territory.  
Determination of legal holder of title to a territory, therefore, is a central inquiry in resolving 
territorial dispute. In old days it was believed that title to territory acquired in a way similar to 
acquisition of title to private properties. The assumption of territories as properties has facilitated 
transactions involving territories. A sovereign power that had title to territory used to dispose it in a 
way similar to private properties. Tribal chiefs in Africa used to sell, donate or lease territories to 
anyone that had fulfilled demands of the chief.17 As a monarch was considered as an “elect of God” 
to have power over every thing in the State; he/she was considered as the ultimate owner of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
15 Sharma supra note 6 at 4. 
16 Id.  
17 For example, Italian missionaries and traders bought land from tribal chief before capturing the whole territory of 
Eritrea. Almost an identical system was employed by France to hold Djibouti in a lease for 99 years. To avoid 
colonization, the 19th century Ethiopian government did not allow foreigners to own land and other immovable 
properties in Ethiopia. Still now in Ethiopia, foreigners cannot own land and buildings in their own name.   
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State territory and things found therein. Practically, therefore, there was no basic difference 
between the monarch’s private property and State property, including territory.  
Later on, some distinctions were made in personal property of monarch and state properties 
including territorial land. Prominent international lawyer and author, Lasa Oppenheim, remarks, 
“State territory is territorial property of a State.”18 Thus, to Oppenheim, it was not the monarch, but 
the State that included organs other than the monarch was “proprietor” of the territory.19  In other 
words,“ The territory of a State is not the property of the monarch, or the Government, […] it is the 
country which is subjected to territorial supremacy of the imperium of a State.”20  This is a great 
deviation of the medieval view of ownership of territory.  Even in 20th century, however, some 
traditional monarchs in Africa, like of kings of Ethiopia, stuck to the old view and considered the 
Ethiopian territory as property of the king and freely donated land to anyone he liked. In those days, 
there was no basic difference in property ownership of the king and the State. This assumption was 
changed immediately after removal of the monarch and change of its regime.   
Thus, in old days, as a ‘proprietor’, a State, could sale, lease, bequest, or transfer the 
territory in any way, legally possible, irrespective of the interest of people on the territory.21 Thus, a 
territory, like any commodity, passed through different ‘hands’ that directly or indirectly involved 
in ownership or possession. When dispute arises over title of a territory the tribunal has to ascertain 
an actual titleholder at the time of the dispute by assessing how the current title was obtained, as a 
transferee can acquire exactly the title of the transferor (the principle of nemo dat quod non habet).  
The judicial organ before which a territorial or boundary case is lodged, at the outset, will 
ascertain how opposing parties have acquired ownership or possession of the territory. If a party 
                                            
18 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, A TREATISE 217 (1905).  
19 Crawford supra note 9 at 216. 
20 Oppenheim, supra note 18 at 218.  
21 Crawford supra note 9.  
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proves its title over the claimed territory the next issue will be defining the limits of territory and 
emplacing marks on the ground (delimitation and demarcation). Now the issue is how title to a 
territory can be legally acquired and how it is possible to prove ones territorial title? Because of the 
traditional assumption of a territory as property, the Roman law doctrine of acquisition of title to 
private property can be analogized to acquisition of title to territory. Shaw confirms this view 
stating:  
The international rules regarding territorial sovereignty are rooted in the Roman law 
provisions governing ownership and possession, and the classification of the different 
methods of acquiring territory is direct descendant of the Roman rules dealing with 
property.22  
 
 Thus, the traditional modes of acquisition of title to territory are, “… stereotyped way[s] 
reflecting those of Roman law,”23 which prescribes five prominent modes of acquiring title to a 
property, viz: occupation, accretion, cession, conquest, and prescription. Now it appears fairly 
correct to sum that the traditional modes of acquisition of title to territory, with all the defects and 
critiques, have got the status of customary international law.24    
Though some modes of acquisition of title to territory in 21st century are viewed as outdated 
and practically irrelevant, understanding of the historical background of acquisition of territory may 
make some help in resolving the rampant territorial or boundary conflict almost all over the globe. 
Due to time and space limitation, merely a Birdseye view of each of the modes of acquisition is 
briefly stated herein under.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
22 Shaw supra note 14. 
23 Crawford supra note 9.  
24 Lee supra note 22. 
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3.3.1. Occupation 
Occupation is the oldest form of acquisition of title to territory that was never been under 
sovereignty of another state, or occupation of an abandoned territory.25  The occupant to a valid title 
the territory has to be terra nullius. The expression terra nullius may be understood in different 
senses depending upon the interest of European powers. First, literally the expression terra nullius 
meant an unoccupied (uninhibited) territory. In this sense, a state had an unlimited right to occupy a 
virgin land which never been under sovereignty of another state. In the Eastern Greenland Case,26 
for example, Denmark exercised sovereignty over unoccupied and uninhibited Eastern Greenland. 
Danish people settled in the Eastern Greenland in 1894 and since then Denmark continuously and 
peacefully exercised its sovereignty by issuing various legislations to resolve issues involving 
Eastern Greenland.27 It granted concession and issued hunting and mining permits over Eastern 
Greenland. The Permanent Court of International Justice held that Denmark acquired title to 
Eastern Greenland by occupation.28 Norway’s contention of proximity of the land to its territory 
did not prevail over Denmark’s occupation and effective control of the territory.  
Second, a newly formed land (territory) may also be occupied as master less. Though it may 
not be a usual phenomenon, there is a possibility that a new land may emerge in the high sea (res 
communis) when the sea dries up or a hill uncovered by water emerges as a result of volcanic 
eruption. The first occupier of a territory that emerges in high seas my acquire title to the territory 
by occupation. This is almost identical with occupation of terra nullius after first discovery of a 
territory.  
                                            
25Monon supra note 1 at 134. 
26 Charles Cheny Hyde, The Case Concerning the Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, 27 :4   AM. J. INT’L L. 732 -738 
(1933); see also Denmark v. Norway, 3 P.C.I.J. REPORTS 148(1938).  
27  Id, see also J.KT. Chao, The Legal Status of Eastern Greenland Case:  a Note on its Legal Aspects, 
http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/bitstream/140.119/11287/1/Greenland.63 accessed 4/30/15 
28    Eastern Greenland Case, 3 P.C.I. J. REPORTS 148 (1938),  
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Thirdly, a territory inhibited by politically unorganized aboriginal people had been subject of 
occupation, as a “sovereign-less” territory.29 Put simply, a territory occupied by disorganized 
indigenous people was considered as terra nullius and subjected to occupation. In twenty first 
century, this assumption is awkward, but was applied even in United States. The following 
statement of Winston Churchill reveals the assumption territories occupied by indigenous people 
was terra nullius.  
I do not agree that the dog in a manger has the final right to the manger even though he may 
have lain there for a very long time. I do not admit that right. I do not admit for instance, that a 
great wrong as been done to the Red Indians of America or the black people of Australia. I do 
not admit that a wrong has been done to these people by the fact that a stranger race, a higher–
grade race, a more worldly wise race to put it that way, has come in and taken their place.30  
 
History has to be understood by the time, but in current state of mind, Churchill’s statements 
are racially biased and offensive. All humans including Native Americans and Black People of 
Australia or Africa got their own share of earth on which they were created. They are the original 
occupiers of their land and they had their own indigenous type of political system and political 
organization that may not be congruent with the political systems of Europe, but often disregarded. 
Therefore, it is absurd to disregard a non-European form of organization of people and consider 
traditional people that get order from their ethnic elite, as politically unorganized.  This 
expansionist policy had initiated the Berlin Conference of 1884 – 1885 to partition Africa among 
the European powers. European powers disregarded traditional African political system and 
governance, which was different from European system and viewed Africa as terra nullius and 
subjected to appropriation.  Professor Menon concludes: 
The concept that a territory not possessed by a community having a united political organization 
[…was] subject to effective occupation by a foreign power appeared to be dominant thought the 
later part of the nineteenth century in the contest of the African Continent. The inhabitants of the 
                                            
29   Joshua Castellino, Territorial Integrity and the “right” to self –Determination: An examination of the Conceptual 
Tools, 33 BROOK, J. INT’L 512, 503-568 (2008).  
30   Id.  note 46 Winston Churchill’s Statement as quoted by Anindhil Roy in Lannan reading and Conversion: 
September ( Sept. 18, 1937). 
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territory were considered factually, but not legally, in occupation of the territory. 
[Consequently…] occupation of [fictionally] an inhabited territory was possible according to the 
then prevalent legal order which was predominantly Eurocentric.31 
 
In Western Sahara Case, Spain argued that Western Sahara was terra nullius though indigenous 
people inhibited in it.32  Morocco and Mauritania vigorously opposed Spain’s assertion and 
convinced the ICJ panel that Western Sahara was not terra nullius at the time of occupation by 
Spain.33 The World Court in its advisory opinion summed that, at the time of colonization, Western 
Sahara was inhibited by politically and socially organized people and cannot be viewed as terra 
nullius.34 Spain’s argument was awkward as it occupied the territory by concluding treaty with local 
chief, but not by mere occupation.35  
In medieval society, there were also other uncommon specific situations in which an 
occupied territory had been viewed as terra nullius because the residents were “different people”.  
In Roman antiquity, for instance, “… any territory which did not belong to a Christian sovereign 
was terra nullius, and later in the nineteenth century, any territory which did not belong to a 
civilized State was terra nullius.”36  
In conclusion, to get sovereignty over territory by occupation international tribunals 
consider certain minimum conditions.  First, the territory has to be terra nullius.  As has been 
pointed out above the meaning of the expression, terra nullius has changed from time to time and 
depend on socio political system.37 Second the intention of the occupier (animus occupandi) to 
exercise sovereignty over the territory. The intention to exercise sovereignty over the occupied 
                                            
31 Menon supra note 1 at 136 
32. Senors Crc-Salgado Gonzalez campos, caro and Lacleta who represented Spain before International Court of Justice 
when it heard the statements from all the concerned parties for giving advisory opinion to the United Nations, argued 
that Western Sahara was terra nullius at the time colonization. Frank Wooldridge, The Advisory Opinion of the 
International Court of Justice in the Western Sahara case, 8 ANGLO-AM L. REV. 97  (1979). 
33 Id, at 93.  
34 Id. at  102 
35 Id. at  108; see also Lee supra note 23 at 8.  
36 Id. at 137 
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territory can be understood by the activities the State carries out and the administration of the 
territory.38  The intention to occupy a territory has to be permanent. Finally, there should be 
continuous and peaceful exercise or display of sovereignty39.  Unwarranted interruption and protest 
from the beginning may spoil the legality of the occupation.40 Nowadays, there is no unoccupied 
land; all the vicinities of earth are occupied. Thus, there is no territory that can satisfy anyone of the 
grounds for acquisition of territorial title by occupation, and hence in modern days, occupation as a 
mode of acquisition of title to territory is obsolete.   
 
3.3.2.  Accretion 
The second mode of acquisition of title to a territory is accretion. This is an unplanned 
natural addition to a territory that has already been held by a sovereign State. Traditionally, “… a 
State has the right of sovereignty over any natural addition, made to its existing territory.” For 
example, a border river may divert its route annexing a chunk of land to one of the neighboring 
stare, or an ocean or a sea may dry up or diminish its size by increasing territorial land uncovered 
by water.  With regard to ocean and sea it may be argued that territorial water is already under 
sovereignty of the State and any addition of land cannot be viewed as a new acquisition of territory, 
but the beginning of territorial water is the shore and the expansion of shore pushes outward to the 
                                                                                                                                                 
37 This assumption was implicit in Easter Greenland Case, 3 P.C.I. J. REPORTS 148 1938, see also Western Sahara 
Case 8 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 86 919790.  
38 In Minquiers and Ecrehos case,  and The Minquiers and Ecrehos Case, ( France /United Kingdom) Judgment of 
November  17th, (1953) ICJ held  that exercise of jurisdiction, issuing legislation and effective administration and 
prove the animus occupandi., Similarly, in Clipperton Island case, the arbitrator King Victor Emmanuel III of Italy 
said that the regulatory acts that were carried out by France in 1858 prove in clearly that France expressed its 
intention to occupy Island as her territory. See Menon supra note 1 at 138; See also D. H. N. Johnson, Minquiers and 
Ecrehos case, 3 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 189  (1954). 
39 In Eastern Greenland Case, just after occupation of the uninhibited eastern part of Greenland, though Norwegians 
held the Western part, Denmark exercised noticeable acts displaying the exercise of sovereignty.  Mining and hunting 
Danish companies had been working in territory. See Charles Cheny Hyde, The Case Concerning the Legal Status of 
Eastern Greenland, 27 (4)  AM. J. INT’L. L. 732 - 738 (1933); see also Denmark v. Norway, 3 P.C.I.J. Reports 
148(1938). 
40 The Island of Palmas case often cited in this situation.  In this case, the first discoverer was Spain but Netherlands 
effectively controlled the Island peacefully without any form of protest.  Spain ceded the Island to Nowadays, but 
Spain already lost occupation, the acquirer cannot be an owner by operation of nemo dat quod non habet principle.    
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territorial water deep into the sea. In the case of high seas Exclusive Economic Zone will be pushed 
into the sea forthwith.  
Nowadays, the traditional rule of accretion as a mode of acquisition of territory when a river 
diverts its direction or dries up appears doubtful. A State that has bordered by a diverted or dried up 
river may not be willing to lose a portion of territory it held. The old river line may still continue to 
be considered as a land boundary line or the two neighboring States may, by agreement, mark their 
line of separation as it is usually done in land boundary. If the river that has diverted its direction 
was a navigable one, the middle of the navigable point (thalweg) will be taken as a critical point. In 
other cases, the center of riverbank is the point of dividing line of two neighboring states.41   
 
                      3.3.3. Cession 
 
Two or more sovereign states may transfer all or a portion of their territory for consideration 
or for any cause.  This is known as cession. According to Menon, “Cession without a quid pro quo 
has been by far the largest group of transfer of territory because most cessions were imposed upon a 
vanquished State by its victor or upon an unwilling State by an international Congress.” 42  For 
instance, Eritrea was federated to Ethiopia by the decision of the winners of WWII and later 
approved by the General Assembly though after ten years of cession to the Ethiopian sovereignty, 
the monarchy merged Eritrea to one of the provinces, which later resulted in armed rebellion. 
Similarly, the Somali region of Ethiopia was ceded to Ethiopia after decolonization. Numerous such 
cases have appeared, especially after the two world wars. Cession, thus, is a peaceful method of 
transfer of territory from one sovereign to another.  It is a “… renunciation made by one State in 
                                            
41 Shaw supra note 14 at 285. 
42 Menon supra note 1 at 151. 
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favour of another of the rights and title which the former may have to the territory in question.”43  
Cession may also be for consideration. A State may transfer sovereignty of a portion of territory or 
some limited instances the whole territory to another sovereign in quid pro quo basis.  In old days 
states used to sell a part or all of territory for money, just like any property. For instance, in 1803 
France ceded Louisiana to United States for consideration just like sale of land in traditional 
sense.44  Similarly, Mexico ceded Texas, New Mexico, and Northern California to the United States 
for $7.2 million. United States also took sovereignty of several territories, hitherto been under the 
sovereignty of Denmark under the doctrine of cession.45  A territory may also be leased for certain 
defined period of time or for indefinite time for consideration. For instance, United States leased 
Guantanamo Bay from Cuba in 1903, after seizing it at the end of Spanish war. United States 
assisted Cuba to get independence from Spain and stayed there holding the territory as naval base.46 
Cuba signed a treaty that has authorized United States for use as naval station as far as it is 
necessary.  If these terms are respected, Guantanamo will be necessary for unlimited number of 
years and will be held permanently. Now a days Cuba has been protesting against the lease, but 
there is no way out, unless United States by its own free will relinquishes possession. This will 
never happen. Similarly a tribal chief who had been in control of territories Djibouti lease it to 
France.  Finally, Djibouti got independence in 1977.  
Before commencement of the formal colonization, European powers were able to step in 
African through missionaries and merchants who bought land from local chiefs, and later facilitated 
taking of the whole territory by their governments. Then European States either held the whole 
                                            
43 See  Id at 150. Quoted  from Reparation Commission v. German Government,  ANNUAL DIGEST OF INT’L L. 
CASES 199(1923 – 24). 
44 Id at 151. 
45 Id at 1.  
46 Jonathan M. Mansen, Give Guantanamo Back to Cuba, N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2012, 
   http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/11/opinion/give-guantanamo-back-to-cuba.html?_r=0 (last visited Sep. 16, 2015 at: 
4:28 PM). 
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territory by force (which is conquest) or bribe tribal chiefs or trick them to sign a treaty legalizing 
transfer of tittle to territory.  For instance, Italy before invading Ethiopia had attempted either to 
bribe or trick the then Ethiopian king. One of the tricks was wrong translation of the treaty. The 
Wuchale Treaty that the Ethiopian king assumed to be a treaty for cooperation, stated in its Italian 
version that Ethiopia can make external relationship only through Italy. After learning the trick, the 
Ethiopian King protested to the treaty and a war broke out in which Italy suffered a great loss and 
finally recognized Ethiopia’s sovereign existence before it finally invaded again and occupied the 
whole country for five years until driven out by the assistance of Great Britain.  
 
3.3.4. Conquest (Annexation) 
Conquest or annexation is another mode of acquisition of title to territory. In old days, 
conquest was the most common form of acquisition of title to a territory. Powerful neighbors or a 
state with superior military power used to invade a weaker nation and annex either the whole 
territory or portion of it into is territory or dominion.  Traditionally the loser of war loses 
sovereignty to territory and the winner acquires title over territory.47 The need for more territory 
and subjects who may be forced to pay tax or render other crucial service like serving in the 
military inspired states to conquer weaker states.   
Acquisition of territory by conquest was lawful until the formation of League of Nations.  The 
first formal prohibition of invasion for territorial acquisition as declared by the League of Nations. 
Art. 10 of the Convenient of League of Nations states:  
The members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external 
aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the 
League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression 
the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.48 
                                            
47 The view was changed since WWI.  The winner of WWI agreed to hold the loser states temporarily with ultimate 
goal of enabling them for self-determination.  
48 League of Nations. Covenant of League of Nations. Art. 10. (April 28, 1919), 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3dd8b9854.html (Accessed 4/20/16). 
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The Covenant of League of Nations may be praised for attempting to prohibit invasion for 
the sole reason of expanding territory, it failed to stop conquest practically because did not 
prescribe possible consequences of aggression. The expression, “In case of any such aggression or 
in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise…’’ appears simply a 
political commitment which can easily be ignored by powerful nations. It was practically 
impossible for weaker nations to stop aggression by peaceful means. Ethiopia was the only African 
country that signed the Covenant without any form of Western affiliation, but it was invaded by 
Italy in disregard of the Convention. Ethiopia invoked the provision and sought restraint but the 
Council could not help. Surprisingly, the Council advised Italy to get certain portion of Ethiopian 
territory and stop invasion. Italy, however, disregarded the advice aiming to occupy the whole 
territories of Ethiopia. As a result, Ethiopia suffered huge loss and faced massacre by Italian fascist. 
Finally, the invaders were expelled during WWII by the Ethiopian resistance army with the help of 
Great Britain. Article 11 of the Covenant states that all members of the League will react if any 
member states were invaded but no action was taken against Italy.  
Art. 2 (4) of the United Nations Charter prohibits threat or use force, unless it is to avert an 
invasion. The Provision is the successor of Art. 10 of Covenant of League of Nations, which states,  
“All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with 
the Purpose of the United Nations.”49  Though the Security Council is relatively stronger and 
effective when compared to League Council, the prohibitory wordings of both Art. 10 of the 
Covenant and Art. 2 Paragraph 4 of the Charter stipulate weak enforcement mechanism in case of 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
49 U.N. Charter of United Nations. Art. 2(4). 1UNTS XVI. (Oct. 24, 
1945),http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3930.html ( Accessed: 4/20/16). 
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aggression.  Several instances of collective measures against invasion were taken, but in numerous 
other cases of violations, the Security Council could not restrain use of force that is contrary to the 
Charter owing to veto or ideological interests of Permanent Members.   
In the Ethiopia/Eritrea cases, the Security Council passed Resolutions No. 1297 which 
simply requested for cessation of military actions, and prohibited further use of force and demanded 
withdrawal of troops from the illegally held territories.50 In Eritrea’s refusal to maintain status quo 
ante bellum, a destructive war that claimed lives of tens of thousands broke out. Finally, Ethiopia 
was able to liberate the occupied territories.  In the words of Marc Von Boemchen, “ Having 
suffered a major defeat, Eritrea eventually accepted to redeploy its forces from all positions held 
after May 6, 1998 thereby fulfilling Ethiopian demands.”51 After defeat, Eritrea expressed its intent 
to abide by the Resolution No. 1297, which Ethiopia refused to comply with. To deter Ethiopia, 
United States sponsored a harsher resolution, which imposed arms embargo on both Ethiopia and 
Eritrea and travel ban on Ethiopian officials. Russia objected to the indefinite travel ban and arms 
embargo, contending open Arms Embargo did not work in Iraq.  Finally, accepting Russia’s 
suggestion, the Security Council unanimously passed Resolution No. 1298 which imposed Arms 
Embargo on Ethiopia and Eritrea for 12 months. Ethiopia objected to the Sanction claiming it was 
unfair while the country was invaded.52 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
50 Resolutions 1297 (2000) and Resolution 1298 (2000),  
51 Marc Von Boemcken, Arms Embargo Against Eritrea and Ethiopia, in PUTTING TEETH IN THE TIGER: 
IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ARMS EMBARGO, 189 – 204 (Michael Brozoska & George A. Lopez ed. 
2009). https://www.bicc.de/publications/by-category/all-issues/category/other-publications/(last visited Sep. 16, 2015 
4:36 PM). 
52 Barbara Crossette, Arms Embargo for Eritrea and Ethiopia,  The N. Y. Times, May 19, 2000, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/05/19/world/arms-embargo-ordered-for-eritrea-and-ethiopia.html 4/21/15 10:18 PM; 
Also See Marc Von Boemcken,  Arms Embargo Against Eritrea and Ethiopia, 10 Conflict Management, Peace 
Economics and Development ( Putting Teeth in the Tiger:  Improving Effectiveness of Arms Embargo) 196 – 201 
(Michael Brozoska & George A. Lpez ed. 2009). 
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Nowadays, therefore, there is no way to acquire title to a territory by conquest. The Charter 
prohibits conquest in any form.  Apart from certain Balkan Stats that were annexed to U.S.S.R, no 
other winner of WWII has retained title to territories of loser States. Israel’s occupation of 
territories that were acquired by war has been frequently condemned.53 Iraq’s temporarily 
occupation Kuwait resulted in collective action that forcefully driven out the occupiers. A state 
cannot acquire title to territory even if it acted in self-defense. At the end of Ethio-Eritrea war, 
Ethiopian troops entered deep into Eritrean territory, but immediately withdrew after ceasefire 
agreement was reached. In other words, self-defense cannot be ground to acquire title of a territory. 
 
                             3.3.5. Prescription 
 A State may also acquire title to territory by acquisitive prescription. The possibility of 
acquisition of territorial title by prescription in international law, however, is arguable.54 According 
to Jennings and Watt, “There has always been some opposition to prescription as a mode of 
acquiring territory.”55  Though there is unanimity, some still show the possibility of acquisition of 
title to territory after prolonged possession.  In this case, prescription as a mode of acquisition of 
title to territory is similar to adverse possession as a mode of transfer of ownership in private 
property.  In adverse possession, states prescribe time limit within which an original titleholder may 
lose ownership. International law does not prescribe a defined time limit, but possession of territory 
fairly for long period of time coupled with fulfillment of other requirements may confer title to the 
possessor by operation of law.   
The length of time need not be immemorial, but some length of time together with peaceful 
possession of the territory and actual and open exercise of sovereignty in exclusion of other states, 
                                            
53 It has been repeatedly declared by the General Assembly and Security Council that Israel’s occupation of certain 
territories that were occupied by the 1967 war invalid.   Menon supra note 1 at 162. 
54 1 ROBERT JENNINGS AND ARTHUR WATTS, OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, 706(1992).  
55 Id. 
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may confer title to the territory.56 The State claiming acquisition of title to territory by prescription 
should prove, among others, the acquiescence of the original titleholder.  If the original title holder 
keeps quiet for long period of time while understanding another states openly exercises sovereignty, 
it is fairly justifiable to transfer title in order to keep international peace and security.  
 
                          3.3.6. The Contemporary Approach 
Eminent international lawyers, Malcolm Shaw and Ian Brownlie, vigorously argue against 
the analogy of Roman law modes of acquisition of title to private property to acquisition of title to 
territory. Ian Brownlie, persuasively summarizes the inadequacy of orthodox modes of acquisition 
of title to territory.57 To Brownlie, when a new state acquires independence and gets statehood, it 
acquires title to the territory without fulfillment of any of the traditional modes. Similarly, 
acquisition of title of a territory by acquiescence, and acquisition of territorial title by recognition 
do not fall in anyone of the traditional modes of acquisition of title to property.58  
The orthodox modes do not give room for adjudicator to consider better title (relative title) 
in ambiguous situation. When contesting parties furnish confusing evidence, the tribunal may 
decide on the basis of preponderance of evidence and confer title of contested territory depending 
on weight of evidence. In the words of Brownlie, “ The importance of showing a better right in 
contentious cases [may be ]obscured if too much credit is given to the five ‘modes’.” 59   Similarly, 
Malcom Shaw observes, “[… Roman rules dealing with property] has resulted in some confusion… 
Law, being so attached to contemporary life, cannot be easily transposed into a different cultural 
                                            
56 Id.  
57 Crawford supra note 9 at 220. 
58 Id at 221. 
59 Id.  
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milieu.”60 Thus, in twenty first century there is no way to acquire title by the application of 
traditional modes.61  
Shaw and Brownlie agree on the significance of factual and legal conditions under which 
title of a territory belong to particular state.62 To Shaw,  “ The essence of territorial sovereignty is 
contained in the notion of title.”63 To Brownlie, “ […] title is a by-product of the events leading to 
the creation of a state as a new source of territorial sovereignty.”64 An international tribunal in 
addition to traditional modes of acquisition of territory may require proof of fulfillment of factual 
and legal conditions such as the exercise of sovereignty over the territory by conduct, a titre de 
sourverain before the date in question.65  The issue of sovereignty carries complex legal questions 
including “prohibition” in acquiring the territory and the right to seek invalidity of former coercive 
treaties that were entered without the state giving free consent.66  
Factual and legal conditions are facts proving that the territory belonged to one or more of 
the claimants. After ascertaining the fulfillment of conditions, the tribunal will decide on the issue. 
Thus, “[… ] the existence of those factors is [is] required under international law to entail the legal 
consequences of a change in the juridical status of a particular territory.”67  In a way different from 
the conventional methods, proof of title to territory need not necessarily be absolute; it is based on 
preponderance of evidence. This means the international tribunals will decide on relative weight of 
the evidence presented by the contending parties. The tribunal thus “[…] will consider all the 
                                            
60 Shaw supra note 14. 
61 Crawford supra note 9 at 216; See also Shaw who remarks, “ … the Roman method of categorizing the different 
methods of acquiring territory faces difficulties when applied in international law.” Shaw supra note 14. 
62 Shaw supra note 14. 
63 Id.  
64 Crawford supra note 9 at 221. 
65 Id. 
66 See Id.  
67 Shaw supra note 14 
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relevant arguments and will award the land to the state which relatively speaking puts forward the 
better … legal case.”68 
As declared in the Frontier Dispute Case, (Burkina Faso v. Mali),69 contemporary rules of 
international law gives preference to title than other rights and privileges over a territory. The 
titleholder is presumed to be a sovereign over the territory even if the territory is under possession 
of a different organ for whatever reason or cause. The superiority of title over effective control 
accords with the doctrine of uti possidetis juris70. In Frontier Dispute Case ICJ remarked, “ The 
principle of uti possidetis juirs accords pre-eminence to legal title over effective possession as a 
basis of sovereignty.” [Emphasis added]. Shaw shares this view stating, “ Where the act does 
correspond to the law, where the territory which the subject of the dispute is effectively 
administered by a State other than the one possessing the legal title, preference should be given to 
the holder of the title.”71  
The question is how to prove title? In private property holding title to a property is 
established by registration of the property.  In absence of international registry system, how can a 
State purporting titleholder prove its status? Ian Brownlie enumerates possibilities one can prove 
title to a territory.  To Brownlie, “ unquestioned title is a contingency arising from history, general 
recognition, and the absence of an other claimant.”72  
Title to territory may also depend upon other factors.  The private property law maxim of 
nemodat quod non habet, may be applicable to acquisition of territorial tile. A state acquiring title 
to a territory cannot acquire a better title than the transferor. Thus, a state with a defective title can 
transfer only a defective title. Other factors like judicial decision, recognition from some states, , 
                                            
68 Id. 
69 Case Concerning The Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso /Republic of Mali), ICJ Reports (1986), http://www.icj-cij.org.  
70 For detailed discussion of the doctrine of uti possidetis juris see. 3.3 of this work.  
71 Crawford supra note 9 at 216. 
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and compromise on territorial title can affect title on territory. Competing claims for title to territory 
often resolved in adjudication by international tribunals. In Island of Palmas and Minquieers and 
Ecrehos,73 it was remarked that title to territory could be conferred to one of the contending parties 
in spite of the fact that there was reason to believe the territory was terra nullius at a given point of 
time.  In Eastern Greenland case Danish activity in the disputed area had been intensive, but the 
Court did not consider the area terra nullius though Danish sovereignty was formally declared on 
another ground. Finally, where it is too ambiguous to arrive a given conclusion the court may 
simply weigh a given title with another.74 
In modern times, most of the traditional modes of acquisition of title to territory are 
practically obsolete. As pointed out above, there is no way to occupy a territory, as the earth’s entire 
surface has been occupied.75  Consequently Ian Borwnlie suggests the following methods that may 
prove title to territory as a matter of convenience.76 First, original and historic title: Possession of a 
territory from the time immemorial may be a ground for getting title to territory. This may appear 
similar to the traditional modes of occupation, but it need not be occupation of master less territory. 
It may include possessing a territory for long period of time without objection or formal transfer. 
Titleholder may invoke “… an ancient, original or historic title.”77 To prove title the titleholder may 
furnish evidences of “general repute or opinion as to matters of historical fact.” This method of 
acquiring title to territory may be relevant to some Asian states in which traditional boundaries 
                                                                                                                                                 
72 Id at  217.  
73 1953 I.C.J 47-52 cited by Crawford p. 217 
74 Crawford supra note 9 at 217. 
75 High sea  with its appur tenant beyond territorial water is held res communes; Antarctica is reserved for scientific 
research as res commune.  Greenland is already occupied. Moon and other stars and plants belong to everyone on 
earth.  
76 Crawford supra note 9 at 221. 
77 Id. 
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were recognized.78  In some cases, depending upon facts and evidences presented, “ International 
tribunals have recognized the concept of ancient or original title [….]”79 
Second, effective control may be a ground to acquire title to territory. In absence of 
registration of title to territory, treaty or judicial decisions conferring title a territory by effective 
control is an effective legal possibility. In Eastern Greenland, (Denmark v. Norway)80 the 
Permanent Court remarked:  
 “[ … ] Sovereignty based not upon some particular act or title such as treaty of cession 
but merely upon continued display of authority involves two elements such of which 
must be shown to exit the intention and will to ac as sovereign, and some actual exercise 
of display of such authority”81   
 
Professor Menon expounds the requirements for effective control into three parts82. First, 
there should be appropriable terra nullius.  It is to mean the territory to be controlled should satisfy 
anyone of the requirements of terra nullius. Second, there should be a permanent intention (animus 
occupandi) to hold sovereignty over the territory, and lastly, the state should display continuous 
display of authority (corpus occupandi).83  
While continuous display of authority is observable and tangible, as the State has to 
effectively control the territory establishing its administration, but the  intention to act as sovereign 
appears subjective, which may be inferred from actual exercise of sovereignty.  This means, unless 
the State expressly declares otherwise, permanent intention to hold the territory as a sovereign 
power can be presumed from ‘actual control and display of authority’.84  The issue of effective 
control arises where the actual holder of the territory lacks proof of original or derivative title. An 
uninterrupted control of territory is necessary to prove effective control. The requirement of 
                                            
78 See Id.  
79 Id.  
80 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser.A/B/) No. 53 ( Apr. 5).  
81 Crawford supra note 9 at 222. 
82  Menon supra note 1 at 135. 
83 Id.  
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continued display of authority is reiterated in Eritrea/Yemen Case,85 territorial conflict over 
Hannish Island, which was awarded to Yemen. Thus, intentional display of authority is the 
contemporary rule of proving effective control of a territory in dispute. Exercise of criminal 
jurisdiction over wrongs committed in the territory, for example may be an instance of exercise of 
authority.  Similarly, normal and peaceful administration also proves effective control.  
Effective control was also an important procedural requirement when occupation served as 
mode of acquisition of title to territory. Discovery of a territory, by itself, was not enough to confer 
title to territory. A discovered territory should be effectively controlled. The old rule of mere 
settlement and close physical possession of the territory is not `enough. The current view is 
effective control, which demands administration with continuous display of authority. The notion of 
‘discovery’ entail previously unknown land that never been inhibited by humans. In old time 
(fifteenth and sixteenth century) a mere discover was sufficient to confer title. 86 Later it was held 
that a title acquired by mere discovery was “inchoate’’.  An inchoate title is a defective one that can 
be disregarded by states unless effectively controlled in a reasonable period of time. In Island of 
Palmas case, United States, as a successor to Spain, invoked title by mere discovery of the island 
by Spain. This assertion was not accepted, as 19th century law required a discovered territory to be 
effectively occupied within a reasonable time of discovery.  Ultimately, as a result, United States 
took a position that discovery alone cannot confer any form of title. 87  
Territory may be controlled directly or indirectly via representation. An effective control 
through representation has to be approved to constitute a legal title and confer sovereignty. This is 
                                                                                                                                                 
84 Crawford supra note 9 at 222. 
85 Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the First Stage of the Proceedings between Eritrea and Yemen (9 Oct. 1998) 
http://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_XXII/209-332.pdf  (last visited Sep. 16, 2015 5:21 PM). 
86 Crawford supra note 9 at 223. 
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called symbolic annexation.88 In Clipperton Island Case, a French man who was authorized by 
French government to hold a territory on its behalf occupied the Clipperton Island. The French 
Consulate notified the occupation to the government of Hawaii. Later Mexican authorities claimed 
title by Spanish discovery of Island,89 but the Island was awarded to France by a binding arbitration 
agreement that was entered between Mexico and France.   
To sum up, in accordance with the current international law, title to territory prevails over 
effective control. Unchallenged title can be acquired by initial occupation and continuous exercise 
of sovereignty over the territory peacefully. While this is the usual form, a State with unchallenged 
title can transfer its title to another State. The transferee acquires all the rights and the privileges of 
the transferor (nomo dat quod non habet).  This requires a valid treaty between the transferor and 
transferee. The date of coming into force of a ratified treaty is deemed as the date of transfer of title 
and sovereignty. This form of acquisition of title is known as cession. A state may transfer the 
sovereignty over territory to another state for consideration or other causes.  States may simply 
recognize the sovereignty of a given territory in consideration of recognition of its own sovereignty 
over another territory. This kind of arrangement may be made with a view to settle boundary 
dispute between two or more neighboring states.  In medieval times, it was common to conclude 
treaty with tribal chiefs to take possession of territory. For example, France concluded a treaty with 
tribal chief of Afar to take possession of land surrounded by Red Sea and later took sovereignty of 
over Djibouti renaming the territory as French Somali land.90 As cited by Brownlie, Judge Huber in 
Island of Plamas remarks, “  In substance, it is not an agreement between equals; it is rather a form 
of internal organization of a colonial territory, on the basis of autonomy of the natives… And thus 
                                            
88 Id. See also Ivan L. Head, Canadian Claims to Territorial Sovereignty in the Arctic Regions, 9 MCG.L. J.  202, 200 – 
226 (1963).  
89 Crawford supra note 9 at 223.   
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sovereignty over native States becomes the basis of territorial sovereignty as toward other members 
of the community of nations.”91 
 
3.4. The Doctrine of Uti Possiditis 
3.4.1.   Nature and Origin 
Uti Possidits, is a concept of international law that may be used in making territorial limits 
of states when new states get independence form colonial yoke.92 Uti possidetis, as a norm of 
boundary delineation, was first applied in Spanish Latin America. After getting political 
independence from Spain, the Latin American Republics, were confronted with a perplexing task of 
settling territorial limits.93 At the time the easiest possible solution to obviate a looming border 
conflict was taking colonial administrative boundaries as international boundaries between the 
newly emerged republics. Accordingly, the new Republics agreed to honor pre-independence 
colonial administrative subdivisions as international boundary defining the jurisdictional limits of 
their sovereignty in accordance with the Roman law principles of uti possidetis.94 Given shortage of 
resources to redraw a new international boundary, in conflicting situation, the agreement to employ 
uti possidetis as a guiding doctrine was a sensible decision.  The doctrine of uti possidetis, “[…] 
posits that title to the colonial territory devolves to the local authorities and prevails over any 
competing claims based on occupation.”95 
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Thus, even though the doctrine of uti possidetis was first applied as a rule of international 
boundary defining norm in Spanish Latin America, its origin was the classical Roman edict.96 
Suzanne Lalonde remarks, “[…] uti possidetis principle [was] originated in Latin America, in fact 
uti possidetis is a principle bequeathed to international law by the Roman Empire.”97 In accordance 
with Roman law edict, “[…] the Praetor forbade the disturbance of the existing state of possession 
of immovable as between two individuals.”98  The principle of uti possidetis derived from the Latin 
expressions, “ uti possidetis ita possideatis,” which means, “As you possess, so you may possess.”99   
The application of the doctrine of Uti possidetis in Roman law as a safeguarding rule of 
peaceful enjoyment of property, and as a rule of boundary delimitation norm in Latin America, is 
not alike; but the ultimate goal appears same. In both cases, rights already possessed should be kept 
intact. The Roman law doctrine affords temporary protection while action for dispossession 
pendingd.100 Authorization of continuity of possession is a common element of both way of 
application of uti pssidetis. The Roman law edict had the objective of keeping peaceful possession 
and enjoyment of rights on immovable property, as a temporary remedy, until a final decision 
declared by court.101 Thus, even a person claiming, “to be an owner” cannot disturb a good faith 
possessor until the court so decides.102 In Roman civil law tradition, thus, the expression, uti 
possideits, confers a temporary right to use the property peacefully until contrary court order.103 The 
good faith possessor may only be challenged by a person claiming to be an owner peacefully 
                                            
96 Bartos supra not 1 at 37.   
97 Lalonde supra note 93 at 23.  
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through action for dispossession and the possessor cannot be forced to vacate until final 
judgment.104  
Unlike the Roman law doctrine of uti possidetis that protects actual physical possession, the 
international law principle shields juridical title. Thus, in international law, actual possessor of a 
territory may be forced to surrender the territory to the titleholder. In both cases, however, the 
claimant cannot physically force the actual possessor to surrender possession.105 Needless, to say 
the claimant should not take law by its own hand – there should be court order or arbitral award.  
The other basic distinction between application of uti possdetis in Roman law and Spanish Latin 
America is the object of the right. In international law the principle of uti possidetis governs 
territorial possession, while Roman law edict deals with private property. The other glaring 
distinction is in international law, the principle creates a definite status unlike temporary protection 
of Roman law.106 
The Roman Law expressions, “ […] uti possidetis, ita possideatis ( “as you possess, so may 
you possess”), indicates the significance of factual possession.”107  Derivatively, in international 
law, the notion of uti possidetis, refers to legal right to possess as you possess.108  In relation to 
territory, it means possessor of a right over a given territory will continue possessing in the same 
way even after the old regime is gone by whatever cause.  By doing so, the rule of uti possidetis has 
maintained peace among the newly liberated nations. Technically the principle of uti possidetis 
keeps territorial integrity, as no boundary or territorial change is expected. Thus, there is nexus 
between the doctrine of uti possidetis and the doctrine of territorial integrity norm. Founders of the 
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new republics of Latin America were inspired by the old Roman law as a guiding principle to keep 
territorial integrity as defined by the colonial Spain.109  
As a concept of defining international boundary, legal history has recorded two forms of uti 
possidetis.110 The oldest form of uti possidetis was based on the actual possession of immovable 
property. This version of uti possidetis is known as uti possidetis de facto. The actual possessor of a 
property may not necessarily be an owner, or the possession need not be backed by title, or 
approved by authorities.111 The other proper version of uti possidetis is uti possidetis juris. In this 
case, the claimant of a property may be taken as a legal owner of the property who may or may not 
necessarily be in actual possession, but cannot lose the ownership simply because s/he is not in 
possession. In Roman law titleholder of a property who temporarily parted the property, either by 
some kind of arrangement or by involuntarily means may not lose ownership of the property and 
assumed constructive possessor of the property. Constructive possession is a legal assumption that 
empowers an actual titleholder to retake the property. The actual holder cannot refuse to give the 
property when the court so orders.  
In Roman civil law tradition, the expression, uti possideits, confers a prima facie title to the 
good faith possessor. The good faith possessor of an immovable property is presumed an owner by 
mere possession, unless some one with a better title challenges it. This rule of civil law is still a 
binding law in civil law tradition. In Ethiopia, for instance, good faith possessor of a movable 
property is presumed as titleholder.112 The presumption if rebateable by contrary evidence.  Under 
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the Ethiopian Civil Code, after lapse of certain limited period of time, a good faith possessor 
acquires ownership of the property by virtue of law. In Roman law, however, the rule of uti 
possidetis governs transfer of title of immovable properties to the good faith possessor. The good 
possessor may be challenged by contrary evidence. 113 The Roman law doctrine of good faith 
possession is equivalent to the common law doctrine of “adverse possession”.114  
The Roman Law expressions, “ […] uti possidetis, ita possideatis ( ‘as you possess, so may 
you possess’), indicates the significance of factual possession.”115  Derivatively, in international 
law, the notion of uti possidetis refers to legal right to possess as one possessed.116  In relation to 
territory, thus, it means possessor of a right over a given territory will continue possessing in the 
same way after decolonization. By doing so, the rule of uti possidetis has contributed to maintain 
peace among the newly liberated nations. Technically the principle of uti possidetis keeps territorial 
integrity, as no boundary or territorial change is expected.  
Thus, each republic was allowed to continue possessing a territory that the colonial power 
had allocated as administrative subdivision. The doctrine of uti possidetis, “[…] assumes that 
internal administrative boundaries are functionally equivalent to international boundaries.”117 At a 
time where there was no better option to avert a looming boundary conflict, other than resorting to 
colonial boundaries by the authority of principles of uti possidetis was a very apposite stand.118  
In early 19th century after decolonization in South and Central America (Latin America), the 
Roman law of private property norm was transformed into a principle defining international 
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boundary.119 The two version of uti possidetis were invoked in different sense, albeit, uti possidetis 
de facto did not win international recognition as a doctrine of delineating international boundary. It 
was only Brazil that claimed the application of ut possidetis de facto as a norm of defining 
international boundary. Brazil had the ambition of expanding territory. Its very aim was to extend 
its territorial possession to the unoccupied regions under the guise of occupation of terra nullius. 
Consequently, “ Brazil generally rejected the application of uti possidetis de jure (legal possession) 
in favor of uti possidetis de facto (effective possession) an alternative doctrine that determines 
ownership of territory based on physical occupation rather than colonial title.”120 Brazil’s 
expansionist policy to go beyond the supposed 1810 legal border was opposed by all former 
Spanish colonies.121 Consequently, Spanish colonies never took uti possidetis de facto as a 
governing principle. Swiss Federal Council in arbitral award of territorial dispute between 
Colombia and Venezuela briefly elaborated uti possidentis de jure vis-à-vis territorial boundary as 
follows: 
When the Spanish Colonies of Central and South America proclaimed themselves independent 
in the second decade of the nineteenth century, they adopted a principle of constitutional and 
international law which they gave the name uti possidetis juris of 1810, with the effect of laying 
down the rule that bounds of newly created Republics should be the frontiers of the Spanish 
provinces to which they were substituted. The general principle afforded the advantage of 
establishing an absolute rule that there was no in law the old Spanish America any territory 
without a master.122  
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Thus, the de facto version never been taken as a governing norm for defining international 
boundary. In the words of Bartos, “ […] once the principle became relevant in international law, its 
emphasis apparently shifted towards a legal right to possess.”123  
 
3.4.2.  Contributions of the Principle  
Soon after getting out of colonial yoke, there was no better option to avert territorial and 
boundary conflict other than resorting to the doctrine of uti possidetis. It was the easiest and the 
cheapest option to create a mutually acceptable boundary line in short period of time.124 This 
principle has saved time and resources by a mere recognition of already functional colonial 
administrative boundaries as international boundary line.125 In other words, colonial administrative 
boundary lines that had separated colonial administrative subdivisions were taken as international 
boundary.  
As colonial administrative boundaries largely known to the public, unless otherwise agreed, 
there was no need for further delimitation or demarcation. Negotiation to extend pre-existing 
colonial administrative boundaries into international boundary may not take long time nor require 
highly skilled boundary experts or boundary engineers. As pre-independence boundaries are already 
known and accepted by the local people, the boundary may be stable and permanent. Boundary 
making on the basis of the doctrine of uti possidetis is not hard and is not time consuming.  It may 
also be negotiated on phone or may be deliberated on decolonization document or by national 
congresses of respective newly constituted States.  
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  The process was acclaimed as, “[…] a proscription against the violent acquisition of 
territory.”126 Any attempt to redraw territorial limits would generate unending destructive war. As 
Edwards remarks:  
Already frontier questions were beginning to appear and in order to prevent the conflicts to 
which they might give raise, it was decided that in the absence of special stipulation the 
boundaries of the varies states should be those existing at the time of their emancipation from 
the Spanish rule.127  
 
With a view to subdue the possibility of costly border conflict, at a time the newly emerged 
republics could not bear it, accepting pre-independence territorial limit was the best political 
decision that has been exemplary global practice and has made tremendous contribution to the 
international peace and stability.  
  To avoid foreign aggression or further colonization under the guise of occupation of terra 
nullius, the young republics were guarded by the principle of uti possidetis that conferred 
constructive possession of all territories including unsettled barren lands on the new republics.  In 
the words of Bartos, “This convenient legal fiction of constructive possession was peculiarly 
adapted to a continent which was, sparsely populated.”128  Thus, “It scotched the designs of 
competing colonial powers who may have made claims to territory on the basis of terra nullius 
[….]”129 According to old Spanish law in Latin America, there was no territory without an owner.  
All territories including unsettled regions were assumed owned. This has established a constructive 
possession rule baring an alien to create ownership by occupation. Under uti possidetis juirs, an 
alien actually possessing anyone or more of the unsettled territories that were previously presumed 
to be under Spanish control cannot claim title simply by virtue of actual possession. The new 
Republics, therefore, deemed by law occupying all the former Spanish Latin America territories as 
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it was assumed that there was no Spanish American territory without an owner.130 Put otherwise, in 
accordance with the old Spanish colonial rule, all the Latin American territories were occupied, 
albeit, not settled by residents or frequently used.  By virtue of the doctrine of uti possidetis, the 
new Republics were conferred with automatic transfer of legal title to the entire territory belonged 
to them during colonial time and they will be conferred with title to some unoccupied regions. As 
there was no terra nullius in Spanish American, the same rule was applicable to the new republics. 
This ownership over unoccupied territory is known as constructive possession. Pursuant to the 
doctrine of uti possidetis juris, the actual possessor may be dispossessed at any time if the 
titleholder wishes to exercise its legal right of ownership.  Brazil’s contention of uti possiditis 
defacto, which confers title by actual possession, did not prevail, as the contemporary rule is based 
on uti possidetis juris.    
Though later territorial conflicts were surfaced in Latin America, at the foundational stage 
of application of the principles of uti possidetis juris curbed possibilities of territorial or boundary 
conflict. As Hensel remarks, “ […] uti possidetis norm constituted a proscription against the violent 
acquisition of territory [….]”131 The principle also effectively reduced the possibility of forceful 
annexation of territories. Application of the principle has also proved the possibility of territorial 
change through peaceful means.132 For instance, some Central America States merged to constitute 
a single strong nation but later disintegrated peacefully.133 Thus, the “ […] application of uti 
possidetis left open the possibility of peaceful territorial change by mutual agreement, only 
opposing the threat or use of force for the acquisition of territory.”134  
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Though it is arguable, the principle has impressed founding fathers of Organization of 
African Unity to take “existing” boundaries as binding international boundaries in Africa.  There 
are also wide spread assumption that the principle of uti possidits juris has guided during 
disintegration of nations like U.S.S.R or other former communist States like Yugoslavia and 
Czechoslovakia.  
 
3.4.3. Limitations of the Principle 
Since its inception, application of the principle of uti possidetis has been “[…] plagued by a 
number of problems.”135 The most obvious short comings of the principle of Uti possidetis vis-à-vis 
international territorial delimitation was its reliance on pre-independence colonial boundaries that 
were set in a way meeting colonial interests that often disregarded geographic and human 
conditions of local people. As Hensel et al attest, “ The Spanish often changed the border of their 
administrative units over time though seemingly arbitrary royal decrees or cedulas from Madrid.”136 
The principle of uti possidetis thus keeps colonial ‘evils’ vis-à-vis territorial division to continue 
even after getting freedom from the old colonial yoke. McCorquodale and Pangalangan, remark: 
“ [T]he consequences of adopting [the principle of uti possidetis] is that territorial boundaries 
operate inequitably and in favour of the colonial power’s division of territory [….] [S]o the 
rule developed by the international legal system to deal with boundaries are affirming  of the 
state structure of that system.137  
 
On top of this, boundary makers had little or no empirical facts before crafting colonial boundaries. 
As Suzanne Lalonde observes, “ The lack of trustworthy information during the colonial period 
with respect to large sections of the continent created serious difficulties.”138 The continent was not 
fully explored and not known even to the local people. Colonial legislations often ignored 
geographic facts and maps were imperfect. Natural futures of land that were referred either 
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disfigured or could not be located.139 This is a crucial problem and […] often criticized for being 
source of conflict. Most territorial conflicts stem from disputes “[…] the location of old colonial 
boundaries.”140  Though founding fathers of OAU have decided to honor pre-existing African 
boundaries, which are largely defined by colonial powers, colonial boundaries have created 
permanent scare that cannot heal at all.  Colonial boundaries in Africa have disintegrated closely 
associated ethnic groups, caused animosity among the brotherly people that had been coexisted 
peacefully before colonial boots landed in Africa.  Some neighboring states currently have been 
enduring unsolvable boundary issue due to the complicated colonial boundary delimitation.141  
These borderland people often disregard the boundary line if they need to use resources such as 
grazing land or hunting on the other side of the territory.  
The Principle of uti possidetis, has suffered interpretational problem, which resulted in 
confusion and conflict in Latin America.142 Interpretational issue evolved as a result of perceived 
and actual possession of territories during colonial time. During colonial time, administrative units 
had exercised jurisdiction beyond the actual possession. The provincial administration supposedly 
acted in good faith without any evil intent of usurpation.143  As the administrative units were 
controlled by the colonial power, internal boundaries were not strictly adhered like international 
boundaries and hence the units did not regard action beyond formal lines as an issue. According to 
Lalonde, “ […] at the time of independence the colonial administrative authorities of a given 
territorial unit had in fact been exercising civil jurisdiction beyond the line designated as the limit of 
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their territorial jurisdiction.”144 The issue surfaced after administrative units got independence and 
their common command of chain was lapsed.  
The new independence States that have got freedom from colonial Spain and Brazil, wrangled 
over interpretation of uti possidetis. While the Republics wished to draw international boundary line 
beyond the actual possession including all the territories perceived by colonial rule invoked uti 
possidetis juris (legal possession), Brazil invoked uti possidetis de facto (actual effective 
possession).  Lalonde terms the two forms of uti possidetis as “ Rival Version of the Uti Possidetis 
principle.”145 Prescott expounds competing versions of uti possidetis as follows:  
Some states regarded the rule as applying to the limits legally in force when the act of 
decolonization occurred. Others believed that the rule was concerned with the boundaries 
observed for practical administration by the colonial authorities.  These two lines did not always 
coincide and competing states would urge the interpretation, which suited themselves best. 146 
 
As has been pointed at the outset, Brazil asserted for definition of uti possidetis on the basis of 
effective possession while rejecting the application of uti possidetis de jure. But the new republics 
contested for legal possessions (uti possidetis de jure).147  Proponents of both forms of uti possidetis 
were able to produce evidences proving their respective position. But there was no document 
proving equal application of both categories of uti possidetis at the same time.148  The dispute 
between Bolivia and Paraguay over the Chaco Boreal territory illustrates interpretational fight 
between the two former Spanish administrative units.149  In this case, Bolivia and Paraguay invoked 
a version of uti possidetis, supporting their position.  While Bolivia invoked uti possidetis juris of 
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1810 “[…] appealing to her status, as successor to the Royal Audiencia of Charcas […]”150 
Paraguay relied on uti possidetis both de jure and def facto” arguing that it was successor to the old 
colonial province of Paraguay and considered that Chaco belonged to her on the basis of afore 
stated principle.151  It was finally held that “ de facto occupation became ineffective and of no legal 
consequence.”152  
  Brazil has rejected the application of uti possidetis juris regarding it alien to the original 
Roman law principle of uti possidetis. It views the Spanish republics attempt to ‘‘inject into the 
Roman formula a meaning entirely alien to its origin, namely the right to possess independent of 
effective possession,” beyond the spirit of original Roman law.153 Brazil contends that uti possidetis 
principle was based on real and ‘effective possession independent of title’.154 Building its position 
on the basis of actual possession at the critical date of independence, Brazil’s ultimate aim was 
expanding its territory to disregarding the rule of constructive possession.155 By doing so, Brazil has 
defended Portuguese expansion during the colonial time and attempted to protect her own interest 
for further expansion into the unoccupied territories of Spanish Latin America territories. Spanish 
America Republics, however, disregarded Brazilian version of uti possidetis de facto favoring to uti 
possidetis juirs.  which incorporates both actual and constructive possessions. Construction 
possession (Juridical title) on the basis of title granted by the colonial decree. Thus the republics 
were entitled to the territory they had actually possessed at the time independence, and territories 
that they were entitled by “[…] the decrees of the sovereign they had had a right to possess.”156 
                                            
150 Id.  
151 Id. at 1087, Regarding inconsistent state practice vis-à-vis the principle of uti possidetis see Lalonde supra note 5 at 
34.  
152 Id.  
153 Lalonde supra note 5 at 33 
154 Id. 
155 Bartos supra note 1 at 47.  
156 Lalonde supra note 5 at 32 
 130 
The problem of interpretation of the Principle not only limited to the creation of rival 
doctrines, but also dwells in the meaning of s single version had surfaced. Though Dominican 
Republic and Haiti agreed to be bound by uti  possidetis juris in the delimitation of their boundary, 
they were unable to agree on the exact meaning of the term. They submitted their dispute over 
terminology to an arbitrator.157 Abdelhamid El Quali plausibly argues that “[…] the inconsistency 
of the uti possidetis […] raised serious doubts on the legal character of [the principle of uti 
possidetis.]”158 
Though the doctrine of uti possidetis, made a great contribution in curbing disputes among 
the emerging nations, it did not stop territorial or boundary dispute as it was initially thought. As 
Cukwurah, remarks:  
It was widely anticipated that the doctrine would do away with boundary dispute 
between the new States of Latin America.  But, as experience has shown, the facts 
confounded people’s expectations as indeed, such disputes occurred159  
 
 Thus, in fact, the principle of uti possidetis has merely postponed potential disputes, but not 
completely stopped them.160 After decolonization a number of territorial and boundary disputes 
have surfaced.  According to Bartos, more than 30 boundary disputes, some of which lasted more 
than a century, were erupted in Latin America.161 Recognition of a defective colonial border as a 
territorial limit binding the new independent States, therefore, may not build a stable boundary. 
Though the application of principle of uti possidetis in Africa is arguable, application of 
colonial boundaries in Africa has been source of most of interstate conflicts. The founding fathers 
of OAU have affirmed to respect pre-independence boundaries with a view to avoid unmanageable 
boundary conflicts, as a result of poor delineation of pre-existing boundary, clashes were 
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rampant.162 The Cairo resolution of July 1964 was actually reaffirmation of respect to colonial 
boundaries.163   Most inter-state African conflicts were one way or the other related to colonial 
boundaries.164  Territorial and boundary conflict, in Africa, has been incurable disease that 
consumes lives of huge number of Africans and no viable solution yet devised.165  
With a view to get relief from actual and presumed boundary conflict, founding fathers of 
African Union (OAU) in the Cairo Summit of 1964 decided to honor boundaries existing at the date 
of acquiring independence.166  The Cairo Resolution was a response to the on going boundary and 
territorial disputes. Morocco was in war with Algeria and Somalia lodged a case against Ethiopia 
and Kenya.  The dispute between Dahomey and Nigeron, the border dispute between Ghana and 
Upper Volta were some of the ongoing territorial and border disputes that the First Ordinary 
Summit of OAU had to resolve. The Cairo Resolution thus, was not only preventive but also a kind 
of judgment that was meant to solve actual boundary disputes. In this stressing situation, the 
Assembly almost unanimously decided to abide by boundaries existed on the date of independence. 
Only Morocco and Somalia objected, asserting to redraw boundaries on the basis of cultural, ethnic 
and historic basis.  Prime Minster of Kenya proposed for a specific and strong continental charter 
that explicitly declares the preservation of territorial status quo.167 Emperor Haile Selassie of 
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Ethiopia remarked, “ [A]cceptance of colonial boundaries was necessary for Africa’s safety 
[….]”168 Incorporating these strong suggestions posed by the prominent founding fathers of the 
continental organization and the consideration of ongoing territorial and boundary disputes 
culminated at express restatement of sanctity of pre-existing boundaries. Apart from Somalia and 
Morocco overwhelming majority adopted the Resolution, but it did not stop territorial or boundary 
conflict. Since the adoption of OAU Charter or the Cairo Resolution of 1964, Africans have been 
enduing frequent border related wars.  
To sum up, though the principle of uti possidetis calmed boundary or territorial conflict in 
formative stage of Spanish Latin America republics, in fact it did not resolve territorial or boundary 
conflict. During Spanish rule some areas were never been clearly marked due to ignorance of local 
geography.169 Vaguely defined boundary was inadequate to govern international relationship. The 
porous provincial boundary has not only caused serious conflict, but also frustrated the newly 
independent Republics. For example, the incomplete or vaguely defined Bolivia-Chile and Bolivia-
Paraguay border raised the issue of territorial expansion beyond the presumptive border.170  Thus, 
even if the principle uti possidetis temporarily suspended a looming territorial conflict, actually it  “ 
[…] did not solve the problem of delimitation, to which it was meant to apply.”171 Commentators 
suggest that reliance on the principle of uti possidetis has caused territorial and boundary dispute 
more than it initial benefits.172  
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3.4.4. The Status of Doctrine of Uti Possidetis in International Law  
Even though the principle of uti possidetis, is a Roman law advent, its approach as a 
doctrine of determination of international boundary, is a Spanish Latin America formulation. Soon 
after decolonization, the new Republics attempted to avoid impending territorial and boundary 
conflict by applying the principle of uti possidetis modifying its traditional sense as applied in the 
Roman law. The principle of uti possidetis helped the Republics to tackle imminent boundary 
conflicts that thought endangered their very survival as independent political entities.  With a view 
to evade a looming conflict the Republics decided to abide by the pre-existing colonial 
administrative divisions as international boundary lines. The principle of uti possidetis has also 
shielded the Republics from further colonization through the Spanish colonial law that regarded the 
entire territory, be it occupied or unoccupied, as already owned. The principle of uti possidetis was 
overwhelmingly accepted by the Republics to govern their territorial relationship. Since its 
inception in 19th century, the principle of uti possidetis has attracted international law scholars and 
tribunals to resolve a number of boundary disputes.173  
Though the principle uti possidetis is one of the oldest and widely invoked to resolve 
territorial limits of emerging states, it is still not free from confusion and misconstruction.174 
Regarding the scope, relevance and binding nature of the principle of uti possidetis, we have 
diverging views among international law scholars and international tribunals, including 
International Court of Justice (ICJ). Some scholars and tribunal offer a broader scope to the 
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Principle with the intention to apply it in all situations of territorial dispute whenever a territory is 
inherited from colonial power.175  
Some commentators suggest the application of the Principle in all situations of acquiring 
independence including disintegration of States like the former U.S.S.R or Yugoslavia. During 
formal disintegration of U.S.S.R, the Heads of State of the Russian Federation, Belarus and 
Ukraine, proclaimed a declaration akin to the territorial integrity resolution as enshrined in the 
Charter of the African Unity. It stated, “ The High Contracting Parties acknowledge and respect 
each others territorial integrity and the inviolability of the existing borders within the common 
wealth.”176 This bilateral resolution does not expressly mention the principle of uti possidetis, but 
any attempt to import application of the principle of uti possidetis is based on assumption. Suzanne 
Lalonde who thorough researched the role of uti possidetis, questions whether the international law 
has to relay on a principle when its basis are ‘shaky’ and unsettled to extend application of the 
principle to non-colonial situations.177 
The Frontier Dispute Case (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali) takes forefront among the 
attempts to afford a general scope to the Principle. The Chamber of Frontier Dispute case bids to 
expand the contours of the Principle and extends its applicability in all situations wherever 
“independence occurs.”178 This appears a “novel” idea, but it goes beyond the imagination of the 
original crafters of the principle. As pointed out in Paragraph 20 of the Judgment, ICJ has disclosed 
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that disputants have agreed their boundary dispute to be resolved in accordance with the “[…] 
principle of the intangibility of frontiers inherited from colonization.”179  There is no doubt that 
Burkina Faso and Mali, who have inherited territory from common colonial power – France, 
empowered the tribunal to decide their dispute in accordance with the pre-existing boundaries that 
aligns with the Cairo declaration of July 1964.  
The Chamber of Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali) Case has attempted to make the 
principle of uti possidetis as a general principle of international law and ultimately to build its 
binding nature as customary international law.180 This appears unsubstantiated and unpersuasive 
conclusion that may easily be challenged, as the principle of uti possidetis is not a universally 
binding norm even in Latin American.  
Paragraph 20 of the Frontier Dispute Judgment reveals the chamber’s unsuccessful attempt 
to afford a wider global status to the principle uti possidetis. The Chamber concludes:  
 […] the Chamber cannot disregard the principle of uti possidetis juris, the application of which 
gives rise to this respect for intangibility of frontiers. It emphasizes the general scope of the 
Principle in matters of decolonization and its exceptional importance for the African continent, 
including the two Parties to this case. Although this principle was invoked for the first time in 
Spanish America, it is not a rule pertaining solely to one specific system of international law. It is 
a principle of general scope, logically connected with the phenomenon of the obtaining of 
independence, wherever it occurs. Its obvious purpose is to prevent the independence and 
stability of new States being endangered by fratricidal struggles provoked by the challenging of 
frontiers following the withdrawal of the administering power.  The fact that the new African 
States have respected the territorial status quo which existed when they obtained independence 
must therefore be seen not as a mere practice but as the application in Africa of a rule of general 
scope which is fairly established in matters of decolonization [….] The principle of uti possidetis 
juris accords pre-eminence to legal tide over effective possession as a basis of sovereignty. Its 
primary aim is to secure respect for the territorial boundaries which existed at the time when 
independent was achieved.”181 (Emphasis added). 
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terms implying that the principle of uti possidetis is general principle of international law, which is also not supported 
by evidence.  In general state practice regarding uti possidetis is not constant and uniform.  
181 Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali) Dec. 22, 1986, (Paras, 20 -0 26) 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?sum=359&p1=3&p2=3&case=69&p3=5  
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This decision thought to be game changing, as it appears to make the principle of uti 
possidetis generally applicable in all situations whenever new States get independence either as a 
result of decolonization, or disintegration, no matter what cause triggers the independence. The 
expression, “ “It is a principle of general scope, logically connected with the phenomenon of 
obtaining of independence, wherever it occurs,”182 reveals the Chambers intended to extend the 
scope of the Principle to govern all cases of getting independence irrespective of the cause of 
independence and intention of the parties. The Frontiers Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali) Case was 
inspired by the Gunine/Guinea Bissau Martime Delimiation Case, in which the arbitration tribunal 
has considered the African colonial status quo policy was equivalent to the Latin American 
principle of uti possidetis.183 This assumption does not align with the original meaning of the 
Principle in Latin America. Whenever boundary dispute surfaces in Spanish America, the 
disputants often make express agreement to abide by the principles of uti possidetis.184 Moreover, 
the principle of uti possidetis is irrelevant when boundary of neighboring States is defined by 
treaty.185  It is, therefore, fallacious to apply the principle of uti possidetis in all cases of 
independence or in all situations of boundary conflict in Africa or elsewhere.  
The principle of uti possdetis is consensual in nature.186  Baratos in his inspiring article 
confirms this view stating, “ The principle has never been applied by a tribunal in the absence of 
specific compromise or direction by the disputants to that effect.”187(Emphasis added). The 
arbitration tribunal of Dubai-Sharjah Border Arbitration   declares that states are in liberty to reject 
                                            
182 Id. at Para. 20.  
183 Lalonde supra note 5 at 127.  
184 For instance, on 25 January 1860, Peru concluded a Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Alliance with Equator referring 
to the uti possidetis juris. Similarly the preamble of the 1881 treaty concluded between Venezuela and Colombia 
refers to the uti possidetis juris of 1880 while Article VIII of the Geranial Arbitration treaty between Bolivia and Peru 
instructed Arbitrator to resolve the dispute in strict obedience with the principles of uti possidetis of 1810. In Latin 
America the principle was meant to be applicable to Spanish colonies.(See Lalonde supra note 5 at 127.) 
185 Lalonde supra note 5 at 127. 
186 Antonopoulos supra note 94 at 44. See also Dubai-Sharjah Border Arbitration  Lalonde supra note 94 at 124. 
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determination of case in accordance with principle of uti possidetis and adopt a different 
approach.188 The earliest and most cited authority was, the Swiss Federal Council in a Dispute 
between Colombia and Venezuela, the contested consented to be bound by the colonial boundary 
lines.189 Thus, the principle of uti possidetis cannot step in the litigation, unless parties express their 
consent to abide by the principles of uti possidetis. Parties to the Frontier Dispute Case (Burkina 
Faso and Mali) never requested the tribunal to decide their dispute in accordance with the principle 
of uti possidetis juris. They have requested the tribunal to decide the Case on the basis of the 
boundary existing at the time of independence which accords with the Cairo Resolution of July 
1964, but ICJ implausibly assumed the demand of the Parties to mean uti possidetis.  
Similarly, in Guinea – Guinea-Bissau Maritime Delimitation case, an arbitration tribunal 
consisting of three judges of ICJ took a similar stand. The Parties to the case requested their 
boundary dispute to be resolved in accordance with 1886 convention of France and Portugal, the 
tribunal did not find boundary delimitation in the convention as requested by the Parties and 
resorted to the uti possidetis stating it as one of the relevant rule of international law.190  
The tribunals in both of the cases went beyond the mandate granted by the Parties. The 
Parties of both cases did not take uti possedits as a governing law.  In a situation where the parities 
never referred to or the African continental organization never formally recognized, why the 
tribunals of Frontier Dispute Case or Guinea- Guinea-Bissau Maritime Delimitation Case relied on 
the principles of uti possidetis? The founding fathers of African continental organization (OAU) did 
not directly import the Latin American principle; rather they have declared a different approach.191 
In a situation where the real ‘owners” of the boundary have opted for a different alternative while 
                                                                                                                                                 
187 Bartos supra note 1 at 59.  
188 Antonopoulos supra note 94 at 44 
189 Id. at 30.  
190 Lalonde  supra note 5 at 126. 
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they had a possibility to explicitly state the principle either in the constitutive document or in the 
Cairo Resolution, can ICJ make a binding law that changes the Cairo Declaration of 1964? Bartos 
strongly disagrees with the assumption stating, “ Equation of the preservation of colonial 
boundaries with uti possidetis is “both false and misleading in an African context.192 
In Latin America, as has been pinpointed elsewhere, the application of the principle of uti 
possidetis juris was legally confined to the former Spanish colonies (Spanish Latin America). Brazil 
explicitly disregarded the Principle contending it encompasses rights constructively possessed, 
which Brazil views contrary to the original Roman law. To Brazil uti possidetis de facto accords 
with Roman law doctrine of uti possidetis, that shields peaceful enjoyment of immovable property 
that was actually possessed. Brazil’s motive was to expand its territory into the unoccupied 
territories.193 Even some of the new Republics were not consistent enough in applying the principle 
of uti possidetis.  Susan Lalonde confirms this view stating:   
In addition to the various and often conflicting versions of the uti possidetis principle, there was 
also inconsistent State practice in the particular version adopted from one treaty to another.194 
 
Moreover, Some Republics disclosed the tendency to recognize actual possession rule contracting 
with Brazil. For instance, Peru, Venezuela and Bolivia concluded a treaty with Brazil in accordance 
with uti possidetis de facto.195  There also instances in which Latin American Republics set 
boundary inconsistent with the principle of uti possidetis.196 The establishment of big union of 
States (Central American Republic) was not in line with the Latin American principle of uti 
possidetis.  
                                                                                                                                                 
191 Although  the Cairo Congress did not expressly state a reason to ignore half a century old doctrine that that was 
accepted in Spanish Latin America,  century old no clear reason to ignore the principle of uti possidetis in Cairo  
192 Bartos supra note 1 at 60.  
193 As Lalonde asserts, Brazil by relying on the “[…] de facto version of the principle, […] was able to defend not only 
Portuguese expansion during colonial times, but also her own expansion during the post- colonial era.” Lalonde  
supra note 93 at 32. 
194 Id. at  36 
195 Id.  
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In a situation where original architects of the principle not consistently adopted binding role 
uti possidetis juris, it appears implausible to confer international sense of obligation by recognizing 
the Principle as a universal binding norm thereby extend its role beyond the expectation of the 
original designers. Thus, in spite of the fact that the principle of uti possidetis has got some general 
recognition in the former Spanish Latin America, “[…] it has no validity in universal international 
law.”197 (Emphasis added). As vividly stated in Beagles Channel Case, “[Uti possidetis] is peculiar 
to the field of the Spanish –American States whose territories were formerly under the rule of the 
Spanish Crown.”198 A quote from Whiteman by Bloomfield in an article regarding Egypt, Israel and 
the Gulf of Aqaba regarding status of uti possidetis as follows: 
[…] in no case has the International Community recognized [the Principle of Uti Possidetis] as 
an institution of international law [….] It remains, just like Bull of Pope Alexander VI wherein 
it originates, derogatory to general international law, which insist on occupation as a basis for 
sovereignty. A rule derogating to generally accepted customary international law is binding 
only on those persons which have, by convention, expressly agreed to it.199 
 
The principle of uti possidetis temporarily shielded the Spanish Latin America Republics from a 
destructive territorial and boundary conflict, it did not win universal acceptance even in Latin 
America, as there was inconsistence in state practice concerning the application and binding effect 
of the norm. The principle did not get constitutional protection, nor clearly stated in treaties. In this 
unsettled situation it is too early to regard the principle of uti possidetis as a binding international 
norm.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
196 Lalonde supra note 5 at 34. 
197 Bartos supra note 1at 58. 
198 Beagles Channel Arbitration (Argentina v. Chile) 52 I.L.R 93, 125 (1979). 
199 L.M. BLOOMFIELD, EGYPT, ISRAEL AND THE GULF OF AQABA IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 107 – 108 
(1957) quoted in M. Whiteman 2 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1086 (1963).  
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3.5. The Principle of Territorial Integrity 
 
3.5.1. Obsoleteness of Conquest as Mode of Acquisition of Territory 
In contemporary world there is no vacant territory. Thus, occupation as mode of acquisition 
of new territory practically obsolete, and before outlawed, the only possible way to expand 
territory was conquest. Before use of force as a means of acquiring territory was formally rendered 
illegal, conquest was a legitimate mode of acquisition of territory though it could be carried out at 
the cost of the actual possessors.  In pre-modern era, therefore, conquest became “the law of 
necessity” and it was “universally acknowledged.”200 Before coercive use of force was legally 
banned, it had been a normal practice to invade a weaker nation in search for more territory with a 
view to expand the scope of sovereignty, and in quest for more people that served in the imperial 
army.201 Territorial expansion was considered as a way of making wealth202, as prosperity of an 
empire was measured by the territorial possession.  It was also viewed as a method of 
strengthening security of an empire by pushing external security threat away from the power 
center.  As a result, protection and acquisition of territory was one of the guiding directives of 
foreign policy of medieval States.203  
At a time invasion for territorial occupation was a permissible norm, the competition to 
acquire more territory generated frequent territorial dispute and war.204 As John Vasquez rightly 
remarks, “Of all the issues over which wars could logically be sought, territorial issues seem to be 
                                            
200 See WILBER F. GORDY, THE CAUSE AND MEANING OF GREAT WAR 33 (1910).   
201 According to Wilber F Gordy, ancient Prussian was guided by the premises, “war pays.’”   At the time, “War was 
regarded as the national industry of Prussia.”  (See Id. at 26. Bismarck and subsequent rules pursued the same 
coercive approach and expanded contours of territory and wealth. For instance, in Franco – Prussian war Germany 
benefited 2000%. Id. As a result, Germany even before Hitler regime relied on “power to take whatever wanted by 
force. “ Id.  Even at the end of WWI,  some of the powerful States “supported the right of victories states to realize 
territorial gains, this was reflected in their secret treaties concerning territorial exchanges at the end of the war.” 
Zacher, supra note 1.  
202 For instance, in Franco – Prussian war Germany benefited 2000%.  See Gordy supra note 200.  
203 Zacher, supra note 5 at  217. 
204 As Marck Zacher  points out of 119 interstate wars since 1648 – 1945, 93 were territorial wars. See Id.  at 223.  
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the ones most often associated with wars.”205  Dispute over territory can easily flare up and 
generate destructive war either among the colonial rivalries or a colonial power and indigenous 
people who actually hold the territory.206 For instance, until finally settled in the Berlin Conference 
of 1884 -1885, powerful nations had competed among themselves to occupy African territories.207 
Art. 34 of the Berlin Act required colonial powers to report their occupation of African territory 
and Art. 35 the Act demanded effective occupation in order to avoid war among the colonizers for 
reoccupation.208  
                            3.5.2.  Emergence of the Principle of Territorial Integrity 
At the end of 19th century, most precisely in early 20th century after the end of WWI, the 
traditional conception and practice of conquest as a legitimate means of territorial expansion was 
steadily diminished and virtually substituted by the principle of territorial integrity norm.209  The 
principle of territorial integrity is one of the core principles of international law that was evolved 
as a solution to avoid frequent territorial expansion wars. Thus, it is a “[…] positive norm of a 
paramount importance in the contemporary international society.”210 The principle of territorial 
integrity norm prohibits use of force for territorial expansion.211 Simply put, the principle of 
territorial integrity prohibits compulsory dismemberment of a territory or impairment of state 
sovereignty or intervention in domestic affairs of a given state.212 It was based on the objectives of 
                                            
205 Id. at  216. 
206 Id.  
207 Goran Aronson, The Berlin Conference, 1884 
    http://www.thenagain.info/WebChron/Africa/BerlinConf.html, (last visited 8/20/15 at 10:17 AM.) See also Jason 
Kong and Emily Zhang, Berlin Conference of 1884,  GSMUN (2010),  
http://gsmun13.weebly.com/uploads/7/3/7/4/737477/berlin.pdf 
208 Id.  
209 In Versailles treaty victorious nations of the WWI pledged to abandon the tradition practice of annexing territories of 
the defeated nation. Former colonies of defeated nations were kept under League mandate and States to which these 
Mandates were entrusted were required to prepare the Mandates for self governance. Sharon Korman remarks, “[…] 
the First World War undoubtedly marked a moral turning point. “See Zacher supra note 5.  
210 --------------,  Rethinking Territorial Integrity, www.Springer.com/static/pdf/276/bfm%253A978-3-642 
211 U.N . Charter  art. 2(4)  
212 Id.   
 142 
the 19th century nationalist movement that advocated for respect to sovereignty of state and 
sanctity of territory. According to this movement “ […] a territory belonged to the national 
grouping and it was wrong to take the land from a nation.”213  It was viewed that the French 
Revolution has spurred the nationalist movement in its bid for abolition of conquest as a means for 
territorial expansion. The Movement was also supported by the Napoleon’s stand for self-
determination.214 The principle of territorial integrity requires all States to respect territorial 
integrity of fellow State and not to encroach an occupied territory, either directly or indirectly. 
Thus, the principle of territorial integrity is based on a rule that an already occupied territory 
cannot be reoccupied by force, thereby ending the legitimacy of conquest as a norm of territorial 
acquisition.  
The principle of territorial integrity has got legal recognition and “formal support” since the 
end of WWI.215  Art. 10 of the Covenant of League of Nations specifically declares the duty of 
member States to respect territorial integrity of another State as follows:  
The member of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression 
the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League. In 
case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council 
shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled. 216 
 
Art. 10 of the Covenant of League of Nations was a product of W.W.I. It was a provision 
proving, “formal support for the territorial integrity norm.”217 It was designed to discourage 
conquest for territorial expansion. Historically, as Graham states, the duty to respect territorial 
integrity was not a novel creation of the Covenant.218  Graham remarks, “The passive aspect of this 
territorial guarantee ‘to respect” was no departure from the existing practice under the international 
                                            
213 Zacher, supra note 5 at 217. 
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215 Id. at 219.  
216 League of Nations Covenant art. 10.  
217 Zacher supra note 5 at 219. 
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law in 1919.”219 It may be rightly argued that since the Westphalian stipulation, international law 
has firm stand for respect for a defined territory. The motive of Westphalian congress was to avoid 
war by setting a clearly defined territory and inviolability of State sovereignty.  
  In this respect Graham was right, but the Westphalian stipulation did not deter territorial 
invasion. Since then the world has experienced numerous wars that aimed at territorial expansion. 
Graham in his seminal article, however, did not deny the novel contribution of Art. 10 of the 
Covenant of League of Nations. The Covenant for the first time declared the duty of member States 
to “preserve” territorial integrity. Graham states the duty to “preserve” existing territory of member 
States as “[…] a new obligation previously unrecognized and implied a potential coercive duty as a 
consequence of the new order.”220  
The League of Nations attempted to discourage conquest by requiring member States to 
settle disputes peacefully.221 Though the Covenant has made a great contribution, at least, by 
formalizing the legality of the principle of territorial integrity, in effect, the League failed to stop 
violations and territorial invasions.222 Two major aggressions by member states against another 
member states often cited for the ultimate demise of the League. After 10 years of membership of 
League of Nations, Italy invaded Ethiopia, a member of League of Nation, and Japan invaded 
Manchuria.223 In the former case, the then Ethiopia’s king, Emperor Haile Selassie appealed against 
                                                                                                                                                 
218 Malbone Watson Graham (Jr.),  The Effect of the League of Nations Covenant on the Theory and Practice of 
Neutrality, 15:5  CAL L. REV. 362  (1927).  
219 Id.  
220 Id.  
221 Art. 12 and 13 of the Covenant spell out the requirement and procedures of settling disputes not only among the 
member States but also between members and non-members and Art. 16  declares sanctions that may be imposed in 
case peaceful dispute settlement cannot be attained and the aggressor pursues invasive activities.  
222 In 1932 Japan invaded Manchuria, in 1935 Italy conquered Ethiopia (then Abyssinia), in 1936 Germany reoccupied 
Rhinland in defiance of the League, in 1938 Germany merged Austria contrary to the Treaty of Versailles. See 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/schools/gcsebitesize/history/mwh/ir1/manchuriarev1.shtml  ultimately, combination of all 
aggressions and aggressive behaviors coupled with ignores  and betrayal of power nations rendered the League 
powerless to attain its objectives. Finally, WWII erupted ultimately taking away the League of Nations.  
223 B. B. C. The Manchurian and Abyssinian crises shook people’s confidence in the League and proved that 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/schools/gcsebitesize/history/mwh/ir1/manchuriarev1.shtml ( last visited 8/21/15  
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Italian invasion in person, but the League could not stop the invasion. In defiance of Italy to stop 
the invasion, the League in accordance with Art. 16 of the Covenant, imposed sanction on both 
States that mainly harmed Ethiopia. The League prohibited sale of arms to both nations. The 
sanction had little impact on Italy as a maker of arms, but it had crippled Ethiopia, which totally 
relied on import.  
Surprisingly, contrary to Art. 10 of the Covenant, the League advised Ethiopia to surrender 
certain border territories to Italy as a consideration to stop the invasion. Italy, however, refused to 
comply with the advice longing to occupy the whole Ethiopia – not simply annex border territories. 
With the help of superior arm and highly trained military personnel, and use prohibited poisonous 
gas, Italy occupied the whole nation until driven out after 5 years of the occupation. The League 
was not only powerless, but also slow in responding to territorial invasion. For instance, after Japan 
invaded Manchuria, it took the Council of League a year respond to the request by the victim to 
avert the situation.  After twelve months of lodging of petition, the Council visited Manchuria but 
could not stop the invasion as it simply sought Japan to leave the invaded territory. Weak response 
of the League, supposedly, motivated Japan to invade more territory. Ultimately both Japan and 
Italy left the League. Subsequently, Germany disclosed an extensive aggressive behavior and 
invaded more territories under the leadership of Hitler.224 
Though the principle of territorial integrity had already got international legal recognition, 
signatories of the Covenant of League of Nations were not actually committed to respect binding 
provisions. Expansionist ambition never stopped. Very few African States were members of League 
                                            
224 Supposedly, losing hope due to weakness of League of Nations to resolve international issues, more members left 
the League. In 1933 German, Italy in 1937. Due to Leagues failure to stop invasion by Italy, Ethiopia formally left 
the League in 1936. For details of the list of members of League of Nations, date of membership and date of 
dismemberment see http://www.indiana.edu/~league/nationalmember.htm.  
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of Nations.225 In actual fact there was no difference in being member or non-member as the League 
was not effective in discharging its goals. Powerful nations were not really committed to abide by 
the Covenant. This had rendered weaker nations, like Ethiopia to lose hope. The League was unable 
to maintain global peace and security. It practically failed to control widespread violations of 
territorial integrity and political independence. As a result, at the end of WWII a new relatively 
effective global organization, the United Nations, constituted thereby ending League of Nations. 
 
                              3.5.3. The Principle of Territorial Integrity Norm after WWII 
The end of WW II has heralded multifaceted socio-economic, and political changes. Most 
importantly, the global political system has been restructured.226 As Stuart Elden attests, with a final 
goal of maintaining global peace, preservation of existing boundaries was one of the core tenets of 
this structure.227 The weak League of Nations was dissolved and a “progressive” global umbrella 
organization, the United Nations, was constituted.  The most important mission of United Nations is 
maintaining global peace. As United Nations may be viewed as the product of WWII, it is not an 
exaggeration to say that it was an organization meant to keep global peace.  Peacekeeping mission 
of the United Nations can be observed from the very first line of the preamble. It states, “ WE THE 
PEOPLES OF UNITED NANTIONS DETERMINED to save succeeding generation form he 
scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind.”228  
In reorganizing the global organization, world leaders have determined to build unshakable 
global peace, and thereby avoid another world war. Tolerance of member States of United Nations, 
peaceful coexistence, fostering to unit, and strength maintenance international peace and security, 
                                            
225 Liberia, South Africa, Ethiopia and Egypt were the only African members of League of Nations.  For list of League 
of Member States see,   http://www.indiana.edu/~league/nationalmember.htm 
226 Stuart Elden, Contingent Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity and the Sanctity of Borders, XXVI SAIS  REV. 11, 11 – 
24 (2006). 
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development of good neighborhood are among the principles that are enshrined in the United 
Nations Charter.229 As a modality of keeping peace and security the Charter strictly prohibits use of 
force for any motive save self-defense.230 The act of self - defense may be carried out by the victim, 
or collective action may taken to avert an aggression.231  
It has been repeatedly pointed out that border issues can easily and quickly generate armed 
confrontation and spoil global peace. With a view to avoid use of war to resolve border conflict or 
territorial dispute, the charter has reaffirmed territorial integrity of member States as one of the 
important tenets for maintenance of global peace and friendly relationship.  Art. 2 (4) of the Charter 
in this case is vital. It declares, “All members shall refrain in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in 
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”232 Use of force for the 
purposes of territorial expansion or redrawing boundary, thus ipso facto, illegal. A State having 
territorial or border issue has to resort peaceful dispute resolution method. Any attempt to force a 
neighboring State surrender an illusive territory or border is illegal and, in principle, can trigger 
                                                                                                                                                 
228 U.N. Charter of United Nations, Preamble. 1UNTS XVI. (Oct. 24, 1945), 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3930.html ( Accessed: 4/20/16). 
229 Id.  
230 U.N. Charter of United Nations Art. 2(4). 1UNTS XVI. (Oct. 24, 1945), 
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security takes lions share of the United Nations mandates. As pinpointed in Art. 1 of the Charter, in case of 
disturbance of global peace and security, member States collectively can take preventive action and remove threats 
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232 U.N. Charter of United Nations Art. 2(4). 1UNTS XVI. (Oct. 24, 1945), 
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collective action.233 “The principle of territorial integrity is considered as one of the primary means 
in achieving and maintaining international security and stability in the world.”234 
The principle of territorial integrity norm has been strictly enforced since Second World 
War.235 The only exceptions were temporary acquisition of sovereignty of former colonies of Italy, 
Germany and Japan by the allied forces, and Soviet Union’s annexation of Baltic States. While the 
former was temporary until colonies got ready for independence, the latter States retained under the 
federation of U.S.S.R until Soviet Union finally disintegrated.236  Despite Soviet Union’s actions of 
traditional practice of taking sovereignty of territories of loser of war, almost all the founding 
members of United Nations have accepted the sanctity of territorial integrity norm.237 Since then the 
Principle of territorial integrity has become “[…] one of the cornerstones of the U.N. Charter 
system and the post-Second World War international legal order.”238  
Following the Charter, several international agencies and movements, either under the 
auspicious of United Nations or regional organizations, have acknowledged the need to preserve 
existing territorial limit and the need to keep them whether they are good or bad with the goal of 
maintaining international peace and security. The 1960 United Nations Declaration accordingly 
states, “ Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity or territorial 
                                            
233 Collective use of force against Iraq to avert its violation by invading and later annexing Kuwait, and a collective 
action against North Korea for its violation of South Korea’s territorial integrity are some of instances in which 
Security Council authorized collective use of force.  
234 Vita Gudeleviciute, Does the Principle of Self –Determination prevail over the Principle of territorial Integrity?, 2 
INT’L J. BALTIC L. 48,  48- 74 (2005). 
235 The contribution of League of Nations and international agreements thereafter is not doubtful, but some States were 
not ready to stop conquest for territorial expansion and were not satisfied by the gains of the WWI. As a result, 
Japan, Germany and Italy ignored Art. 10 of the League of Nations and Versailles Treaty in quest for territorial 
expansion, while France, Great Britain and United States stood for territorial integrity of all states. After WWII, 
however, supporters of the territorial integrity got enhance power over Italy, Germany and Japan, as their motive 
was failed.  Mark Zacher rightly remarks, “At the end of the World War II the Western Allied Powers exhibited very 
strong support for the integrity of the interstate boundaries.”  Zacher supra note 1 at 220.  
236 Soviet Union also retained some of the territories of Poland, Germany, Finland and Rumania. Id.  
237 U.N. Charter art. 2(4). 
238 Jure Vidmar, Territorial Integrity and the Law of Statehood, 44 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 692 – 747 707 
(2012).  
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integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations.”239  
In 1970 United Nations further clarified how to effectuate the decolonization process while 
maintaining territorial integrity. It is clearly pointed out in Clause 5(6) of the Declaration of 
Principles of International Law that territories of colonies and other self governing entities was 
separate from territories of colonial powers240 Thus, self-determination of a colony cannot be 
viewed as an act distracting the preservation of territorial integrity, as colonies were allowed to 
declare their independence within the bounds of their own territories. But ethnic groups were not 
entitled for the unreserved declaration of independence.241  In Africa, for instance, most colonial 
boundaries were arbitrary and ethnic groups were split into several colonial powers; granting 
independence to ethnic groups would obviously disrupt territorial integrity thereby generating 
unmanageable territorial and boundary conflict.  
The 1970 Declaration of Principles of International Law, and Friendly Relations and 
Cooperation among States has further strengthened the sanctity of existing territories. The 
Declaration reaffirms that territorial integrity norm has reached the level of customary international 
law. 242 It requires all states to refrain from any act or conduct that may disrupt national unity or 
territorial integrity of any state.243 The Principle of Territorial Integrity also endorsed by some 
regional organizations.  The Charter of the Arab League of 1945 and the Charter of Organization of 
American States 1948 acknowledged the sanctity of territorial integrity of member States.244 
Similarly, the 1963 Charter of Organization of African Unity (OAU) and subsequent 1964 Cairo 
                                            
239 Clause 6, UNGA RES. 1514,  DECLARATION ON GRANTING OF INDEPEDENCE TO COLONIES 
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Declaration approved the principle of territorial integrity.245 The Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) reaffirmed the territorial integrity. The present Europe also 
acclaimed the respect to territorial integrity by the Paris Charter of 1990 and by the Dayton Peace 
Treaty.246 
 Now it appears almost settled, that the existing territories should not be disrupted or 
disintegrated, as the preservations of inherited territories for the maintenance of international peace 
and security. Thus the only available legal option to redefine international boundary is peaceful 
means; use of force to redraw boundary is strictly prohibited and contrary to the United Nations 
Charter.247 The strong and sensitive statements of founding fathers of OAU reveal this fact. Elden 
pinpoints remarks of Michael Walzerin as follows:   
Although boundaries may be arbitrary, rooted in history and subject to the politics that condition 
the making of maps, they are the grid that create a “habitable world.’ State sovereignty generally 
provides a measure of protection within those borders. While [ Michael Walzer] recognizes that 
adjustments may be necessary, in a most cases borders should be preserved.  In deed, if ‘an 
invasion has been threatened or has actually begun, it may be necessary to defend a bad border 
simply because there is no other.’248 
 
Thus, the existing international law favors stability and integrity of territory. It is plausible that 
keeping territories stable and intact makes immense contribution for stability of international peace 
and international solidarity. By implication, as territorial limits are identified by their borders, the 
existing international borders, should remain undisturbed. That is why most nations chose to honor 
existing boundaries, despite their elusiveness or arbitrary nature.      
 
             
                                                                                                                                                 
244 Zacher  supra note 5 at 221.  
245 Somalia and Morocco opposed the position of  OAU that requires member States to respect boundaries     
    existing on the critical date of independence.  
246 Zacher supra note 5 at 222 
247 Needless to say that a State having border issue cannot use force, as use force unless fails under Art. 51  of the U.N. 
Charter is illegal and may trigger collective action.   
 150 
  3.5.4. The Principle of Territorial Integrity and Self-determination 
In this Section we will briefly look at the relationship between self-determination in non-
colonial situation and implications of the principle of territorial integrity norm. The question is 
whether ethnic groups or an administrative region of a given nation can exercise self-determination 
or the principle of territorial integrity bars the right of self-determination outside colonial setting. 
The right of self-determination is a universal right.249 As clearly stated in international 
human rights covenants, “All peoples have the right of self-determination.” 250 Thus, as a rule all 
people can exercise the right of self-determination. On the other hand, the principle of territorial 
integrity requires territory of a given nation to remain in tact. Thus, the two principles are 
apparently contradictory.251 Therefore, an inquisitive mind may fairly question how to reconcile this 
apparently conflicting situation.   
In non-colonial sense the principle of self-determination applies to internal self-governance 
of ethnic or territorial units of a given nation.252 This stand is well clarified by the Declaration of 
International Law, which reaffirms both territorial integrity norm and the principle of self-
determination. Clause six of the Declaration is very pertinent in this regard. It states:  
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action 
which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unit of 
sovereign and independent States conducing themselves in compliance with the principle of equal 
rights and self-determination of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a government 
representing the whole people belonging of the territory without distinction as to race, creed or 
colour.253  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
248 Elden supra note   226 at 13. 
249 See the very first provisions of the United Nations Charter, International Convenient on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural rights (ICESCR) 
250 Art. 1 of INTERNATIONAL COVENIENT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHT. Almost the same expression is 
stated in Art. 1. of the INTERNATIONAL COVENEINT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS. 
251 It may appear that the principle of territorial integrity imposes limitation on Self-determination.  See Jure Vidmar, 
Territorial integrity and the Law of Statehood, 44 GEO. WASH. INT’ L. REV. 692-747      707  2012  
252 Vidmar supra note 238 at 708.  
253 G.A. RES/25/2625 - Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation 
Among States in Accordance with United nations Charter (1970).  
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As mentioned in the purpose clauses Art. I(2) and Art. 55 of the United Nations Charter and 
international covenants, the principle of self-determination is peoples’ right – it is about “equal 
right and self-determination of people.”254 It is not dismemberment or interference in domestic 
affairs of a nation. If the right of self-determination is invoked to dismember a territory, then it will 
turn to be secession, which will be briefly discussed later. Self-determination, therefore, need not be 
secession.  In non-secession context, the principle of self-determination affords autonomy to self-
administer an administrative unit of a State.255 As Vidmar lucidly remarks: 
[The principle of territorial integrity] “limits peoples’ right of self-determination, so the 
elaboration reflects the doctrine that outside of colonialism, the right of peoples to self 
determination will be normally consummated internally within the international borders of the 
parent State and thus will not result in a new State. 256 
 
Though the principle of self-determination may appear to include secession or 
dismemberment, close assessment of the rule reveals that the right of self-determination is 
independent of secession or dismemberment. It is simply the right of people, nations and 
nationalities for self- governance, which does not affect territorial integrity. Secession or 
dismemberment obviously affects territorial integrity, as both actions result in disintegration of 
territory.  
 
3.5.5. The Principle of Territorial Integrity and Secession 
Secession results in dismemberment of territory and hence, affects territorial integrity of a 
given State, and post-colonial practice reveals that in the case of unilateral secession, the claim for 
                                            
254 U. N. Charter art. I(2) and Art. 55. 
255 According to Nawaz, President Wilson in his infamous fourteen points indicate that “the concept of self 
determination consisted of the nation of self –government of people.” See M.K. Nawaz, The meaning and Range of 
the Principles of Self-Determination, 82 DUK. L. J  82 -101  84  1965 This line of interpretation accords with the 
original draft of  I(2) of U.N. Charter as can be understood from Travaux Preparatoires. The original Dumbarrton 
Oaks draft stated that “to develop friendly relations among nations and to take other appropriate measures to 
strengthen international peas.” The original motive behind Art. I(2) thus appears to maintain internal peace by 
granting autonomy for self administration. Id.  
256 Vidmar supra note 238  at 708.  
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territorial integrity is “prima facie applicable.”257  So is it permissible to unilaterally secede while a 
parent State objects? If so, what international law authority supports it? This question often asked 
than answered. Prevailing authorities simply support the sanctity of territorial integrity and prohibit 
dismemberment of existing territories, but in realty we know new state emerge by secession. For 
instance, the world’s newest nation, the Republic of South Sudan has declared its independence in 
2011 after more than 30 years of armed struggle, and Eritrea split from Ethiopia in 1993 after 
fighting one of the longest civil war in Africa during cold war era.  
With regard to unilateral secession, international law appears neutral.  In normal course of 
things, international law does not acknowledge nor explicitly prohibit unilateral secession.258 Once 
a new State acquires independence without a counterclaim by the parent State or the parent State so 
consents to the secession by waiving its right to claim the principle of territorial integrity, 
international law acknowledges the new State. But where a parent State makes the claim of 
territorial integrity, international law never affords recognition, unless the situation falls in one of 
the strict exception.  For instance, de facto independent States like Somaliland, Taiwan are not 
independent States; as their respective parent States make territorial integrity claim. However, in 
very limited instances exceptionally, Security Council may disregard the counterclaim for territorial 
integrity and confer independent existence of a new secede State.259  For instance, where the parent 
State makes explicit discrimination or causes grave human rights violation in a territory demanding 
unilateral secession, the claim for territorial integrity may be disregarded.  
                                            
257 Id.   at 710. 
258 Id.  at 708. International experience so far discourages unilateral secession. The Congo case proves this fact. In 1960 
the State of Katanga declared independence form Congo but the international community fought against the State of 
Katanga by affording respect to territorial integrity of Democratic Republic of Congo.  The question of Nigerian 
State of Biafra was another illustration. The international community, in particular African States, have opted for 
territorial integrity of Nigeria. Only Tanzania recognized Biafra as independent State while the rest of the African 
countries and the world supported Nigeria’s territorial integrity. 
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As Marc Waller argues in Kosovo Advisory opinion, unilateral secession may bestow 
statehood, if and only if the new State is conferred with “legal authority.”260  It is an authority that 
may be granted either by the parent State or collectively by international community including 
Security Council for just cause.261  A parent State may expressly or impliedly consent to the 
secession.  In the case of session of Eritrea, for example, Ethiopia was the first country to recognize 
Eritrea as an independent State just after the people Eritrea opted for secession by U.N sponsored 
referendum. Recognition by Ethiopia was waiver of the claim for territorial integrity thereby 
created legal authority for the creation of State of Eritrea. Almost an identical procedure was in 
secession of South Sudan.  Legal authority may also be created by constitutional process. For 
example, the current Ethiopian Constitution legalizes secession if certain procedural requirements 
stipulated in the Constitution are met.262 A constituent State of the Federal Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia can get an unchallenged statehood by the authority of the FDRE Constitution. 
As pointed out above, in very exceptional cases, as a result of grave human right violation 
and injustice, the Security Council may act under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to 
confer legal authority that may enable secession in rare cases. This situation may surface if 
collective action is taken under the auspicious of Security Council. Where Security Council 
confirms unstoppable and widespread human rights violation against a specific category of nation 
by mother nation, or grave discrimination that cannot be averted and thought to destabilize the State 
and affect international peace and security, may grant legal authority. Similarly wide spread 
recognition may confer statehood. Say for example, if almost all State recognize State hood of 
                                                                                                                                                 
259 Take for instance the case of East Timor where United Nations ignored the question of territorial integrity by 
Indonesia and finally assisted East Timor to get secede.  Security Council acted under VII of the Charter by 
establishing a transitional administration. See Vidmar supra note 258 at 729.  
260 Vidmar supra note 238 at 710.  
261 Id.  
262 FDRE Constitution, art. 39.  
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Somaliland, and if there is no way for Somalia to avert the situation through claim of territorial 
integrity, Somali Land may be conferred legal authority to secede.  
 
3.6.   Stages of International Boundary Making 
International boundary making involves some basic stages.  The stages are commonly 
adhered though strict adherence is not a legal requirement, or not a necessary step that need to be 
strictly. However, the stages naturally involve in international boundary making. For instance, the 
territory to be separated by a boundary line should be determined; then the criteria for the actual 
separation should be set. The size, width, length, the method of delineation is supposed to be 
expressed in the boundary making treaty. The territory then will be apportioned in accordance with 
the pre-determined rule. Each part of territory will be described in a way it is possible to 
specifically distinguish from the other portion of territory. On the basis of the description, and 
accompanying map, boundary markers will be emplaced on the actual point of separation (the 
boundary line). Boundary markers may be pillars, monuments, posts or beacons that signal the end 
of territory of a given State and the beginning of another.  These are normal procedures that 
naturally involve in the international land boundary making. 
The stages of international boundary making termed until finally settled with clearly 
articulated expressions. For instance, in Argentine-Chile case of 1902 Edward VII captioned the 
stages as definition, delineation and fixation.263 Definition holds the initial stage of boundary 
making, including agreement on the territory to be partitioned, deliberation on areas to be 
apportioned, the extent of the division and the part to be ceded to or given to a neighboring State. 
The stage of definition is too general, which may not specifically locate a given boundary line. The 
                                            
263 Dennis Ruthworth, Mapping in Support of Frontier Arbitration  IBRU BOUNDARY AND SECURITY BULLETIN 
(SPRING 1999)  at 61 available at  https://www.dur.ac.uk/resources/ibru/publications/full/bsb5-1_rushworth.pdf last 
accessed 9/2/15. 
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next step, delineation, is description of each part of territory including maps. Fixation is the last 
stage in which visible signs will be planted on the actual point of separation.  In 1902 Sir Thomas 
Holdich termed the last stage of boundary making (fixation) as “actual demarcation”.264  Lord 
Cruzon in his 1907 lecture describes the second stage of boundary making (known as delineation at 
the time), as a work of diplomats that require the art of diplomacy, whereas, the last stage (fixation 
at the time), as a mechanical process.265  It is a mechanical process because it is a stage of 
implementation of deliberations of political authorities that is already described in the boundary-
making document. At this stage, boundary engineers will build pillars signaling the end of one’s 
boundary and the beginning of another.  
French International Jurist, Paul de Lepadelle, however, chose other captions denoting 
international boundary making. To Lpadelle, boundary making involves three important stages: 
preparation, decision and execution.266 Apart from variation in caption, in essence all 
classifications of boundary making stages are similar.  
In the middle of 20th century Stephen Jones came up with the expressions that clearly reveal 
practical functions of stages of boundary making which has got universal acceptance. Jones in his 
notorious book entitled, “Boundary-Making A Handbook for Treaty Editors and Boundary 
Commissioners) illuminates four stages of boundary making:  allocation, delimitation, demarcation 
and maintenance.267  Allocation is a political decision to divide a given territory among two or more 
                                            
264 Id.  
265 Id.  
266 Donaldson & Williams, Delimitation and Demarcation:  Analyzing Legacy of Stephen B. Jones Boundary-Making 
13:4 GEOPOLITICS 687  (2008). 
267 Victor Prescott accepts the four stages of boundary making as stated by Stephen Jones (See Prescott supra note 123 
at 59 – 76).  
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contending States. The next stage of boundary making is a stage of precise delineation of the 
allocated territory. It is known as delimitation. 268 
Delimitation can be effected in numerous ways and by different organs depending up on the 
nature of the contest relationship between contending States. It may be stipulated by treaty, 
resolutions or minutes of political decision makers, resolution of international organizations like 
Security Council, UN General Assembly or regional organizations, court decision or arbitral award 
and so forth that can effectively determine territorial limits of two or more states.  The next most 
important step in international boundary making is demarcation. It is generally viewed as the last 
stage in boundary making, as it finalizes the most important aspect of boundary making by 
emplacing boundary signs at the actual boundary point, in accordance with the act that has created 
the boundary. Maintenance is routine administration and periodic inspection of the boundary. It is 
“maintenance of the boundary makers […] as long as the relevant boundary lines run.”269 
Delimitation is more specific phase when compared to allocation but less precise when compared to 
demarcation. 270 
These historical classifications of phases still dominate boundary-making literature.  As 
pointed out above, the stages of boundary making may not necessarily be strictly followed step by 
step in each case. In some cases some phases may be merged together, or in other cases it may be 
overlapped or delayed for centuries.271  For instance, allocation and delimitation may be decided in 
the same forum, as both steps may be decided simultaneously.272 Allocation may also take place by 
a unilateral action of one or more of parties and the other party may simply acquiesce by conduct or 
                                            
268 The terms “delimitation” and  “demarcation’’ were coined by Mcmahon who regarded the dictionary meaning of the 
terms identical. Mcmahon’ s usage of the terms did not win universal acceptance.  See STEPHEN B. JONES, 
BOUNDARY-MAKING, 57(1945).  
269 GBENGA ODUNTAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BOUDNARY DISPUTES IN AFRICA, 79(2015).  
270 Jones supra note 268.  
271 Id.  
272 See Id.   
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expressly approve the stand of the contending party to take a given portion of territory before a 
precise scope is delineated. Thus, where the boundary is allocated for whatever reason before the 
formal delimitation, there is no need for reallocation, unless the parties involved disagree with the 
action of another.   
The stages of boundary making may also vary depending upon the situation. Though the 
timing at which the parties involved, or the prevailing scenario on the ground may vary, each 
boundary making process involves some common phases. In some case parties may have involved 
in violent confrontation and either attempting to end the ongoing war or simply attempt to take 
time, tactically to prepare for a bigger war, or genuinely negotiate to end confrontation. The forum 
of negotiation may be bilateral, or mediated by third party, or it may be arbitration tribunal or 
International Court of Justice, which exercises a formal judicial process.  
Execution of each phase demands resources and knowhow – expertise.273 Some times a 
political will or a motive may determine the actual process of boundary making. Depending upon 
urgency, after dealing with some pressing issues, states my keep a given phase for later 
consideration until financial or technical preconditions are met. In some cases demarcation may be 
delayed for centuries, unless there is a pressing issue for immediate actual demarcation. The nature 
of territory and its economic value may determine the moment of demarcation. Needless to say, if 
the territory is economically important and involves high cross boundary contact, states may be 
motivated to demarcate the border as soon as possible. On the contrary states may not prioritize 
demarcation of a barren land to other pressing issues. States may opt to use meager resources for 
necessities of life thereby reserving demarcation of unimportant land for some time in the future. 
Political, administrative, economic, technical considerations may therefore play a role in deciding a 
                                            
273 Economic, technical, and times variables may influence the decision to demarcate. 
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moment in which a delimited territory has to be demarcated. Thus, depending upon the variables, 
after delimitation on paper, the boundary may remain unmarked for a long period of time.  
  This Section highlights each of these phases with a view to appreciate the legal, socio 
cultural and economic problems that may arise as a result of poor boundary making. International 
boundary making process, technically, starts with allocation or division of territory among 
contesting political organs. After a successful allocation, the next step is defining each point or 
negotiating on exact lines of separation. After an agreement reached on the specific points of 
separation then the actual boundary will be marked on the ground. The later stages are more of 
boundary management that may be done routinely. Some of the important steps are briefly 
summarized below.  
3.6.1. Allocation 
The first step in boundary making is to allocate a territory among the contesting parties. 
“Allocation is the initial political division of territory between two states.”274 Stephen Jones limits 
the number of parties to which a territory to be allocated into two, but in some cases a territory may 
be allocated among numerous States; there is no reason to limit the number of parties into two. It is 
not the number of beneficiaries of allocation that matters, but its meaning and nature. As pinpointed 
above, allocation is a political decision or an agreement authorizing a given state/states to legally 
possess a certain part of territory that will be specifically described under the stage of delimitation. 
For instance, Italy and Ethiopia agreed that the Kunama ethnic group (borderland residents in the 
north west of Ethiopia) was on Eritrean side. This is a general agreement because an exact limit of 
the territory that belonged to Kunama was not specifically described, even it was not actually 
known at the time of the allocation. The “contractants” agreed to deal with the actual specification 
of an exact limit of territories of Kunama later on.  
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In colonial times, territories were allocated among the European superpowers. Most of 
African territories were allocated among the colonial powers in the Berlin Conference. This process 
was continued even after WWI. For example, Great Britain and France agreed the former Levant 
(Syria and Lebanon) to be allocated to France and Palestine to Great Britain.275 
A territory may be allocated to contending parties as a temporary relief on going conflict. 
First, allocating a territory by referring to indigenous communities like Kunama, as pointed out 
above. This is known as allocation referring to the “general inherent boundary”.276 In this case, the 
parties refer to a boundary separating tribes, villages or watersheds. The very purpose of this kind 
of clearly unsettled or precisely undefined distribution of territory is a temporary measure that 
would avoid dispute by giving some relief to the parties until a clear boundary is set. 
  Parties may also refer to a previously known administrative boundary.277 The previous 
administrative boundary may not necessarily be precisely delineated, but it can serve as a temporary 
solution until a joint boundary commission or any other designated organ makes a final and clear 
delineation. In some cases, allocation may be simply recognition of sovereignty of a given political 
organ. Allocation, however, is not identical to recognition of a state by another political entity 
having no territorial link. A State negotiating with another State to get a given portion or part of 
territory may be a constituent part of a bigger State. For instance, former U.S.S.R member States or 
a state from which a given constituent political organ was seceded can recognize territorial holding 
of the parted State.  After collapse of the U.S.S.R most former members have recognized the 
independence of another State before dealing with the actual boundary that has clearly divided 
them.  For example, “Ukraine has signed bilateral and multilateral agreements with all of its 
                                                                                                                                                 
274  Jones supra note 268 
275 INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF SURVEYORS (FIS), INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY MAKING,  FIG 
PUBLICATION NO. 59, 21(Haim Srebo ed. 2013). This was not actually colonization but occupation of the states 
concerned until they are able to exercise self – determination.  
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neighbours that recognize sovereignty over their respective territories and the inviolability of 
boundaries that defined them at independence.”278  Parties may also use geometrical method at 
distant location without having topographic view or actual holders of the territory. This was the 
method applied in Berlin Conference during partition of Africa. In a situation where geographic or 
human realties were not known, the only method was using meridian and parallel lines. Eastern 
Sector of Ethio-Eritrean boundary was delimited by mathematical system of boundary making.  
This method is also known as astronomical method.279 This method may appear the actual 
delimitation but it has an element of allocation too.  
Allocation is a procedure of boundary making that is often done at a time where no clear 
knowledge about the geographic or human realties on the ground is available. It is a temporary 
solution, but effective use of some available information would make delimitation quicker and 
easier.  Needless to say, an ambiguous allocation would result in a messy delimitation that would 
plant an unmanageable conflict like the one Africa has been enduring. The decision to allocate a 
territory may not necessarily specify every aspect of boundary points but it should address all the 
possible issue that may halt delimitation. The political decision “ […] should better address the 
problems that are likely to emerge in the later stage of delimitation or demarcation.”280 Thus, the 
quality and efficacy of demarcation depends upon clarity and preciseness of allocation.  Jones 
remarks, “ If territorial allocation has been unwise, the utmost nicety of treaty phrasing or surveying 
will not make a stable boundary.”281 On the same token, a well-allocated boundary should also be 
                                                                                                                                                 
276 Id. 
277 Id. at 22. 
278 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE),  Applied Issues in International Land & Boundary 
Delimitation/Demarcation practices, A seminar Organized by the OSCE Borders Team I Cooperation with Lithuanian 
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specified in the treaty or other forms of delimitation precisely; otherwise, demarcation would be 
impossible or conflict may arise during demarcation.282 
 
3.6.2. Delimitation 
3.6.2.1. Meaning and Nature 
Delimitation is a legal process in which two or more sovereign nations “establish and 
describe” the location of their common border.283  McMahon, the first person to coin the notion of 
“delimitation” defines it as, “…the definition on paper either in words or on a map of the limits of a 
country.”284   To Professor Cukwurah, delimitation is “ […] a diplomatic procedure, the business of 
treaty makers, who should decide on the trustworthy evidence the line which will be acceptable to 
both high contracting parties.”285 Stephen Jones illuminates delimitation as, “… the choice of a 
boundary site and its definition in a treaty or other formal document.”286 Other formal documents 
include judicial decisions, arbitral award, or compromise in which boundary dispute is resolved.287  
  Thus, delimitation is a process in which an exact specification of the scope of boundary is 
stated. The extent of boundary description or specification may vary with the level of development 
and technological progress. Each separating point will be pinpointed in a way it is possible to 
emplace boundary makers on the borderline. Delimitation, therefore, services as a blueprint that 
guides the actual boundary making. As preparatory stage for the actual boundary making, 
“Delimitation covers […] all the preliminary processes and procedures involved before a boundary 
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283 Alec McEwen, The Demarcation and Maintenance of International Boundaries, A paper presented at a training 
workshop on the Demarcation and Maintenance of International Boundaries, University of Durham, 8 – 9 July 2002, 
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286 Jones supra note 268 at 57.  
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is laid down on the ground [….]”288 Thus, all acts and procedure that involve in boundary making 
before the stage of demarcation commences is viewed as delimitation.  
It has been pointed out that delimitation is a description of supposed boundary. As a 
procedure leveling ground for erection of boundary markers, delimitation should be clear enough 
specifying all the boundary points in consideration of local geographic and human factors. The 
question then is how to gauge the clarity? The bottom-line for delimitation is its unambiguous 
guidance to set an actual boundary line on the ground at the demarcation phase. It is not only the 
clarity that matters, but as Professor Cukwurah points out, delimitation should be acceptable to all 
involved.289 This aspect makes the work of delimitation hard, as it is not possible to win consensus 
of all involved in the boundary making. To settle issues that may arise during delimitation, 
compromise appears mandatory; otherwise, peace cannot prevail in the region.  
The clarity of delimitation, therefore, depends upon its quality to ease the demarcation 
process.  Boundary engineers can easily understand a clear delimitation that coincides with the 
border facts to erect boundary markers. The demarcators will be able to build pillars or other forms 
of boundary signs just by reading or observing the delimitation without the need for further 
clarification or negotiation. The engineers or other experts may not necessarily be people who took 
part in the delimitation negotiation to have personal knowledge of the geographic or human realties 
on the actual boundary. They will be guided only by the statements and figures stated in the 
delimitation.  
 
3.6.2.2. The Need to Know Geographic and Human Situation  
To make an acceptable borderline, treaty makers should know the nature of borderland.  As 
Stephen Jones rightly remarks, “[…] a boundary is not an idea, nor a paragraph in a treaty, nor a 
                                            
288 Ruthworth supra note 263. 
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line on a map, but a functional feature of the face of the earth.”290 Boundary making, therefore, 
involves a hybrid process. It is a mix of multifaceted facts and factors such as historical facts, 
political and economic considerations, and demographic factors.291 Needless to say, delimiters 
should have a clear understanding of all of these complex realities on the ground.292  Therefore, 
actual field visit and observation appears a necessary requirement that need to be carried out before 
actual commencement of delimitation. Stephen Jones, thus, rightly remarks, “The best definition or 
description of a boundary is that based on personal knowledge of the area in question [….]”293  
(Emphasis added). Put simply, before attempting to delimit a borderline, there should be a complete 
field study of bordered regions. 
A mistake in one stage of boundary making may hamper execution of the other stage. It may 
also lead into friction and stale the whole process or may even lead into war. The best approach to 
avoid or reduce mistake is to have personal knowledge of the borderland facts or gathering 
information from all possible sources if delimiters cannot personally visit the borderland.294  
Participation of all relevant organs in boundary making would also reduce the possibility of 
mistake. Numerous people, with diverse expertise and political commitment, may take part in the 
delimitation process. Diplomats/ politicians, lawyers, surveyors, civil engineers, are among the 
persons that may be chosen to describe (delimit) an exact boundary line. As International 
Federation of Surveyors suggests, “[S]ince the precision of the delimitation process is very  
important, in order to avoid problems during the demarcation on the ground, the participation of 
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practical experts, who are capable of anticipating the practical problem of demarcation, is 
essential.”295   
International Federation of Surveyors, suggest the need to form a joint team of experts who 
may reconnaissance border situation before carrying out delimitation. The team will analyze facts 
on the ground in light of demand of States to be separated by a boundary line. The team will regard 
historical facts, natural features and impact on the borderland residents. Investigation of facts on the 
ground may include studying and interviewing borderland community and their wishes. The team 
will also consider the actual evil of the prevailing boundary ( dejure or defacto).  The team “ 
[…should be assigned to the task of defining and preparing all the necessary professional data and 
tools for the boundary annex, of the treaty including defining the wording and the graphical 
expression of the delimitation which will be incorporated in the Treaty.”296 Despite paramount 
contribution of expert team that may ease the whole task of delimitation and shorten the time to 
complete border making, in a hostile environment that may be backed by multifaceted motives (like 
a situation border issue is simply a bargaining leverage, like Ethio-Eritrea border case), it is almost 
impossible to constitute a team of experts. 297 Constitution of expert team will not only facilitate 
boundary making, it will formulate an acceptable borderline.  
If delimitation carried out without assistance of experts and in disregard of local situation, it 
may not be implementable – or would be extremely be hard to implement, if not impossible at all.  
According to Stephen Jones,  “ It is highly desirable that no boundary be defined irrevocable in a 
treaty until a technical adviser experienced in boundary problems has been consulted upon the 
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choice of the site and the working of the definition.” 298  This reconnaissance need not consume 
much time but may prevent delimitation of unsuitable lines and reveal inaccuracies on maps.  
  Eritrea and Ethiopia border delineation best explains ambiguous boundary delimitation. . 
During colonial time, the Ethio-Eritrean boundary was delimited in the treaty of Addis Ababa, 
which was far away from the boundary area. It was very hard for the Ethiopian King who was not 
from Tigrai Region to know an exact boundary line.  Given the absence of quick communication or 
modern transportation facility that would enable Ethiopian negotiators and experts to contact border 
people, it is incomprehensible to admit that facts in the border were known.299 Presumably, as a 
result of unfamiliarity of the border regions, serious errors have been made which referred a 
boundary point to a non-existent river (Muna/ Berbero Gedo) or a confusing river that was referred 
several times in the map ( maiteb, maiten, Meeteb or Maeten, Belesa A, B, C), that confused  EEBC  
to draw an acceptable boundary and stuck the whole process of boundary making. The delimitation 
decision by the Eritrea/Ethiopia Boundary Commission has been unacceptable to the border 
residents, especially Irob people.300 As Stephen Jones attests, delimiters may commit a grave 
mistake if they are not familiar with the boundary, unfamiliarity with geographic and human facts 
or lack of knowledge of defining boundary.301  
To be familiar with the boundary in question one has to visit the borderland and observe 
facts on the ground. This method may, however, be impossible due to several contingencies. As 
physical visit is the best choice, members of the boundary commission should exert utmost effort to 
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299 The apparent treaty does not mention whether border people were consulted or visited by the Ethiopian king. For the 
Italian negotiators there was ample possibility as they drafted the treaty in a way they wished to have more land. It 
has hared for the king who sat in the Capital, which was far away from the border area to know the local realties.  
300 The Irob are indigenous people that reside on Ethio-Eritrea border region, but always been on the Ethiopian side 
even during colonial time. They never regarded them as Eritreans and never separated.  Details of the Irob people 
and their opposition to the decision of the Eritrea/Ethiopia Border Commission (EEBC) will be mentioned in the last 
chapter.  
301 Jones supra note 268 
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visit the actual boundary.  It is true that physical visit by high-ranking political personalities may 
not be possible, but authorities may delegate experts who can relay them documented facts on the 
ground. An actual physical visitation and reconnaissance of the borderland reality will consume 
much time but will save a lot during the delimitation stage and avoid errors and consequential 
confusion and conflict. Ariel photograph and satellite picture can be used, but may not effectively 
substitute an actual physical observation. In a situation where it is absolutely impossible for 
physical observation, the aerial photograph or satellite image may be the only option.302  
 
 3.6.2.3.  Methods of Delimitation 
Jones has provided numerous options for defining boundary.303 The first method is complete 
definition. In this case, the whole boundary line will be defined. This kind of delimitation makes 
demarcation easier as each point of boundary will be clearly spelled out.  A boundary commission 
or other experts may opt to define boundary with the possibility to deviate. This means, delimiters 
may expressly authorize demarcators to deviate from the terms of delimitation in case of unforeseen 
situation that may not coincide with the terms of delimitation surfaces. One scenario may be human 
relationship like the situation of native border people. A treaty entered between Estonia and Latvia 
best illustrates this point. The treaty had authorized the Boundary Commission to make certain 
adjustments in consultation with the Parties to introduce changes to accommodate local facts, for 
example to “ […] reunite farms which had been divided by the Arbitrators, and to make most 
reasonable use of the channels of communication.”304 The treaty may restrict the Boundary 
Commissions power to adjust by using words like “slight” or “minor”305 or the treaty may express 
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304  Estonia-Lativia:  Convention regarding the Delimitation on the Spot of the Frontier between the Two States, Riga, 
October 19, 1920. League of Nations, Treaty Series, Vo. 17 (1923) at 40 Note 6 Id at 59 
305 Treaty between Belgium and the United Kingdom, March 19, 1927 Concerning Cong-Rohodesia boundary  (Jones 
supra note 268 at 600. 
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the extent of deviation that  the demarctors may go. It may be in terms of length. Costa Rica and 
Nicaragua, for example, authorized the Commission to depart up to one mile from the line drawn in 
the treaty.306  
Delimitation may also be made in terms of turning points. This is the most common method 
of delimiting an exact scope of the boundary.  The boundary point may be located by latitude and 
longitude (geographic coordinates). For efficacy of delimitation by turning points, the points should 
be clear enough so that a straight line to be drawn without any deviation. In some cases, a clear 
turning point may not be available. If the points were at a known place, the name of the place may 
also be used.307 It may be hard for the demarcators if the turning point cannot be found. This 
situation happened in Somaliland-Ethiopia border.308 It would have been easier, had the delimitors 
used the name of the place at which the turning/boundary point was located.  
A zone may be defined as a point of demarcation in the delimitation. This method, however, 
is not advisable unless the two neighboring States have a reliable and strong friendship.309  
Similarly, a boundary may be delimited by referring to natural features of land. This is the most 
common method of delineation in old days. In medieval times it was common to delimit boundary 
by referring to natural features of land. Mountains, rivers, lakes, oceans, are the prominent natural 
features that were commonly used as points of division of territories of two or more states.310 Land 
holding of a given ethnic group had also been used as the end of territory of a given states. When 
delineating the Ethiopia and colonial Eritrea territory, Ethiopia and Italy agreed the Western Sector 
of the boundary to be territorial limit of Kunama ethnic group. Delimiting by the location of 
mountain, forest and desert is also elusive as an exact diving line can be doubtful. The very purpose 
                                            
306 For example, Convention between Costa Rica Nicaragua December 24, 1886. See Jones supra note 104 at 60.  
307 Id. at 61. 
308 In British Somaliland-Ethiopia Boundary, it was not possible to find out the turning point as stated in the 
delimitation while names were not rare. As a result, demarcators have adopted latitude and longitude (44˚ E, 9˚ N). 
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of boundary setting is to avoid possible territorial dispute, but is an elusive delimitation is not 
helpful to locate the actual boundary and dispute may arise.  
As rivers cover a longest distance of boundary often used as point of separation of two ore 
more states. It may be used on assumption of clarity or for defensive purposes.311 The colonial 
boundary treaties that were concluded between Ethiopia and Eritrea referred to rivers. If the river is 
not big enough, it may dry up or its name may vary from one locality to the other and create 
confusion during demarcation. Before delimiting borderline, by referring to river, a thorough study 
of nature and common naming is helpful. Delimiting by referring to river nowadays is almost 
settled. The actual boundary depends upon the kind of river. In non-navigable river, in absence of 
contrary agreement, an exact boundary is exactly the middle of the river, whereas in the case of 
navigable river, an exact of point of separation of two states is thalweg.312 
Thus, delimitation by natural features of land often causes trouble.313 Maps drawn on the 
basis of natural features of land may be inaccurate, and indequate map may cause conflict during 
demarcation. This situation exactly happened in the Western and Central Sectors of Ethiopia - 
Eritrea border.  The 1900 colonial treaty mentioned three rivers: Belesa, Muna and Mereb as 
boundary rivers separating Eritrean and Ethiopian land, but the river Muna was not known in Irob 
districts and could not be found. As result a huge mistake that may split Irob indigenous people and 
permanently change their lives was committed. The Irob people have been fighting to convince the 
Ethiopian Government to ignore the decision of Eritrea/Ethiopia Boundary Commission. This and 
other similar issues have practically staled the demarcation process.  
                                                                                                                                                 
309 Elder supra note 226 at 5. 
310  Cukwurah, supra note 101 at 40 – 77.  
311 IBRU, International River Data Base,  https://www.dur.ac.uk/ibru/resources/irbd/ ( last Visited Jun 18, 2015). 
312 Cukwurah, supra note 101 at 51. 
313 Jones supra note 268 at 62. 
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A boundary may also be defined in principle. It is a flexible form of delimitation. Boundary 
makers depending upon the prevailing circumstance may adjust boundary with a view to reduce 
rigidity. Delimitation in principle, thus, is not a comprehensive and fixed type of definition.  
Delimiters authorize demarcators to consider geographic and human factors into account.  This kind 
of delimitation is based on fairness. It is a form creating boundary line by considering the need and 
interest bordered people. For instance, Boundary Commission may ignore a borderline that may 
split closely related indigenous people; it may be set by considering resource sharing, among 
communities, or follow prevailing trade line.314 Delimitation in principle cannot be used to delimit 
the whole boundary but can only be applied in need basis to create justice among the closely related 
border residents. This kind of delimitation gives high latitude to demarcators, but is time 
consuming, as the demarctors have to investigate the prevailing geographic reality and border 
residents’ way of life before deciding on the point of separation (the border line).  With a view to 
limit the power of Eritrea-Ethiopia Border Commission (EEBC), the two States have expressly 
avoided consideration of fairness (the principle of ex aequo et bono). 
 
3.6.3. Demarcation 
 
3.6.3.1. Nature and meaning 
It has been point out that delimitation is a blueprint in boundary making process – it is a 
plan that directs the process of boundary making at the demarcation stage. Delimitation, in fact, not 
only guides the process of demarcation, but also controls demarcators to carry out the boundary 
making in accordance with the specification enshrined in the delimitation document (the treaty). 
Work procedures, governing laws, personnel and financial consideration, and so forth are expected 
to be exhaustively dealt at the delimitation stage. The number of demarcators, composition and 
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power, the extent of neutrality expected from the expert demarcators, security personnel, assistants 
and laborers, medical personnel, scientific staff, resources, the extent of each party’s share of 
demarcation expenses, supplies and transportation are some of the points expected to be decided at 
the delimitation stage.315 The demarcation process, thus, may not be as tense as delimitation and 
will be carried out by experts and technicians, relieving high level authorities from routine technical 
matters, unless unexpected event that would stale the work of demarcation surfaces.  
 To geographers and other experts in the field, the notions of “demarcation” and 
“delimitation” are very basic concepts, but to an ordinary people the terms may be vague or may 
appear one and the same. An ordinary person may have notice of a border when it retrains 
movement. But a border wall or a fence that restrains movement comes into existence after the 
stage of demarcation is completed. Therefore, one may question what demarcation is and how it 
actually works? Who carries out the demarcation and what makes it less tense than delimitation? 
How unexpected situations that may surface during border making may be managed? These are 
some of the issues that need brief explanation.  
 According to Stephen Jones demarcation, “ […] by its very nature, [is] a field operation,”316 
It is a work which “ […] is strictly technical: control by astronomy, triangulation, or aerial 
photography, projection of the line, mapping a boundary strip and erection of monuments.”317  A 
pillar, post or monument will be erected at the spot stated in the delimitation and shown in the map. 
As has been pointed out else where, a map may illustrate textual description of treaty, court 
decisions or arbitral award regarding a given boundary. In all cases an exact boundary point at 
which a pillar may be placed is expected to be pinpointed in the delimitation. Surveyors and 
cartographers can easily locate the boundary point as stated in the delimitation and boundary 
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engineers will erect boundary marker.  After boundary markers are erected at all the spots, and 
other complementary tasks are discharged, the demarcation team will be discharged and the 
processes of boundary making may be complete.   
 It may happen that demarcation, for various reasons and causes, may not be congruent with 
the boundary points as stated in the delimitation.  For instance, a boundary pillar, by mistake or in 
deliberate foul play, may be implanted at a wrong location contrary to the treaty wordings.  The 
problem may be discovered after centuries and the two neighboring States may not reach into 
agreement to amicably resolve it. This was an actual problem that surfaced in the boundary between 
Israel and Egypt.  In this contradictory situation which one shall prevail? The boundary point that 
was specified in the delimitation treaty about 100 years ago or the location of pillar on the ground 
which was known to the local people as a boundary point for several years? Each State will 
supposedly favor an interpretation that adds more territory. The disparity between the two important 
facts of boundary making may happen due to mistake, foul play or a pillar may have been moved 
unilaterally by one of the neighboring State or it may have happened by third parties or by non-state 
actors. The point in this situation is not investigation of how the disparity surfaced, but how to 
resolve such a situation? Put other ways, if delimitation and demarcation don’t coincide which one 
prevails?  
 In Israel-Egypt case, the joint Boundary Commission could not solve the contradiction and 
referred the case for resolution by a neutral court.318 As delimitation is simply a description stated 
on the paper – be it treaty, judgment or arbitration award with or without accompanying map - the 
boundary marker – may be pillar, monument, post or there mark denoting boundary line on the 
boundary spot, which is known to the local people, and presumably impliedly approved by serving 
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318  E. Lauterpacht, CBE, QC, The Taba Case: Some Recollections and Reflections, 23 ISR. L. REV. 443 – 468 (1989).  
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as a line of separation of two neighboring States is preferred to an abstract delimitation, which may 
not be known to the local people - the actual beneficiary.  
 
3.6.3.2. Demarcation on the Basis of Natural Features of Land  
 It has been pointed out elsewhere that before advancement of technology to precisely locate 
an actual boundary point on the ground, nations had relied on natural features of earth like 
mountain, river, ocean, sea and even dense forests. If a treaty simply refers to a given land scape as 
boundary, say for example, a given river or mountain as a boundary between two or more states, 
then the law regards the stated land scape as a point of separation between the neighboring States. 
The problem of delineation with “natural boundaries” is its elusiveness. An ocean, a river or a given 
forest may be large enough having its own width to specifically demarcate. Thus, demarcation by 
using these natural features of earth may arise a question, “Where is an exact boundary line?”  If a 
treaty, for instance, stipulates, “The boundary between China and India is Mountain Everest,” one 
may fairly ask if which State owns the mountain or if the mountain is taken as commonly owned, or 
the extent of share of China’s or India’s share of the mountain.  Therefore, delineation of boundary 
on the basis of natural features of land may not be precise enough to tackle boundary conflict.  
 However, experts in the field have attempted to mitigate the elusiveness of natural 
boundaries. For instance, in the case of mountain boundaries, unless otherwise agreed, the 
watershed is taken as boundary point.319  In the case of dense forest or desert, however, an exact 
dividing line is still elusive. As Cukwurah, rightly points out deserts or dense forests may afford 
effective barrier for border crossing, “[…] yet unlike mountain, they do not possess naturally 
marked sites for boundary lines.”320 The most rational solution appears to take the median point of 
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the desert. Otherwise, a forest boundary will be deemed as a zonal boundary that is in between the 
bordered States.  
 The traditional rule of delimitation in non-navigable river boundaries was riverbanks as 
boundary line and making the riverbed common to the riparian States.321 In this changing world 
where all spaces can be exploited for natural resources, this rule is not adequate enough to preclude 
the possibility of conflict. Thus, unless otherwise agreed to the contrary, a separating line extends to 
the riverbed.  In the case of non-navigable river, the center of the reverted riverbed is boundary 
point; whereas, in the case of navigable river, it is thawleg,  (the median channel) of the riverbed is 
a boundary point.322 Apportioning the navigable part of the river allows both riparian States to 
benefit the navigation function of the river. Its side effect is the possibility to annex more territory 
to the other side if the deepest navigable side of the river squeezed to one of the banks.  
 The other related issue of river boundary is the legal effect of boundary when the river 
changes its route. The old rule was that the boundary follows the river. This means, if the river 
diverts to the other riparian territory, the old bed will belong to the other adjacent territory, making 
the owner of the territory to whom the river diverted lose some portion of territory including the 
former waterbed. This rule appears unfair, as it makes one of the neighboring States to lose a 
portion of its territory because of the diversion of the river. The current law has changed the 
unfairness of the old law by making the former riverbed to continue serving as boundary point.323 
River diversion, therefore, cannot change the old boundary. It will be changed into a land boundary.  
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323 In the Case between Iowa and Nebreaska, where Missouri river suddenly changed its course and made a new 
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 Regarding water boundaries, it is not only river that poses puzzle, but also litigation and legal 
wrangling is common in respect of boundaries of stationery water like lakes, oceans and seas. Who 
owns for example, an inland lake that is bounded by two or more States?  For instances, numerous 
States are surrounded by Lake Victoria.   It is true that each neighboring State has interest in the 
lake and its rich resources. International law has to address an apparent conflict of interest. A lake is 
inland water; thus unless otherwise agreed, the rule of delimitation and demarcation of river 
boundary governs demarcation of lake boundaries.324  A lake is normally navigable, and hence, the 
median channel, thalweg, is the boundary point. Thus, territorial jurisdiction of State extends up to 
the middle of thalweg of the lake.325 It is a matter of measurement and physical assessment that can 
be easily determined by the neighboring States with the need of judicial assistance.326  
 In the case of sea, it is also settled that jurisdiction over coastal states goes up to 12 nautical 
miles,327 with the possibility of EEZ of 200 nautical miles.  The fundamental principles of 
international law governing international sea has been never doubted since the judgment of the 
seminal case, Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case,328 which extends territorial limit of coastal states to 
certain predetermined scope of international sea.  The core principle is the adjacent land determines 
the possibility of extending territories into the sea. ICJ in the Anglo Norwegian Fisheries cases has 
declared, “ […] the belt of territorial water must follow the general direction of the coast [….] ”329  
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 Demarcation and boundary making is generally sue generis, though territorial limit of sea is 
as a general rule is applicable through out the globe. Unless the parties stipulate otherwise, a 
commonly accepted international law norm governs the demarcation of international maritime 
boundaries. Territorial water limit of a State is demarcated virtually through geographic 
coordinates. 
 
3.6.3.3.   Is demarcation a necessary requirement in all cases? 
 Demarcation is sign making on the actual boundary line to indicate the end of one’s territory 
and beginning of another. Should the point of separation of two nations still be demarcated while a 
clear boundary line is set at the delimitation stage? Technically, it is possible to say that if all the 
contours of the boundary are precisely and exhaustively spelled out at the delimitation stage, 
demarcation may be redundant. For instance, if negotiating States have exhaustively described a 
boundary line and if the boundary line is unambiguously clear, demarcation will be redundant. If 
the negotiating parties have agreed a specific river, mountain, or another form of permanent mark to 
be a boundary point, and an exact point of separation is clear, there is no need to carryout 
demarcation.  
 In practice, however, delimitation by using natural features of land can never be precise.  
Nature is always in the state of change and so does the landscape of earth, but boundaries are 
expected to be permanent and stable. For instance, a river may divert its bank, or may dry up or 
perimeter of a mountain may be wide enough and later on conflict may arise. Thus, if the clarity of 
the boundary line is doubtful or subjected to varied interpretation, it is advisable to erect a pillar or 
monument that will sharply indicate a specific point of separation between the neighboring States. 
The very purpose of demarcation is to set an unambiguous mark that can clearly reveal a point of 
 176 
separation. If this point is naturally and clearly set, and the Parties have consented to it, there no 
need for demarcation – delimitation in this case serves both functions.  
 
3.6.3.4.  Demarcating Personnel 
Enormous people with diverse experience, professional capacity and political interest may 
involve in the demarcation process. Depending upon terms of the delimitation, boundary engineers, 
surveyors, cartographers and other supporting staff will carry out the actual marking of exact of 
point of separation (the boundary line). The Parties in, accordance with terms of delimitation, will 
name demarcators. The number of demarcators, their professional expertise, nationality and the 
scope of neutrality expected to be specified in the delimitation. 
  In the case the demarcation personnel was not stated in the delimitation, the highest officials 
of the concerned States have to name the demarctors or set a criteria for the appointment of 
demcarctors.  Demarcation traditionally performed by a group of people assigned from the 
neighboring States. Each State will appoint certain number of persons as stated in the delimitation. 
The number of demarcators from each of the States may be equal, but this is not a requirement.  
The experts (engineers, surveyors, cartographers, researchers, doctors, other assistants, like drivers, 
cook, security personnel and so forth) may be appointed either by the joint Boundary Commission 
(usually highest category).When delimitation is court judgment or arbitration award the tribunal 
may also be entrusted with power of demarcation. The judges or arbitrators may not personally 
carry out the demarcation, but can hire experts who work under their guidance and close scrutiny.  
In other cases, tribunals simply decide on delimitation and another group of people may be 
empowered to demarcate the actual boundary line. The Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission, for 
instance, empowered with the power to delimit and demarcate.  
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3.6.3.5. The Power to Adjust Boundary 
 It appears unwise to refer all minor contingencies that may surface during demarcation to the 
busy political authorities for explanation. As a result, it has been an established practice to authorize 
expert demarctors to adjust the delimitation line if an unforeseen barrier emerges out during the 
demarcation. Put simply, the demarctors may be empowered to make a minor adjustment in the 
boundary line, should strict application of terms of delimitation thought to hamper peaceful 
coexistence or if it is manifestly impracticable to demarcate.    International boundary experts, 
including Stephen Jones, agree with the possibility of adjusting boundary to suit to the borderland 
facts and geographic realties.330 In the words of Jones, “Many treaties leave, and all should leave, to 
the demarctors the final adjustment of the line to local needs and the realties on the terrain.”331 
(Emphasis added). The very purpose of boundary making is to create a lasting peace. If the 
boundary fails to meet this objective, it would be waste of time and resources. Therefore, unless all 
situations were empirically studied and considered in advance, the demarcating team should be 
conferred with fair latitude of power to adjust an actual line before drawing a final boundary line. It 
is the demarcating team that interacts with two sides of border residents and observe an actual 
problem on the ground. A notorious boundary-making expert remarks as follows: 
[…] when Commissioners reach the locality of demarcation, a reasonable latitude is 
commonly conceded to them in carrying out their responsible task.  Provision is made 
for necessary departure from the Treaty line, usually on the basis of mutual 
concession. 332 
 
The demarcating team will analyze the impact of a given boundary line on border 
interaction and border transactions. The team knows the weather condition, shared resources like 
water springs, grazing land or forests for firewood. If a power to adjust boundary line is given in a 
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treaty with the objectives of making lasting peace, the borderline will be respected forever and will 
be a gate for interaction thereby changing the traditional restraining function of borders. Therefore, 
adjustment of the border by the demarcators who may take local facts into account will have a 
paramount significance in building a smooth functioning border.333     
 
                     3.6.3.6. Ancillary Functions of Demarctors 
 A demarcation team may extend effort beyond border marking to peaceful and stable border 
making. In other words, demarcators in addition to emplacing border markers, may endeavor to 
improve borderland interaction by encouraging bordered people to socialize. Socializing bordered 
people will build confidence and avoid animosity. In the words of Stephen Jones, “A demarcation 
commission has also a third function, seldom, if ever explicitly stated.” That function is according 
to Clifford, the improvement of frontier relationships.334 Though not empowered with the task of 
border making, the United Nations Mission on Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) has attempted to 
connect Ethiopian and Eritrea church leader with a view to build confidence between the two 
brotherly people. A border marking (demarcation) team is the only neutral body working in the 
borderland with a view to create peace in the region, especially in a situation where the scares of 
violent conflict not healed. Peace making, thus, is complementary to border creating and hence 
helpful to build an acceptable and effective borderline that can create a lasting peace.  
 
    3.6.4. Boundary Administration (Maintenance) 
A demarcated boundary should serve the goals of keeping peace and stability by signaling 
an exact limit of boundary line between neighboring States. Visibility of a boundary marker avoids 
confusion and conflict that may arise as a result of inadvertent intrusion. Travelers crossing a well-
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demarcated boundary with a clearly noticeable boundary pillar, voluntarily submit themselves to 
the jurisdiction of a State that has sovereignty over the territory.  A boundary marker is an 
important tool to regulate the behavior of border residents or anyone around the border.335  
Erecting boundary markers is not the end of the “ business” of boundary making.  Boundary 
pillars have to be kept in tact in a way visible to the actual and potential boundary crossers.  A 
boundary marker is a man-made building that may be destroyed either by naturally catastrophe, 
wild animals or by human act.  To be specific, a pillar or other form of boundary marker may be 
destroyed by wear and tear, it may fall or may be dismantled by flood and erosion, or may be wiped 
out by wind and other forms of natural disaster with/without influence and contribution of human 
being. A pillar may be obliterated or moved from its original location by human act or by other 
unforeseen cause. Visibility of a boundary marker may also be vitiated as a result of growing trees 
or vegetables that may cover the boundary marker. This calls for a periodic inspection and a 
remedial action with a view to obviate an act or fact that can hamper the important functions of the 
boundary markers.  The inspection and reconnaissance of boundary markers is a permanent activity 
that should be done periodically at a predetermined time gap.  
Stephen Jones classifies this stage of as a fourth stage of boundary making, and labels it as 
boundary administration. It is also known as boundary maintenance. Is boundary maintenance, 
which is unending enterprise, a stage of boundary making? Both boundary administration and 
maintenance are permanent in nature, as far as the boundary exists. Boundary 
administration/maintenance is vital to keep boundary markers to continue “making good neighbors” 
by keeping peace and stability.  
Boundary administration has to be   preplanned as a part of boundary negotiation at the 
delimitation stage or can also be done during demarcation, or may be agreed immediately after 
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completion of the demarcation.  Treaty makers should devise a specific provision governing 
boundary administration. Cukwurah attests this view stating, “The delimitation and demarcation of 
an international boundary will be no avail if, in the long run, no provisions are made by parties for 
the protection, maintenance and repair of an established boundary.”336  
According to the Federation of International Surveyors, with a view to keep border stability, 
boundary markers should be maintained continuously in regular intervals.337 An uninterrupted and 
periodic maintenance demands a clear procedure and a regular reconnaissance.338 It may be carried 
out by a professional team, who may work either jointly or separately depending upon the terms of 
negotiation. A periodic inspection and reconnaissance can be effected through a joint boundary 
commission. Joint boundary team of China-Mongolia boundary commission, for instance, in 
addition to the partial investigation that can be carried out as needed, the joint team works within 5 
years, while Israel – Jordan carries out reconnaissance within a year.339 Boundary administrators 
will jointly or individually resolve boundary problems depending upon the terms of agreement or 
the nature and volume of the problem. All problems and solutions should be documented.340  
Boundary Commissioners of United States/Canada are authorized to permanently administer 
United States – Canada boundary.341 Each State appoints a commissioner who makes annual report 
to State department. The Commissioners have their own staff that assist Commissioners and 
remunerated by their governments. The boundary commission works in accordance with the treaty 
that was approved by the States.   Some boundary commissions discharge the normal periodic duty 
of inspection separately in accordance with prearranged method while others may carryout the 
                                            
336 Cukwurah,supra note 101  at 83. 
337 Id.  at 33. 
338 FIG 275  32 
339 Id.  at 34. 
340 For example, Art. 4 of the  U.S.A Canada treaty of Feb. 24, 1925 empowers a joint team  to monitor the boundary 
line and to settle all problems that will be encountered including repairing damaged boundary marker, relocate or 
rebuild them if obliterated, keep boundary vistas open or move boundary monuments to the new sites. Id. 
 181 
inspection jointly.342 While inspection has to be done individually, unless there is issue, each teach 
team should not repeat what the other has done.  It is possible to apportion the duty to inspect the 
pillars among the team. If anyone of the team finds some thing unusual, has to report the finding to 
the other team and action can be taken jointly. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
341 See International Boundary Commission, 
342 Pillars with the tag of odd numbers were allocated to Chinese team, while even numbered pillars were allocated to 
Mongolian team.  FIG supra note 295 at 35. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
African Boundary Regime and Governing Principles 
 
4. 1. Overview 
 
There is little doubt about the arbitrary and divisive nature of African colonial boundaries. 
African boundaries were set in complete disregard of geographic, linguistic, and ethnographic 
affinity, and have planted unending conflict and animosity among Africans.1  Ironically, in fear of 
presumed chaotic situation that thought to surface, had the boundaries redrawn2, founding fathers of 
OAU have decided to respect boundaries existed on the critical date of independence.3 Despite the 
decision to abide by the pre-independence boundaries with the intention to avoid the presumed 
chaotic situation, colonial boundaries have been source of most of Africa’s “civil and [international] 
wars that have ravaged the continent, and brought misery to many of its inhabitants.”4  In some 
cases, arbitrary boundaries are pondered as time bombs that may explode at any time and in any 
                                            
1 The very people who partitioned Africa admit ignorance of African facts when partitioning Africa. Lord Salisbury’s in 
his 1890 speech regrettably remarks,  “We have been engaged … in drawing lines upon maps where no white man’s 
feet have ever trod; we have been giving away mountains and rivers and lakes to each other, but we have only been 
hindered by the small impediment that we never knew exactly where those mountains and rivers exactly where those 
mountains and rivers and lakes were.” (Emphasis mine)  ( Lord Salisbury’s speech of 1890 quoted in Territorial 
Dispute (Libya v. Chad) by Judge Ajbola in his separate opinion, ICJ Reports 6(1994) at 53  quoted in Robert 
McCorquodale and Raul pangalangan, Pushing Back the Limitations of Territorial Boundaries, 12:5 EJIL  867, 867 – 
888 (2001). See also Johson Oalaosebikan Aremu, Conflict in Africa:  meaning, Causes, Impact and Solution,  4(4) 
AFRICAN RES. REV. 559  551, 549 – 560 (2010). 
2  Ikome terms the takings of founding fathers of OAU as, “ … partly because of a legitimate concern that any attempt 
to review the boundary will lead to anarchy.” Francis Nguendi Ikome, Africa’s International Borders as Potential 
Sources of Conflict and Future Threats to Peace and Security, ISS PAPER NO. 233  12 (2012).  According to Ikome, 
though “inviolability” of existing border did not absolutely avoid border conflict, had the borders been reviewed quite 
more chaos would have been emerged. Id. 
3  Apart from Morocco and Somalia, the rest of the founding members of OAU have consented to respect boundary 
lines drawn before decolonization, See the Cairo Resolution of Assembly of Heads of States and Governments 
(AHSG/Res/16(1) July 1964 
4 Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the 34d Conference of African Ministers in Charge of Borders 
Issues, EC.CL/726(XXI)  9- 13 July 2012. See also Depart of Peace & Security of African Union Commission, From 
Barriers to Bridges Collection of Official Texts of African Borders from 1963 – 2012  22(2nd ed. 2013). It is aptly 
stated, “ Africa became the theatre of the most devastating wars that have occurred in the world since 1945.” Id.  See 
also Samuel G. Amoo, The OAU and African Conflicts: Past Successes, Present Paralysis, and Future Perspectives, 
WORKING PAPER Inst.of Conf. Analysis and Res, George Mason University,  (May 
1992).http://scar.gmu.edu/wp_5_amoo.pdf 
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direction.5 Continued push by the separated tribal groups for unity, irredentist movement, vague 
boundary line that is hard or impossible to demarcate on the ground has been perpetuating unending 
conflict in Africa.6  As a result, more than any continent in the world, Africa suffers from protracted 
territorial and boundary wars.   
 As do pre-Westphalian European boundaries, pre-colonial African boundaries were porous 
and had been changing, as tribes, ethnic groups, nations or nation states frequently move or migrate 
from one place into other looking for favorable environment or resources necessary for conducive 
life. Despite some attempts to devise a clear boundary line, the Westphalian formula of creating a 
linear boundary was largely “imported” to Africa by colonial powers. The African Westphalia, 
however, was arbitrary. The actual people for whom the boundary was set or their representatives 
did not take part in the boundary making to suggest a better working boundary line that would align 
with facts on the ground.7  African boundaries were drawn far away in Europe by the people never 
been in Africa and were not aware of African terrain.8   
This Chapter briefly assesses African boundaries starting from Pre-colonial era to the 
current state. Part I reveals that pre-colonial Africa had an indigenous form of boundaries that had 
separated territorial holdings of nations, nationalities, and tribal groups. Pre-colonial African 
                                            
5 President Chadly of Algeria views colonial boundaries as “delayed action bombs left by colonialism.” See J.R.V. 
PRESCOTT, POLITICAL FRONTIERS AND BOUNDARIES, 254(1987). For detailed consequences of colonial 
boundaries see Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou, The Long-run effects of the Scramble for Africa, 
WORKING PAPER SERIOUS, NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, WORKING PAPER 1720 
(2011), http://www.nber.org/papers/w17620 
6 Ikome, supra note 2.  See also Agulbou Diarrah, An Overview of the African union Border Programme, in 
DELIMITATIONA ND DEMARCATION OF AFRICAN BOUNDAREIS: GENAEAL ISUES AND CASE 
STUDY, DEPT OF PSC, COMMISION FOR AFRICAN UNION 8(2013).  
7 Professor Mutua surmises, “Unlike their European counter parts, African states and borders  are distinctively artificial 
and are not  ‘the visible expression of the age-long efforts of [indigenous] peoples to achieve political 
adjustment[….]” See Makau wa Mutua, Why Redraw The Map of Africa: A moral and Legal Inquiry, 16 MICH JL 
INT’L  L. 1115, 1113 – 1176 (1994 – 1995).   Thus, colonization and resultant arbitrary boundary has interrupted 
evolutionary process of African boundaries by implanting arbitrary European formulation. Id. Professor Mutua, 
contends that foreign imposition of African system would lead into African extinction and proposes for readjustment. 
Id. at 1118.   
8 Lord Salisbury’s admission of arbitrary delineation of African boundaries is often cited.   
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boundaries were analogous to the European boundaries before the historic Westphalian Resolution 
of 1648. All boundaries, being human creation are artificial, but all boundaries need not necessarily 
be arbitrary. A boundary that is set by the common will of the people who reside therein in, or by 
their representatives who took geographic and human factors, may not necessarily be regarded 
arbitrary.  Part II of this Chapter illuminates the scramble for Africa and partition of its territories 
and people by the European colonial powers. Finally, the post colonial movements to revise African 
boundaries during pan Africa movements, the stand of founding fathers of African umbrella 
organization (OAU) and subsequent efforts to stop recurrent territorial and boundary conflicts in 
Africa is briefly outlined.  
 
4.2.  Pre-Colonial African Boundaries 
As pinpointed in Chapter two of this work, the emergence of private property has 
necessitated the creation of boundaries in medieval times. Traditional African societies share this 
characteristic, and had indigenous type of boundaries that separated private holdings of ethnic and 
national boundaries.9  The state of pre-colonial African boundaries was almost identical to the pre-
Westaphalian European boundaries.10 As boundary setting was started with frontier system, early 
African boundaries were zonal (frontiers) in nature. Though porous and periodically changed, 
African Empires, nations or cities states had their own territories and boundaries before European 
boots landed in Africa.11  Take, for instances the boundaries of Axumite Kingdom. Despite it often 
worked to expand the scope of its territory, Axumite kings were fully aware of territorial limits of 
                                            
9   Adekunle Ajala, The Nature of African Boundaries, 18:2 AFR. SPECTRUM, 178, 177-189 (1963). 
10 As pointed out chapter 2 of this work, it was in 1648 that the Westphalian congress deliberated for the linear 
boundaries and sovereignty of states in their respective jurisdictions within the clearly defined boundaries. 
11 Ajala supra note 9.  See also Edward Kofi Quasbigab, Legitimate Governance: The Pre- Colonial African 
Perspective in LEGIMATE GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA international and Domestic Legal perspectives, 43(Edward 
Kofi Quashigah & Obiora Chinedu Okafor eds. 1999).  
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the kingdom. Expansionist tendencies and even the possibility to lose one’s territory cannot lead to 
suppose pre-colonial Africa did not have boundary.  
There is an assertion that pre-colonial African societies “[…] were neither in need nor 
capable of projecting their power over large territories.”12 As a result, Englebert and colleagues 
argue that pre-colonial African kingdoms claimed political authority and property rights over 
people more than land.13  Consequently, the learned authors surmise, “[…] with few exception such 
as Ethiopia the concept of territorial delimitation of political control was by and large culturally 
alien.”14 This assertion is not acceptable, for instance, to the pre-colonial dweller of Ovamboland, 
Namibia. In Ovamboland, according to Gregor Dobler, “Territory did matter for pre-colonial 
political domination, even if land as such was plentiful and different polities lay for from each 
other. […] The King and his power were strongly linked to the land.”15  In medieval Africa, thus, it 
is not only the people, but also the territory in which authority may be exercised was considered 
vital.  
As do pre-Westphalian Europe, some nation states in Africa had their own boundary walls 
that are still standing.  The Harar City wall in Ethiopia manifests this fact.16 The wall was erected 
with a view to defend residents of the City State from frequent external invasion. The invaders need 
not be neighboring city-states, empire or ethnic groups but extra-continental invaders like Turkish, 
                                            
12 Pierre Englebert et al, Dismemberment and Suffocation  (A Contribution to the Debate on African Boundaries), 33:10 
COMP. POL. STUDIES, 1095, 1093-1118 (2002).  
13 Id.  
14 Id. 
15 Gregor Dobler, Boundary drawing and the notion of territoriality in pre-colonial and early colonial Ovamboland, 3 
J. OF NAMBIAN STUDIES  16, 1 – 25(2008). 
16 Harar City Wall is one of UNSCO Heritage sites.  For details see,  
http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/1189 
17 Ajala, supra note 9 at 178.  
18 Id. at 179. 
19 Both Hadya and Wolaita ethnic groups are now under their own separate zonal administration of Southern Nations 
and Nationalities Regional State in Ethiopia. 
20 Now the ditch is situated in the middle of districts neighboring Hadya Zone of Wolayta Zone (former Boloso Sore, 
Damot Gale and Damote Woyde  districts).   
21 Oromfa speaking zone of Amhara Regional State is an exception.  
22 This is simply to show that pre-colonial African societies had boundaries that were either altered or redefined by the 
colonial powers. This is author was born and raised in Wolayta nation and personally aware of the boundaries of 
Wolayta and surrounding nations and nationalities. By chance the boundaries of Wolayta nation never altered evening 
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Arab or Europeans. Pre-colonial African borders, like pre-Westphalian European borders, had been 
delineated by the natural features of land. The boundaries often set unilaterally and marked by 
natural features of land. Rivers, mountains, deserts, forests, watersheds, marshlands, lakes and sea 
were some of the dominant method of marking boundaries between tribes, nations, city-states, or 
Empires. Ajala attests this view stating, “ Pre-colonial Africa adopted age–old systems of using 
zones or border marches as buffer between kingdoms.”17 Some of the zonal areas may be wide 
enough to cover deserts or dense forests. As land and resources were more than the need of people 
at the time, there was no question whoever uses the resources in the buffer zones. Practically no one 
cared about resources, as resources were naturally abundant. Buffer zones that separated territories 
of the neighboring tribes were no man’s land.18 This, however, does mean, anyone could occupy the 
boundary zone. It is implied that the zone belonged to the neighboring polities.  
Some pre-colonial African kingdoms have attempted to draw a clear boundary line.  The 
Wolayta Kingdom (now Wolayta Zone in the Southern Nations and Nationalities Regional State in 
Ethiopia) unilaterally drew its boundaries with Hadya ethnic group by digging huge and long ditch 
that covered the supposed boundary.19 The ditch was a clear mark of the end of territories of 
Wolayta. The kingdom of Wolayta had been in frequent war with the neighboring Hadya nation, 
quickly went beyond the ditch line when it won another war and succeeded in acquiring more 
territories.20 The eastern boundary of Wolayta Kingdom was the river Bilaate. The river still serves 
as the boundary line between Sidama and Wolayta Zones of Southern Nations and Nationalities of 
Ethiopia. The river Blaate is traditionally an accepted boundary line between the kingdom of 
                                            
17 Ajala, supra note 9 at 178.  
18 Id. at 179. 
19 Both Hadya and Wolaita ethnic groups are now under their own separate zonal administration of Southern Nations 
and Nationalities Regional State in Ethiopia. 
20 Now the ditch is situated in the middle of districts neighboring Hadya Zone of Wolayta Zone (former Boloso Sore, 
Damot Gale and Damote Woyde  districts).   
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Wolayta and Sidama. This boundary line never doubted, by the former and current residents of the 
two neighboring nationalities.  
The western boundary of Wolayta ethnic group is river Omo. River Omo separates territories 
of Wolayta and Dawuro ethnic groups. The Dawuro ethnic group, the Gamo, and Goffa ethnic 
groups share some of the features of Wolayta and Wolayta never sought to take territories of these 
ethnic groups. The border of Wolayta and Gamo and Goffa ethnic groups is very porous when 
compared to Sidama and Dawuro, but no known territorial or boundary conflict ever been surfaced. 
No one clearly knows an exact time of the creation of these boundaries. The creation of these 
boundaries may be equated with the creation of the two separate kingdoms and their territories.  
Ethiopia has several ethnic groups, kingdoms, nations and nationalities. Most of the 
boundaries of nations and nationalities are still kept intact serving as internal administrative 
boundaries. Boundaries of several Oromfa speaking kingdoms constituted the Oromia Regional 
State21, the Amhara kingdom changed into the Amhara regional State, and so forth.22 Boundaries of 
Tigrigna speaking ethnic group constituted Tigray Regional State. In Western and Eastern Ethiopia, 
there are several ethnic groups and nationalities that kept their traditional boundaries until 
reshuffled by the colonial powers. For instance, before French occupation of Western Africa, the 
territory had been divided into various independent regions, which were also subdivided into 
independent regions that were settled by the local ethnic group.23  The local people undoubtedly 
knew the limit of territories of each of the regions and sub regions. The limits of territories, be it 
                                            
21 Oromfa speaking zone of Amhara Regional State is an exception.  
22 This is simply to show that pre-colonial African societies had boundaries that were either altered or redefined by the 
colonial powers. This is author was born and raised in Wolayta nation and personally aware of the boundaries of 
Wolayta and surrounding nations and nationalities. By chance the boundaries of Wolayta nation never altered evening 
during the five years Italian occupation. The boundaries traditional features even survived the changing regimes. The 
ditch the was supposed to separate the Wolayta and Hadya ethnic groups now situated in the middle of Wolayta 
territory as the kingdom of Wolayta expanded into more Hadya territories by the frequent expansionist war.   
23 SUZANNE LALONDE, DETERMINING BOUNDARIES IN CONFLICTED WORLD: THE ROLE OF UTI 
POSSIDETIS  108(2002).  
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river, mountain, watershed, forest or desert or some kind of zone having its own width and length 
may be taken as boundary.  
Pre-colonial African boundaries were generally elusive, but did not create problem or never 
been considered as problem or actually created problem at the time. Traditional African people 
never fought for boundaries or transgression on boundaries, but the fight was for expansion of 
territories and desire to have more people that can serve the empire.  Frequent territorial expansion 
had rendered the meaning and purposes of boundary meaningless, as there was no guarantee for 
permanent holding of a territory.  For instance, the kingdom of Dahomey (now Benin) in West 
Africa and Buganda often invaded their neighbor to expand their territorial holdings.24  
Expansionist character was the feature of medieval kingdoms throughout Africa. In a 
situation where a powerful ruler could forcefully cede the whole territories and capture its residents, 
the only concern was to protect territories and the people from frequent invasion either from the 
neighboring ethnic groups, tribes or from foreign aggressors. Grazing land or other resources 
including timber, water was not scarce. When things were abundant, boundary conflicts rarely 
surfaced.  For instance, nomads of neighboring Sidama tribe in Southern Nations and Nationalities 
of Regional State of Ethiopia often crossed the border - river Bilaate- and pastured their cattle in the 
Wolayta side, but there was no complaint. Now resources are scarce and everyone expects another 
not to encroach borderlines and use scarce resources. The competition for scarce resources has been 
source of territorial or boundary conflict.   
As Ajala pinpoints, pre-colonial African boundaries can be classed into three categories.25  
First, pre-colonial boundaries did not absolutely retrain movement. Pre-colonial African 
boundaries, as Schengen currently does in Europe, served as points of contact.  In frontiers of 
                                            
24 Ajala supra note 9 at 179.  
25 Id.   
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contact, neighboring kingdoms or ethnic groups were lived side by side and passed territories of 
each without impediment. The southern boundaries between Wolayta, and Gamo and Goffa fall 
under this category; still now, there is no impeding mark or some kind of barrier that separates the 
two groups.  So far there is no boundary conflict. The boundary between Wolayta, Hadya, and 
Kambata has no restraining barrier or boundary mark.  The ethnic groups, however, know the limits 
of their territory and there is no boundary dispute.  Even if one inadvertently trespasses, the conflict 
could easily be resolved through traditional peaceful dispute mechanism. Any misunderstanding 
can be cleared on spot and easily. As a result, no one knows if there was a boundary conflict.  
The second kind of frontier, according to Ajala, is frontier of separation. In this case two or 
more bordered groups were separated by wide border mark – the frontier.  The mark may be a river, 
as between Sidama and Wolayta or dense forest or a desert that was hard to cross. The ditch that 
was dug between Wolayta and Hadya may be an exceptional kind of clearly delineated boundary 
line. In the eastern boundary of Wolayta and Gamo-Goffa, there is Lake Ababa. But it never 
impeded both groups, as each group was not barred to use the Lake or resources therein. Daana 
Forest, a frontier, on the Western side may be used both of the groups as far as they needed it. 
There was no issue in pastureland or water. But borderland residents of both ethnic groups know 
their respective territories that are bounded either by the forest or lake. According to Ajala, “ […] 
states of Central Sudan including Bornu, Maradi, Air and the Fulani Emire had  frontiers.”26  
The third form of pre-colonial Africa boundary was a kind of overlapping boundary. This is 
a rare kind of pre-colonial boundary. This was a mixed type in which different ethnic groups lived 
separately in different localities. It is hard to know an exact boundary between different tribes and 
ethnic groups, as one may be situated within a territory of a bigger group. When ethnic groups were 
mixed the only possible way of boundary setting was individual land boundary. As ethnic groups 
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were too liberal and scattered among another group, there was no way to know boundaries of a 
single ethnic group.   A group may also be an enclave within territory of a bigger unit. In this case, 
ethnic boundary setting, however, is not hard to perceive. Nomadic life also makes boundary setting 
impossible or hard to prove. For example, migratory nature of the Masaai and Tuaregs makes it 
hard to exactly locate their boundaries.27  
 
 4.3. Partitioning Africa: Drawing New Boundary Lines in Europe for Africa 
4.3.1.  Introduction 
This Section briefly outlines how colonial powers apportioned Africa and redrew its 
boundaries disregarding geographic and human facts on the ground. Though there were sporadic 
individual attempts to occupy African territories by European powers since yearly 1830s28, African 
territories were largely partitioned by the Berlin Conference of November 1884 – February 1885.  
The Conference was sponsored by Otto van Bismarck with a view to amicably divide Africa among 
European powers. One of the important resolutions of the conference was the requirement to report 
occupation of a given part of Africa to the potential colonizers. This avoided war among the 
Europeans, as a colonized territory could not be recolonized. Thus, Berlin Conference ‘[…] was 
meant to defuse colonial tensions and avoid the risk of war among the conferees.”29 
 
4. 3. 2.  Arrival of Foreign Agents in Africa 
                                                                                                                                                 
26 Id.  
27 Id.  
28 For instance France invaded Algeria I 1830, British and King Leopold got territories long before the Berlin 
Conference. After all, the Berlin Conference was the consequence of competition of European colonizers on Africa. 
See Mutua, supra note 7 at 1126. The most important objective of the Conference was to partition Africa legally and 
formally by avoiding war among the Europeans.  
29 Id. at 1127.  
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Before the actual colonization, European explorers, missionaries or traders had explored 
Africa and exposed its economic significance to their respective states.30 Some under the guise of 
spreading Christianity had permanently settled while apparently preaching and coaching African 
tribal chiefs.  While it may not be possible to categorize all the missionaries and explorers as spies 
or agents of European colonial powers, undoubtedly they served as source of information to the 
European powers. Explorers, missioners and traders31 relied important facts and potential benefits 
of occupying African territories.32  Some missionaries or traders bought land as any private African 
person from local chiefs who did not suspect that they would be swallowed later, and would be 
considered slaves in their own territories. Unwary native people and naïve traditional chiefs had 
created a conducive situation to the agents and representatives of colonial powers to settle on the 
land that was already acquired with the hidden motive of subsequent expansion of the territory and 
for the ultimate occupation of the entire territory.   
  The original visitation or settlement was very peaceful. The European visitors concluded 
treaties with the local chiefs pledging to help the kingdom or offered gifts or arms to the chief. In 
Ethiopia, Italians who purchased land in coastal areas of Red Sea donated guns that served the 
ruling chiefs to wage war against rival kingdoms. The Kingdom that had modern guns easily 
                                            
30 Lalonde, supra note 23 at 105. Lalonde witnesses that “Until the latter half of nineteenth century the impact of 
Europe upon Africa in general terms was relatively minor. […] By the late 1870s, however, the increasing activity in 
Africa by explorers, merchants and missionaries led not only to a greater impact upon indigenous societies but also to 
a growing awareness in Europe’s political capitals of the advantages to be derived from a more forward policy in 
Africa.”  Id.  
31 Prescott enumerates some of the commercial companies that facilitated colonization of Africa.  For example, the 
British South Africa, the Royal Niger Company in Nigeria, the Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft fur sud West Africa in 
the Namibia, the Nord West Kamerun Gesellschaft in Cameroun, and several French commercial firms Congo, 
Gabon and the Central Africa Republic.  See J. R. V. PRESCOTT, POLITICAL FRONTIERS AND BOUNDAREIS, 
242(1987).  
32 It may be surprising to know that missionaries served some political purpose under the cover of religion. In medieval 
Africa European missionaries acted on behalf of their governments by spying African kingdom and relaying 
information. Most importantly, the missionaries bought land on which European colonizers were able to settle before 
the virtual taking of the whole territory. Bishop Desmond Tutu’s statement vividly explains how missionaries took 
African land. In the words of Desmond Tutu: 
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conquered rival kingdoms that were not exposed to the foreign handouts. For instance, King Minilik 
II of Ethiopia had conquered almost all the Southern Kingdoms using arms donated by Italians who 
occupied some Red Sea coastal regions, which later termed as Eritrea.33   
Initially, the European agents stationed at the coastal areas, but later penetrated into the 
interior territories. For instance, according to Prescott, “The first British fort at the mouth of the 
Gambia River was built in 1664.  […]  France’s concession at Grand Lahu on the Ivory Coast dated 
from 1787; a Portuguese fort was built at Luanda in 1575.”34 However, there is conflicting view 
regarding an actual date of the commencement of the scramble for Africa.  Hertslet points to 1882 
in which Belgian expeditions, the International Association of the Congo started in upper Congo 
and Niadi-Quillou.35  
 
4.3.3.  Pre-Colonial Treaties 
Pre-colonial treaties were apparent promises of European powers to “protect” African chiefs 
– often called Protective Treaties or treaties conferring territorial rights. According to Mutua, 
‘treaties of protection’ were imposed to effectuate colonial rule between African rulers and 
European powers.36 For instances, the International Association of Congo, after arriving in Congo, 
concluded a treaty that may also be taken as contract and got territorial right, before the ultimate 
control of the whole Congo territory by the King of Belgium.37  Similarly, a German colonization 
society concluded treaties with local chiefs in the East Africa and obtained concessional right over 
                                                                                                                                                 
“When the missionaries came to Africa they had the Bible and we had the land. They said “Let us pray.” We close our 
eyes. When we opened then we had the Bible and they had the land.” See www.globalissues.org/article/84 
33 This process has led to the colonization of the northern regions of that had been under the Axumite empire from the 
time immemorial. They saw the seed of difference and separation among the two closely related people that 
ultimately led the Eritrean secession and bloodshed. After Eritrean independence Ethiopia remained landlocked as 
Italian colonizers occupied all the coastal regions that ceded later to Eritrea after occupation of the whole Eritrean 
territory. The current generation, as a result suffer from non-healing wound.  
34 Prescott supra note 31 at 246 
35 Lalonde supra note 23 at 105.  
36 Matua supra note 7 at 1131. 
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territories while the other German group of explorers entered into the South West of Africa and 
concluded treaties that legally authorized colonial power to have territorial right.38 The German 
explorers also entered into protective treaties in West Africa.39 Similarly, Great Britain agents 
entered into treaties with a number of local African chiefs.40 The consideration to African side in 
almost cases was very minimal or none. Offering guns and bombs was the greatest gift that thrilled 
local authorities to perpetuate their dominance against local rivalries.  
European agents had deployed all possible tactics to secure ostensible “consent” of tribal 
chiefs in surrendering their sovereignty, the territories and their people contractually through 
‘shame’ treaties. Colonial agents offered priority to peaceful method of acquiring territories by 
convincing or inducing local chiefs. Bribery, inducement, intimidation, or coercion commonly 
applied to secure signature of local authorities. It may be shocking to know that local authorities 
had surrendered sovereignty of their kingdoms for silly consideration like beads, cloths or old pair 
of boots.41 Gift of arms to wage war on other rival African kingdoms was so common.42 When all 
deceptive method of securing treaties fail to work, colonial powers invaded African territories for 
establishing their sphere of influence through effective occupation.  
On account of signature of naïve local chiefs, some authors tend to argue that Africans were 
involved in colonial boundary making in Africa. Touval, for instance, asserts that Africans were 
indirectly involved in colonial boundary making in Africa. 43  It is true that African local chiefs had 
                                                                                                                                                 
37 Lalonde supra note 35.  
38 Id.  
39 Lalonde supra note 23 at 105. 
40 Id. 
41 Mutua, supra note 7 at 113.  
42The 30000 rifles and 28 artilleries that were donated by Italy to King Minilik of Ethiopia were helped Minilik fighter 
to fight Southern kings like the Kingdom of Wolayta – Kaw Tona.  Without such assistance it was almost impossible 
for Minilik fighter to occupy Wolayta, as tough fighter of Kawo (king) Tona had defeated Minilik soldiers four time 
before.  The rifles made Minilik and his fighter superior to the fighter of Kawo Tona who used simply traditional 
spear and courage to defend their territory and their king.   
43 SAADUA TOUVAL, THE BOUNDASRY POLITICS OF INDEPENDENT AFRICA, 5(1972).  Nevertheless, 
Touval admits that Africans were naïve but not passive at the time. Their decision making power was influence by 
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signed on the pre-drafted standard treaty documents that were written in a language alien to the 
signatories and very technical to comprehend.  In most cases the chiefs were cheated, induced, or 
coerced to sign the documents. How a signature that was acquired by coercion would prove 
participation of Africans in redrawing boundaries? For example an African chief who refused to 
surrender sovereignty of his kingdom to British peacefully signed a treaty with the following terms 
with a view to end war and killing of his people:   
I Docemo, do, with the consent and advice of my council, give, transfer, and by these present 
grant and confirm unto the Queen of Great Britain, her heirs and successors for ever, the Port 
and the Island of Lagos, with all the rights, profits, territories and appurtenance and the direct, 
full and absolute dominion and sovereignty of the said port, Island, and premises, with all the 
royalties thereof, freely, fully entirely, and absolutely.44  
 
If Trouval regards Chief Docemo has involved in the redrawing the colonial map of Nigeria, it 
appears not only wrong, but also it is a blind ignorance. Chief Docemo initially refused to surrender 
his territory, but was overpowered to accept whatever his captors dictate him. A defective consent 
to a treaty term that was tainted by fraud, deceit or inducement cannot be taken as participation of 
colonial boundary making.  
To view Africans had indirectly or directly participated in the partition of Africa is not only 
unconvincing, but also appears endorsement of the methodologies of the infamous Berlin 
Conference. No African was invited to take part in the partition process, and no attempt was made 
to collect empirical data before splitting Africa. In the words of Matua, “Little consideration was 
given to pre-colonial inter-state relations or other relationships between different traditional states. 
In the majority of cases, map-makers were proceeded as though Africa was a blank slate, 
                                                                                                                                                 
either coercion or inducement, by the ‘stick and carrot.”  Id.  In this situation it is doubtful to conclude that Africans 
also participated in the boundaries.  
44  U. O.  UMOZURIKE, INTERNAITONAL LAW AND COLONIZLISM IN AFRICA 40(1979), Quoted in  Mutua 
supra note7  at 1132. 
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uninhabited.”45 Needless to say, local people should have taken part in crafting the treaty terms -- 
they should have all possibilities to say no. In a situation where there was no option, “signing” on a 
treaty documents that was “alien” in all terms is simply unconscionable and an assumption that 
Africans were involved in partitioning Africa is utterly wrong.  
 Explorers, traders or missionaries or in some cases government agents proceeded to the 
inland where they concluded bogus treaties with the tribal chiefs. According to Prescott, these 
treaties apparently offered exclusive trading right or trading depot and sometimes the treaties 
concerned with protection of chief’s territory and payment of subsidies.46   Thus, the treaties were 
colored by some apparently economic or friendship objectives. For instance, when Italy attempted 
to colonize Ethiopia by the treaty of Wuchali (also known as Uccali) stated in the treaty that 
establishing friendship and cooperating between Ethiopia and Italy while the latent motive was to 
take sovereignty of Ethiopia. The three treaties that EEBC wrangled to delimit Ethi-Eritrea 
boundary were concluded with the objective of establishing friendship with Ethiopia. The bogus 
treaties were drafted and presented for monarch’s signature.47 Almost all of the pre-colonial treaties 
disclosed non-occupation objectives – the most usual objective was protection, assistance or 
friendship. After the treaties signed, the latent motives behind the treaties surfacef. As Prescott 
attests, “ Once a treaty had been signed, that territory was reserved for possible annexation in the 
future.”48  
                                            
45 Mutua, supra note 7 at 1135.  See also A. I. ASIWAJU ( ed.), PATITIONED AFRICANS: ETHINCI RELATIONS 
ACROSS AFRICA’S  INTERNAITONAL BOUNDARIES 1884 – 1984 1(1985). Asiwaju observes:   
[…] despite it significance for the subsequent history of Africa, [the Berlin Conference] was essentially a 
European affair; there was no Africans representation, and African concerns were, if they mattered at all, 
completely marginal to the basic economic strategic and political interest of the negotiating European powers. 
(Id.) 
46 Prescott supra note 5 at 126. 
47 The details of these treaties will be stated in Chapter Four of this Dissertation.  
48 Prescott supra note 46.  
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The illusive treaties49 also severed as evidence to prove existing interest before any other 
super power – a potential colonial competitor.50 In accordance with the Berlin deliberation of 1884 -
1885, to avoid war among the colonizers, agreement among the colonial powers were necessary for 
the partition of Africa.51  Proving prior interest or sphere of influence was one of the important facts 
to get priority in agreement concluding the sphere of influence. As a result, “[i]t was always 
considered to be an advantage to possess a treaty which bore an earlier date than that held by a 
competitor”52  
A ‘phony treaty’ that was apparently concluded with local African chiefs served as evidence 
supporting the establishment of the sphere of influence.  These fraudulent documents often invoked 
as binding authorities conferring a right on African territories.53 Colonial powers did not concern 
about clarity or correctness of the contents or terms of the shame treaties as the very motive was to 
get some kind of evidence signed by the local people. As Ajala witnesses, “Such ‘treaties’ served 
many purposes but more importantly they were used to back up their claims for the territories 
involved.”54 Traders or explorer’s at the time carried standard treaty forms in which local names 
and names of chief and witnesses to be signed.55 A commercial representative who carried out a 
printed treaty forms and had signature of local chief in Africa attests the following illustrative 
declaration:   
                                            
49 Most progressive people agree that the colonial tries were simply shames that were not negotiated in full 
comprehension of its terms.  Touval attests that “The treaties can of course be questioned on moral and legal 
grounds.” Touval supra note 43.  
50 Id. at 6.  
51For instance, in 1989 Great Britain and France conducted a convention for deliberation of their respective possession 
and delimitation of boundaries of West of Niger and the spheres of influence to the East of Niger river was signed.  
See Ajala  supra note 9 179.    
52 Prescott supra note 5 at 246.  
53 According to Touval unless the treaties are challenged immediately being faulty, taken as authoritative documents for 
determining African colonial boundaries.  Touval supra note 43 at 10.  
54 Ajala  supra note 9 at 179.  
55 In 19th century apparently commercial companies, such as East India Company, served not only commercial 
objectives but also acted as political purposes. Colonial powers used such alias companies to put their boots in the 
territories they desired to occupy. See Id.  
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I had bundle of printed treaties which I was to make as many people sign as possible. This 
signing is an amiable farce, which is supposed to impose upon foreign government, and to be 
the equivalent of an occupation… A ragged untidy European, who in any civilized country 
would be in danger of being taken up by the police as a vagrant, lands at a native village, the 
people run away; he shouts out after them to come back, holding out before them a shilling’s 
worth beads… the so called interpreter pretends to explain the treaty to the chief. The chief 
does not understand a word of it, but he looks pleased as he receives another present of beads; 
a mark is made on a printed treaty by the chief and another by the interpreter, the vagrant, who 
professes to be the representative of a great empire, signs his name… The boat sails away, and 
the new ally and protégé of England or France immediately throws the treaty into the fire.56  
 
Thruston’s declaration evidently depicts the scenario and character of the pre-colonial 
treaties. It is just an obligation imposed on African kingdoms for nothing. In the words of Mautua, 
“[…] it would make a mockery of the notion of a treaty and the concept of freedom of contract.”57  
It is absurd and unacceptable to true mind an African chief to surrender sovereignty of his kingdom, 
his people, and his territory for no consideration. It is of course not natural and unacceptable.  But if 
the chief’s state of mind was controlled either by coercion or inducement, a mockery treaty should 
not be taken as a binding document as it cannot establish legality and fairness.  
As has been mentioned out elsewhere, the immediate cause of the war between Ethiopia and 
Italy was deceptive wordings of a “Treaty of Friendship and Trade between the Kingdom of Italy 
and the Empire of Ethiopia” ( the Treaty of Wuchale).58 The treaty was written in Italian and 
Amharic languages. While the Amharic version revealed the true sense of the treaty, the Italian 
version took Ethiopia’s sovereignty claiming Ethiopia must deal all foreign relationship by the good 
office of the Government of Italy while the Amharic version stated that Ethiopia could use the 
                                            
56 A. B. THRUSTON, AFRICAN INCIDENTS 170-171 (1900) quoted in Ajala supra note 54.  
57 Mutua, supra note 7 at 1132.  
58 See Daniel Berhane, Text of Wuchale Treaty/1889 Ethio-Italian Treaty – HORN AFFAIRS – ENGLISH, AUGST 17, 
2011, http://hornaffairs.com/en/2011/08/17/text-of-wuchale-treaty-1989-ethio-italian-treaty/ ( last visited Sep. 30, 
2015 at 9:11 PM. ) Article XVII of the treaty was wrongly translated to mean Ethiopia must have all foreign relation 
through good office or Italian government. The Italian translation reads: “ His Majesty the King of Kings of Ethiopia 
allows you to make use of the Government of His Majesty the King of Italy for all business dealings he had with 
other powers or governments.”  While the Amharic vision of Article 17 states: “ His Majesty the King of Kings of 
Ethiopia could allow you to make use the Government of His Majesty the King of Italy for all business dealings he 
had with other powers or Governments.” See http://snem.tk/documents/wuchale.pdf  As a result, “Italians proclaimed 
a protectorate over Ethiopia.” (Encyclopedia of Britannica).  The then Ethiopian king renounced the treaty as a result, 
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Government Italy while dealing with foreign powers.  In rejection of Emperor Minilik II to respect 
the treaty terms, Italy invaded Ethiopia but suffered huge blow that resulted in nullity of the 
deceptive treaty.  
The defunct Wuchale treaty, in addition to attempting to take away Ethiopian sovereignty, had 
annexed some Ethiopian territories to the Italian Eritrea.59 Almost identical treaties later concluded 
after the battle of Adwa in Addis Ababa that were considered by the Eritrea - Ethiopia Border 
Commission when attempting to settle the Ethio-Eritea border conflict in December 2000.60 The 
Ethio-Italian treaties do not sound binding treaties in modern sense. The objective of the “treaties”, 
their appearance and procedures involved don’t confer treaties in the sense of Vienna Convention of 
Law of Treaties.   
Matua rightly summarizes, “ It is difficult, if not impossible to sustain the legality of the 
treaties of protection’ even under extant European law at the time.”61  First only states can make 
treaties and there are strict procedures that should be followed to attain the legality and binding 
force of a valid treaty. Genuine and free negotiation, free consent that is not tainted by any vitiating 
factors and fulfillment of fair procedures including ratification, gives force to treaty. Thus, a treaty 
obtained by explicit or implicit coercion, intimidation, fraud, deceit, or even by error cannot 
legalize cession of a territory. In the modern sense, the treaties do not qualify as binding documents 
as treaties were signed people representing an entity that did not qualify as a state in terms of 
Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties.62  Moreover, Europeans at the time did not recognize 
                                                                                                                                                 
Italians attempted to occupy Ethiopia by force but suffered embracing defeat in which black men for the first time 
defeated what forces.  
59 Bogos, Hamasen and Akale Guzai were granted to Italy while Italy gave money and 30,000 muskets ( rifles) and 28 
cannons which of course gave some assistance to Ethiopia when fighting the war. ( See Treaty of Wuchale, 
ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF BRITANNICA., WWW.BRITANNICA.COM  
60 For details see Chapter 5 and 6 of this Dissertation.  
61 Mutua, supra note 7 at 1133 
62 Id. at 1134. According to Matua, “ one African scholar has argued that these principles, which existed then 
invalidates the treaties.”  Id.  
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signatories of the treaties as states. For them Africa was no man’s land that could be occupied as 
medieval people were considered as politically unorganized and their territories may be occupied 
akin to vacant land.  
 
 
4.3.4.   The Berlin Conference 
The Berlin Conference of November 1884 – February 1885 has got important place in the 
international political history. After 1870s due to exposition of Africa and African resources well 
known by the European explorers, missionaries and traders, more European powers attracted and 
started partitioning Africa which created tension among the competing powers. With a view to 
settle the tension among the European powers, especially between Great Britain and France thereby 
avoid potential war in Europe63 the then German Chancellor Otto Von Bismarck organized the 
notorious Berlin Conference for smooth partition of Africa.64  Before the Berlin Conference, the 
Scramble for Africa was unregulated and there was fierce competition and tension to occupy the 
already occupied African territories. By the request of German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, 
fourteen powerful nations of the time attended the Conference.65  
                                            
63 Ajala states that, “[…] rivalries among the European powers that at the times even threatened the peace of Europe 
when the partition of Africa was in progress.”  See Ajala supra note 9 at 180. The tension among the colonial power 
did not afford time to make empirical survey before partition of Africa. Id.   
64 As Elizabeth Heath summarizes partition of Africa started before the Berlin conference. The Conference with 
organized by the Otto Von Bismarck with view to avoid conflict among the European powers unilaterally launched 
campaign to colonize Africa. There fierce completion among British and France in West Africa, the Portuguese and 
British in East Africa, French and King Leopold II of Belgium in Central Africa.  Finally a strong rivalry between 
Great Britain and France lead intervention by the Otto Von Bismarck that culminated in organizing an international 
conference in creating peace among the European and legalizing the scramble for Africa. See Elizabeth Heath, 
Encyclopedia of Africa 
    http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780195337709.001.0001/acref-9780195337709-e-0467 
65 Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Russia, 
Spain, Sweden-Norway, Turkey, and the United States of America were the States that attended the Conference. The 
Conference was Chaired by the Otto Von Bismarck.   France, Germany, Great Britain, and Portugal were the most 
important players of the Conference.  
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The explicit agenda of the Conference and its latent but the most dominant motive were 
different. The express objectives of the Conference were: To make Congo and Niger basin free and 
open for trade. The conference has explicit purpose of working for the elimination of slave trade 
and maintenance of political stability in Africa.  One may fairly questions whether African 
kingdoms asked for such help or the then African situation created some international problem 
affecting the interest of super powers. The issues may appear senseless, as the very motive of 
behind the Conference is self-evident – sharing African territories peacefully among the European 
powers. The conference took unusually long time:  November 15 – February 26, 1885 was 
extraordinarily long for a conference, unless it was training.  The colonial powers were furious not 
to miss their target of acquiring more territories and not to fight among themselves. The participants 
took time in devising the best mechanism that would help get their share of Africa to collect raw 
materials and labor for the developing industry and market for industrial product.  
As stated in the Article 34 of the Berlin Conference, each European nation had to report to 
the other its sphere of influence, which has to be sufficiently proven. At the time of the Berlin 
Conference 80% African territories were administered under indigenous kingdoms.66 Most coastal 
areas, however, were long occupied by Europeans. The Berlin Conference has enabled colonial 
powers to penetrate deep into the interior. One of the requirements of Article 34 of the Berlin 
Conference was effective occupation, which can easily be proven by bogus treaties that were singed 
by naïve tribal chiefs and fraudulent commercial representatives or other foreign actors. Copies of 
the treaties submitted as proof for occupation in accordance with the geometric map drawn by the 
Berlin Conference.  
                                            
66 See A Brief History of Berlin Conference, http://teacherweb.ftl.pinecrest.edu/snyderd/MWH/Projects/mun-
bc/History.htm  See also A. I. Aswaju, The Conceptual Framework in PARTIONED AFRICANS: ETHINIC 
RELATIONS ACROSS AFRICA’S INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES 1884 – 1984 (A. I. Aswaju ed.)  2(1985). 
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The Berlin Conference is not only condemned for disregarding African interests, but also it 
is blamed for sawing vicious seeds that periodically bear violent territorial and boundary conflict in 
Africa. The arbitrary geometric boundary has split interrelated ethnic groups and lumped them with 
culturally, linguistically and religiously unrelated groups.  Needless to say, the Conference did not 
offer an opportunity for the African indigenous people to suggest the bet option. The architects of 
the colonial boundaries were rather relied by the bogus “[…] treaties, concessions and account of 
European travellers as well as personal reports of local European agents or ‘the men on the sport’ to 
do their job.”67 Whenever these source not available in certain areas, the crafters of the African 
boundaries ‘resorted to ingenuity.’68 It has been a usual saying that the crafter of African boundary 
just took “a blue pencil and a ruler and began drawing lines from one point on the map to 
another.”69 
 
4.3.5.  Effects of Arbitrary Boundary on Local People 
The devastating effect of arbitrary boundary was separation of closely related ethnic groups 
into several colonial powers.70 Tough figures are not uniform in all instances, 30 – 40% of African 
ethnic groups were split into different states. According to Asiwaju, about 177 African tribes are 
split into different States.71 This makes 30 – 40 % of ethnic groups. The case of Somalis is often 
cited in this regard.  Somalis were split into French Somaliland, British Somali, and Italian Somali 
and Ethiopian Somali, Somali region of northern Kenya. The statement of the first Somali present 
appears heart touching. He said:  
                                            
67 Ajala supra note 9 at 180.  
68 Id.  
69 Id. This aspects African boundary arbitrary which has been non-healing wound causing animosity among Africans 
and has been source of most African conflicts.  
70 Anthony I. Asiwaju, Borders and Borderlands as Linchpins For Regional Integration in Africa: Lessons from 
European Experience, I WORLD BOUNDARIES: GLOBAL BOUNDARIES 61 ( Clive H. Schofield ed. 1994). 
71 Asiwaju, supra note 66. 
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Our misfortune is that our neighboring counters with whom, like the rest of Africa, we seek to 
promote constructive harmoniousness relationship, are not our neighbours. Our neighbours are 
our Somali kinsmen whose citizenship has been falsified by indiscriminate boundary 
arrangement. They have to move across artificial frontiers to their pasturelands. They occupy 
the same terrain and pursue the same pastoral economy as ourselves. We speak the same 
language we share the same creed, the same colures and the same tradition. How can we regard 
our brothers as foreigners? 72 
 
It is pretty clear that Somalis in East Africa share common culture, identical way of life, 
same religion, but some are Ethiopians, Djiboutian, or Kenyans.  But this trait of partitioned 
societies is not peculiar to Somalis. Similarly, the Afar ethnic group is also split into three States. 
Afar’s main land is in Ethiopia in Afar Regional State, whereas the Red Sea Afars who reside in the 
coast of Red Sea are allocated to Eritrea. This was the spot where Italians initially settled by 
purchasing land from a local chief. The rest of the Afars are in Djibouti. The Masai nomadic people 
were split into Kenya and Tanzania.73 In West Africa the Gyaman, Indenie, Sefwi were partitioned 
between Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire, Kakwa ethnic groups is found in Uganda and South Sudan, 
Mandara partitioned between Cameroon and Nigeria, Iteso people found in Kenya and Uganda, 
Bobo ethnic groups divided between Mali and Burkina Faso, Chewa and Nagoni found in Zambia, 
Mozambique and Malawi, Hausa is split between Niger and Nigeria.74 The Ewe in West Africa was 
split into three colonial regimes:  French Togo, British Togoland and British Gold Coast. 75 
Similarly, “the Bakongo across the Gabon-Congo, Congo-Zaire and Zaire – Angola boundaries.”76 
                                            
72 JOHN DRYSDALE, THE SOMALI DISPUTE, 8(1964), Quoted by Said S. Samatar, The Somali Dilemma,: Nation 
in Search of A State,  in PARTITIONED AFRICANS: ETHNIC RELATIONS ACROSS AFRICA’S  
INTERNAITONBAL BOUNDAREIS 1884 – 1984. 155 ( A. I. ASIWAJU (edu.) 1985).  
73 Enormous ethnic and tribal groups were split due to arbitrary nature of the African boundary. The main ethnic groups 
in Ethiopia, the Oromo, for instance, separated into Kenya and Ethiopia.  The Anuak ethnic group found both in 
Ethiopia and South Sudan. Highland Tigrigna speakers of Eritrea are almost identical with the people of Tigrai 
Region of Ethiopia. More such cases can be enumerated though out the whole Africa.  
74 Asiwaju supra note 66 at 2. 
75 Touval supra note 43 at 19.  
76 Asiwaju supra note 66. Asiwaju provides several list of petitioned ethnic groups. The Lunda, the Zande, the 
Yorubathe Wolf and the serers of Senegal and Gambia, the Sonninke and the Tukulor the Tubu the Tswana are some 
of the ethnic groups that were petitioned by the colonial boundary. See Id.  
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The arbitrary boundary not only split the closely related kinsmen, but also restrained 
movements and inflicted economic hardship and social inconvenience. In the words of Ajala, 
“[Africans] suddenly discovered that they could not longer move freely across areas which they and 
their forefathers had for centuries regarded as their virtual backyard.”77 Africans were ignorant of 
the Berlin deliberation and never cared about the action of colonial powers in Berlin, but they felt 
brunt of the boundary after its demarcation. Their natural right of free movement was suddenly 
restrained. After creation of the boundary wall either they were required to have permission to enter 
into the artificial alien land or they had to walk far distance to the checkpoint. The artificial 
boundary has introduced different way of life, different laws, tax system and so forth. The problem 
of separation of ethnic groups turned the life of nomadic people from bad to worse. Nomads are 
moving people looking for pasture and water for their herd.  The artificial barrier thus has deprived 
economic opportunity.  
In addition to the physical, social and economic restraints, arbitrary boundaries take 
forefront among the factors that has been fueling conflicts in Africa.78 The war between Ethiopia 
and Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Morocco and Algeria, Libya and Chad, Mali and Burkina Faso, 
are some of the African border related wars that erupted after formation of OAU.  The partitioned 
ethnic groups have been fighting for unity and in the case of civil war, the split group on another 
side of the boundary served as hiding place. Any attempt of hot pursuit generates dissatisfaction and 
animosity which in turn interstate violent conflict. For example, suspected rebels allegedly 
belonged to Afar Ethnic group that killed and abducted tourists in the northern Ethiopia fled into the 
                                            
77 Ajala, supra note 9 at 181.  
78 Touval however does not agree with the assertion that arbitrary colonial boundaries are as source of conflicts in 
Africa. Touval argues that the assumption that African “[…] borders would give rise to many biter conflicts,” was 
unsubstantiated. According to Touval, “ the expectation has not been born out.”   Trouval supra note 10 at preface.  
This stand is contrary to the takings of most African intellectuals and friends of Africa. Kwame Nkrumah propagated 
for  either redrawing of African border or total unification of Africa to avoid the effects of arbitrary boundary. The 
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Eritrean territory of Afar region. Hot pursuit by the Ethiopian arms resulted in condemnation by the 
State of Eritrea, on the ground of encroachment of state sovereignty.   
 
 4.4. Post Colonial African Boundaries  
In the eve of decolonization, the Pan African movement had campaigned to take away the 
arbitrary colonial boundaries. The aim of the Pan African movement was to reunite partitioned 
Africans by avoiding restraining colonial boundary walls by redrawing lines that would reunite the 
divided ethnic and tribal groups.79 The Movement pioneered by the Pan Africanist leader of 
independent Ghana, President Kwame Nkrumah who felt, Ghana’s independence was meaningless 
while other African states were colonized.80 Supported by the progressive Pan Africans the 
Movement conducted the first Pan African conference known as “All African People’s Congress” 
in the African soil in 1958.81 As one author rightly attests, Kwame Nkrumah was “[…] regarded as 
one of the principal spokesmen of African nationalism warned in 1958 against the danger of 
inherited in the colonial legacies of irredentism and tribalism.”82  The Congress was led by the 
                                                                                                                                                 
revisionist movement that was centered in Ghana in late 1950s nevertheless discarded by the founding fathers of 
Organization of African Unity.  See Touval supra note 43 at  18 – 19. 
79  The Movement was inspired by the Pan African movements of 1919 – 1945 which aimed to unit West African tribes 
that were former German colonies but later among the territories colonized by France and Great Britain. The 1945 
Pan African Conference was held in Great Britain but the participants were Africans. The conference did not discuss 
the whole African boundary problem but the point of discussion was boundary problems of West African and 
Ethiopia. See Id. at 18.  With regard to Ethiopia, the Congress of 1945 has passed very important resolutions   that 
contributed for maintenance of territorial integrity of Ethiopia. The Congress opposed keeping Massawa and Asmara 
under international administration, demanded Eritrea and Somalia to be reunited to their mother land, Ethiopia and 
required Great Britain to surrender administration of Eritrea handing it back to Ethiopia. See Id. at 23.  
80 South African History online ( SAHO), All African People Conference is held in Accra, Ghana,  Nov. 8, 1958, 
http://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/all-african-people-conference-held-accra-ghana 
81 Kwame Nkrumah, Africa Prospect, 37 Foreign Aff. 45, 45 - 53(1958 -1959). Nkrumah who was secretary of the 1945 
Manchester Pan African Conference, has presided the first Pan African Conference in Accra, Ghana.  Limited 
number of free African States took part in the Conference. Statesmen from Ghana, Ethiopia, Liberia, Morocco, 
Sudan, Tunisia, and United Arab Republic ( now Egypt) took part in the Conference. After the Conference Nkrumah 
visited capitals of all the participating nations to know more about African issues (common problems and purposes.) 
Id.   
82  Touval supra note 43 at preface.  The effort of Kwame Nkrumah to unit Africa and abolish all arbitrary boundary 
that has disrupted communal life in Africa has been revived during the formation of African Union which decided 
construction of Statue of Kwame Nkrumah in AU’s heard Quarter – Addis Ababa Ethiopia. See also Lalonde supra 
note 23 at 116. 
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courageous Africans who worried about the future of Africa and campaigned for revision of African 
boundaries all together or redraw African boundaries in a way it would reunite the split ethnic 
groups.83  The 1958 Pan African conference of Accra among other things passed the following 
border related Resolutions:84 
o denounced artificial boundaries that has divided the people of Africa, 
o demanded abolition or adjustment of colonial boundaries as soon as possible; and  
o  asked independent States of Africa to work for the permanent solution for the 
destructive colonial boundaries. 
Pan African movements finally culminated in founding the first continental umbrella 
organization.  Foreign ministers of independent African deliberated in Addis Ababa shaping 
directions forward and paving ways for the historic mission of forming a continental organization – 
the Organization of African Unity (OAU).  Determination of the nature of the continental 
organization divided African leaders into two major camps.85 The Unionist Camp demanded 
immediate political integration of Africa thereby abolishing colonial boundaries, whereas, Statist 
group advocated for a loose continental organization in which the sovereignty, independence and 
political integrity of constituent members maintained.  Samuel Amoo succinctly puts the scenario of 
formation of OAU as follows:  
The OAU was very much a product of its time, and its principles and provisions reflect the 
aspiration, concerns and fears of the founding fathers.  [It…] evolved as a compromise solution 
to the ideological disputes and divisions, which dogged Africans states at the initial stages of 
systematic relations.86  
 
                                            
83 Touval supra note 43 at 18.  
84 Id.  
85 Ideological division of African leaders had been boiling since All Peoples Conference that was held in Accra, Ghana. 
At the time the balance of movement was toward political integration of Africa but when time went on African 
leaders tend to support sovereignty and independent existence of each of the States.  Ultimately the Statists 
movement dominated the Unionist ideology which lead into formation of a compromised continual organization. See  
Amoo, supra note 5.  
86 Id 
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President Kwame Nkrumah had a strong will for the political unity of Africa with a view to avoid 
the effects of arbitrary boundaries once and for all. However, most the founding fathers of OAU, 
including King Haile Selassie, Jomo Kenyatta did not accept the political unity of Africa at the 
time.87 The overwhelming majority of founding fathers were under statist camp decided to form a 
loose continental organization. Ethiopia proposed a draft Charter which served as starting point for 
deliberation on drafting the Charter of OAU. Most of the principles of the OAU charter were 
dedicated to maintaining sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Member States 
“preferring loose form of [continental] association based on principles of functions and 
cooperation.”88  
The original version of the Charter of OAU of 1963 did not explicitly stipulate how to deal 
with the border issue that had been boiling since late 1950s, and that was the center of campaign by 
the Pan African movements. Pan African movements openly blamed the arbitrary colonial 
boundary that has split Africans. African border issues and liberation of Africa were among the top 
points of deliberation in pre-independence conferences and in revisionist movement.  Silence of the 
original version of OAU Charter on African boundary issue may appear strange but it was for good, 
as it gave time for the young continental organization not to be thwarted before its birth. African 
border issue is very complex that affects everyone and not easy to resolve. In a situation where 
compromise may not be easily reached, the founding fathers traded time by avoiding anything that 
would block formation of the continental organization that thought to facilitate African unity.  
                                            
87 Kwame Nkrumah advocated for full continental integration as a necessary means to solve African socio-economic 
and political deficiencies, due to inexplicable justifications, other founding father of OAU refused to honor the idea 
of integration of African states forming a loose continental organization.  The very motivation behind formation of 
continental organization was integration but several limitations and constrains surfaced ( see SAHO, African Union 
and Regional Economic Integration,  http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/african-union-and-regional-economic-
integration). See also Lalonde supra note 23 at 117. 
88 Amoo supra note 5.  
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Due to the arbitrary partition of Africa, territorial and boundary issues were widespread. 
There was hot territorial and boundary issue in North Africa. Morocco claimed the whole territory 
of Mauritania and Sahara Arab Republic and portion of territories of Algeria. In East Africa 
Somalia already started claiming certain territories of Ethiopia, Kenya. In a situation where every 
state and founding fathers were overwhelmed with variety of interests, any attempt to deal with the 
“unsolvable boundary issue” feared to turn continental relationship from bad to worse. Therefore, 
prioritizing organizational unity before attempting to deal with inescapable colonial seed was a wise 
decision. 
The founding fathers of the continental organization have decided to keep status quo with a 
view to maintain territorial integrity of Member States. It was absolutely not possible to go back to 
the traditional African boundaries (pre-colonial boundaries), as the whole terrain was altered. 
Colonial power had repeatedly changed pre-colonial frontiers, which rendered traditional zonal 
nature of boundaries unrecognizable. Any attempt to redraw African boundaries in accordance with 
the pre-colonial boundary lines would further complicate continental relationship. As a result, the 
Charter sets out guiding principles instead of a specific provision that meant to resolve border 
issues. In Art. 3(3) of the OAU Charter African Heads of State and Government have agreed to 
maintain “[…] territorial integrity of each State and […] its inalienable right to independent 
existence.”89 This provision does not directly address the impending border dispute but rather spells 
out a general norm. Thus, territories of Member States were expected to continue as it was inherited 
from colonial powers. The Revisionist agenda had been set aside in fear of opening Pandora’s box 
                                            
89 Charter of Organization of African Unity, Art. 3(3).  
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that was thought to activate unmanageable territorial and boundary conflict at all corners of 
Africa.90  
Remarks of the President Tsiranana of Madagascar and President Modibo of Mali at the in 
the inaugural Conference of Organization of African Unity reveals compelling causes for African 
territorial integrity norm.91 Apart from Morocco and Somali, the rest vast majority of newly 
decolonized African States have unreservedly “endorsed the supremacy of the principle of 
territorial integrity.”92 This was formally negotiated and incorporated into continental rule in first 
ordinary OAU Summit, July 1964. Put simply, the founding fathers of OAU have consented to 
recognize boundaries of new States, as it was existed on the critical date of independence. This 
decision thus has effectively trashed the idea of redrawing African boundaries on the bases of 
culture, religion, and ethnic affinity or the possibility of abolishing borders at all thereby creating 
United States of Africa.93  
Shortly after formation of the OAU, devastating border wars engulfed in the north and 
eastern Africa. To find African solution for the on going wars and settle other looming border 
issues, OAU convened the first ordinary session of Assembly Heads of States and Governments in 
Cairo, Egypt. The Cairo summit has devised a specific rule governing issues involving African 
                                            
90 While President Kenyatta proposed for a special charter that expressly bound OAU Member States declaring 
preservation of the territorial status quo, King Haile Selassie I of Ethiopia stressed for the “acceptance of colonial 
boundaries necessary for Africa’s safety.”  See Lalonde supra note 23 at 119.  
91 President Tsiranana acclaimed, “ It is no longer possible, nor desirable, to modify the boundaries of Nations, on the 
pretext of racial, religious or linguistic criteria…. Indeed, should we take race, religion or language as criteria of 
setting our boundaries, a few States in Africa would be blotted out from the map.” Id. at 117 Similarly, the President 
of Mali, Modibo Keita supported pre-existing boundaries stating, “ We must take Africa as it is, and we must 
renounce any territorial claims, if we do not wish to introduce what we might call black imperialism in Africa.” Id. at 
117 - 118.  
92  Id. at  118.  
93 In 1958 few independent African states deliberated in Ghana to redraw African boundaries based on cultural, 
linguistic, and religious affinity. President Nkrumah was one of the leading advocates of revisionist movement (See 
Lalonde supra note 94 at 116).  President Nkrumah attempted to convince the founder of Organization of African 
Unity, but “African leaders soon realized the risk involved in the abolishing the entire colonial territorial framework 
or in systemically revising all existing boundary regimes,” and took a firm standing to maintain boundaries existing 
on independence. (Id.) 
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boundaries. The main point of the Summit was the agreement to, respect border existing on 
achievement of national independence.94 The motive behind the Cairo Resolution was maintaining 
territorial integrity of Member States, and avoiding unmanageable territorial conflict. In Cairo 
Summit, the Assembly Heads of State and Government pledged to respect borders of each Member 
State actually possessed on achievement independence.95  The Assembly has agreed to respect 
existing boundaries whether it was good or bad.96 
Unlike Art. 3(3) of the OAU Charter, the Cairo Resolution was very specific and self 
explanatory. Again, apart from Morocco and Somalia that had expansionist motives, the 
overwhelming majority has voted to respect boundaries existed on critical date of independence.  
Boundaries existing on the date of independence means boundary lines that a given state possessed 
on the actual date of declaration or granting of independence. Therefore, unless otherwise agreed, a 
State cannot claim a territory beyond the boundary it possessed on the date of independence. It 
appears that the proponents of Pan African Movement who sought to revise colonial African 
boundaries have changed their position and agreed to comply with the boundaries existed on 
independence. This rule effectively bars Somalia and Morocco’s claims.   
The Cairo Resolution of July 1964, in effect, appears synonymous to the Latin American 
principle of uti possidetis.97 The usual issues with regard to the Cairo Resolution of 1964 was 
whether it is an African innovative formulation which is different from the Spanish Latin American 
principle of uti possideti or it is actually an African uti possidetis?  This issue has split international 
lawyers and tribunals as two camps. As the final goal of the Cairo Resolution and the Principle of 
                                            
94 Cairo Resolution of Assembly of Heads and Governments, OAU Doc. AHG/Res.16(1) July 1964. 
95 Id.   
96 Tomas Bartos, Uti Possidetis, Quo Vadis? 18 AUST. YBIL 56, 37-68 (1997  
97 The African rule of “ respect for boundaries existing on independence” and the Principle of uti possidetsi appear 
conveying the same meaning. The principle of uti possidetis, as has been discussed in chapter Three of this 
Dissertation, means “ You may possess, as you possess” which basically the same with the meaning of continuing 
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Uti possidetis, are analogous, international lawyers who are familiar with rationales the principle of 
uti possidetis are quick to read the Cairo Resolution of July 9, 1964 to mean African uti 
possidetis.98 Most commentators admit that the principle of uti possidetis is implicit in the Cairo 
Declaration.99 Garth Abraham states,  “In its Cairo Declaration of 1964 the principle of uti 
possidetis, although not explicitly referred to by name, was formally adopted by the organization of 
Africa Unity.”100  
Close assessment of the Resolution vis-à-vis the principle of uti possidetis, however, points 
the contrary. A simple question that has to be answered at the outset is, if the founding fathers of 
Organization of African Union were inspired by the Latin American Principle, as a conflict 
avoidance tool, why they kept shy away from express recognition of the principle of uti possidetis 
in the Cairo Resolution? The Cairo Resolution was passed at a time in which the contours of the 
principles of uti possidetis were well settled, but why the African Heads of States and Governments 
at the Cairo Summit opted to use a different the expression instead? Though some international 
lawyers view that the founding fathers of OAU were inspired by the Latin American principle of uti 
possidetis,101 it appears that the founders of African continental organization have deliberately 
                                                                                                                                                 
possession of boundaries that an African States continue to possess as it possessed on actual date of gaining 
independence. The procedures entitling to continue possession, however, are not identical.   
98 As Lalonde attests, “Many commentators have argued that this respect for boundaries inherited from the colonial past 
is simply the application in the African context of the Latin American principle of uti possidetis.”  See Lalonde 
supra note 5 at 104. Contantine Antonopoulos, for instances, states “ The Principle of uti possidetis Juris was also 
applied in the course of decolonization in Africa.” Antonopoulos, supra note 95 at 32. Antonopoulos, assumes the 
founding fathers of Organization of African Unity in the formative document declared the Principle and reaffirmed 
the same principle in the Cairo Declaration of 1964.  
99 Sumner, supra note 1.  Frontiers Dispute, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 554 (1986). Some authors view Art. 4(b) of the 
current AU Constitutive Act which states “ respect to pre-existing boundaries,” as express recognition of the 
principle of uti possidetis. See COMMISSION OF AFRICAN UNION, DEPARGTMENT OF PEACE AND 
SECURITY, DELIMITATION AND DEMARCATION OF AFRICAN BOUNDRIES, (General Issues and Case 
Studies) 43 (2013). See also  Lalonde supra note 5 See also Dubai-Sharjah Border Arbitration, which expressed that 
uti possidetis revived in Africa. ( Lalonde, supra note 94 at 125). 
100  Garth Abraham, “Lines upon”:  Africa and the Sanctity of African Boundaries, 15 Afr. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 70, 
61-84 (2007).  
101 Id.  Abraham remarks that “[…] although not explicitly referred to by name, was formally adopted by the 
Organization of Africa Unity.” The founding fathers have all possibilities to explicitly refer the principle of uti 
possidetis had they wished to import the Principle to Africa; all other remarks appear speculation as the Cairo 
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avoided use of the expression uti possidetis by applying a general expression “ boundaries existing 
on the date of independence,” which need not be a boundary defined by colonial powers. The 
intention of African leaders can also be read from objectives of Pan African Movement. The 
Movement had a motto of redrawing boundaries of Africa to reunite the partitioned ethnic or tribal 
groups, until it changed its stance by accepting to respect boundaries existed on independence.  
There are numerous justifications to prove incongruence of the African meaning of colonial 
boundary delineation rule, and the Latin American principle of uti pssidetis.  Unlike Latin 
American States, Africa houses some States that never been colonized.102 As the principle of uti 
possidetis explains only boundaries inherited from colonial powers, it has nothing to do with the 
boundaries of States never been colonized. Most importantly, the principle of uti possidetis, as a 
principle of defining international boundaries, was born in a situation where administrative 
boundaries were inherited from a single colonial power - Spain. The principle of uti possidetis 
never been applied even in South America States that were not colonized by Spain. Brazil which 
was a colony of Portugal or other enclaves of South America that were colonized by other European 
colonial power do not recognize the Principle of Uti possidetis Juris.103   
Africa was colonized by several European powers. In some cases, a single ethnic group was 
split into several European powers. Even if nations opt to rely on the principle of uti possidetis 
acknowledging the doctrine of uti possidetis with all its deficiencies, it can be used to delimit 
                                                                                                                                                 
Resolution has some element identical concept. Antonopoulos poses the same view stating, “ The adoption of uti 
possidetis juirs in Africa by virtue of the 1964 Cairo declaration has worked as the legal vehicle of reaffirming the 
right of territorial integrity.” Constantine Antonopoulos, The Principles of Uti possidetis juris in Contemporary 
International Law, 49 RHDI 29  996.  Similarly, Thomas Bartos, for example, summarizes, “ Since the Cairo 
Declaration says nothing of situations where colonial boundaries are physically non-existence, or incorrectly 
demarcated, or where boundary documents cannot be interpreted without recourse to arbitration, the Declaration is 
meaningless unless viewed as standing only for a broad principle of inheriting colonial boundaries.” 
102 For instance, Ethiopia and Liberia never colonized. Ethiopian boundaries were set by treaty with the neighboring 
States that were represented by their respective colonial powers. Boundaries of Ethiopia and Sudan, boundaries 
between Ethiopia and Kenya, boundaries between Ethiopia and the current Somaliland were set by the treaties 
concluded with Great Britain, while Eritrean boundaries was defined by three defunct treaties while Ethiopian and 
Djibouti boundary was set between Ethiopia and France.  
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boundaries that were inherited only from a single colonial power.  This accords with the traditional 
sense of the Principle as practiced in Spanish Latin America. In this regard, Bartos suggests, “[the 
principle of uti possidetis] needs to be applied where the new States succeed to different 
administrative units of the same colonial power.”104  In a situation where states have inherited 
boundaries from different colonial powers, “It is unnecessary to have recourse to uti possidetis.”105  
The situation in Africa is, essentially different from Spanish Latin America. Africa was not only 
colonized by numerous colonizers, but also colonial powers repeatedly altered African territories 
with a view to smooth their administration under divide and rule system.106  Apart from Ethiopia 
that survived colonization by resisting several colonization attempts and Liberia that was protected 
by the United States, the rest of Africa was partitioned among various super powers. A single ethnic 
group, in certain cases was split into administration of multiple colonial powers.  In east Africa, the 
Somali ethnic group was shared among Great Britain, Italy, and France. In West Africa, the current 
Cameroon was split into Great Britain and France. If the Principle originally meant to apply to 
colonial administrative subdivision of a single colonizer, how could it work in Africa?  
On top of this, most African boundaries were delineated by bilateral or multilateral treaties 
either between African States among themselves after gaining independence, or an African State 
and a colonial power. For instance, Ethiopia concluded a number of territorial or boundary treaties 
with colonial power that had occupied neighboring east African States. In defining the northern 
boundary, Ethiopia in 1900, 1902 and 1908 concluded boundary treaty with Italy that colonized 
                                                                                                                                                 
103 Take, for instance, the former Great Britain colony of Guyana.  
104  Bartos supra note 95 at 62.  
105 Id.  
106 At the end of WWI all African colonies of loser of the war either allocated into winners of the war or mandated into 
the administration of another State. For example, Togoland and Cameroon were formerly German colonies but after 
German defeated by the WWI, both of the territories apportioned between Great Britain and France. Similarly 
Rwanda & Burundi were entrusted to Belgian administration and the rest of German East and West Africa were 
transferred to Great Britain and Tanganyka. For details see James E. Kitchen, Colonial Empires after the 
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Eritrea. Great Britain and Ethiopia concluded various colonial treaty governing Kenya, Sudan and 
Somalia. After decolonization, Kenya, Sudan and Somalia succeeded the treaties thereby complying 
with the boundary lines that were set by Ethiopia and Great Britain. Ethiopia concluded boundary 
treaties with Italy regarding Ethio-Somalia boundary and successive treaties governing Eritrean 
boundaries though Italy shortly terminated the treaties by invading Ethiopia thereby attempting to 
unify both countries as Italian East Africa Colony.  
 Thus, if any issue arises in boundaries between Ethiopia and Kenya or Sudan it is possible 
to resort to the Cairo Resolution. Had there been no treaty, by chance, the scope of the boundary 
would have been determined in accordance with the limits of territory actual held on the critical 
date of political independence. The principle of uti possideits can offer no better solution than the 
Cairo Resolution in this regard. Boundaries of French Somali Land (now Djibouti) were set by 
colonial treaties that were entered between Ethiopia and France. The same situation prevailed in 
other areas of Africa.107  In this sui generis boundary setting that was created by bilateral or 
multilateral treaty, it is the treaty that defines boundary – not the principle of uti possidetis.  
The Cairo Resolution dictates Member States to respect pre-existing boundaries on the 
critical date of independence. There are various ways of proving either critical date or colonial 
boundaries. The date in which the colonial power expressly declared decolonization or forced to 
leave political administration to the local people may be taken as the critical date in which the 
starting point of the existing boundaries. Colonial treaties, colonial maps, other documents that can 
prove the extent of colonial boundary limit, or in absence of all these effective control may prove 
the limits of the colonial boundary line.  Unlike the Latin American principle of uti possidetis juris, 
                                                                                                                                                 
War/Decolonization, INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF FIRST WORLD WAR, http://encyclopedia.1914-
1918-online.net/article/colonial_empires_after_the_wardecolonization (last visited Aug. 5, 2015 5:44 PM).  
107 Id.  
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the Cairo Resolution refers to the boundaries actually held on the very date of independence. Put 
simply, boundaries were set by effective possession.  
Thus, a nation cannot invoke a territory that it did not effectively control on the date of 
independence. There is no assumption of possession. In accordance with the old Spanish law, the 
Latin American principle of uti possidetis juris assumes all vacant lands were also assumed 
occupied. But the African rules respects sanctity of territories of already occupied by the claimant 
state. This aspect makes the African boundary law completely different from the Spanish Latin 
American principle of uti possidetis. The principle of Uti possidetis de facto, which recognizes 
boundaries of territories actually held on independence appears relevant to the African boundary 
law, it is not an established international law even in Latin America.108  
Moreover, the principle of uti possidetis never been consistently applied even in Latin 
America. Brazil always rejected the principle of uti possidetis juris opting for application of uti 
possidetis de facto. Even some former Spanish American colonies, albeit certain limited instances, 
sidelined the Principle by contracting with Brazil or forming a bigger union of States reforming an 
already formed international boundary into different form of internal boundary. Moreover,  
application of the Principle of uti possidetis was effectively suspended territorial or boundary 
conflict temporarily, but it did not offer a lasting solution for territorial or boundary conflict. The 
usefulness of the principle of uti possidetis specifically to Africa, therefore, is unsubstantiated.  
ICJ’s equation of the expression, “boundaries pre-existing on independence” with the 
Spanish Latin American principle of uti possidetis juris  in Frontier Dispute Case ( Burkina Faso 
vs. The Republic of Mali)109 was not supported by any evidence, nor the intention and conduct of 
founding fathers, suggest such assumption. The Cairo Resolution that was passed at a time Africa 
                                            
108 Only Brazil invokes the application of uti possidetis de facto. Therefore, this is not a commonly accepted 
international law doctrine.  
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was chocked with engulfing territorial or boundary conflict did not mention a word or there is no 
clue to deduce the possibility of application of the doctrine of uti possidetis in Africa. Given the 
popularity of the Principle in 1964, Suzan Lalonde, aptly surmises that omission of the Principle of 
uti possidetis from the most pertinent declaration, the Cairo Resolution of 1964 was “a deliberate 
choice.”110  
The Cairo Resolution by referring to expressions, “boundaries pre-existing at independent” 
meant boundaries that a State possessed exactly on the critical date of independence and that can be 
proved by unequivocal evidence. Thus, the African policy was effective occupation.111 Any attempt 
to go beyond the lines effectively controlled at the critical time of acquiring independence, appears 
contrary to the OAU charter and the Cairo Resolution. The Cairo Resolution gives no room to 
constructive possession – in African sense, only territories actually possessed on the critical date 
confers title. The actual possession rule aligns with the Brazil’s position of uti possidetis de facto, 
but it is not an international law principle.112  
 
4.5.  Current State of African Boundaries: Transforming Borders from Barriers to Bridges    
4.5.1.  Moving Toward Integration of Africa:  Leveling the Play Ground 
The Pan African Movement’s motto of creating an independent, prosperous, peaceful and 
united Africa appears revitalizing since the Algiers conference of Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government.113  The 35th Ordinary Session of Assembly of Heads of State and Government took 
                                                                                                                                                 
109 Case Concerning The Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso /Republic of Mali), ICJ Reports (1986), http://www.icj-cij.org. 
110 Lalonde supra note 23 at 120. 
111 Id. at  123. 
112  Suzzanne Lalonde, agrees with this stand stating, “  […] if African practice is to be equated with the uti possideits 
principle, it should at least be assimilated to the much less influential uti possideits de facto formula. On this rival 
formulation of the uti possideits principle, the Chamber is silent.” 
113 DECLARATION AND DECSIION ADOPTED BY THE THRITY FIFTH ASSEMBLY OF HEADS OF STATE 
AND GOVERNMENTS, ALIGIERS, ALGIVERIA, July 8 – 9, 1999.  
https://www.issafrica.org/Af/RegOrg/unity_to_union/pdfs/oau/hog/9HoGAssembly1999.pdf 
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the initiative to work beyond “business as usual.” The Summit ended up with a great motivation 
and ambition to move for ultimate political integration of Africa  “[…to] enter the third millennium 
with a genuine sprit of cooperation.”114  The Assembly of Heads of Stats and Governments (AHG) 
in quest for unity, economic and social development have deliberated in length the possibility for 
leveling the play ground for the ultimate political integration of Africa.115  
The Assembly of Heads of States and Governments reassessed the socio-political and 
economic journeys that OAU has travelled and have supported Colonial Muhammad Gadhafi’s 
proposal for greater unity and cooperation of Africa to resist the challenges of globalization and 
changing world phenomenon and improve living standards of Africans.116 The Algiers Resolutions 
underpin the need for thorough deliberation to attain a greater unity with a view to cope with the 
changing global social-political and economic situations that demand greater unity, strength and 
determination to uplift the state of Africa.117  
  Visionary African leaders have expressed their dedication to change the usual journeys of 
OAU by transforming its nature. African leaders applauded OAU’s success in playing pivotal role 
during liberation movement against colonialism and apartheid.  But due to external and internal 
factors, OAU could not fully meet the expectations of Africans. According to Vincent, though 
                                                                                                                                                 
35th Ordinary Session of Assembly of Heads of State and Governments (AHSG) that was held in Algiers in July 
1999 deliberated variety of continental and international issues. Among other things the proposal suggested by the 
late Libyan leader, Muhammad Gadhafi geared toward political integration of Africa. The declaration of   35th 
Ordinary Session of African Heads of States and Governments reveals that Muhammad Gadhafi suggested for 
reshaping OAU and creating a strong continental organization that can align with the changing world phenomenon. 
To deliberate on this noble agenda Assembly of Heads of States and Governments scheduled an extraordinary 
conference to be held a month later ( Sep. 1999) in Sirte, Libya by the invitation of Colonel Ghadhaffi. 
114 The late Libyan leader Muhammad Gadhafi suggested for the formation of United African and accordingly the an 
extra ordinary meeting was scheduled to be held in Sirte Libya.  See Convening of extra Ordinary Session of OAU 
Heads of States 6 – 9  Sep. 1999 to discuss ways and means of making OAU Effective See, 
https://www.issafrica.org/Af/RegOrg/unity_to_union/pdfs/oau/hog/9HoGAssembly1999.pdf 
115 Vincent O. Nimehielle, The African Peer Review Mechanism Under the African Union and its initiative: The New 
partnership for Africa’s Development 98 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 242, 231 – 249(2004). 
116 Id.   
117 Clause 2 of Sirte Declaration,  EAHG/Draft/Decl. (IV) Rev.1. FOURTH EXTRADODINARY SESSIN OF THE 
ASSEMBLY OF HEADS OF STATES AND GOVERNMENTS  8 – 9 Sep. 1999 Sirte, Libya.  
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“OAU played a central role in the political emancipation of colonized African states, but beyond 
that it was of little relevance and effectiveness in shaping political, economic and social 
development of the continent.”118Lack of good governance, neocolonialism, sporadic conflicts, 
protracted territorial and boundary induced wars among Africans, and corruption have been the 
usual phenomenon.   
African leaders offered credit to the philosophy of visionary Pan Africanist,119 who sought 
to abolish colonial boundaries and redraw genuine African boundaries in a way uniting balkanized 
nations and nationalities with the ultimate goal of creating united Africa under the auspicious of 
Pan African movement.120  
Kwame Nkrumah’s vision of creating a united Africa was ultimately trashed in the Addis 
Ababa Conference of 1963 that founded the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Kwame 
Nkrumah foresaw possible consequences of fragmented Africa and arbitrary colonial boundaries 
that has partitioned communities and restricted their right to use natural resources like grazing land 
and water. President Kwame Nkrumah at the early days of independence of African nations 
                                            
118  Nimehielle supra note 115 242.  Africans though technically free, but still remained under the bondage of poverty, 
recurrent war, political instability, famine, corruption ( all sorts of evils). African  
119  See Sirte Declaration Clausees 3 and 4 which recall the heroic struggles during liberation movement.  Assembly of 
Heads of States and Governments afforded respect to the Pan Africanists and  the people of African for efforts 
endeavored to consolidate African Unity. (Clause 4 of Sirte Declaration). The decision to erect a Statute in memory 
of Kwame Nkrumah at the newly constructed AU head quarter in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia proves the credit afforded 
to the extra-ordinary vision of creating United Africa. The Statute of Kwame Nkrumah gives grace to the head 
quarter of the AU. The aspiration of the Pan Africanist was dumped at the very formation of the continental 
organization where some parts of Africa were under the yoke of colonialism. Various rationale may be speculated: 
interest of “corrupt and inept political elites” to be sovereign in their local land over the divided people with 
competition for long time. (See Matua supra note 7 at 116. In fear of opening Pandora’s box that would saw 
unavoidable boundary conflict all over Africa may be another reason why founding fathers of OAU have opted to 
give respect for the colonial boundaries though it was arbitrary and artificial.  The other reason may be the interest 
of super powers that have been remotely controlling African leaders. For instance, Liberia did not out rightly reject 
the idea of forming a United West Africa, but later changed it stance of joining the already united Ghana and 
Guinea. Later on the then Leader of Liberia together with the leaders of Mali, and Ethiopia adversely fought Kwame 
Nkrumah’s vision of forming a United States of Africa.  
120 It was viewed that colonial boundaries disrupted the natural evolution of African indigenous boundary. Arbitrary 
colonial boundary disregarded “[…] the age-long efforts of (the indigenous) peoples to achieve political adjustment 
between themselves and the physical conditions in which they live.” J. C. ANENE THE INTERNIOANAL 
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vigorously worked to create a unified and independent Africa with a view to fight natural and 
manmade evils that have been cursing Africa. President Nkrumah went beyond mere political 
campaign to create a united Africa. 121 Before the formation of Organization of African Unity 
President Nkrumah attempted to unite neighboring regions of West Africa – Union of West Africa 
States.122 Ghana and Guinea formed a United West Africa and attempted to incorporate Liberia.   
After 50 years of the formation of OAU, facts on the grounds have been completely changed and it 
appears not easy, if not possible at all, to launch a single continual political entity - the United 
States of Africa.  
The possibility of uniting Africa, however, is not a dead agenda.123 Inspired by the 
cooperative spirit of Assembly of Heads of State and Government at the 35 Ordinary Session of 
OAU in Algiers Algeria, the late Libyan strongman, Colonel Muhammad Gadhafi, vigorously 
campaigned for immediate political unity of Africa.  He invited African leaders to deliberate for 
instant political integration of Africa. Clause 7 of Sirte Declaration manifests Gadhaffi’s 
enthusiasm to form politically integrated and strong Africa that can resist challenges of 
                                                                                                                                                 
BOUNDARIS OF NIGERIA 1885 – 1960 3(1970) Quoted in Makau wa Mutua, Why Redraw the Map of Afirca: A 
Moral and Legal Inquiry,  16 MICH. J. INT’L 1115, 1113 – 1176 ( 1994 – 1995).  
121 Mwangi S. Kimenyi and Katrin Kuhmann,  African Union: Challenges and Prospects for Regional Integration in 
Africa, 13 WHITEHEADJ. DIPL. & INT’ REL. 7-27 (2012). 
122 Paul-Mare Henry, Pan-Africanism: A Dream Come True, 37 FOREIGN AFF.  450, 443 – 452 (1958 – 1959). 
123 After 50 years of decolonization, due internal and external factors good brotherly relationship is spoiled. 
Communism and cold war era world relationship has spoiled Africa.  There is a wide gap in socio-economic and 
political development among Africans.  Colonialists, with a view to divide and rule Africa, have spoiled African 
nationalism and good brotherly relationship by Africa by planting protracted problems as a result of which brotherly 
people sought separation with a view to exploit weak side of neighboring States that was built by colonial powers. 
Take for example the boundaries of Ethiopia.  Before Arrival of Italian boots in coastal areas of Red Sea, in all 
standards and proof, Ethiopia’s boundary extended into the Red Sea. Italy cut all the coastal areas and formed the 
colony of Eritrea by changing its former name “Bahir Negash.” France took the coastal land- Djibouti and Ethiopia 
though few miles away from Red Sea now landlocked. Now separation from the motherland, Ethiopia, has been 
source of income to Eritrea and Djibouti as they can simply live by the income they get from the port fee that 
Ethiopia pays. African unity would avoid this advantage to Eritrea and Djibouti. Moreover, the leaders of this tiny 
States would compete with more competent persons to lead the nation. It is hard to convince selfish leader who 
desire to retain power for life. In order to Unit Africa as a one political entity, it may take years to change the 
attitude of African leader and level ground for creating United States of Africa by reducing poverty, developing 
infra structure and developing stronger tie by creating peace.  Border can play vital role in uniting Africa by creating 
peace among Africa.( the role of borders in keeping peace among the neighboring States will be dealt later.), 
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globalization and protect interests of Africa. With this view in mind, by the invitation of Colonel 
Muhammad Gadhafi, fourth extra-ordinary Summit of Assembly of Heads of States and 
Governments was held in Sirte, Libya to assess possible ways for political integration of Africa.124  
Assembly of Heads of State and Government, in principle, accepted the possibility of 
uniting Africa as a single political entity.125  Simply put, there was no strong objection against the 
proposed political integration of Africa, but immediate political integration was almost impossible. 
In a situation where divisive consequences of colonization have been spread all over the continent, 
immediate political integration would easily be thwarted. Due to arbitrary colonial partition of 
Africa and other disruptive seeds that were sown by the colonial powers, animosity and hatred still 
reigns in some vicinities of Africa.126 There are potential internal and external forces that can spoil 
any move for immediate political integration: former colonial hands still subtly control Africa.127  
Consequently, African Heads of States and Governments have agreed to level the 
playground for viable political integration before rushing to set up a single continental political 
                                            
124 The Fourth Extra ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government was inspired by the Pan 
African movement that restlessly worked of the pressing African issue of the time and attempted to create United 
States of Africa. As stated in the Sirte Declaration, participants of Summit declared: “ […] we  were inspired by the 
ideals which guided the Founding Fathers of our Organization and Generations of Pan-Africanists in their resolving 
to forge unity, solidarity and cohesion, as well as cooperation between African people and among African States.”  
Sirte Declaration  Clause 3.  
125 Participants of Sirte Assembly expressed their inspiration by the proposal of Colonel Muammar Ghaddafi and “his 
vision for strong and united Africa capable of meetings global challenges and shouldering it responsibility to harness 
the human and natural resources of the continent in order to improve the living condition of its people.” See Clause 
7 of Sirte Declaration.  
126 Take for example the case of relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The ambiguous boundary line between 
Ethiopian and Eritrea has created animosity among Ethiopians and Eritreans. Both of the States host rebels of each 
other. Almost an identical attitude exists between Eritrea and Djibouti.  
127 It appears not completely wrong if one says Africa is not completely independent. Though, technically Africa is free 
and independent, neocolonialism still persists. Most African State depends on foreign budgetary subsidy. Under the 
guise of human rights violation or western ideology, African States indirect control of the West. One can fairly 
imagine if any former French colonies integrate with another African nation. For instance, France has military base in 
Djibouti. If Djibouti, for instance, moves for political integration with any other African State, France would not keep 
quiet. With respect to political changes taking in any of the former French, colonies France is quick to react than any 
African neighboring States or Regional Economic Communities or African Union. In current state if Africa moves for 
political integration, it is not hard to guess the direct or indirect reaction of United States or other European powers. 
Therefore, for a meaningful integration to take place all threats have to be tackled. Smoothing relationship among the 
member states may take time but would produce a suit fruit. Thus, border issues have to be resolved amicably and 
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entity. Accordingly, in Sirte Summit Assembly Heads of State and Government extensively 
deliberated on possible ways of setting up a continental organization that can effectively work 
toward fulfilling the mission and attain the vision of African integration goals by keeping “[…] 
pace with political, economic and social developments taking place within and outside […the] 
continent.”128 As Nmehielle, attests, “The Sirte declaration was based on frank and extensive 
discussions on ‘how to proceed with strengthening of the unity of our continent and its people’ and 
contained a decision to establish […]”129 A continental organization akin to the European Union in 
which each Member State retains its sovereignty until facts on the ground steadily changes for the 
future political integration. At present Europe is moving toward political integration under the 
strong continental organization – European Union. Internal national boundaries have been changed 
enabling everyone to move freely in the Schengen area. Free movement and monetary union are 
some of the achievements of the European Union that may lead into a smooth political integration. 
  In relative thinking, it may be said that Africa was in a better position for integration during 
the Pan African movement. Africa has missed a better moment for possible political integration 
when Pan Africanism was at its high and enthusiastic African intellectuals were with full vigor and 
spirit of Africanism.130  Since launching of OAU, African States have messed with evil 
consequences of colonization that seeded perpetual antagonism.131 For instance, due to expansionist 
move of Morocco and Somalia destructive wars erupted. Somalia attempted to unit ethnic Somali 
                                                                                                                                                 
good neighborhood should be created. Economic empowerment brings about political empowerment, the African 
Union should work for economic integration before moving for complete political integration.  
128 Clause 2 of Sirte Declaration EAHG/Draft/Decl.(IV) Rev.1  FOURTH EXTADODINARY SESSION OF THE 
ASSEMBLY OFHEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT  8 – 9  Sep. 1999  See also  Nimehielle supra note 111 
at 241.  
129 Id.   
130 This does not, however, mean that Kwame Nkrumah’s  effort for political unity was failed without resistance. 
Ethiopia, Mali, Liberia strongly argued against political integration. Liberia spoiled the already started political 
integration with Ghana and Guinea. Though a clear justification is not revealed, one may speculate foreign 
interference against formation of a strong Africa that may be easy to manipulate.  
 221 
people in Ethiopia and Kenya by waging war against both of the neighboring States. There was 
boundary war between Egypt and Sudan, Morocco and Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania, Morocco 
and Sahrawi Arab, Chad and Libya, Nigeria and Cameroon, Mali and Burkina Faso, Tanzania and 
Uganda and so forth.132 
With this goal in mind, African leaders in Sirte, Libya have decided to phase out OAU and 
set up a new continental umbrella organization, African Union, to accelerate political integration. 
The constitutional document (Constitutive Act of African Union) was deliberated and adopted in 
Lome Summit of July 2000.133 African Union was officially come into existence after 36th 
accession of Nigeria on May 26, 2001.134  For the purposes of paving a smooth road map by 
structuring and defining the role of constitutive organs of African Union Lusaka Summit was 
convened. The Lusaka Summit of July 2001 set up major department that thought to play 
significant role for realization of the objectives of African Union. Finally, in December 2002 
African Union was formally launched thereby formally dissolving OAU.135   
  Though there are lingering doubts among ordinary Africans and the academia136 that the 
transformation of OAU into AU was merely a change of name, the mission and expected goals are 
not strictly alike. According to AShlegh Lezard, a contributor of African Inventor (Ai), while 
                                                                                                                                                 
131 See Abdalla Burja, African Conflicts: Their Causes and Their Political and  Social Environment, DPMF Occasional 
Ppaer No. 4 (2002), http://www.dpmf.org/images/occasionalpaper4.pdf According to Abdalla, though all post 
colonial African Conflicts were not border motivated, about 80 conflicts surfaced in Africa. Id. 
132 According to Timothy Besley and Marta Reynal- Querol, since 1950 African conflict propensity approaching to 
double the rest of world. In Armed Conflict Database (ACD) “measure of Civil Conflict on threshold of 1000 battle 
deaths suggests that around 8.5% of country years in Africa since 1950 are conflict years  compared to 5% of [ … 
]the rest of the world.” Timothy Besley and Marta Reynal- Querol, The Legacy of Historical Conflict Evidence from 
Africa, EOPP/036  (2012), http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/dps/eopp/eopp36.pdf 
133  See http://www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/african-union-au/ 
134 Jeremy I. Levitt et al, The African Union and The New Pan Africanism: Rush to Organize or Timely Shift, 13 
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTMP. PROBS. 2 (2003). 
135 Thirty Six Ordinary Session of Assembly of Heads of States and Governments,  AHG/Decl.2(XXXVI) Tog Lomme 
July 10 – 12, 2000, http://www.afrimap.org/english/images/treaty/CSSDCA_Lome_Decl.pdf, See also   
http://www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/african-union-au/o 
136 See Levitt et all supra note 121.  Dero Olowu expressed his doubt stating: “[…] despite noble pronouncement, the 
African Union is dogged by doubts that it will not achieve any more of tis goals than its predecessor, the OAU.” The 
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“OAU was about ‘Unity”; the AU is about ‘Union’ [and] unlike OAU, the AU is preparing to take a 
stand.”137 Among other things, the formation of African Union has created new feeling and boosted 
“[…] consciousness in the African continent among its leaders and its citizenry arising [….] That 
feeling or consciousness is expressed in the term African Renaissance [….]”138 African Renaissance 
means Africa should be able to solve its problems and uplift moral and logistic needs of its people. 
Business as usual should end and Africa should unit to tackle all socio-economic challenges that the 
continent has been wrangling.139  
As underpinned in the Sirte Declaration, the prevailing continental and global challenges 
have necessitated the formation of a strong continental organization that can empower Africans to 
address the socio-economic and political hurdles of contemporary world.140 The objectives, 
modalities, and modus operandi of African Union are different from the purposes and goals of the 
OAU.141 AU is conferred with variety of responsibilities to accelerate a way for African political 
integration. The creation of African Union Peace and Security Department is a noble move that 
make AU practically differ from OAU. OAU was guided by the neutrality principle, which 
                                                                                                                                                 
authors agree to Olowu stating, “ This skepticism may be well founded because of formidable normative institutional 
, and structural imperfections.”  Id.  
137 Ashelegh Lezard, Valuing Integration, AFRICAN INVETOR (Ai), July 1, 2004, 
http://www.africainvestor.com/article.asp?id=468 
138 Vincent O. Nimehielle, The African Union and African Renaissance: A New Era for Human rights Protection in 
Africa? 7 SINGAPORE J. INT’L L & COMP. L. (2003) Quoted in Nimehielle supra note 111 at 242  
139 This was Gadhafi ‘s vision.  Colonel Gadhafi was regarded as dictator and synonymized as African Sadam Hussen, 
but his ambition for African Renaissance appreciated by many Africans.  With a view to speed up African political 
integration Colonel Gadhafi, invited African Heads of States and Government to conduct a fourth extraordinary 
meeting in Sirte, Libya.  
140 See Clause 6 of the Sirte Declaration. 
141 While promoting unity and solidarity of African States was one of the prime objectives of OAU, AU is expected to 
achieve a greater unity and solidarity between African States and the people of Africa. The extent of unity that AU 
has to achieve is greater. AU is not simply expected to promote unity and solidarity, but has been endeavoring to 
achieve it. AU is also mandated to achieve the unity among African people and strengthen it. Some of the objectives 
of OAU are already phased out. One of the objectives of OAU was eradicating colonialism. The purpose is already 
attained. AU is mandated ‘to accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the continent. While working 
for ultimate political integration is not the main motto of OAU, AU is expressly mandated to promote peace, 
security and stability on the continent. Though this was implicit in the OAU’s mandate, the Constitutive Act of AU 
has afforded constitutional authority that must be achieved. Unlike OAU, AU got a wide range of mandates that 
consider socio-economic and political development.  
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prohibited interference in domestic affairs of Member States.142 But AU is legally empowered to 
intervene should grave atrocities that could spoil peace and stability surface in anyone of the 
Member States.143  AU has clear vision and mission – facilitating political integration of Africa – 
with the motive of making Africa a nation caring for all Africans equally. Anything short of this 
may be redundant or simply a side issue.  
With the objective of building strong and close relationship among the Member States, AU 
is set to perform variety of tasks that may foster friendship, cooperation and regional integration. 
New Partnership for African Development, NEPAD is among the programs that are believed to 
bolster smooth ties among Africans.144 NEPAD has the objective of uplifting the economic position 
of Africa, which in turn would make positive contribution for African political integration.145  
Specifically, NEPAD aims at eradicating poverty in Africa.146 Poverty affects integration – a 
prosperous nation may hesitate to mingle with a weaker one that comes with burden, but has little to 
offer.147 Today, trade relationship among African nations is very low.148 This may be explained in 
various ways. A poor nation is generally unproductive and may simply look for assistance. Even if 
                                            
142 The Rwanda Genocide has shaded a dark strain on OAU, as it did little to avert the slaughter of African on account 
of maintaining the policy of non-interference in domestic affairs of Member States.  
143 The main objectives of PSC is to oversee African peace and stability, which includes conflict prevention measures, 
conflict management and resolution. PSC has the objective of controlling acts and facts disturbing peace in Africa. It 
will have a regular force that may be deployed instantly to avert a grieve condition that may lead into gross human 
right violation or genocide. See Ahlegh Leznd , Valuing Integration, AFRICAN INVESTOR ( Ai), July 1, 2004, 
http://www.africainvestor.com/article.asp?id=468 
144 Declaration AHG/Decl.1 (XXXVII) adopted by the 37th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government of the OAU, Lusaka, Zambia 9 – 11 July 2001. 
145 African States have to open their doors to their neighbors; a nation cannot interact with neighbors while locked up by 
borders.  Mo Ibrahim, Africa’s telecommunication Miguel, remarks,   “[…] people normally trade with their 
neighbors first and then move further afield. That hasn’t been the case in Africa and that what we really need to start 
encouraging. We need free movement of people and over trade across local borders. Not only will that encourage the 
economy, it is also a safeguard against conflict.”  See Ashlegh Lezard, Valuing Integration, AFRICAN INVESTOR 
(Ai), Jul 1, 2004, http://www.africainvestor.com/article.asp?id=468 
146 Nimehielle supra note 138  
147 Though border dispute takes lion’s share of interstate conflict in Africa, poverty is another ground for conflict. See 
See also Johson Oalaosebikan Aremu, Conflict in Africa:  meaning, Causes, Impact and Solution,  4(4) AFRICAN 
RES. REV. 549    553, 549 – 560 (2010). 
148 Mwangi S. Kimenyi and Katrin Kuhmann,  African Union: Challenges and Prospects for Regional Integration in 
Africa, 13 WHITEHEADJ. DIPL. & INT’ REL. 7-27 (2012). 
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it is able to export some to the neighboring nation, commodities may be uncompetitive in term of 
quality and cost. After all, products of most weak nations are agricultural produce and a 
neighboring state may not have taste, as it also produces an identical product. On top of this, poor 
infrastructure, and undeveloped transportation channels increase cost. As a result, African States 
prefer to trade with Europe or Asian States in exchange for their industrial products.149  
Fragmented nation states, and their boundaries worsen the situation.150  Due to dispute most 
boundaries are not open for free passage, which requires to travel far distant that adds up cost.151 
The effect of arbitrary colonial boundaries is very evident in the cases of landlocked States. Africa 
houses 15 of the world’s land locked nations that depend on boundaries of neighboring states that 
may not necessarily be open in all times.152 As Uprety attests, “ Excessive high transit costs inflate 
the consumer prices of imported goods in LLDC and undermine the competitiveness of their 
exports in foreign market. They are thus a serious barrier to trade.”153 It is not only changing transit 
cost but also the whole situation depends upon political will of the neighboring state. For instance 
due to Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict, the border has been closed for more than a decade and Ethiopia 
cannot use the port that it built before Eritrea’s secession.  Ethiopia has to depend on small Djibouti 
port or has to travel long distance to port Sudan or to another longer distance Mombasa port, 
Kenya.  In all cases Ethiopian people suffer from additional unnecessary cost. This also affects 
competitiveness of Ethiopian products in continental or global market.  
                                            
149 Id.  
150 For instances the cost of import cars manufactured in Ethiopia to Ivory coast will coast $5000 while a better can be 
imported from Japan to ivory cost at $1500.  Similarly, it is cost effective to deal with Europe or Asia to the Eastern 
African nations. Thus, poor infrastructure and fragmented boundary system discourage inter Africa trade. See Id, at 9. 
151 Michael L. Faye et al, The Challenges Facing Landlocked Developing Countries, 5:1 J.O. Hum. Devt. 31 (2004). 
Available at http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/documents/JHD051P003TP.pdf 
152 THE WORLD BANK, THE TRANSIT REGIME FOR LANDLOCKED STATES: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVE (The World Bank) 17 (2006). 
153 Id.  
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To achieve the vision of continental unity and ultimate political integration among the 
Member States, all “stumbling blocks” should be tackled – closed boundary walls are some of the 
determinants. Removing boundary wall or changing its nature from barriers to bridges will speed up 
integration and ultimately enhance wellbeing of common people. This will enable Africans to trade 
with their fellow Africans and will boost global competitiveness. Free movement of goods and 
services will not only reduce cost and promote welfare system of bordered people, but also it would 
strengthen interdependence and unity.154 Realization of NEPAD’s objectives would make immense 
contribute for AU’s integration goals by emancipating Africans from economic dependence, which 
would indirectly affect Africa’s political integration.  
The other important milestone of AU is the objective of maintaining continental peace and 
stability. In addition to the economic challenges that Africans have been struggling, erratic conflict 
that unexpectedly explodes at all corner of Africa is another factor that would hamper 
integration.155 The Chairperson of the Commission in the report for the African ministers attests this 
points.156  Needless to say conflict resolution or prevention is pivotal for keeping peace and stability 
to create smooth relationship among the member States for the ultimate goal of political integration. 
As revealed in Clause 6 of the Sirte Declaration, the Assembly of Heads of States and Governments 
have expressed their commitment to eliminate “ […] the scourge of conflicts, which constitutes a 
                                            
154 The current friendly relationship between Ethiopia and Djibouti explains positive effects of changing barrier nature 
of border to bridges. While Ethiopia uses Djibouti port, Djibouti gets low cost hydroelectric power from Ethiopia.  
Ethiopia also provides free underground water to Djibouti. Ethiopians do a lot of investments and businesses in 
Djibouti. As a result of socioeconomic link between the people and good relation between the Government of 
Ethiopia and Djibouti, the President of Djibouti tipped the possibility of political integration of both nations, if the 
people of both States so desire.  See also Addis Tribune, May 08, 1998 which quoted Mr. Ismail Omar Geleh saying 
that authorities in Djibouti would exert every effort to work for economic and political integration of two countries. 
See http://www.biyokulule.com/Ethio_Djibouti_Union.htm 
155 Report of the Chairperson of the Commission (AUBP) on the 3rd Conference of African Ministers in Charge of 
Border Issues ( EX. CL/726(XXI). 
156 The Chairperson states, “ [N]on – definition of borders constitutes an obstacle to the process of economic 
integration, which the  Member States are striving to achieve.” Id. Non-definition – imprecise boundary line by itself 
cannot affect integration but its consequences obviously strains good relationship with also strains integration. If 
there is suspicion or animosity, states stay away which makes integration impossible.  
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major impediment to the implementation of […] development and integration agenda.” (Clause 6 of 
Sirte Declaration).  Conflict over territory or border conflict takes lion’s share in Africa. As pointed 
out in Chapter 2 and 3 of this work, territorial or border conflict is very sensitive and can 
unexpectedly flare up into armed confrontations.  Therefore, avoiding root causes of territorial or 
border conflict has been the most important concern of the continental organization (AU and even 
the predecessor OAU).157  
For the purposes of solving existing territorial or border conflicts and tackle other 
multifaceted intra or inter- state disputes, that may obstruct political integration of Africa, the 
Constitutive Act of African Union has created an organ that is responsible for overseeing the 
maintenance of peace and security in Africa.158 The protocol for setting up of African Peace and 
Security Council was initiated in Lusaka Conference of 2001 at which the structure of AU was 
designed.159 This means the architectural design of main constitutive organs of AU was devised at 
the Lusaka Conference of July 2001. At the Lusaka Summit, African Heads of State and 
Government have “ […] decided to incorporate Central Organs of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict 
Prevention, Management and Resolution as on of the organs of the Union in accordance with 
Article 5(2) of the Constitutive Act [….]”160At the Durban Conference, 23 Member States of AU 
have signed the Protocol, which was ultimately ratified in Maputo Summit.161 The Protocol 
Relating to the Establishment of Peace and Security Council came into force on December 26, 
2003.  
                                            
157 Id.   
158 Jeremy I. Levitt,  The African Union and the New Pan Africanism: Rushing to Organize or Time Shift: The 
Peace and Security Council of the African Union: The Known Unknowns, 13 TRANSNAT’L L. CONTEMP. 
PROBS.109 – 137 (2003). 
159 Decision of AHG/Dec. 160 (XXXVII) adopted at the 37th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government of the OAU 9 – 11 July 2001.  
160 Preamble to Draft Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union ( 9 
July, 2002, Durban South Africa). 
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Peace and Security Council (PSC) is one of the core organs of AU that is responsible to 
speed up the realization of the visions of AU by working for “prevention, management and 
resolution of conflicts.”162 It is “ […] the African Union’s standing decision–making body 
responsible for maintenance of continental peace and security.”163 PSC is analogous to the Security 
Council of UN. Members of PSC are elected from each zone. The number of members of PSC is 
equal to the members of Security Council of UN, but PSC bestows neither permanent membership 
nor veto power – all the Member States have equal role and power. Five of the Member States from 
each zone elected for 3 years terms and the rest 10 members elected for 2 years. Re-election is 
possible.164  
PSC is entrusted with multifaceted powers that are assumed to make immense contribution 
in the endeavor to maintain peace and security in Africa. As the name suggests the PSC Department 
of AU has the objective of promoting peace, security and stability in Africa.165 The three objectives 
of PSC are vital to the conflict-ridden Africa. Africa is blessed with natural resources and hard 
working people on whose labor enriched “others”, but ironically at present Africa is struggling to 
feed its people. It is puzzling to import food from Europe while Africa is endowed with fertile land 
and hard working people. The driving force behind Africa’s poverty is not secret. Since heyday of 
                                                                                                                                                 
161 See Ahlegh Leznd , Valuing Integration, AFRICAN INVESTOR ( Ai), July 1, 2004, 
http://www.africainvestor.com/article.asp?id=468 
162 See www.peacau.org, The creation of PSC decided by the declaration AHG/Dec160 (xxxvii) of Lusaka Summit of 
July 2001.  
163 Art. 2(1) PROTOCOL REALTING TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL 
OF THE AFRICAN UNION. See also Peace and Security Council ( PSC) – African Union – Peace and Security 
Department, www.peaceau.org 
164 Art. 5  PROTOCOL REALTING TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL OF 
THE AFRICAN UNION. AU’s Peace and Security Department will be assisted by the Commission, council of Wise 
(POW), a continental Early Warning System (CEWS), African Standby Force (ASF) See Art. 2 (2) PROTOCOL 
REALTING TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE AFRICAN 
UNION  
165  Art. 3 PROTOCOL REALTING TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL OF 
THE AFRICAN UNION  
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its independence Africa has been messed with unending international or civil wars.166 Needless to 
say, Africans will reap a better life by using resources that the continent is endowed with if peace 
and security prevails in the continent. Admittedly, no external force can change the prevailing 
African situation – only Africans can transform Africa. To this end, Africans should get united and 
use all available resources and power at disposal to fight colonial and neocolonial evils that have 
been “embarrassing” Africans and strain peaceful coexistence. With this goal in mind, PSC has set 
a road map to tackle causes of conflict being assisted with other organs of AU.167 Currently, PSC is 
reactive, which exposes weakness of Africa to resolve its problems. But PSC has to be proactive 
which will enable Africa to anticipate potential conflict situations and contain it before it actually 
flares up. PSC has the responsibility not only to make peace in Africa but also it is entrusted with 
peace building role which also includes “[,,.] post conflict reconstruction activities to consolidate 
peace and prevent the resurgence of violence” by coordinating and harmonizing continental 
efforts.168  
PSC respects “[…] the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Member States.”169 One may 
fairly question how PSC may intervene without encroaching sovereignty of a state? Non -
                                            
166 Abdalla Burjua surmises that almost all interstate conflicts in Africa are border conflicts. See Abdalla Burja, African 
Conflicts: Their Causes and their political and social Environment, DMPF No. 4    5, 1 – 49 (2002). See also Johson 
Oalaosebikan Aremu, Conflict in Africa:  meaning, Causes, Impact and Solution,  4(4) AFRICAN RES. REV. 559  
550, 549 – 560 (2010). Aremu aptly observes, “The history of Africa as a continent is replete with conflict.” Id at 
549. The Moroccan war against the neighboring states and the expansionist policy Somalia are repeatedly as wars 
among Africans even before colonial boots completely left Africa. The current chaotic situation in South Sudan 
explains how seeds of colonialism spoil internal and external relationships. The cause for split of Sudan is the 
divisive polity of Great Britain, which favored the Arab north. Sudan experienced a clear visible division in terms of 
education, power sharing, culture, religion etc. On top of this, administrative boundaries were porous. The South and 
North Sudan could not see each other as brothers; as a result they battled for separation. After getting independence, 
the North Sudan and South Sudan fought over undefined boundary lines and border resources.  Antagonistic 
relationship with North and South Sudan compounded with internal ethnic division, power trust, lack of good 
governance and poverty.  
167 Id. Art. 4(b) , Art. 5(b) See also Art. 7 (1) a Early Warning System and assessment and advice of Wise Men, armed 
force that can take quick action in case of grave atrocity are some of the organs of Au that can assist  in realization of 
the objective of PSC.  
168   Id. Art. 3(b) (c) PROTOCOL REALTING TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PEACE AND SECURITY 
COUNCIL OF THE AFRICAN UNION Id. Art. 6(e). 
169  Id. Art. 4(e). 
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intervention in domestic affairs is one of the basic pillars upon which principles of AU are built. 
There are certain preconditions that need to be satisfied before PSC intervenes. First, PSC will not 
intervene unless a grave situation that is thought to adversely spoil peace and security (like mass 
atrocity) surfaces and a Member State that is primarily responsible to protect its people and either 
unable or fails to discharge its responsibility.170  The other important oversight is the need to get 
authorization. Before intervening in the affairs of a Member State, PSC has to secure the go ahead 
from Assembly of Heads of State and Government pursuant to Art. 4(h) of the Constitutive Act.171 
The failure of AU to deploy peacekeeping mission in Burundi was the first challenge that PSC has 
confronted with.  The Government of Burundi strongly condemned AU’s decision to keep peace 
threatening to fight peacekeeping mission. This has halted the plan.  
 
4.5.2. African Union Border Program (AUBP) 
As border conflict takes lion’s share of Africa’s interstate conflicts and wars,172 AU has 
launched a special programmatic approach called African Union Border Program (AUBP) 
specifically meant to focus on border problems.173 AUBP is the most significant innovative 
approach of AU. As Ambassador Lamamra remarks:  
Africa is finally waking up to the fact that the absence of visible boundaries on the ground can 
hamper the co-existence and trade that are driving Africa’s demographic and economic 
dynamism. The African Union Border Programme (AUBP) is a vital factor in importing and 
modernizing the continents border regimes.174 
                                            
170 The intervention mechanism of PSC are identical to R2P when gross human rights violation occurs and the State that 
has the primary responsibility to protects is the perpetrator or is unable or unwilling to stop it.  See DAN KUWALI 
AND FRANC VILJON ( Eds.)  AFRICA AND THE REPONSIBIITY TO PROTECT ARTICLE 4(h) OF THE 
AFRICAN UNION CONSITITVE ACT  (2014) Forward by Justice Richard Goldstone.   
171 Id. Art. 4(j).  
172 According to Francis Ikome, since 1950 – 1990 over 50% of African states involved in some form of boundary 
conflict with neighboring states.  Ikome supra note 2 at 3.  
173  AUBP is entrusted with a two-prong objectives:  the task of delimitation and demarcation as a strategy for conflict 
prevention and a tool  facilitating integration process.  See Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on The 3rd 
Conference of African Ministers in Charge of Border Issues ( EX. CL/726(XXI). 
174 AFRICAN UNION COMMISISON, DELIMITATION AND DEMARCAITON OF BOUNDIERS IN AFRICA: 
GENERAL ISSUES AND CASE STUIDES FORWARD BY AMBASSADOR RAMTANE LAMAMRA, (2013). 
See http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/au-2-en-2013-delim-a-demar-user-guide.pdf 
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  Dealing with African borders is a conflict avoidance or conflict prevention strategy. As has 
been repeatedly pointed out, African boundaries are not only arbitrary and divisive, but also poorly 
defined and not precisely demarcated or impossible to demarcate. It is often said that porous nature 
of African boundaries has been source of protracted conflict and seed hatred among the neighboring 
States and their subjects. To avert divisive effect of the boundaries and create friendship among the 
Africans Pan Africanists moved to unite Africa by abolishing colonial boundaries, but in fear of 
presumed chaotic situation, the founding fathers of Organization of African Union have trashed the 
revisionist agenda of abolishing colonial boundaries. The Assembly of African Heads of States and 
Governments has concluded that any attempt to revise borders to go back to the pre-colonial state 
would cost more than it would benefit. Now, it appears neither possible nor desirable to redraw 
African borders in way reconnecting the balkanized ethnic or tribal groups back to the original 
form, but it is possible to unit the partitioned people by changing the nature and effect of borders.   
As Lord Curzon rightly observes boundaries hold two opposing scenarios: war and peace. 
Lord Curzon when asked to lecture at his former University on any topic of his interest, his first 
choice was to lecture about frontiers. The points of Lord Curzon’s famous lecture of 1907 are still 
relevant to the 21st century Africa.175 He rightly said, “Frontiers are indeed the razor’s edge on 
which hang suspended the modern issues of war or peace of life or death to nations.”176  (Emphasis 
mine). Borders thus have potential to ignite war or are channels for building peace among bordered 
people. Needless to say we have to avoid the “war” side of borders and build the “peace” aspect– it 
                                            
175 Conflicts involving frontiers is an old issue and it was so hot in late 19th and 20th in which European colonial powers 
were rushing to occupy territories of Africa and Asia.  The rush and competition to occupy African territories has 
sawn permanent wound in Africa that is not easy to treat.  Therefore, boundary issue is still current in Africa and has 
been consuming lives and resources. Border issue is still hot in Africa in 21st century. To build peace in Africa and 
thereby change lives of perishing Africans there is no priority than settling with border issue. 
176 Lord Curzon,  Text of the 1907 Romanes Lectures on the Subject of Frontiers, 
https://www.dur.ac.uk/resources/ibru/resources/links/curzon.pdf  accessed 10/30/15 at 11:43 A.M 
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is not a matter of choice, but it is a matter of death or life, which any perceptive mind cannot take a 
second to choose.  
The current state of African boundaries points the length of journey that AUBP has to go in 
order to attain it goals. African borders are still elusive and remain as battle ground that still bear 
poisonous fruits that destroy Africans. In 2007 only 25% of African borders were demarcated and 
in 2012 this figure moved upwards by 10% (totally 30% African borders were demarcated).177 In 
order to realize a viable political integration this situation has to be changed. Being aware of the 
fact that undefined boundaries can hamper the move for political integration AU has set up African 
Union Border Program (AUBP) as a unit under the Peace and Security Department.  
  AUBP is mandated to build peace in Africa by changing the nature of borders in a way it 
could be used to bear integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa. Changing the current state of 
African borders is not easy, but it is possible. African Union, under AUBP has been intensively 
working to change barrier nature of borders that has been source of animosity to bridges that would 
serve as points of contact and cooperation. Numerous conferences of African boundary experts, 
council of ministers and Assembly were held and declarations were passed.178 Transforming 
African borders from points of separation to the points of contact is one of the objectives of African 
Union Border Program (AUBP). At the time of liberation of Ethiopian from five year so Italian 
occupation an author remarked, “ The tendency today must be towards integration, not partition. 
The balkanization of Africa can hardly be the aim of enlightened statesmanship.”179 By shaping 
borders from barriers to bridges, it is certainly possible to reunite the partitioned ethnic or tribal 
                                            
177 Report of 3rd Conference of African Ministers in Charge of Border Disputes, Niamey, Niger 14 – 16 May 2012. 
(EX.CL/726 (XXI) Annex I The goal of demarcating all African boundaries is postponed until 2017 but no current data 
publically available.   
178 The Conference of March 2007 of African boundary experts was held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The Addis Ababa 
Conference of June 2007 passed the first declaration on African border program, the July 2007 Conference that was 
held in Niamey, Niger that passed the second declaration, and 2010 Addis Ababa declaration that passed the third 
declaration.  
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groups thereby resolving the age old question of free passage to their ancestral land or grazing field 
or water sources.  
AUBP is entrusted with a huge and difficult of task of assisting coordinating the making of 
clear boundaries within the defined time framework. There was a plan to delimit and demarcate the 
whole African boundary by 2012, but little gains were achieved.180 As a result, the time framework 
has been extended to 2017.  So far there is no data indicating further work or it is not publicly 
available. Given the volume of work and outstanding border conflicts and shortage of resource, it is 
not hard to assume further extension of time framework. The border conflict of horn of Africa is 
simply suspended. Ethiopian and Eritrean troops are extremely vigilant expecting to full trigger at 
any moment. Almost the same scenario is expected in border between Eritrea and Djibouti.  The 
Ethiopia Sudan border though appear settled as a result of the current friendly relationship between 
the two governments, imprecise border (Non-demarcated) border has been source of tension.181  
AUBP is empowered to enforce African border related laws since heyday of OAU, 
resolution of African Heads of State and Government, Declarations of Council of Ministries, AU 
Constitutive Act, and other continental and international principles of that meant to keep peace and 
security. Brief overview of the governing principles, mandates, achievements, and challenges of 
AUBP are briefly summarized below.   
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
179 Robert Gale Woolbert, The Future of Ethiopia, 20 FOREIGN AFF. 546, 537 – 551 (1941 -1942).  
180 A continental survey revealed only 35% of African boundaries demarcated ( See Report of 3rd Conference supra 
note 177. 
181 SUDAN TRIBUNE, 16 Sudanese Killed by Ethiopian Gangs in El Gardref: Minister, Oct. 28, 2015, 
http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?iframe&page=imprimable&id_article=56884 
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4.5.2.1. Legal Authorities and Guiding Principles182   
1. At present, the supreme legal authority governing border delineation in Africa is the 
Constitutive Act of AU. The Act has reaffirmed the Cairo Resolution of 1964 in which 
African Heads of States and Governments adopted to respect borders existing on 
independence and incorporated into the AU Constitutive Act.183  
2. The principle of negotiated settlement of border dispute is one of the guiding principles of 
AU as a successor of OAU.184 In accordance with the Resolution CM/Res/1069 (XLIV) 
adopted by the 44th Ordinary Session of Council of Ministries of OAU in 1986, Member 
States of AU should endeavor to resolve all territorial disputes peacefully.  
3. AU’s affirmation to carry out delimitation and demarcation all African boundaries for the 
purpose of building peace and security in Africa with the goal of achieving socio-economic 
progress (affirmed in Resolution CM/Res.1069(XLIV).  
4. The Memorandum of Understanding on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in 
Africa (CSSDCA) that African Heads of States and Governments have adopted to delimit 
and demarcate African boundaries in first ordinary session of AU, Durban 2002. 
5. The mission and vision of AU that derives all constitutive organs to work for the ultimate 
end of political integration of Africa.  In this regard legal framework for cross border 
cooperation that would accelerate the integration of Africa.185  
6.  The Declarations on the African Union Border Program adopted by the Conference of 
African Ministries in charge of border issues.   
7.  African Union decisions related to border issues including Decisions EX CL/370 (X) and 
Ex, CL/Dec.461 (XIV) adopted by the 11th and 14th Ordinary Sessions of the Executive 
Council of the African Union in June 2007 in Ghana and January 2009 in Addis Ababa.  
                                            
182 Agulbou Diarrah, An Overview of the African union Border Programme,  in DELIMITATIONA ND 
DEMARCATION OF AFRICAN BOUNDAREIS: GENERAL ISUES AND CASE STUDY, DEPT OF PSC, 
COMMISION FOR AFRICAN UNION 8(2013).  See also AUBP, ROM BARRIERS TO BRIDGES: 
COLLECTION OF OFFICIAL TEXTS OF AFRICAN BORDERS FROM 1963 – 2012   7(2013). 
http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/au-1-en-2013-barriers-to-bridges.pdf  (Accessed 4/16/15). 
183 Resolution of First Ordinary Session of Assembly of the African Heads of State and Government, AHG/Res. 16(1) 
on principle of respect of borders existing at the time of accession to national independence (Cairo July 1964). This 
Resolution directly succeeded by Art. 4(b) of AU Constitutive Act. See also Peace and Security Department, 
Declaration on the African Union Border Prgramme and The Modalities for the Pursuit and Acceleration of Its 
Implementation, 3 (2010), http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/aubp-dec-e.pdf 
184 Peace and Security Department, Declaration on the African Union Border Prgramme and The Modalities for the 
Pursuit and Acceleration of Its Implementation, 3 (2010), http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/aubp-dec-e.pdf 
185  Niamey Convention on African Union Convention Cross-border Cooperation May 17, 20012.  
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8. The Resolution of 8th ordinary Summit of Heads of States and Governments the need to work 
conflict prevention though AUBP.  
9. The International initiatives on the delimitation and delineation of maritime borders and 
provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea.  
 
4.5.2.2. AUBP Mandates186 
1.  Facilitate and Support Delimitation and Demarcation of African Boundaries.  
AUBP is expected to play a vital role in African integration by working to avoid border 
related disputes by facilitating and supporting the effort of AU and Member States to build peace 
and harmony. Creation of smooth relationship among the Member States is the most important 
strategic tool for regional or continental integration. Therefore, all causes and cases of conflict that 
may strain relationship among the Member States should be tackled. The most usual source for 
interstate dispute is elusive colonial boundary, which so far has caused almost all international 
conflicts in Africa. It is not exaggeration to say that the end of border issue in Africa would mark 
the end of interstate dispute.  
To this end AUBP is set to fulfill “ two pronged objectives.”187  One is “Structural 
Prevention of Conflict” and the other is the need to “deepen the integration process.” 188 Fulfillment 
of these two interrelated objectives is one of the core objectives of the AU.  Other organs of AU are 
also mandated to work for fulfillment of anyone or both of these objectives. The main agenda of 
PSC, for instance, is maintaining peace by preventing and resolving disputes in Africa. As most 
inter-states conflicts in Africa arise from problems related to borders, AUBP, being at the forefront 
                                            
186  See AUBP, ROM BARRIERS TO BRIDGES: COLLECTION OF OFFICIAL TEXTS OF AFRICAN BORDERS 
FROM 1963 – 2012   7(2013). http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/au-1-en-2013-barriers-to-bridges.pdf 
187 Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the 3rd Conference of African Ministers in Charge of Border issues 
( EX – CL/726(XXI) 
188 Id.  
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of issues involving borders, is very pertinent to the attaining of objectives of PSC, AUC and the 
other organs of AU.  
Success of the objectives of AUBP, therefore, would cut the roots of “poisonous tree” that 
was planted during colonial era, which makes African “brothers” fight each other.189  To root out 
toxic effects of arbitrary boundary lines (the colonial seeds), establishing unambiguous point of 
separation (delimitation and demarcation) is vital. It may appear weird to suggest projecting to draw 
dividing lines while campaigning for political integration. It has been repeatedly pointed out that to 
have a true economic or political integration, a cooperative environment has to be created. Settling 
border issues by drawing unambiguous limits of borderlines would stimulate cooperation among the 
bordered states. The adage of “Good fence make good neighborhood” really works. It is possible to 
mingle good neighbors. In the words of Ikome: 
“ [... B]order delimitation and demarcation is seen as a precondition for successful 
integration, because a non-defined border is susceptible to being a source of contention, 
even conflict. Border demarcation therefore should be seen as having the potential to 
open rather than close the doors of cooperation and integration.”190 
 
Currently, less than half of the Africa’s boundaries are unambiguous.191 This suggests that most 
of the African boundaries are still susceptible to fuel conflict or actually ignited one. In this 
scenario Colonel Gadhafi’s move for immediate political integration was impracticable. As a result, 
founders of AU have rightly decided to prepare grounds through AU for the ultimate political 
integration.  
                                            
189 Describing Ethiopia and Eritrea war, Western Media titled, “… brothers at war.” It is true that Ethiopians and 
Eritreans are brothers. Just based on facial or physical appearance it is not easy, if not difficult at all to distinguish an 
Ethiopian or an Ethiopia.  The two nations have common culture, practice identical religion, speak common language 
and intertwined by marriage. Today, due to the secession of Eritrea, has separated families no less than colonial 
boundaries did at the beginning of 19th century. One can notice a situation in which parents Eritreans while their 
children are Ethiopians.  
190 Ikome supra note 2. 
191 According to Ikome, 1/3 of African boundaries were not delimited or demarcated. Id.  According to the Report 
submitted by the Chair person of AUBP, “ A little more than one third of African borders have been delimited and 
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AUBP is entrusted with the task of facilitating the intended integration by building fences 
that would contain destructive colonial seeds. The fences are temporary measures and will be 
destroyed when the actual integration takes place.192 Therefore, as means of clearing ground for 
political integration, ABUP has to work for complete delimitation and demarcation of African 
boundaries. This solution is not easy to attain, but it is possible. The prevailing reality (socio-
economic and political situation) may not be conducive enough for contesting parties to  devise an 
amicable solution of African border problems. It may take painstaking journey to secure agreement 
of contesting parties, but there is no better option to obviate boundary conflict other than drawing 
an acceptable boundary line (delimitation and demarcation). Member States of AU have agreed to 
speed up delimitation and demarcation where not already done. These processes include 
maintenance of already demarcated borders, and densify boundary beacons, if necessary. 
Neighboring states should be willing to compromise their interest with a view to make life more 
confortable to their people by avoiding possibilities that would ignite wars that often consume lives 
and resources. With full understanding of possible response from the contesting parties and 
prevailing reality on the disputed area, AUBP has to endeavor through the PSC to support 
contesting parties to comply with the AU’s mission of peaceful dispute settlement objectives.  To 
tackle actual or potential border disputes or disputes that may arise while attempting to delimit or 
demarcate borders, African States are required to apply all possible options for peaceful resolution 
disputes peacefully (negotiation, mediation, conciliation, inquiry, regional and international 
arbitration or use of Intentional Court of Justice).  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
demarcated.”  See also Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on The 3rd Conference of African Ministers in 
Charge of Border issues ( EX – CL/726(XXI) 
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2. Coordinate Cross Border Cooperation as strategy for African Integration. 
By facilitating the processes of setting clear and acceptable boundary lines, AUBP can 
achieve its objectives of preventing conflict and promote cross border cooperation. In vicinities 
where there is no border issue, AUBP has to work for enhancing cross border cooperation with the 
ultimate objective of changing the nature of borders from barriers to bridges. Cross-border 
cooperation is: 
[…] any act or policy aimed tat promoting and strengthening good neighborly relations 
between border populations, territorial communities and administration or other 
stakeholders within the jurisdiction of two more Sates, including the conclusion of 
agreements and arrangements useful for this purposes.193  
 
Take, for example, the boundaries between Ethiopia and Kenya. The boundaries of two 
Eastern African countries are almost settled though sporadic conflict among neighboring nomads 
can be observed as a result of cross border crimes. Nomadic people of South Omo region of 
Ethiopia sometimes cross Kenyan border and raid cattle from their Kenya counterparts. Kenyan 
nomads may take the same action. This has nothing to do with the boundary and cannot change the 
prevailing smooth relationship between Ethiopia and Kenya. Building cross border cooperation can 
change the situation. The border people can effectively police cross border criminals.  
Residents of Ethiopian Moyale town and Kenyan side freely cross the border even noticing 
there was border or freely transact without thinking they belong to a different State. Thus, for some 
residents of Moyale town, Ethiopianness and Kenyanness is simply a term on their IDs and borders 
are simply check points sometimes may be used to filter unwarranted persons and goods. 
Nowadays, numerous cross border activities are taking place. Kenya is set to get hydroelectric 
power that will connect both countries. Similarly, the relationship between Djibouti and Ethiopia 
goes beyond port use. After Ethiopian and Eritrean relationship is spoiled due to border conflict, 
                                                                                                                                                 
192 Ikome, Id.  
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Ethiopia has stopped using Assab port and has shifted to port of Djibouti.  Now Djibouti gets free 
under ground water from Ethiopia. Train lines, oil pumps and regular inland and air transports are 
some of the projects that link Ethiopia and Djibouti. Similar to Eritrea, Djibouti was separated from 
Ethiopia as a result of colonization. The two main ethnic groups of Djibouti have their kinsmen in 
Ethiopia who speak the same language, have almost identical culture and practice the same religion 
and pursue identical way of life. The relationship of Ethiopia and Djibouti now appears well 
cemented on mutual advantages. As a result of strong economic and cultural links, both States have 
been assessing the possibility of future economic and political integration to reunion the two 
brotherly people.  The Ethiopia Sudan border is not fully demarcated, the two countries have agreed 
to respect the colonial delimitation and demarcate the boundary line. This agreement has enhanced 
Ethiopia Sudan relationship. There is regular land and air transport that link the people of Sudan 
and Ethiopia. Ethiopia has been importing oil from Sudan and agreed to use Port Sudan for its 
import and export. 
Thus, “[f]acilitating the development of cross-border integration dynamics sustained by 
local stakeholders” is one of the prime objectives of the AUBP.  AUBP should enhance such good 
border relationship and cross border projects that would ultimately enable integration of the whole 
Africa. The Niamey Convention on Cross Border Cooperation will boost AUBP in effectuating its 
mandate of promotion and coordination of cross border relationship, projects and commercial 
activities.  The Niamey Convention has been ratified by some Member States and expected to come 
into force after fifteen ratifications.  
The on going work on regional integration will facilitate much needed continental 
integration. Africa has about 10 REC’s and all African States are members one or more of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
193 See African Union Peace & Security, htt://www.peaceau.org 
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Regional Economic Communities.194 In some cases membership is overlapping and “characterized 
by ambitious targets.”195 Though REC’s enjoy considerable support from African Governments and 
can possibly play huge role eventually, in African political and economic integration.196 Though 
more is expected from REC’s currently the performance of REC’s is unsatisfactory.197  For 
example, East Africa Economic Community (EAC) long planned for economic and monetary 
integration, but so far not implemented. This also affects the intended political integration.  
 In addition to the support of Members States, African Economic Community and other 
stakeholders, AUBP has the objective to support REC’s as an important tool that can contribute for 
the African integration.  Some Regional Economic Communities are moving for economic 
integration, monetary and aiming for ultimate political integration is an important aspect of AUBP.   
With a view to effectively coordinate cross border cooperation and integration agenda, 
member States have agreed to enable AUBP make “comprehensive inventories of existing border 
cooperation initiatives and agreements [….]”198 Assisting member States to enhance cross border 
initiatives, cross border cooperation including preparation of appropriate legal instruments, border 
commissions, cross border resource management.  
The need to fight cross border crime is another area that demand cooperation of bordered 
communities. As African Heads of States and Governments declared, ”the strengthening of cross-
border cooperation in the area of the prevention and fight against terrorism and cross-border crime, 
                                            
194 Alemayehu Geda and Haile Kibret, Regional Economic Integration in Africa: A Review of Problems and Prospects 
with a Case Study of COMESA,  WORKING PAPER, 
www.soas.ac.Uk/economcs/research/workingppaers/file.28853.pdf (last accessed 10/21/15 at 9:05 PM.  See also 
Jaime de Melo and Yvonne Taskata, Regional Integration in Africa: Challenges and Prospects, WIDER WORKING 
PAPER, 2014/037 U.N. University UNU-WIDR,  (2014) www.imvf.org/ficheiros/filewp2014-037_1.pdf 
195 Trudi hartzenber, Regional integration in Africa, WORKING PAPER,  (2011), 
www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd201114_e.pdf 
196 Manone Regina Madyo, The Importance of Regional Economic Integration in Africa, MC DISSERATION,  
University of South Africa, (2008) Unpublished  uir.unisa.ac.za/bitstream./handle/10500/2075/dissertation.pdf 
197 Trudi Hartzenber supra note 130. 
198 AUBP. Declaration on African Union Border Programme and The Modalities for the Pursuit and Acceleration of its 
implementation. http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/aubp-dec-e.pdf (Accessed 4/16/16). 
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including drug trafficking, and other cross border threats, such as piracy and other illicit acts on sea, 
[…]”199 
3. Capacity building, awareness creating and net working 
 
Designing or encouraging the emergence of special border related education and 
encouraging research programs is one of the strategies of AUBP.  It includes “harnessing” existing 
African skills and experiences with a view to develop indigenous knowledge. 200 To coordinate 
existing experience and skill in border management, AUC under the auspicious of AUBP is 
mandated to make inventory of experts and training institutions in Africa.  Partnership, networking 
and experience sharing among international, continental, and national institutions that deal with 
border related issues are vital. Networking and partnership with EU, and United Nations, is 
detrimental for experience sharing and resource mobilization.  
African states have also agreed to develop institutions for border study programs. Border 
related training is not only confined to civilian but training of immigration security and defense 
personal will make immense contribution. Strengthening institutional capacity of AUBP by 
recruiting additional personal and developing structure.  
AUBP is mandated to popular itself among the African people. Local awareness of the 
objectives of AUBP is vital for efficacy of border management. Though African leaders have 
acclaimed the contribution of AUBP, the actual beneficiaries of the Program should understanding 
the goals of AUBP and accept its mission and vision.  Local people both at the center and 
borderland should know and accept neutrality and methodologies of AUBP. The best way to 
                                            
199 Declaration on the African Union Border Programme and the Modalities for the Pursuit and Acceleration of its 
Implementation on Occasion of Second Conference  On African Union Border Program, March 25, 2010, Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia  
200 Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on The 3rd Conference of African Ministers in Charge of Border issues 
( EX – CL/726(XXI) 
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popularize AUBP in Africa is close working with the communities, religious leaders, and tribal 
chiefs. AUBP’s agenda and goals are noble and, if successful, would benefit the whole continent, 
but should not imposed on the local people. Translation of materials developed under the auspicious 
of AUBP in various African languages and dissemination of the work and importance of AUBP in 
mass media is another way of awareness creating. All actors, therefore, should know and accept 
AU’s border program strategies and goals.  
4. Implementation and the way forward 
AUBP is an innovative African formulation. The main objectives of AU that are geared 
toward integration of Africa are being steadily implemented under the auspicious of AUBP. 
Political and economic integration of Africa will certainly root out colonial footsteps that have been 
spoiling peaceful coexistence. Though AUBP has to go a long distance in attaining its goal of 
border delimitation and demarcation, preliminary activities that have been implemented so far are 
greatly appreciable and demonstrate AU’s dedication and ground works to achieve the vision of 
ultimate political integration of African nations.  
In the implementation of African Border Program every one in Africa is expected to 
involve. AUBP boundary making is basically a bottom top approach. The most important 
beneficiaries and actors are Member States. As Professor Asiwaju rightly remark, “ […] border 
delimitation and demarcation under the AUBP cannot afforded to be the kind of top-down 
operations used in the era of European imperialism and colonialism [….]”201 The border programs 
are expected to be implemented at continental, regional, and national levels. The most important 
beneficiaries and in worse cases the immediate victims are border resident. Involvement and 
consultation of border residents and local administrations of both contesting States is vital to build 
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confidence and trust of local people. Asiwaju attests this view stating,“ […] sensitivity to the 
interest and rights of locally affected indigenous communities, […] consultation and collaboration 
of national and sub national authorities each side [bordered states]”202 is essential. The important 
consideration afforded by AUBP to local people makes the program very different from colonial 
boundary making.  This is a way to build an acceptable boundary that will bridge relationship in the 
future when the barrier nature of border changes to point of contact.  
  AUBP, being an umbrella program, has been coordinating regional or national initiatives. 
Fund raising, capacity development programs, and technical support that have been afforded by 
AUBP are very crucial for the success of the regional and national endeavors. It is true that each 
level has to exert its effort including fund raising and capacity building to the extend possible. 
Though not uniform in all regions, and the level of financial and capacity hindrance is not identical, 
REC’s are doing great in smoothing regional integration. Working for efficacy of free trade, free 
movement of good and services, monetary integration, easing of avoiding custom barriers are some 
of the important tasks being carried out by the REC’s.  
 Fulfillment of the vision of AU demands extra effort from Member States. The most crucial 
step that Member States should expert is willingness to find out solution to address conflict of 
interest that would spoil peaceful coexistence. Porous borders are the usual causes that vitiate good 
neighborhood.  Member States of AU should honestly endeavor to define their respective 
borderlines in a way acceptable to their people. National and regional politics often influence the 
will and readiness to define borders.   It is also influenced by the divisive mechanisms that were 
planted by the colonial powers and takes time to change that setting. Former colonial powers are 
                                                                                                                                                 
201 A.I. Asiwau, The Factor of Affected Local Populations, in DELIMIATION AND DEMARCATION IN AFRICA, 
GNERAL ISSUES AND CASES STUDIES (AUBP) 149 (2013). http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/au-2-en-2013-
delim-a-demar-user-guide.pdf 
202 Id. at 150.  
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still attempting to rule their former colonies stretching their hands from Europe indirectly under the 
guise of economic or security assistance. Personal interest of selfish leader who indirectly guided 
and backed up by the colonial powers may not be willing to settle boundary issues in a way address 
the interest of Africa. This is another colonial evil that takes time to root out and African leaders 
and the umbrella organization has to change all effects of colonialism and neocolonialism to find 
out African solution for the African problem.   
It is true that AU and other continental organs cannot compel or instruct Member States 
either to define or demarcate their respective borders or accept the definition offered by AU, as it is 
illegal being contrary to the principle of AU that respects sovereignty and independent existence of 
Member States, AU has the responsibility to make follow up and venture to persuade unwilling 
Member States to cooperate with their neighbors so that they should devise solution to their own 
problem thereby create conducive environment to avoid border issues for the purposes of moving  
to change borders from barrier to bridges.   There should be continuous interaction of bordered 
people to resolve all border problems that may emerge.203 Border issues cannot be resolved 
overnight.  It takes time and should be tackled step by step. Therefore the work has to be planned, 
implemented, and assessed periodically. Most importantly, Member States should organize a joint 
border commission that can resolve emerging issues in give and take way.204  Unless states are 
                                            
203 Regarding the role of Member State in facilitating delimitation and demarcation in setting joint border commission, 
raising fund and organizing technical tools, and sensational meeting with bordered people thereby building trust and 
confidence of local people see Issa Coulibaly, Demarcating Africa’s  Post – Conflict Boundaries: The Burkina  Faso 
– Mali Experience, in DELIMIATION AND DEMARCATION IN AFRICA, GNERAL ISSUES AND CASES 
STUDIES (AUBP) 180 (2013). http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/au-2-en-2013-delim-a-demar-user-guide.pdf 
According to Coulibaly, “Site Based Sensitization meetings for cross border communities were organized with the 
support of village chiefs and local leaders” Id. The State of Burkina Faso  and the Republic of Mali demarcation 
exercise proves how an acceptable boundary may be created where national leaders have honest will to solve the 
problem. After delimitation by the contested boundary line by ICJ both States reveal exemplary cooperation. As 
Coulibay vividly remarks, “ The political will on both sides meant all obstacles could be overcome.” Id.  
204  For example, in demarcating the contested borer between Cameroon and Nigeria, leaders of both States 
demonstrated a political will after both leaders initially negotiated in presence of Secretary of United Nations. The 
leaders organized a mixed commission that “[… ] mandated to consider all the implication of the [ICJ] decision, 
including the need to protect the rights of the affected population in both countries.” See Ali Toure and Sani M. Isa, 
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willing to compromise for the ultimate benefit of their people in win-win bases, no one can 
effectively settle issues.205  AUBP can play a great role by working to bring unwilling parties to the 
negotiation table and assist them to resolve their own problem through mutual and constructive 
dialogue. 
So far AUBP has been doing vital businesses of AU. Without being impended by the 
personnel and resource constraints, AUBP has exerted efforts to alleviate deep-rooted African 
border problems. As a measure of awareness creation and capacity building objectives, AUBP has 
conducted numerous regional sensitization workshops on the AUBP.206 Held international 
symposium on management of land, river and lake boundaries in Maputo Mozambique (Dec. 2008), 
conference on Maritime boundaries and the continental shelf in Accra, (Nov. 2009), Bamako 
conference on cross border cooperation (Nov 3 – 4 2009) to discuss on drafting Convention on 
Cross Border Cooperation, as well as national initiatives on bilateral and regional levels to promote 
cross border cooperation. Each region took part in the workshop and got full awareness of the 
businesses and goals of AUBP, the vision and mission of AU, the strategies and mechanisms of 
effectuating the vision of ultimate political integration of Africa by tackling all barriers that may 
hinder friendship, and peaceful coexistence in Africa.  
For the purposes of planning, follow up and audit, AUBP has to know facts of African 
borders. Given financial, technical and manpower constraints, AUBP cannot physically visit all 
                                                                                                                                                 
Post Conflict Demarcation of African Boundaries: The Cameroon-Nigeria Experience, in DELIMIATION AND 
DEMARCATION IN AFRICA, GNERAL ISSUES AND CASES STUDIES (AUBP) 190 (2013). 
http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/au-2-en-2013-delim-a-demar-user-guide.pdf 
205 Involvement of third parties may not only delay solutions, but also has cost implications.  For example, the 
involvement of United Nations as third party during demarcation of Cameroon-Nigeria border, it was actually a 
problem than a solution. See Ali Toure and Sani M. Isa, Post Conflict Demarcation of African Boundaries: The 
Cameroon-Nigeria Experience, in DELIMIATION AND DEMARCATION IN AFRICA, GNERAL ISSUES AND 
CASES STUDIES (AUBP) 201 (2013). http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/au-2-en-2013-delim-a-demar-user-
guide.pdf 
206 Kampala conference of 2008 for East Africa, Algiers Conference of October 2008 for North Africa, Ouagadougou 
Conference e of 2009 for West Africa, Libreville Conference of May 2009 for central Africa, and Windhoek 
conference of 2009 for Southern Africa.  
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African borders or collect data from Member States. The easiest and cheapest method of collecting 
African border information is by channeling Member States. To this end, AUBP has conducted 
survey of African Boundaries.  But suddenly only 32 of the 54 African States replied to the survey 
that indicated only 35% of the African borders were actually demarcated in 2012. Since then AUBP 
has been working to collect information for the rest of states.  
The establishment of a specialized Unit that is in charge of implementation of AUBP under 
the PSC and publication of resources books on African borders are significant in building capacity.  
The books and other publications that are published under the auspicious of AUBP are useful tools 
that can guide and assist boundary making. Theories and procedures of border making are briefly 
stated in the books. In partnership with GIZ and resource mobilization for implementation of AU 
programs AUBP has effectively leveled the playground to resolve African Border issues. The books 
were products of thorough research and contain valuable insights of highly skilled international 
professionals in the field of boundary making. It is thought that the books will successfully guide 
boundary making from beginning to end. The processes, procedures, and technicalities of border 
negotiation, treaty making, delimitation, demarcation, and maintenance of border are succinctly 
outlined in the books. The books are useful tools of boundary making not only in Africa but can 
guide boundary making anywhere around the world and can serve as reference materials in training 
centers.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
  Pre-1998 Ethio - Eritrea Affinity and Boundary Arrangement 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
The boundary between Ethiopia and Eritrea is a colonial “seed” that has been jeopardizing 
close affinity and peaceful co-existence of the two intertwined people. It has not only separated the 
brotherly people of Ethiopia and Eritrea, but also has been source of conflict and sown animosity 
and hatred – incurable diseases. Put simply, if properly enforced, the elusive colonial boundary 
between Ethiopia and Eritrea would distance the people of Ethiopia and Eritrea that have been 
living together for thousands of years, interwoven in marriage, have common culture, profess the 
same religion, and originated from the same historical route.1  Close affinity between Ethiopians 
and Eritreans is not hard to appreciate, even to a stranger. One easily can comprehend the close 
affinity just by spotting lifestyle or even physical features.2  Physical appearance and facial 
features of Ethiopians and Eritreans prove “oneness” of the two brotherly people. It is equally hard 
to differentiate an Ethiopian and an Eritrean on account of social or cultural life, language, and 
ethno-historic background.3 It is, therefore, fair to question, “[…] how such closely related people 
                                            
1 TEKESTE NEGASH & KJETIL TRONVOLL, BROTHERS AT WAR: MAKING SENSE OF THE 
ETRITREAN-ETHIOPIAN WAR, 10(2000). 
2 Hoyle attests close affinity of the two inter-related people stating, “The Eritrean highlanders, the Tigriyans were 
culturally and linguistically related to the Tigreans of Tigray of Ethiopia, and these peoples even referred to each 
other by a common name, the “Habesha”. See also Peggy A. Hoyle, The Eritrean National Identity: A case Study, 
24 N.C.J. I.NT’L 7 COM. REG. 381, 381-416 (1998 – 1999).  However, some Eritrean politicians tend to question 
this fact by opting to side themselves with Egypt or other former colonial powers. For instance, Merhaw Hagos 
Mesghina poses unrealistic conclusion stating, “Even according to ancient history, Eritrea and Ethiopia didn’t have 
much in common as indicated by the different names that Eritrea was called by.” See Merhawi Hagos Mesghina, 
Eritrea Under Fire: Synopsis of Eritrean History from Turkish Colonization to the present and the Genesis and 
Contributing Factors to the Current Conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia, 
WWW.dehal.org/conflict/aricles/merhawai.html. Accessed Jul.30, 2015:12:43 pm. Surprisingly, Mr. Mesghina, 
takes Ethiopia as one of the colonizers of Eritrea. Id.  
3Tigrinya speaking people of Eritrea (the majority in Eritrea) and the people of Tigray Regional State of Ethiopia are 
Semitic and originally migrated from South Arabia. It is hard to find out cultural or linguistic distinction, especially 
among Ethiopian Tigreans and Eritrean highlanders.  The two people are still brothers. They are intermingled in 
marriage and other sort of social bond. The colonial boundary treaty was not demarcated and known to local 
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could be considered a separate nation?”4 It is an obvious fact that the separation of Eritrean people 
from their Ethiopian brothers was a colonial disease from which most African people have been 
suffering. Colonial powers have deliberately planted a divisive seed that has created antagonism, 
which in turn has been vitiating historic kinship.5  
Appalling effects of the 1998 border war and wrong political judgment of inapt and selfish 
leaders of Ethiopia and Eritrea have further complicated the situation. This chapter briefly explores 
the relationship of Ethiopia and Eritrea from pre-colonial time to the moment of reunion and 
cooperation until the boundary conflict in May1998.  A closer look at historical kinship, and socio-
economic and political ties of the two brotherly people will help appreciate the nature of 
boundaries and problems involving in boundary setting of the two nations.  
 
5.2. Pre-Colonial Relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea   
Ethiopia is the second most populous nation in Africa comprising numerous ethnic groups 
with diverse languages and cultural background. Today’s Ethiopia is about ten times Eritrea and 
comprises of nine regional states with the power of self-administration: Afar, Amhara, 
Beneshangul/Gumuz, Gambella, Harari, Oromia, Southern Nations and Nationalities and Tigray 
                                                                                                                                               
people. The only known natural demarcation was “Mereb River”.  Even the “Mereb Melash” separation line 
assumed by the local people as a kind of administrative boundary. Some Eritreans accept the overall similarity 
between Tigreans and Eritrean highlanders but deny overall similarity between the people of Ethiopia and Eritrea. 
According to Berhane Woldegabriel, Eritrean lowland was under the control of Baja State which was outside the 
jurisdiction of Axumite Kingdom. See Berhane Woldegabriel, A War for National Unity, in LEENCO LATA, 
(ed.).  THE SEARCH FOR PEACE: THE CONFLICT BETWEEN ETHIOPIA AND ERITREA (Proceedings of 
Scholarly Conference on the Ethiopia and Eritrea Conflict Held in Oslo Norway, 5-6 July, 2006 31(2007). 
4 As a result, Hoyle states that the international community shares Ethiopian community’s concern regarding 
separation of Eritrea from Ethiopia.  Id.  The Ethiopian communities concern was impossibility of separation of 
the two entwined people. Today there are so many instances in which a mother viewed as Eritrean and allowed to 
stay there while children regarded as Ethiopians and either expelled to Ethiopia or simply followed their farther to 
Ethiopia. During the war Ethiopia also expelled some people of Eritrean origin without their wish. Wrong political 
judgment to separate naturally interlinked people may worry any neutral mind, let alone Ethiopian community.  
5 For instance, Italy used ideological differences between Eritrean lowland Muslims by giving them special 
treatment and sown hatred between Christians and Muslims.  
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along with two chartered cities of Addis Ababa and Diredawa. Before secession in 1991 (de facto) 
and 1993 (de jure) Eritrea was one of the provinces of Ethiopia. 6  
Until separated by the Italian colonialism 1890, Eritrea was integral part of Abyssinian 
kingdom. As Rubenson succinctly puts, “ There was no question locally about the sovereignty over 
Midre Bahir, ‘the land on the sea [renamed Eritrea by Italy].’ This ancient Ethiopian provinces had 
at least for one century […] been ruled as one or several sub provinces of Tigre.” 7 Currently Eritrea 
comprises of nine ethnic groups, some either migrated from the current territories of Ethiopia or 
have kinsmen in Ethiopia that still make close contact. The Eritrean highland region, which was 
popularly captioned by Ethiopians as “ Mereb Melash” (the land of river Mereb) or (Kebessa) is 
culturally, religiously, or linguistically very close to the people of northern Ethiopia. The people of 
Kebessa region are Tigrinya speaking Orthodox Christians having no apparent distinction from 
Tigreans in Ethiopia. Kebessa regions consist of Hamasaiaen, Seraye, and Akale Guzai were 
integral part of Abyssinian Kingdom that vigorously battled to reintegrate with Ethiopia after 
liberation of Eritrea from Italian occupation. In addition there are Kunama, Afar, Tigre and other 
lowland residents, which are dominantly Muslims that were not substantially integrated with 
highlanders before the Italian occupation. 8  
                                            
6 See SEVEN RUBENSON, THE SURVIVAL OF ETHIOPIAN INDEPENDECE, 51(2003). Today Ethiopia 
comprises of more than 80 ethnic groups that have their own language, culture but share enormous common 
Ethiopian values.  Most of the Eritrean ethnic groups have their own kinships in Ethiopia.  
7 Rubenson supra note 6. See Negash and Tronvoll, supra note 1 at 6.  See also RICHARD PANKHURST, THE 
ETHIOPIAN BORDERLANDS, 101(1997). According to Professor Pankhurst, the ruler of the current territories 
Eritrea was known as “Bahr Nagash” (the ruler of Sea) that was granted wider power under the charter granted by 
King Zara Yacob. (Id). Northern part of the nation, especially the current territories of Eritrea was very important 
tot the ancient Ethiopian empire. The northern highland was very important economically and important route for 
international trade. The port of Massawa and Hergigo mainly used to export ivory, gold, and other produces of the 
time. Id at 156. See also Kidanu Atinafu and Endalcachew Bayeh, The Etio-Eritrean Post war Stalement: An 
assessment on the Causes & Prospects  96, 96 – 101 SCI. PG, (2015). Available at: 
http://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.hss.20150302.15.pdf  (Jan. 13/2016  5:35 PM).  
8 ROBERTO MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ, THE BORDER DISPUTE BETWEEN ERITREA AND ETHIOPIA; LEGAL 
CONSIDERATIONS   7(2011). According to Rodgiguez, “Most Christians (50% of the populations) live in the 
highlands, and Sunni Muslims and adherents of traditional beliefs ( the other half of the population) live in the 
lowland region.). Seyoum Yohannys, Eritrea-Ethiopia Arbitration: A ‘Cure’  Based on Neither Diagnosis nor 
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The ethnic affinity of the people of Tigray region of Ethiopia is so strong to the Tigrinya 
speaking highlanders of Eritrea. In the words of Negash and Tronvoll, “[A]s many scholars define 
it, the Tigrinya in Eritrea and Tigreans in Ethiopia belong to the same ‘nationality’. […and] 
Tigrinya speaking population (who straddle both Eritrea and Ethiopia) are one and the same 
people.”9 (Emphasis mine). In addition to the linguistic and cultural affinity, the people of Tigray 
region of Ethiopia and Eritrean highlanders are intertwined by marriage.  The close familial 
relationship between the former Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Melese Zenawi and the President of 
Eritrea, Isias Afeworki, proves this fact. Both former “camaraderie” were cousins. It is common to 
have members of a given family both in Ethiopia or Eritrean.10 The People of Tigray Regional 
State of Ethiopia and Tigrinya speaking highlanders of Eritrea speak the same language, practice 
almost identical religion and have common culture.  Almost 50% of Eritrean people speak 
Tigrinya, a language along with Amharic derived from Ge’ez, which is also official language of 
Tigray Regional State of Ethiopia. Majority of the Eritrean highland residents are members of 
Coptic Christians while lowland residents of Eritrea are Muslims. These are also the two major 
religions in the Tigray Regional State of Ethiopia. Both Tigray and Eritrean people are not friendly 
to the followers of Protestant Christianity, albeit, no legal prohibition in Tigray Ethiopia. To a 
politically neutral person, apart from difference in geographic location, there is no basic distinction 
between the people of Tigray and Tigrinya speaking highlanders of Eritrea (the majority). This 
                                                                                                                                               
Prognosis 6: 2 Miz. L. Rev. 163 - (2012).. See also Kjetil Tronvoll, Borders of Violence-Boundaries of Identity: 
Demarcating the Eritrean Nation- State, 22:6 ISSN 1042, 1037 – 1060 (1999). 
9Negash and Tronvoll supra note 1 at 10. Id. at 8  see also Seyoum Yohannes, Eritrea-Ethiopia Arbitration: A Cure 
neither Based on Diagnosis nor Prognosis 6 MIZAN L. REV. 168, 163-199 (2012 
10 Kjetil Tronvoll, Borders of Violence – Boundaries of Identity: demarcating the Eritrea Nation-State, 22 ETHNIC 
& RECIAL STUD. 1037, 1037 – 1060 (1999).  
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similarity and frequent cross border interaction has produced a complex boundary setting that is 
hard to draw a clear separating line.11 
Majority of the Eritrean people and the people of northern Ethiopia, including Tigray and 
Amhara, are from the same root – Semitic people who migrated from the South Arabia.12 Eritrea’s 
strategic location and proximity to Asia and Europe had attracted migration of various categories 
of people to the eastern Africa. Long before the emergence of powerful Kingdom of Axum, the 
Sabaean people migrated to the northern Ethiopia and the current territories of Eritrea during first 
millennium B.C.13 While some settled in the northern Ethiopia, the rest proceeded to the interior, 
west and southwards. The immigrants, in some cases, pushed indigenous people to the unfavorable 
territories like lowlands and deserts. Before arrival of the newcomer, there were Negriod, 
indigenous people, now settled in the lowlands of western regions of Ethiopia and Eritrea.14 The 
people of Kunama repeatedly pushed to the western low land villages that were not conducive for 
the powerful immigrants to claim. As Professor Abbnik witnesses, “[…Kunama] were politically 
marginalized and lived under domination. Much of their lands were gradually taken for 
resettlement of other groups [….]15  
The name “Ethiopia” was coined during Axumite Empire but not formally used as a name 
of nation. According to legend, “Cush the son of Ham and the founder of the Axumite Kingdom”16 
                                            
11 Yacob Haile Mariam who knows the two people very closely attests, “[…] there are no other two people who are 
so irretrievably intertwined as Eritreans and Ethiopians [….] If there are any two people who should not be 
separated, Eritreans and Ethiopians perhaps provide the best example. We are after all “ Habesh” historically 
speaking.” See Yacob Haile Mariam, Dialogue between Eritreans and Ethiopians: An idea whose Time Has Come, 
A paper presented at a conference organized by ESAT, October 25, 2015. Washington DC, United States.  
12 W.M. FLINDERS PETRIE ET EL, THE BOOK OF HISTGORY, A BOOK OF ALL NATIONS FROM 
EARSLIEST TIMES TO THE PRESENT 1915 (Tropical North Africa –IV Abyssinia, 2251(1915).  
13 Yacob HaileMariam supra note 11. 
14 NIAZ MULTAZA, THE PILLAGE OF SUSTAINABILITY IN ERITERA 1600 – 1990s  45(1998).  
15 Jon Abbink, Creating Borders: Exploring the Impact of the Ethio-Eritrean War on the Local Population, 4 Africa 
LVI, 452, 447 – 458 (2001).  
16 Tsegaye Beru, Brief History of the Ethiopian Legal Systems – Past and Present , 41 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO 335, 
335 – 388 (2013).  
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named his son Ethiopis17– from which the name “Ethiopia” derived and formally substituted the 
traditional name of Abyssinia. In the words of Flinders Petrie et al, “ From a son of Cush named 
Ethiopis it received the name of Ethiopia, which it divided with Meroe at an earlier period; and it 
appears to the present day in the official title of the Abyssinian ruler.”18 Thus, there is no doubt 
that the name Abyssinia had encompassed the current territories of Eritrea and Ethiopia (the 
Habesh or Habesha). Even today, some diaspora Ethiopians and Eritreans use the expression, 
“Habesh” to connote an Ethiopian or Eritrean.19  
Today major ethnic groups of Ethiopia are classed in the main ethnic category of Cushitic, 
Semitic, Hermetic, Omotic.20 Cushitic group comprises several ethnic groups that are settled both 
in Ethiopia and Eritrea. For instance, the Cushitic people of Afar reside both in Eritrea and 
Ethiopia. The Amhara ethnic group, which mainly settled in the Amhara Regional States of 
Ethiopia, and Tigreans are Semitic people having the same origin, as Semitic people of Eritrea.  
                                            
17 The name Ethiopia was derived from the Greek word “burned face” Id.  
18 Flinders Petrie et al supra note 12. 
19 Multaza supra note 14. See also Yacob Haile Mariam supra note 11. In United States it is not uncommon to 
confront a query: “Are you Habesh or Habesha?”  The question often posed to a person having Habesh facial 
features. If the person responds positively, then Amharic or Tigrinya communication continues. In some cases 
second generation immigrants may speak both languages but they even understand either Amharic or Tigrinya. The 
query whether a person is an Abyssinian or Habesha is a common strategy that is often used to differentiate an 
Eritrean or an Ethiopian from “others”.  Irving Kaplan, et al also portray the citizens of Abyssinian ( the Habesha) 
See IRIVING KAPLAN ET AL, AREA HANDBOOK FOR ETHIOPIA 3(1971). One may also fairly query why 
Ethiopian and Eritreans are called “Habesha” or “Habesh”?  There are various interpretations of the term 
“Habesha”. Some local Ethiopian and Eritrean people in some case use the term to mean non -“Ferenj.”  In this 
sense, all Ethiopians and Eritreans, being not “Ferenj” are “Habesha.” Still non-Semitic tribes can still denounce 
the term, as it referred to mean Semitic people of northern Ethiopia and Semitic Eritrean people. See Magn Nyang, 
The difference between being an Ethiopian and being Habesha, SUDAN TRIBUNE, Feb. 18, 2009. The noun 
“Habesha” probably derived from the name of Arab coast Kingdom. It is said that the Kingdom of Axum “[… rose 
as an offshoot of the Arab coast Kingdom of Habashat, about beginning of the Christian ear.” see Flinders Petrie et 
al supra note 12. Thus, the name “Habesha” is very relevant to the Semitic speaking areas of Ethiopia and Eritrea. 
It is an expression of “oneness” of interrelated Semitic people of Ethiopia and Eritrea. According to Sven 
Rubenson Ottoman Turks called the island Massawa as “Habesh or Habeshtan.” See Rubeson supra note 6 at 30.  
20 Both Ethiopia and Eritrea have distinct ethnic groups that are classed under Cushitic, Semitic, Hamitic or the 
groups. Take, for example, the main ethnic group, Oromia, which is Cushitic which situated in Ethiopia and Kenya.  
Eritrea has about 13 ethnic groups that either under Cushitic, Semitic, or Hamitic category.  Similarly, Ethiopia 
comprises of numerous ethnicities that may be classed in anyone main categories. Listing all ethnic groups of 
Ethiopia and Eritrea is out of scope of this work. The main objective here is to show close affinity between major 
Eritrean ethnic groups and ethnicities in the northern Ethiopian. 
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The official language of Axumite Empire was Ge’ez.21 It was a language from which the 
current Semitic languages of Amharic and Tigrinya were derived. According to Flinders Petrie et 
al, “A Semitic language eventually become the universal idiom, the Geez, which is now dead and 
is used only in church services but represented by two daughter languages, the Amharish and the 
Tigrish.” 22After fell of Axumite Empire in 7th century due to foreign invaders, especially Jewish 
that lead by Judith, subjects Axumite Empire dispersed and Ge’ez was substituted by different 
regional dialectics.23  
Residents of coastal areas, especially the Red Sea lowlanders were subjected to frequent 
invasion and occupation of foreign aggressors.24 Suppression by highlanders and foreign influence 
has created cultural and religious differences. While highlanders remained followers of Ethiopian 
Orthodox Church, lowlanders converted into Islam due to frequent invasion of Islamic jihadists 
and occupation by Ottoman Turks.25  Orthodox Christianity remained as an official religion since 
333 AD until Jewish occupation in 9th century and restored after restoration of Abyssinian power 
in 13th century.26  As a result, Coptic Orthodox Christian remained as a dominant religion both in 
Ethiopia and Eritrea.  Vandoren explains the cultural and political dominance and the cause of fell 
of Axumite Empire as follows: 
Ethiopia evolved from Axum, a highly developed Christian slave owning kingdom. Axum 
was located in the area now occupied by the northern Ethiopian province of Tigre and former 
province of Eritrea. Nearly all the lands of Modern day Ethiopia were Axumite vassals.  
                                            
21 Multaza supra note 14. 
22 Flinders Petrie supra note 12. 
23  Amharic and Tigrinya are offspring of Ge’ez,  
24 Ottoman Turks and Egyptians were among common aggressors that occupied Eritrean lowlands before the arrival 
of European colonizers in late 19th century.  
25 According to Flinders Petrie et all, in 1527 Turks occupied Massawa and United with the Muslim prince of Harar, 
Mohammed Grange who destroyed Axum to the grand.  See Flinders Petrie et al supra note  at 2254.  
26 King Ezana of Axumite Kingdom was baptized by Frmentius, the apostle of the Abyssinians at the time. King 
Ezana was so powerful who ruled not only the current territories of Eritrea and northern Ethiopia but large areas in 
Southern Arabia. See Flinders Petrie supra note 12.at 2252.  As regards Christianization of Axumite Empire see 
PANKHURST supra note 7 at 21. According to Pankhurst, Hamasen and Saraye (Southern Eritrea districts) 
adopted Ethiopian Orthodox Christianity at early time and considered the “paramountcy” of oldest church in Axum 
(Tsion Maryam) in Axum. Id.  
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Maintaining economic, political and cultural ties with Egypt, Persia, Arabia, Greece and 
India. Axum reached its peak of development, between the 4th and 6th centuries A.D.  The 
decline of Axum triggered by the 7th century Muslim Arab conquest, marked the beginning of 
a long period of conflict. 27    
  
According to the folklore that is supported by the Bible28 Abyssinian kingship since Axumite 
Empire had King Solomonic lineage.29 The then famous queen was inspired by the wisdom of 
King Solomon and travelled to Jerusalem to visit the “wise king”. As a result of close personal 
relationship with King Solomon, Queen Sheba was conceived and gave birth to King Minilik I.30 
Ethiopian kings generally known as “King of Kings the Lion of Judah”, the name which conveys a 
message that Abyssinia had several kings and the central king was regarded as above all the 
regional kings (the king of kings). In the words of Lady Herbert, “The country known by the name 
Abyssinia is governing by an Emperor, formerly calling himself “King of Kings; for his empire 
extended from Kaffa which is close to the mountains of the moon […]’  ”31 Lady Herbert, thus, 
proves the fact that boundaries of Abyssinian Emperors extend beyond northern Ethiopia to the 
very long regions of Kaffa. The Kingdom of Axum had wider contours, which extended to the 
South Arabia, south Egypt and north Sudan. At the time that Queen Shaba visited King Solomon, 
her capital situated in South Arabia32, before it moved into the notorious ancient city of Axum in 
which a new city of Axum built on the ruins of the old city.   
 It is an obvious fact that the current territories of Eritrea were part and parcel of 
Abyssinia/Ethiopia under the rule of Abyssinian kings with no clearly set boundary.33 
                                            
27 John W. Vandoren, Positivism and the Rule of Law, Formal System or Concealed Values: A case Study of The Ethiopian 
Legal System,  3 J. TRANSNAT’L & POL’Y 167 - 168, 165 – 214 (1994)  Pankhurst remarks, “The Kingdom [ 
Axum…]included the highlands north of the Marab river (which were subsequently to constitute the Country of the Bahr 
Nagash, and much later present-day Eritrea). Id.  
28 Bible, 1Kings 10 KJB  
29 Flinders Petrie supra note 12. at 2252.  
30 LADY HERBERT (Trans.),  ABYSSINIA AND ITS APOSTLE,  (1867) 
31 Id.  
32 Id. 
33 It is not just ethnic lineage but geographic location proves that Eritrea was a component of Axumite Empire, as 
boundaries of the Kingdom of Axum goes beyond territories of Eritrea in all directions.  The port of Adulis and 
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Administrative or ethnic boundaries depended on private land holding. The boundaries of northern 
Tigrinya speaking group (currently majority in Eritrea) and the southern Tigrinya speaking group 
(the current Tigray Regional State of Ethiopia) is very difficult to delineate, as the there was no 
basic fact that distinguishes the two group of people apart from the elusive classification as north 
and south that has no clearly cut point of separation. In the case of other ethnic groups like 
Kunama, Afar, Saho, boundary setting was done on the basis of peripheries of ethnic groups 
known by the landholding of the last person of the ethnic group or sometimes traditional method of 
delineation of villages may be marked by natural features of land like rivers and mountains.  
 After his coronation in 1872, Emperor Yohannis continued to strengthen the unity between 
Ethiopian regions was already started by Emperor Thewodros.34 Internal rivalry and foreign 
aggression however, hampered this effort. Yohannis IV was Tigre and had no Tigrean rivalry both 
in current territories of Eritrea or in the territories of Tigray. Even most of his southern or western 
rivalries were either defeated or submitted to his administration.35 After short confrontation in 
Lasta, Minilik II, the king of Shoa, submitted himself to Yohannis IV and pacified relationship by 
arranging marriage of his daughter to Emperor Yohannis’s son. The Harar Prince also 
acknowledged King Yohannis’s Emperorship of Abyssinia. Most international wars were fought in 
current territories of Eritrea. The main reason was foreign interest in coastal regions, especially 
commercial routes and ports. Turks and Egyptians were the major invaders that occupied northern 
                                                                                                                                               
Massawa were used by the Axumite kingdom for its imports and export.  The destruction of Adulis port by 
invaders weakened the Kingdom and caused its ultimate demise in 7th century.  According to Irving Kaplan et al, 
the people of Tigray (north and south or in another way Eritrean and Ethiopian Tigre) were the “founders” of 
Kingdom of Axum “some 2500 years ago.” See Kaplan et al supra note 19 at 5 
34 There was little tie with the far south though some regional kings paid tribute to the King of Kings. However, most of the 
Southern regions of Ethiopia stood at the side of their northern brothers when Italy attempted to colonize Ethiopia in 1896.  
35 In a way consolidating his power, Tigre Kassa ( King of Kings Yohannis) defeated Gobeze, the governor of Lasta and 
Gojam. See Flinders Petrie supra note 12 at 2256. 
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and coastal areas of Eritrea. Egypt’s interest to move to the hinterlands was failed by defeat of 
Egyptians by Emperor Yohannis at Gundet and Gura (both now in Eritrea).36  
 Ethiopian/Abyssinians never considered territories making up Eritrea as foreign land. 
Unless it was beyond their power, Abyssinian kings used to defend Eritrean coastal regions against 
foreign aggressors. For instance, King Yohannis’s notable General, Alula, as recent as 19th century 
fought and restrained Italians who attempted to move to the hinterland but on account of the death 
of Yohannis IV in fight with Mahdists of Sudan37, Ras Alula did not absolutely stop Italians who 
reoccupied hinterlands of Eritrea.38  In five month’s time since death of Yohannis IV since March 
10, 1889 Italy occupied substantial portion of current territories of Eritrea.   
 After death of Yohannis39, Minilik II of Shoa was crowned as King of Kings of 
Abyssinia/Ethiopia, and was expected to defend all the territories making up Abyssinia.  In some 
peripheries, foreign occupiers were already settled for long time. Strategically, due to multifaceted 
restraints, some occupiers left unchallenged as far as they stayed in the coastal areas. Fore 
example, there were Turks or Egyptians in coastal areas of Red Sea, Massawa for long time. When 
Egyptians crossed the tolerable level of the line, Yohannis IV fought them with great victory.40 
                                            
36Rubenson supra note 6 at 318 -329.  See AFRICAN AMERICAN REGISGRY, Ethiopia Wins the Battle of 
Gundet, ( Tue, 11/16/1875), www.aareqistry.org  See also AGAI ERLIKH, THE CROSS AND THE RIVER:  
ETHIOPIA, EGYPT, AND THE NILE 70(2002). See also Esayas Girmay, Ethiopia:  The “Nile Factor” and 
Pragmatic Opportunism in Egypt-Eritrea Relations, THE REPOTER (Oct. 4, 2014) 
37 Mahdits were Dervishes (Sufi Muslims) who conquered Sudan and occupied Kassala after Egypt occupied by 
Great Britain. After occupying Kassa Dervishes moved to the Ethiopian territory and fought with Yohannes IV 
who lost his life in the battle. See W.B. Stern, The Treaty Background of the Italo-Ethiopian Disputes, 30 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 190, 189 -203 (1936). 
38 Minilik who enjoyed Italy’s support in his effort to reunify Harar in 1886 and strengthen his power against other 
rivals in Ethiopia opposed Italia’s occupation of Massawa. Minilik  thought it was under his sovereignty. This 
appears contradictory to the spirits of Wichale (uccalli) treaty In Italy’s refusal to surrender Massawa, Minilik 
sought the assistance of Queen Victoria which “proved to be unsuccessful.” In the mean time Italians appeared to 
be peaceful and appeared to be friendly with a subtle motive of pacifying the relationship with Minilik.  See Stern 
supra note 37.Treaty Background of the Italio-Ethiopian Disputes, 30 AM. J. INT’L L. 190, 189 -203 (1936).  
39 Yohannis IV was a Tigrinya speaking King of Kings who ruled Abyssinia for 18 years. Negash and Tronvoll supra 
note 1 at 6 
40 History of Eritrea, See www.eritrea.be/old/eritrea-history.htm. 
 256 
 Numerous factors had enabled Italians to consolidate their occupation of Massawa and 
surrounding areas. The most important factor was the competition to occupy Abyssinia against 
another European rival – French (during the Scramble Africa). Internal political turmoil, like death 
of Yohannis IV and competition to throne by multiple contenders was another cause that created 
conducive ground to Italians. Minilik II needed Italian support to prevail other possible contenders 
including Yohannis’s heirs.  Moreover, Minilik’s naïvely assumed that Italy’s occupation of 
Kassala as advantage that repeatedly attacked the current territories of Eritrea. As a result, Italians 
were able to quickly occupy western lowlands of Eritrea and further moved to the highlands. 
Cognizant of internal politics, and shortcomings and interest of Minilik II to consolidate his power 
towards South, Italians tricked him41 by offering gifts of guns  that helped Minilik soldiers to fight 
southern kings like the King Tona of Wolayta.   
 The thwarted treaty of Wichalle (also written as uccalli) often cited to prove Minilik’s 
acceptance of Italy’s occupation of territories of Eritrea. 42  But he actually protested against Italy’s 
occupation of Massawa and used all possible peaceful methods including appealing to Queen 
                                            
41 Robert Klonsky, Internaitonal Law Background in the Itlalo-Ethiopian Dispute, 1935 -1936, 5 NATIL B. J. 152, 
151 -183 (1947). According to Klonsky,  
Italy first appeared during a turbulent period of Ethiopian politics, shortly after John IV from the Tigre 
seized the Ethiopian throne in January, 1872 which had reminded in dispute  [….] In furtherance of a 
secret pact with Minilik, King of Shoa, Italy supported the pretensions of Minilik over the heir of John.  
The Italian candidate became Minilik II, Negus Negasti of Ethiopia in 1889 , and “then began a 
systematic effort to acquire Ethiopia as a protectorate by Treaty arrangement with Minilik. See Id.  
42  Id. at 153. According to Klonsky, the “ill –fated treaty was consummated on May 2, 1889 between Minilik II and 
Count Antonelli, representative of Crispi, Prime Minister of Italy, whereby the Italian version reduced Ethiopia to 
the level of a protectorate, with Italy to represent that Empire in its foreign affairs.” Id.  It is rightly said that 
history should be judged on facts of a time, but on the basis of current facts, Minlik’s agreement with Italians 
appear shocking to give portion of a nation to an alien power.  Several African traditional chiefs had sold land or 
entered into treaty of protection, but it was unusual to deal with a colonial power to peacefully take substantial 
portion of a nation cutting sea root in exchange of arms that would be used to force internal rivalries to submit 
power.  This often claimed as justification by some Eritrean people for separation from Ethiopia, but Eritrean 
should note that actions and decisions of Minilik II was not the taking of their Ethiopian brothers. It is true that 
Minilik was powerless given backward transpiration and hard geographic condition. This claim may easily be 
challenged on account of defeat of Italians in Aduwa later and absence of minimal attempt to expel Italians from 
Eritrea after death of Yohannis IV.  
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Victoria’s mediation, which was unsuccessful.43 Minilik’s interest to consolidate his domestic 
power by reunifying Southern, Western and Southern kingdoms and his reliance on Italy for arms 
and economic assistance has blinded him not to fight Italians against occupation of Eritrea.  
 
5.3.  Creation of Italian Sphere of Interest  
As it was the case in other parts of Africa, Italy established its sphere of influence in 
Abyssinian soil through missionaries and under the guise of land transaction for commercial 
shipping company.44 An Italian missionary called Fr. Giuseppe Sapeto had facilitated purchase of a 
piece of land near the then small town of Assab from a local chief apparently for the Italian 
national shipping company known as Rubattino Shipping Company.45  Later the Italian 
government took over administration of land.46 Italian interest in Abyssinia was so intense after the 
Berlin Conference. After taking direct administration of the land near Assab, Italy moved to 
occupy Massawa. In order to avoid possible French occupation of Massawa, Great Britain favored 
the Italian occupation. At the time Egypt was under control of Great Britain and there was no 
major confrontation with Egyptians and Italy.47  
                                            
43 Stern supra note 38 at 189   see also History of Eritrea supra note 32. 
44 Purchasing land from naïve and ignorant local chief’s was the easiest way to step in to African nations with the 
ultimate objective of occupying the whole nation.  With a view to avoid the threat of occupation, during heydays of 
the modernization of laws, Ethiopia prohibited ownership of immovable properties by non-Ethiopians. No 
foreigner can own building in Ethiopia.  As there is no private ownership of land in Ethiopia today, the prohibition 
is relevant only to buildings.  Nowadays, however, there is lenience with regard to foreigners having Ethiopian 
blood. These are persons having foreign nationality but may be considered as Ethiopians for investment purpose as 
Ethiopians. A person who was by birth Ethiopian but naturalized into another nationality, or person having some 
kind of Ethiopian tie like children born to Ethiopian parents abroad and having foreign nationality and can buy 
immovable properties in Ethiopia.  
45 Stern supra note 38 at 189    
46 According to Tekeste Negash opening of Suez Canal in 1869 arose the interest for Eastern African territories and 
Italy acquired the port of Assab “which had been purchased by a shipping company in a tacit agreement with the 
Savoy dynasty, was bought by the government in Rome in 1882.” See TEKSTE NEGASH, ERITEA AND 
ETHIOPIA THE FEDERAL EXPERIENCE, 13(1997). 
47 British encouraged and facilitated Italy’s occupation of Massawa fearing France would extend its holding from 
French Somaliland. As Egyptians who occupied the coast after Ottoman Turks left were under control of British, 
its preference of Italy over France made the occupation easier, but confronted with Ethiopian resistance. Id. 
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But Italy’s attempt to further expand to the hinterland was confronted with a huge battle 
with Ethiopians. At the moment Ras Alula was at high time, as a prominent general and 
administrator of King Yohannis IV, who moved with his brigade to expel the steadily expanding 
Italians. Alula’s forces defeated Italians at Dogali in 1887, which made the expansionist enemy to 
retreat.  However, Alula and his forces did not stay there to keep Italians at the periphery.  In the 
mean time, Yohannis IV confronted with Mahdists of Sudan in the Western front and lost his life. 
Since his coronation, Yohannis IV never peacefully sat at his throne. He spent most of his 
emperorship by repelling foreign invaders (Egyptians and Italian or Mahdists) or restoring internal 
union battling with regional rivalries like Minilik II who later submitted. Minilik II, however, did 
not abandon the ambition to get the power of king of kings. He had been dealing with Italians for 
arms ceding territories.48 After death of Yohannis IV, Ras Allula apparently left alone. Though he 
defeated Italians at Dogali in 1887 and made them to retreat, he moved to Tigray leaving the 
periphery unguarded.  
 
5.4.  Colonization of Eritrea as a Prelude to Occupy Ethiopia 
Emperor Yohannis’s death coupled with Alula’s move to Tigray had created a conducive 
situation for Italians who already did not go far waiting for a best moment to come back. After 
Yohannis’s death Italians came back from peripheries and occupied substantial portion of current 
territories Eritrea.49 Moreover, internal power struggle created another best opportunity to Italians. 
Italians had cheated Minilik promising to work together and enable him get the title of 
emperorship. In 1889 Minilik II of Shoa was coroneted as King of Kings of Abyssinia.  In the 
                                            
48 “ As early as 1887, Minilik, the king of Shoa, had expressed readiness to negotiate with the Italians for the supply 
of arms in the exchange for cession of territory, if this would ensure his speedy accession to power [….]” Id at 13.  
49 Italians realized the attitude of the lowland Eritreans who were tired of Eritrean highlanders and Ethiopians who 
occasionally plundered their cattle. Italians thus continued occupying territories where they welcomed in order to 
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mean time, Italians quickly moved to the highlands of Eritrea occupied Karen and then Asmara in 
July 1889.  
 Italy occupied territories it could possibly consolidate its power and named it  
“Erythraea.”50 The name “Eritrea” was derived from the Greek term called Erythraea, which 
literally means red.51 Thus, the Biblical terminology of Erythraean Sea Red Sea.52 As a result, one 
author surmises, “ Eritrea, however, existed as a historical fiction created by the Italians in the late 
ninetieth century.” 53  
Italy used variety of deceptive mechanisms to silence Minilik II against Eritrea’s 
occupation.54 Numerous ostensive peace, friendship, and cooperation treaties were signed.55  After 
establishing its power in current territories of Eritrea, Italy concluded an infamous treaty with 
Minilik II at Wichalle (some times called Uccalli, but herein after we will use only Wichalle) with 
intention to extend its power to other territories of Ethiopia.56  The most important aspect of this 
treaty was Minilik’s formal acceptance of occupation of Eritrea. It is true that Minilik II by 
determining boundaries beyond which Italy cannot claim had produced an appearance of legality 
                                                                                                                                               
restrain Eritrean highlanders and Ethiopians from raiding their cattle. According to Tekeste Negash, “By the end of 
1888, the Italians had established contacts with the Tigre, Hababa and Beni Amer leaders.” See Id.  
50 Negash and Tronvoll supra note 1 at 5.  
51 The noun “Erithraean Sea” had been in use long before the birth of Christianity. For instance, Agatharchides, a 
Greek  historian and geographer  who lived in 169 BC authored a book entitled, “On the Erithraean Sea” in which 
the limits of the boundaries of Saudi Arabia was described. See http://www.bible.ca/archeology/bible-archeology-
exodus-red-sea-agatharchides-of-cnidus-on-the-erythraean-sea-169bc.htm 
52 See Exodus 10:19, Acts 7:36, The Amharic version still uses the expression “Eritrean Sea” while the contemporary 
English versions changed it into “Red Sea”.  Some even doubt the meaning of “Red Sea”, stating that the original 
meaning of the Sea of Reeds, which is derived from common reeds ( salt grass around the sea) For closer 
assessment of the origin of Erythrean Sea or Red Sea or Reed Sea, see, William F. Tanner, Did Israel Cross Red 
Sea?, 50 FSCF 211 -215 (1998), available at http://www.asa3.org/ASA/PSCF/1998/PSCF9-98Tanner.html 
53 Robert Eale Woolbert, The Future of Ethiopia, 20 FOREIGN AFF546, 537 – 551 (1941 – 1942).  
54 It was assumed that the Wichalle Treaty would create perpetual peace and friendship between Ethiopia and Italy 
but the Italy’s motive was far from Minilik’s thought.  Italy attempted to peacefully occupy the whole Ethiopia 
under the guise of assistance in foreign relationship was apparently.   
55 The Treaty of October 20, 1887, a treaty of friendship and alliance, In Art. 2 of the Treaty Italy, among other things 
declared not to occupy Ethiopia’s territory. This treaty later including in Wichale Treaty of 1889. Stern supra note 
38. See also History of Eritrea supra note 32. 
56 The Italians offered  Minilik 30,000 Musket rifles and 28 cannons and also loan, See Ethiopian Foreign Policy 
(Jan. 30, 2014) ,www.ethiopian foreingpolicy.com. 
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to Italy’s occupation of territories hitherto Ethiopian kings had defended for centuries apart from 
some coastal spots that used for dockyard for commercial ships and the medieval Ethiopian port of 
Massawa.  
Minilik’s apparent acceptance of the occupation of Eritrean territories by Italy was not 
actually free from doubt.  First, Minilik protested against Italy’s occupation of Massawa and 
hinterlands57, albeit he enjoyed overwhelming Italian support against his rivals including Yohannis 
IV.58 In Italy’s refusal, Minilik sought the mediation of Queen Victoria, which “proved to be 
unsuccessful.”59 In addition to the deceits and apparent help Minilik had enjoyed considerable 
financial and arms gift that was crucial for consolidation of Minilik’s power to continue 
reunification of other kingdoms. Italy had also intention to weaken the power of Yohannis IV and 
support Minilik to acquire Emperorship with the objective of occupying the whole Abyssinia 
peacefully. The other was Italy’s superiority and the assumption of future backup in case of 
internal and external threat, presumably, had silenced Minilik to accept the treaty. Furthermore, 
previous silence to contend of occupation of Massawa by Ottoman Turkey and some villages like 
Bogos by Egyptians had created an impression that occupation of border territories was not 
threatening.60 
The Treaty of Wichale was concluded after Minilik’s coronation as Negus Negest (King of 
Kings) of Abyssinia/Ethiopia.61 The Treaty included important pillars of the Treaty of 1887 that 
                                            
57 According to Stern when Ethiopians were “preoccupied with other affairs, the Italians occupied Massawa and 
Beilul. They soon advanced their posts into the hinterland. In a letter to Queen Victories, Minilik protested against 
the Italian invasion [….]” See Stern supra note     at 190. 
58For instance, Minilik was supported by Italy when he conquered and restored Harar to the Abyssinian. See Stern 
supra note 38.  
59 Id. 
60 Ottoman Turks had occupied Massawa for long period. It confined to the port collecting fees.  This presumably 
created an impression that their presence at the Port of Massawa was not a threat.  
61 The Treaty of Wichale is very important in the history of colonial treaties.  First it practically proved deceptive 
practices of colonial powers and its abandonment after the colonial power was defeated by the native people whose 
sovereignty might have been taken under the guise of deceitful treaty terms.   
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was concluded between Minilik II and Italy before his coronation.62 The Treaty of Wichale was 
written in Italian and Amharic versions. Art. III of the Treaty of Wichale had provisions to 
establish frontier commission that assumed to delimit and demarcate boundaries between Ethiopia 
and the occupied territories that later named as Erythraea. The treaty set boundaries of Ethiopia “to 
run south of Arafali, Halai and Asmara.”63 It did not only provide Italy’s extraterritorial 
jurisdiction over Ethiopia, but proclaimed “the creation of monetary union between Italian colonies 
and Ethiopia.64  However, Article 17 of the Treaty rendered the rest of the terms meaningless as it 
put Ethiopia under Italian protectorate.65  The Amharic and Italian versions of the treaty were not 
congruent. It simply offered Minilik the option to seek Italy’s assistance if needed. Then after Italy 
declared to the other European powers that Ethiopia was under its protectorate and any foreign 
government wishing to deal with Ethiopia could do so only by channeling Italy.66 
Realizing facts of the deceptive wordings of the Treaty of Wichalle, Minilik attempted to 
have the treaty wordings to be fixed, but at vain.  Italy, rather attempted to appease him by bribing 
through ammunition, which this time did not silence Minilik II.67 After wards Minilik II repudiated 
the treaty thereby declining any kind of contact with Italy.68  Italians moved to occupy Ethiopia by 
force.  Minilik II deployed his people and troops to the north Ethiopia and fought the invading 
                                            
62 This was a treaty of friendship and alliance. In  this treaty the Minilik II and Italy promised to support each other 
(Art. 2 of the Treaty). Italy promised  arms to Minilik who promised not to turn the arms against Italy (Art. 5). 
Most importantly to Minilik II, Italy promised not annex any Ethiopian territory.  See Stern supra note 38. 
63 Id.   
64 Id.  
65 This means, “ His Majesty the King of Kings of Ethiopia consents to make use of the Italian Government for any 
negotiation which he may enter into which other Powers or Governments.” Id.  
66 Italian version of the Treaty reads “Sua maesta il Re dei Re d’Etiopia consente di servirsi del Governo di Sua 
Maesta il Re d’Italia per tutte le trattazioni di affair che avesse con alter Potenze e Governi.” Id at 191. Italy 
telegrammed thirteen leading powers about Art. 17 of the Wuchale Treaty. Id.  
67 Italy sent 2,000,000 cartridges that finally served to fight Italians at Aduwa. Id.  
68 After Italy refused to fix the deceptive provision demanding direct negotiation, Minilik apparently sent a telegram 
stating boundaries of Ethiopia. This telegram proves Minilik’s takings of Ethiopian territories. He stated that 
Ethiopia’s territories “ran from south of Arafali on the Read Sea eastward through territories which is today Eritrea 
and through large part of Sudan to Lake Rudolf in South.”  Id at 192. In the east it goes to Ogaden and parts of 
Djibouti. Id. Thus, Miniik’s Ethiopia was large enough than today’s Ethiopia.  
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forces in Aduwa in 1896.  Though Minilik’s forces were tired walking to the northern Ethiopia 
from Addis Ababa by the help of people of Tigray and the best geographic condition that was 
conducive for defense, his forces humiliated Italians army making history.69   
After defeating Italy, however, Minilik forces did not move to the extent of freeing the 
previously occupied territories of Eritrea. Given lack of logistics, ammunition, backward 
transportation and difficult geographic condition, it was hard to Minilik II pursue towards Eritrea.  
Minilik’s fighters were already exhausted by the fight and long journey from Addis Ababa. Some 
Eritrean villages, especially, Muslims supported Italy on Ethiopia’s conservative religious 
grounds.70  
Italy ultimately opted for peaceful resolution by renegotiating with emperor Minilik II. On 
October 26, 1896 a peace treaty was signed in Addis Ababa thereby formally annulling the whole 
treaty of Wichalle.71 At this treaty Italy recognized Ethiopia’s sovereign and independent 
existence.  
 
5.5.  “Boundary Treaties” 
After battle of Adwa (also known as Aduwa), apparently, as a step for peaceful existence, 
Italy sought delineation of boundaries between Ethiopia and Eritrea.72 Accordingly, in addition to 
the peace treat of October 1896, three successive boundary treaties were concluded in 1900, 1902 
and 1908. These were the treaties that Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) was 
authorized to delimit and demarcated boundary between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Brief overview of 
                                            
69 Minilik’s forces killed 4600 Italian army and captured 2000. Id at 193, see also Negash supra note 46 at 14. 
70 Eritrean highlanders and most Ethiopians were followers of Ethiopian Orthodox Church that had suppressed the Muslim 
minority. In fear of cooperation between Orthodox brothers Muslims favored Italians. Thus, any further move to wipe out 
Italians from Eritrea may not be easy to Minilik even if his forces were not already exhausted. Fighting on Tigray land was easy 
and favorable as Tigreans were absolute supporters of the Emperor.  71 It was not only the contentious provision Art. 17 but also the October 1896 treaty was discarded. Id at 193.  
72 Art. III of the Addis Ababa Peace Treaty of October 1896. 
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each of the treaties presented in the following sections. Controversies and point of contention as a 
result of wordings of the treaties and associated problems will dealt in the next chapter.  
5.5.1. 1900 Treaty 
The 1900 treaty was concluded in the aftermath of Italy’s defeat at the battle of Adwa. Italy 
apparently lost its hope of occupying the whole country and set to secure a portion of Ethiopian 
territory that it captioned as Erythraea. As has been pointed out elsewhere, the validity and 
fairness historical actions have to be gauged on the basis of facts prevailing at a time, (application 
of the doctrine of contemporaneity), but the current generation may query why the Ethiopian king 
negotiated with Italy to legally and freely surrender a territory that had been under the sovereignty 
of Ethiopia for thousands of years. Given legality of coercive occupation of African territories, 
especially after the notorious Berlin Conference and coercive expansionist policies of Italy, 
Minilik II had to be assured by confining Italians at a given point. It is true that Ethiopia won the 
war with Italy that had superior military hardware and highly trained military personnel, but that 
victory by itself could not guarantee that Italians would be completely restrained. Repeated Italian 
inducement, and Minilik II’s desire to reintegrate the southern kingdoms were some of the causes 
that dictated Minilik II to accept Italy’s offer to establish a borderline that Italians could not further 
claim.  
The 1900 treaty was very significant as it attempted to define boundaries of substantial 
portion of central and western regions of Ethiopia and Eritrea. This treaty is also vital as it dealt 
with the localities at which the 1998 dispute arose. However, the confusion arising from 1900 and 
subsequent treaties has caused unending conflict. The treaty was signed on July 10, 1900 in Addis 
Ababa, which is far away from the border areas. Either the treaty or accompanying statement of 
signatories does not reveal the reason for setting boundaries at stated locations. Apart from few 
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squares of land that were purchased from tribal chiefs near Assab under the guise of commercial 
shipping company, the rest of territories were taken by force. Turning back to 1900 Treaty, one 
may also questioned that why Italy chose a particular land to be an end of its Eritrean territory? 
The plan to set boundary was totally Italian initiative that freely determined the point of separation.  
It is true that Italy was defeated and signed a peace treaty in October 1896, but no rationale was 
justified to draw the boundary at a point.  
Moreover, either the treaty, accompanying statement of statesmen, or literature in the field 
does not disclose whether pre-negotiation survey was conducted. Given communication and 
transportation restraints at the time, it was hard for Ethiopian leaders to know the details of local 
geography and ethnographic facts before setting the boundary. The colonial power, on the other 
hand, was in a better position to know facts on the ground, but had a hidden motive for further 
expansion to acquire more territories by any means, if not possible to occupy the whole Ethiopia.  
It is doubtful to regard the 1900 treaty as “treaties” in true sense. It was a one-page “note”73 
having simply two provisions. While Art. I of the treaty stipulates the supposed boundary spots, 
Art. II declares obligation on Italy not to cede or transfer the territories bounded by said boundary 
points to any power.74 Thus, only a single provision was meant to set boundary line proper. 
Mentioning only names of rivers as boundary line, the treaty was excessively vague. Art. I of the 
treaty states, “The line Tomat-Todluc-Mareb-Belesa-Muna, traced on the map annexed, is 
recognized by the two contracting Parties as the boundary between Erythrea and Ethiopia.”  Tomat 
                                            
73 Professor Larebo calls the treaties as “notes.” See Haile M. Larebo, Colonial Treaties in the Context of the Current Ethio-
Eritrean Border Dispute and Settlement, Paper presented to the 14th  INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF ETHIOPIAN 
STUDIES, Addis Ababa, November 6 – 10, 2000. The 1902 treaties itself has applied the term, “note” to mean the treaty. See ¶ 
three of Art. II of 1902 which states, “ […]His majesty Edward VII, king of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and of the 
British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and his successors, have signed the present note […]” 
74 It is not clear why Minilik II cautioned Italy not to transfer the territory to another power. It is not lease in which 
case the territory to be returned back to Ethiopia.  But is it possible to read Minilik’s intention. Italy could possess 
the territories as far as it needed, but if Italy no more needed them the territories should be returned back to 
Ethiopia.  
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and Todluc are not nearby locations.  Tomat is located on the treaty map at very west, which 
borders Sudan, whereas Todluc was at very north, and the other boundary rivers are in the central 
regions. The treaty does not mention how the boundary line to be drawn. That is, whether the spots 
mentioned in the treaties to be linked by straight-line or the actual borderline to be drawn on the 
basis of individual landholding of residents or ethnic and other facts on the ground to be 
considered.  
The treaty of 1900 was not only arbitrary and unconscionable, (Ethiopia surrendered its 
territories for no consideration and boundaries were set without survey of facts on the ground) but 
also influenced by the wishes of Italy.75 At this time, Minilk II was already aware of dishonest 
character Italy.76 An inquisitive mind may also query why Italy moved to set a point of separation 
between its people while Italy did not abandon its expansionist policy? It may be taken that 
boundary setting was simply a deceitful act that meant to pacify Minilik II to subtly submit the 
whole territories. Italy knew that the boundary was a temporary quelling practice, as its ultimate 
goal was to colonize the whole Ethiopia. This fact was proved by the 1935 invasion and 
incorporation of the whole Ethiopian territories to the Italian East Africa colonies.  
The other reason for arbitrariness of Ethio-Eritrean boundary was ignorance of contracting 
parties to consider ethnographic and geographic facts on the ground. Given absence of quick 
transportation, modern communication channel, and distance from urban centers at the time, 
contracting parties supposedly relied on information supplied by third parties. Consequently, we 
have today an elusive treaty that remained hard, if not impossible to execute, as facts on the ground 
and treaty wordings could not match or facts referred in the treaty or their naming appears wrong 
                                            
75 Unilateral drawing of maps and applying a straight line, which has planted confusion and animosity among the 
neighboring ethnic groups and the two bordered nations. It was the effects of expansionist dishonest policies of 
Italy.  
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or non-existing. As Tomat-Todluc issue was resolved by the 1902 treaty, “Mereb – Belesa – 
Muna” is still outstanding and has been source of conflict. Non-existent river or wrong junctions 
were invoked by the Parties and unacceptable and impracticable decision was passed. Italy had 
intentionally set a vague boundary with a view to effectuate its expansionist policy, assuming a 
clear boundary would make some kind of restraint on her long run motives of stretching its long 
hands to the Ethiopian territories.  
The 1900 treaty was backed by the treaty map, which further complicates the situation. 
Subsequent attempts by Italy to fill the treaty lacunae have further inflicted Ethiopian interest, as 
Italy repeatedly draw boundary map that influenced EEBC to pursue a path designed by Italy. 
Italian agencies or cartographers unilaterally mapped border areas.77 This added unsolvable 
complexity that staled all efforts of peaceful settlement of Eritrea-Ethiopia boundary issue.  
The next spots of boundary were defined by river route. The straight line connects Tekezze 
river with Mereb river at Mai Ambessa. The border then follows Mereb River in the central 
highlands.78  “When the Mareb joins on its right side by Belessa river, the border follows 
Belessa”79 Though modified by the 1902 Treaty, the 1900 Treaty still covers substantial portion of 
the disputed boundaries.80  
5.5. 2.  1902 Treaty 
The 1902 Treaty was a tripartite agreement that was concluded between Great Britain on 
behalf of Anglo Egyptian Sudan, Italy and Ethiopia. The 1902 Treaty was a fruit of conspiracy 
between Great Britain and Italy for peaceful taking of Ethiopian territory under the guise of treaty. 
                                                                                                                                               
76 A clear boundary would stagnate expansionist move or the Ethiopian king might not sign the treaty if all the 
contours of territory lines were known.  
77 Robdriguez supra note 8 at abstract. 
78 Jean _Louis Peninou, The Ethiopian – Eritrean Border Conflict, IBRU OUNDARY AND SECURITY BULLETIN 
46, 46 – 50 (1998).   
79 Id.  
80 It covered about 1/3 of the boundaries between Ethiopia and Eritrea.  
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Both great powers made a secret arrangement to place the Kunama into Eritrean territory. 
Apparently it was meant to set meeting point of three States: Ethiopia, Eritrea and Anglo Egyptian 
Sudan. The confusion dwelling in 1902 treaty is hard to cure. It was the source of most of the 
Ethio-Eritrean boundary conflict. First, it did not actually set borderlands that regarded as Kunama 
territories, and the other was confusing nomenclature of River Maiteb. The 1902 Treaty has two 
provisions that basically meant to annex Kunama territories to Italian colony of Eritrea.  The 1902 
Treaty declares:  
 Commencing from the junction of the Kbur Um Hagar with the Setit, the new frontier 
follows this river to its junction with the Maieteb, following the latter’s course so as to 
leave Mount Ala Tacura to Erythrea, and joins the Mareb at its junction with the Mai 
Ambessa.  
     The line from the junction of the Setit and Maieteb to the junction of the Mareb and Mai 
Ambessa shall be delimited by Italian and Ethiopian Delegates, so that the Cunama tribe 
belong to Erythrea.81 (Emphasis added). 
 
As shown in Map 2 that was submitted to the EEBC by the parties, after few miles from 
Kbur Um Hagar through courses Setit river there is a river that flows to the northwards known as 
Maieteb.  As the 1902 Treaty makes a juncture of Sitit River and Maieteb then proceeds to the 
confluence of Mai Ambessa to the northeast, and then follow river courses of Mereb in accordance 
with 1900 treaty. Ethiopia claims that paragraph I of the 1902 treaty mentions about the junction of 
the Maiteb that flows up ward in western region and the boundary line follows Maiteb and at the 
end of Maiteb the boundary goes by straight line to Mai Ambessa which for sure puts Badme on 
Ethiopian side. To the worse, an old map shows a stream known as Maiten or in some cases 
spelled as “Meeteb” long away from the boundary line that Ethiopia claims.82 In the Map, Maieteb 
can be spotted at least in three locations. Each party takes a location that supposedly affords more 
                                            
81 Art. I of 1902 Treaty Between Ethiopia, United Kingdom and Italy for the Delimitation of the Frontiers between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea and The Sudan. 191 C.T.S. 180 XCV B.S.S.P. 469 (Eng. It)  
82 At the time of the treaty most of the claimed territories were vacant and naming supposedly not settled or it may 
also be translation problem or a mere ignorance or may also deliberate action of colonial Italy with the motives of 
further expansion.  
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territory. While Ethiopia chose the first Maieteb not far from Sudanese border, Eritrea opted 
Maieten in the very southeast in the central section, which locates Badme to Eritrea. No one 
claimed Meeteb that was in the middle.  
The other ambiguity lies on the question of leaving Kunama (some times written as 
Cunama) to the Eritrean side.  As pointed out above, Kunama continuously relinquished their 
territories and had been moving to unfavorable desert regions. Therefore, delineation of clear 
territories of Kunama land is hared unless through on spot study is conducted. Cognizant of this 
problem, contracting parties pledged to determine territories of Kunama on the basis site visit but 
no further action was taken. Thus, it is possible to surmise that delimitation work of 1902 Treaty 
was not complete. Moreover, Kunama’s were never been evacuated, as it was required in the 
treaty.83 Now we have Kunama’s on Ethiopian side of the border, and also on the Eritrean 
Kunama. To sum up, unless Ethiopia and Eritrea renegotiate with a view to clearly delineate an 
exact line of separation in accordance with facts on the ground and accepted practice of local 
people, no acceptable boundary line may be drawn.  
 
5.5.3.  1908 Treaty 
The 1908 Treaty delineates the Eastern regions.  It starts from the boundary set by the 1900 
treaty and goes to eastwards up to the territory of Djibouti.  
From the most easterly point of the frontier established between the colony of Eritrea and 
the Tigre by the convention of 10th July 1900 the boundary proceeds in a south easterly 
direction, parallel to and at a distance of 60 kilometers from the coast, until it joint the 
frontier of the French possessions of Somalia.  
 
The two governments undertake to fix the above-mentioned frontier-line on the spot by 
common accord and as soon as possible, adapting it to the nature and variation of the 
ground. 
 
                                            
83 Id. at 191. 
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The two governments undertake to establish by common accord and as soon as possible the 
respective dependency of the limitrophe tribes on the frontiers on the basis of their 
traditional and usual residence. 84 
 
The first paragraph of the 1908 Treaty sets out the Eastern boundary. It starts from the eastern end 
of 1900 treaty line. It goes then to the southeasterly direction within the 60 kilometers gap until the 
line reaches to the French Somali (now Djibouti).  As usual no rationale was apparent for deciding 
the boundary to be with 60 Kms limit. This plausibly arises a speculation that Italy sought to make 
Ethiopia stay away from sea route. The two contracting parties agreed to make the actual boundary 
on the ground but no action was taken so far. The 1908 Treaty purports to give room for 
consideration of geographic factors like establishing common accord regarding borderland tribe 
(limitrophe tribe) in setting frontier that aligns with their tradition and usual residence.  
  
 5.6.  Ethio-Eritean Boundary (1935 – 1991) 
5.6.1. Annexation of Ethiopia to Italian East Africa Colonies 
 In the Wake of WWII, in 1935, fascist Italy invaded Ethiopia disregarding all the prior 
treaties including the October 1896 Peace Treaty, and boundary treaties of 1900, 1902, and 1908 
that were concluded with a view to create friendship and peace by setting defined boundary lines.85 
Italy’s invasion was also contrary to the international law as embodied in the Convenient of 
League of Nations in which both Ethiopia and Italy were signatories.86  The Italian invasion of 
Ethiopia and the invasion of Manchuria by Japan demonstrated the failure of League of Nations. 
Italy deployed all its available resources including modern fighter jet on the people largely 
untrained and armed with traditional tool like spear and some old guns that were acquired from 
Italy. Italy has used prohibited poisonous gas to disperse courageous Ethiopian fighters.  
                                            
84 1908 Treaty between Ethiopia, and Italy for the Delimitation of the Eastern Frontiers between Ethiopia and       Eritrea. 
85	  TOYIN FALOLA AND ADEBAYO O.OYEBADE, HOT SPOT SUB SAHARAN AFRICA 138 (2010). 
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 The then Ethiopian king, Emperor Haile Selassie fled Europe through Djibouti with a view 
to advocate Italy’s invasion of as a member of League of Nations contrary to the provisions of the 
Covenant of League of Nations.87 The League, however, failed to enforce Art. 11 of the Covenant 
of League of Nations that required collective action against invasion on Member States.88 Emperor 
Haile Selassie stayed in Great Britain while patriotic Ethiopians guerrilla fighters were 
courageously fighting the invaders.  After Italy occupied Addis Ababa, there was no widespread 
direct confrontation, but patriotic guerrilla movement that was spread all over the country did not 
give time to peacefully operate all over the country.89  
 However, as there was no direct confrontation with the invaders, the colonial power was 
able to incorporate Ethiopia into the Italian East Africa Colonies. Within five years of occupation 
of Ethiopia, Italy effectively altered Ethio-Eritrean boundary lines thereby mingling both nations 
again under a single political authority - Italy.  Italy redrew a new colonial map that annexed a 
large portion of territory from Ethiopia to Eritrea. This map has also influenced EEBC to incline to 
the Eritrean side of argument. Richard Cornwell sums: 
It appears that the Italian colonial map issued in 1934, may have exaggerated the 
extent of Eritrean territory with a view to providing Mussolini with the excuse for 
an assault on Ethiopia.  It has therefore been rejected by some advocates of 
Ethiopia’s case, who also point out the difficulty of using the imprecise treaties 
signed at the turn of the century. 90 
 
                                                                                                                                               
86  See Art. 10 The Covenant of League of Nations 
87 Francesco Marino, Military Operations in the Italian East Africa 1935 – 1941: Conquest & Defeat, (MTS Thesis 
Unpublished Marine Corps University1 (2009) 
88 Art. 11 of the Covenant of League of Nations states, “Any war or threat of war […] affecting any of members of 
League or note, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall take any action 
that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations [….]” 
89 Any attempt by Italy to divide Ethiopians, as they succeeded in Eritrea did not work.  For instance, Italians dropped 
leaflets promising to hire Ethiopian fighters to earn regular salary as Eritreans who fight on behalf of Italy did not 
get acceptance.  Even victims of Minilk fighters, for instance, the people of Southern Ethiopia did not support 
Italian invaders.  I cannot forget what my own father summed stating, “ Minilik fighter were cruel to the people of 
Wolayta, and Italians were also no good.” 
90 Richard Cornwell Ethiopia and Eritrea: Fratricidal Conflict in the Horn, 7:5 AFR. SEC. REV. 4, 1 -7 (1998). 
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   The Fascist Italian occupation has not only rendered colonial treaties and boundaries they 
supposed to create null and void, but also abolished international and administrative boundaries of 
Ethiopia. Large territories of current Tigray State of Ethiopia and the northern portion of territories 
of Afar Regional State were annexed to Eritrea. Internal administrative boundaries of Ethiopia 
were also redrawn into four regions. The present territories of Southern Ethiopia, Gambella and 
Oromia regions were lumped together and captioned as “Gala –Sidamo”. The Harer Region, Shoa, 
and Amhara were other regional states that were designed by Italian colonial power.  Thus, during 
the short-lived five years of Italian occupation, there was no question of international boundary 
between Ethiopia and Italy.   
 After occupying all the Ethiopian territories, during WWII, Italy proceeded to annex 
British Somaliland, which brought WWII to the Horn of Africa by initiating Great Britain to take 
action against fascist Italy. With assistance of Great Britain, Emperor Haile Selassie landed in 
Sudan and successfully coordinated the ongoing patriotic movement. Great Britain aligned with 
the already battling Ethiopian guerrilla forces under the leadership of Emperor Haile Selassie. 
Haile Selassie seized the opportunity to liberate Ethiopia by effectively leading patriotic forces 
with British fighter jets dropping bombs on the Italians who surrendered shortly in the northern 
Eritrea.  Emperor Haile Selassie also attempted to coordinate Eritreans who had been fighting on 
behalf of Italy by dropping leaflets and sending messages to align with Ethiopian and British 
forces to turn their arms to the colonial power and stand on behalf of their Ethiopian brothers and 
liberate Ethiopia.  In April 1941 Eritrea was liberated and within a month, in May 1941 the whole 
Ethiopia got freedom.91  
 
 
 
                                            
91 Negash & Tronvoll supra note 1 at 8. 
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5.6.2. British Trusteeship and Eritrea’s Federation to Ethiopia 
  While Emperor Haile Selassie I was back to power and took administration of Ethiopia, 
British Military Administration (BMA) continued occupation of Eritrea as caretaking government 
for 10 years. Haile Selassies’s repeated attempt to reintegrate Eritrea with Ethiopia was not 
accepted.92 After defeating Italian colonizers, Great Britain’s cooperative spirit was changed in a 
way harming Ethiopia’s interest for regaining Eritrea and territorial integrity. This can be justified 
by the initiation and support that BMA lent to anti unity movements in Eritrea. For instance, BMA 
manifestly challenged “Mahber Fikiri Hager”, which was pro-unionist party by organizing rival 
organs that oppose unification agenda of Unionist Party (hereinafter UP).93 For many Ethiopians 
and pro-unionist Tigrinya speaking Eritreans BMA’s position was hard to accept.  
 Great Britain, however, considered Eritrea94 as an enemy territory and stayed there until the 
fate of Eritrea was legally determined by the Allied powers. The changing nature of the wind of 
colonization, and the emerging international commitment that prohibits occupation has dictated 
BMA not to legally claim occupation of Eritrea as an enemy territory. Since League of Nations, 
legality the policy of annexation of enemy territory has been changed. The only legal possibility to 
occupy enemy territory is to hold it until national actors are able to take over power.  Thus, the 
only legal possibility to hold an enemy territory was in the form of trusteeship.  
 During the period of British trusteeship, there was no boundary change, nether boundary 
issue. The colonial boundary was elusive; it was not only fully delimited, but it was not 
demarcated. Therefore, borderland resident did not know the existence of boundary line. The 
                                            
92 On his first official visit to Eritrea in October 1952 Emperor Haile Selassie I disclosed his government’s relentless 
effort to reintegrate Eritrea with Ethiopia even before the end of WWII.  The Emperor disclosed how he helped 
Eritrean brothers to get land in Ethiopia and establish their home and educate their children both at home and 
abroad. See Negash supra note 46 at 78. 
93 For instance, “[…]British were deliberately poking the fire of cultural and political diversity in order to 
counterbalance the dominant position of the UP. The BMA resented the presence of the UP.”  Id. 39. 
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supposed boundary line was simply remained on the paper, not known to the local people – the 
local people were not aware of what Italy was doing and never cared about boundary line, as 
border was not walled or changed social interaction. Put simply, to the local people there was no 
boundary issue, as there was no change on the ground. There was no pillar, beacon, or boundary 
wall. To ordinary people political separation was nothing, as it did not restrain socio-economic 
interaction among people.  There were Ethiopian monasteries in the main land of Eritrea that 
Ethiopian people travelled without noticing emerging boundary. Debre Bazen and Debre Maryam 
monasteries are live memoires proving the true affinity of Eritreans and Ethiopians.95 Thus, in 
terms of political administration for the past 50 years the supposed boundary separated Eritreans 
from their Ethiopian brothers, but social relationship was not absolutely bared:  Economic 
transactions, intermarriage, religious services, market transactions continued. 
 During British Military Administration (BMA), in Eritrea socio-political situation was not 
settled. There were numerous conflicting moves and competing interests. The diplomatic 
wrangling between Ethiopian government and British administration, involvement of interest of 
Allied Forces, direct and indirect interference of Italy to regain and perpetuate its influence in 
Eritrea96, the battle to reunion Eritrea with Ethiopia (especially by the members of UP), or divide 
                                                                                                                                               
94 According to Tekeste Negash, “[…] the BMA’s treatment of Eritrea and its subjects as belonging to Italy had 
complicated relations between the UP and the BMA.” Id.   
95  See Pankhurst supra note 6 at 38. This can be justified by the huge number of Eritreans living in Ethiopia after the 
end of Italian colonial administration.  In 1944 about 100,000 Eritreans were living in Ethiopia considering 
themselves as Eritreans. See Negash supra note 46 at 55.  This is not surprising as an Eritrean (Lorenzo Teazaz) 
was the most important advocate for Ethiopia before League of Nations together with Empower Haile Selassie.  
Later after independence of Ethiopia Lorenzo Teazaz served as Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia.  Moreover, 
about 1500 Eritreans battled Italian colonizers together with their Ethiopian brothers. Id at 50) Furthermore, the 
two Eritrean heroes Abraha Deboch and Mogos Asgedom attempted to assassinate Rodolfo Graziani in Addis 
Ababa while Graziani planned to celebrate birth of an Italian royal baby: the prince of Naples. See Aregawi Berhe, 
Revisiting Resistance in Italian –Occupied Ethiopia: The Patriots Movement (1936 – 1941) and the redefinition of 
Post War Ethiopia in JON ABBINK et al (eds.)  RETHINKG RESISTANCE REVOLT AND VIOLENCE IN 
AFRICAN HISTORY 104(2003). 
96 With a view to disrupt UP’s activism to reintegrate Eritrea with Ethiopia, Italy distributed funds to anyone with 
exchange of UP’s party cards. See Id. Italy also attempted to persuade Allied Force to put Eritrea under Italian 
trusteeship.  (Id. at 50). Moreover, the Italian Community in Eritrea (RIE and CAS) formed pro Italian party by 
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Eritrea between Ethiopia and Anglo Egyptian Sudan (British later move), or the move for creation 
of independent Eritrea. Until these issues fairly decided, boundary question was not important.  
 Professor Tekeste Negash remarks, “[…] the BMA officers did not believe that Eritrea was 
culturally homogenous and already had vague notions as to how to dispose of the colony at the 
opportune moment.”97 As a result, the British Military Administration favored Eritrea’s separation 
rather than union with Ethiopia.98 This was a real challenge to the Unionist Party (Mahber Fikri 
Hager) that aggressively worked for unconditional union with Ethiopia. With a view to tackle the 
insistent move of UP to reunion with Ethiopia, BMA, exerted variety of initiatives that aimed at 
counteracting UP. First BMA initiated formation of competing parties, which demanded 
independence of Eritrea. The Eritrean Party for Eritrea, and Muslim League were formed to 
challenge unionist agenda of UP. When this strategy failed because of UP’s continued strength and 
support even from prominent personalities from Muslim community,99 BMA attempted to split 
Eritrea into Ethiopia and Sudan.  
 Residents of Eritrean western and lowland regions were predominately Muslims and 
nomads. These were areas where expansionist or religion-backed wars were repeatedly fought. 
Due to logistic problems, even Ethiopian fighters raided their cattle,100 which prompted lowlanders 
to support Italian occupation. Moreover, Ethiopian and Eritrean highlanders repeatedly invaded 
lowlands in search for food, cattle, crops, and slaves.101 On top this external invaders like 
                                                                                                                                               
transforming former Italian colonial soldiers Association into political party whose explicit program was to put 
Eritrean under Italian trusteeship. In addition to these manipulations, Italy continued distribution of funds.  (Id. at 
51) 
97 Id. at 39.  
98  Id. at 40 
99 For instance, Muslim League’s prominent figure, Said Baker al Morgani defected to UP adversely affected ML and 
BMA’s counter action plan.  See Negash supra note 46 at 53. 
100 Negash &   Tronvoll supra note 1 at 4. For instance, King Ezana’s brothers Saizana and Adefan invaded Beja’s 
who rebelled King Ezana of Axum and raided 3112 heads of cattle, 6224 sheep.  See Pankhurst supra note 26 at 
26. 
101 Id. at 5. 
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Egyptians, Turks, and jihadist movement had spread their own culture and ideology, which has 
distanced lowlanders from their highland brothers. Thus, residents of lowland regions had no good 
relationship even with their Eritrean kinsmen who were members of Ethiopian Orthodox 
Christians and have huge resemblance to Ethiopians. Italian colonial power seized this divisive 
opportunity and gave more freedom to Muslims and protected their resources and their interest.  
This has nurtured sense of difference, but actually, Muslims and residents of lowland territories 
were not different from their hinterland brothers.   
 UP’s strong and persistent battle for union with Ethiopia,102 had forced BMA partially to 
accept the objectives of UP by integrating some of the strategically important vicinities with 
Ethiopia and to annex western lowland regions with Anglo Egyptian Sudan.103 Great Britain’s 
supposed split of Eritrea was largely based on cultural and religious affinity with neighboring 
people.104     
 In February 1947 Italy concluded numerous treaties called “Treaty of peace” with the 
winners of WWII and associated nations. Ethiopia was also party among associates of allied 
Forces. The Treaty of Peace, specifically, delineated European boundaries of Italy with the Allied 
Forces. With regard to Italian Africa colonies, Italy agreed to abandon all rights it had in Africa. 
Thus, Italian rights and privileges created in Africa were absolutely voided.  Art. 23 of the Peace 
Treaty states, “Italy renounces all right and title to the Italian territorial possessions in Africa, i.e. 
                                            
102 Unionist Party (UP) was very organized and vigorously worked for political union with Ethiopia. It celebrated 
Emperor Haile Selassie I’s birth day and celebrated Ethiopian independence date and prayed in the church for unity 
of Ethiopia and Eritrea again. UP had uncompromising Youth League. It has also Women’s League. UP repeatedly 
conducted demonstrations against BMA for its direct or indirect initiation against Eritrea’s union with Ethiopia. 
The demonstration and actions taken by Sudanese Defense Forces  (SDF) that were acting for BMA resulted loss of 
life. One SDF solder and 47 Eritreans were dead.  Angry move destroyed properties and robbed stores of Italian 
Asmara residents.  See Negash supra note 46 at 42.   
103 In 1943 Great Britain devised this plan, but waited until the end of WWI, as Allied Forces have to seal it. Id. at 41. 
104 This position later accepted by the Allied Forces and even by the General Assembly of United Nations. The idea 
of splitting Eritrea was failed at the last minutes of U.N. deliberation Details are mentioned in 5.6.3. 
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Libya, Eritrea and Italian Somaliland.” (Art. 23(1)).  Thus, Italy has legally abandoned its rights 
and privileges that were created in consecutive boundaries treaties with Ethiopia.  
   Though Italy legally renounced any right in Eritrea, its laws, Institutions, and Italian 
community in Eritrea continued irritating the society of Mahber Fikiri Hager.  Frequent strike and 
violent demonstration that was exerted by the activities demanding immediate and unconditional 
union with Ethiopia dictated Allied Forces decided to dispose Eritrea from care taking 
administration.105 The allied forces set up an Enquiry Commission to assess the interest of Eritrean 
people either to unite with Ethiopia or get independence. Majority of the Tigrinya speaking 
highlanders chose for unconditional union with Ethiopia while lowlanders opted for Eritrea’s 
independence.106  But the Enquiry Commission could not decide as interest of Eritreans and Allied 
Forces was divided.  The division of interest of Eritreans was largely based on religious grounds, 
preconceived Italian divisive politics, and the interest of BMA, which did not favor Eritrea’s 
reunion with Ethiopia. The Muslim population in western regions and lowlanders feared 
suppression by Christian highlanders in collaboration with Ethiopia, in which Orthodox 
Christianity was government religion and the Ethiopian Orthodox Church was granted one third of 
land in Ethiopia. When the Enquiry Commission of the Allied Forces failed to reach at a binding 
decision, the fate of Eritrea was passed onto United Nations General Assembly in 1948.107  
 
 
 
 
                                            
105 Up was tired of indirect control of Italy even after its political administration was removed by the British Forces. 
During BMA, Eritrea was governed by the Italian law, Italian bureaucracy, and Italian system.  According to 
Tekeste Negash, “ […] UP saw little difference between Italian colonial administration and that BMA.” This 
triggered frequent strike and demonstration.  See Negash supra note 104.  
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  5.6.3. Reintegration of Eritrea with Ethiopia 
 
5.6.3.1.  U.N. mandated Federation 
 In 1949, in accordance with the recommendation of allied forces, the United Nations 
General Assembly deliberated on ways of disposing Eritrea from trusteeship. The BMA interest to 
split Eritrea into Ethiopia and Anglo Egyptian Sudan again dominated the deliberation.108 Not only 
Great Britain, but also Italy and Ethiopia have voted for annexation of highland Eritrea and 
Danakil regions to Ethiopia and western lowland regions to Sudan.  This plan thought to solve 
Ethiopia’s pressing quest for sea access, as it allocates both the port of Massawa and Assab to 
Ethiopia.  However, annexation of Western Regions to Sudan could not win a required vote. As a 
result the whole proposal was failed.  At this time Italy changed its stance and vigorously “[…] 
campaigned for complete and immediate independence of Eritrea.”109  The General Assembly was 
about to postpone disposition of Eritrea for the next General Assembly, but due to Great Britain 
and Ethiopia’s opposition, the General Assembly set up an Enquiry Commission to assesse facts 
on the ground with a view to reconsider taking the interest of people of Eritrea.  
  The Enquiry Commission conducted a thorough scrutiny to devise a realistic proposal that 
would best satisfy interest of the people of Eritrea.   The Commission, however, could not reach 
consensus in its finding. It came up with three different proposals: for complete political union 
with Ethiopia, federation of two countries, and independence after 10 more years of trusteeship 
                                                                                                                                               
106 Id. at 9 
107 Id.  
108 This was in accordance with a plan known as Bevin-Sforza deal (A plan to administer Italian colonies in Africa).  
JOHN H. SPENCER, ETHIOPIA AT BAY:  A PERSONAL ACCOUNT OF THE HAILE SELASSIE YEARS, 
211(2006). See also Negash supra note 46 at 45 
109 Id. at 52. 
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under United Nations.110 Three of the five member of the Enquiry Commission proposed Eritrea’s 
integration with Ethiopia (one for unconditional political union and two members for federation 
with Ethiopia) while other members (the minority) recommended for independence of Eritrea after 
10 more years of trusteeship.111  
 United Nations General Assembly ignored the minority view, accepting the majority 
suggestion to integrate Eritrea with Ethiopia in federation.112  In other words, the General 
Assembly federated Eritrea with Ethiopia under the sovereignty of Ethiopian emperor as an 
autonomous constituent unit having its own local government.113 The decision to federate Eritrea 
with Ethiopia was formalized by the resolution of United Nations General Assembly (Resolution 
390 (V)A of 1950). A Memorandum of United States Department of States indicates the 
significance of federation and the role played by United States as follows: 
The resolution recognizes that the disposal of Eritrea should be based on its close political 
and economic association with Ethiopia and assures the inhabitants of Eritrea of the fullest 
respect and safeguards for their institution, traditions, religions and languages, as well as 
the widest possible measures of self-government. At the same time the resolution respects 
the constitutions, institutions, traditions and the international status and identity of the 
Empire of Ethiopia.114 
 
 On the basis of current and historic affinity between the people of Ethiopia and Eritrea, 
United States believed that federating Eritrea with Ethiopia would best satisfy the interest of the 
                                            
110 See United States, Principal aspects of Relations of the United States with Ethiopia: The question of Providing 
United States Military Equipment to Ethiopia: Interest of the United States in the Former Italian Colony of Eritrea, 
5 THE NEAR EAST AND AFRICA 1251, 1982 1237 1982  (1951). 
111 Id.  See also Bereket Habte Selassie, Self-Determination in Principle and Practice: The Ethiopian – Eritrean 
Experience 29 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 106, 91 – 142 (1997 – 1998). 
112 Negash and Tronvoll supra note 1 at 9. The United Nations Commission was set from five member States. 
Norway proposed for political union of Eritrea with Ethiopia, South Africa and Burma suggested for federation of 
Eritrea with Ethiopia, but other two members (Guatemala and Pakistan) suggested for continued trusteeship for 10 
years by U.N. and then independence of Eritrea. See United States, Principal aspects of Relations of the United 
States with Ethiopia: The question of Providing United States Military Equipment to Ethiopia: Interest of the 
United States in the Former Italian Colony of Eritrea, 5 THE NEAR EAST AND AFRICA 1251, 1982 1237 1982  
(1951). 
113 G.A. Res. 390(v) U.N. GAOR 5th Sess. Supp. No. 20 at 20 U.N. Doc A. 1775 (1950). see also Negash and 
Tronvoll supra note 1 at 9  
114 Memorandum of Depart of States, Id at 1252. 
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people of Ethiopia and Eritrea and enhance welfare of the two nations.115 Accordingly, after facts 
on the ground were assessed by the United Nations mandated Commission, United States 
sponsored a resolution for federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia.   
 In September 15, 1952 Eritrea was formally federated to Ethiopia having its own 
autonomous legislature, executive and judiciary.116  Eritrea at the time had two dominant political 
parties. The Union Party that was largely represented by highland residents (Kabessa region) that 
speak, Tigrinya and largely members of Ethiopian Orthodox Church.117 The Unionist Party, as the 
name suggests, was pro-Ethiopian and had advocated for unconditional and complete political 
union with Ethiopia.118  The Muslim League represented lowlanders, on the contrary, repeatedly 
endeavored to distance Eritrea from Ethiopia or integrate with eastern Sudan.119  
 A month after federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia, Emperor Haile Selassie visited Eritrea 
thereby formally abolishing colonial boundary. Emperor Haile Selassie made an historic speech on 
the supposed colonial boundary that had separated Ethiopia and Eritrea.  After thanking Almighty 
God for reuniting Ethiopia and Eritrea the King proclaimed: “ …The Mareb no longer as from 
today has the role of separating brothers.”120(Emphasis added). 
 After Eritrea’s reintegration with Ethiopia by the UN mandated federation, Sheik Ali 
Redai, a member of Muslim League (ML), was appointed President of Constitutional Assembly 
                                            
115 Id  
116 G.A. Res. 390(v) U.N. GAOR 5th Sess. Supp. No. 20 at 20 U.N. Doc A. 1775 (1950). 
117 This does not, however, mean that all the UP members were Christians and highlanders. There were some 
Muslims and people from lowlands.  
118 Unionist Party (UP) was association of people who supported integration of Eritrea with Ethiopia. The Party was 
launched on the very date of Ethiopian independence. After Ethiopian flag was raised in Addis Ababa, on May 5, 
1941 resident of Asmara expressed their joy and support in demonstration that was held in Asmara. On the same 
date UP was launched under the name Mahber Fikiri Hager (The Association of Nation Lovers). 
119 Though past suppression and plunder by Ethiopian and Eritrean highlanders much contributed for the assertions of 
Muslim League, difference in religion and to some extent cultural disparity. Cognizant of sentiments of Muslim 
Italians quickly occupied lowland and coastal regions before proceeding to the highlands. Muslim Eritreans had 
enjoyed better privilege during Italian occupation and professed their religion freely.  Tekeste Negash calls this as, 
“ Italian policy of wooing the loyalty of Moslem Communities had more success.  Italian colonialism protected and 
encouraged the revival and consolidation of Islam.” Negash supra note 46 at 18. 
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whereas, Mr. Tedla Bairu, the head of Unionist Party, was appointed as chief executive officer of 
Eritrea. Political wrangling, suspicion, fear of complete reunion with Ethiopia was continued 
among the parties.121  Lack of good governance, mismanagement, favoritism, budgetary deficiency 
to meet the needs of “overcrowded bureaucracy”, and alleged internal and external interference 
“widened” the gap between Unionist party and Muslim League.122  In the words of Professor 
Tekeste Negash, “ For the majority of the people federation marked a deterioration of their 
economic conditions rather than an improvement.”123 Members of Muslim League argued that 
federal institutions in Eritrea were filled only with Ethiopians.124 Moreover, the Muslim League 
repeatedly blamed the executive chief for plotting with Ethiopia to abolish the federation and make 
Eritrea an Ethiopian province.125   
 After nine months of the formation of the Federation, leaders of ML in the Western Region 
expressed their stand stating that in the event of union with Ethiopia to campaign for formation of 
a new state including “Western Province of Eritrea and Eastern Province of Sudan.”126 Due to 
                                                                                                                                               
120 New Times and Ethiopia News (NTEN), No. 859, Nov. 01, 1952 quoted n Negash supra note 46 at 78. 
121  While the federation was alive the leader of ML, Ibrahim Sultan wrote to Pakistani Political Organization that “ 
Moslems in Eritrea would struggle to establish another Pakistan.” NTEN no. 854 Sep. 29 1952, as cited in Federal 
experience p. 80.  Mr. Ibrahim who was the second top official in the federation did not trust the viability and 
actual working of the federation rather than challenging the legality and validity of the federation.  
122 For instances, Woldeeab Wolde Mariam, the founding member of the Association of Eritrean Workers alleged that 
the leader of Unionist party attempted to murder him for sole reason that a member of Constitutional Assembly, 
Abba Habte-Mariam opposed the move of federal government to register foreigners in Eritrea contending that was 
the power of Eritrean government. Moreover, life and economy deteriorated after federation as Ethiopian 
government could not fill all economic demands of Eritrea.  See. Negash supra note 46 at 81.  
123 It is true that to fill gaps of “generous” subsidies of colonial power the new Eritrean government allegedly increase 
taxes and custom duties raised. Within one year of its formation in 1953 the federation faced with serious problems 
and budgetary deficient, which created “economic recession” with increased tax burden on the population. See Id at 
82.  
124 The Muslim League and some Christians required to federation should be equally staffed by Ethiopians and 
Eritreans irrespective of the proportion of Eritrean population to the Ethiopian people. This stand also put the 
federation in doubt.  
125 Strongly worded comment of the speaker of the Assembly discerns this fact.  Sheik Ali Redai, remarked: “ a hyena 
had been put with a goat and the result was obvious.” See. Negash supra note 46 at 83.  This stand proves the 
position of Muslim League that the federation was dangerous as the “hyena” would swallow the “goat” at any 
moment. See Id. at 85. 
126  There was repeated declaration and plan to form “Baja State” after amalgamation of Western Eritrea and Eastern 
Sudan) Id. 
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persistent opposition of ML and some Christian Eritreans either explicitly or implicitly coupled 
with inexperience in implantation of federalism, lack of good governance, undemocratic 
administration, weakness of the chief executive, prevailing authoritarianism, and domination of 
powerful Unionist Party together with budgetary deficiency and possibly to avoid the influence of 
opposition party and foreign interference, the federation virtually weakened.127  UP from the outset 
had the agenda of unconditional union with their Ethiopian kinsmen that were irrationally 
separated by the Italian colonial power. Understanding of the meaning and consequences of 
federation both by the Ethiopia and Unionist party gave rise to the ignorance of the repeatedly plea 
of  ML for observance of the United Nations Resolution and the Eritrean Constitution. Finally the 
Muslim League and other parties petitioned to the UN pointing violation of the federation 
arrangement, which further intensified the suppression of dissent in Eritrea.128 
 
5.6.3.2. Abolition of Federation and Complete Merger with Ethiopia 
 The actual working of Eritrean federation not only demonstrated troubled relationship 
among dominant political parities, the Federal Council, and the Emperor, but also it has revived 
sectorial gap among the Coptic Christians and Muslim Eritreans.129 Peaceful petition by the ML to 
the Emperor,130 the foreign consuls, and UN did not return any good solution. Consequently, early 
                                            
127 The prominent supporter of federation, Abraha Tessema witnessed that Eritreans did not dislike Ethiopians on 
racial grounds but because “they were not going to fill the economic gaps” left by the Italian and the British.”  
Negash supra note 46 at 88. Therefore, one of the compelling reason for the opposition for integration with 
Ethiopia was economic rationale.  For example, Abraha regretted “for the demise of Italian colonial era,  [… 
stating that…] “the departure of every Italian meant an average of three more unemployed Eritreans.” Id. 
128 Id at 86.  
129 Muslim Eritreans started aligning with Arab world stationing in Cairo, Egypt.  Saud Arabia started making 
generous contribution that enabled exiled ML activities to finance and strength bandits that had been working in 
Eritrea.  Bandit (Shifta) Idris Awate of Bin Amer who had some fighters was motivated and encouraged to 
continue guerrilla warfare.  
130 See, for instance, FO371/118744. Memorandum submitted by the Moslem League to H.I.M. The Emperor of 
Ethiopia, Asmara, 3.1.1956 corresponding to 20 Jamad Awal, 1375, Negash supra note 46 at Appendix 4.  
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1960’s exhibited wide spread demonstration, rebellion and exile.131 Numerous factors have 
contributed for the frustrated relationship among the political actors that ultimately caused demise 
of the federation. First, the very agenda of UP has lion’s share for the complete political union 
between Ethiopia and Eritrea disregarding the Federal Act or the Eritrean Constitution. Complete 
integration with Ethiopia was the preconceived political agenda of UP that was never abandoned 
even after UN Resolution. Until that goal was achieved, UP considered the rest of the work 
including federation as a prelude to the ultimate integration. In the words of Professor Tekeste 
Negash, “ […] the majority of the Unionist activists saw federation as a temporary hindrance to 
complete union with the motherland or as a plot by Ethiopian enemies to weaken the country.”132 
The programs and goals of UP reflected the wishes of the people of Eritrean highland regions, 
which were largely Christians who believed that Italy had separated them from their Ethiopian 
kinsmen.133 Thus, any means that would take them to the complete integration with Ethiopia 
assumed a vehicle taking them to the desired goal.  
 Second, inexperience and unfamiliarity with the working, principles and effects of 
federation both by Ethiopia and the Eritrean government led to the failure of the federal system.134 
Both “the Emperor and his representative professed to see little difference between federation and 
                                            
131 In practice, cultural and sectorial influence made the actual working of Eritrean federation hard to implement. In 
the words of Prfessor Tekeste Negash, “[…] the Eritrean Christians found it very difficult to translate the federal 
system that was embodied in the Eritrean constitution into a workable political framework.” Id. at 125. Though 
there was difference in religion, UP had Muslim members but during actual working of the federation Muslims 
felt that UP and its followers were the actual beneficiaries. Id 
132 Id. at 91. 
133 Eritrean political actors pose a biased and unsubstantiated remark stating that the Ethiopia induced the UP and 
highland Christian Eritreans to work for the complete political integration. It may be fairly believed that the 
Ethiopian government might have wished for complete reunion, but UP’s relentless effort for complete political 
reunion was not simply the work of Ethiopia.  The May 5 1941 demonstration in Asmara that that led into 
formation of Mahber Fikiri Hager and expression of joy of the Eritreans for the restoration of Emperor Haile 
Selassie to the throne (later `converted into UP ) was purely the independent initiative of the Eritreans. This 
motive may have been fueled by the spiritual activities of Coptic Churches in Eritrea.  FPC while assessing the 
best political solution 48% of the Eritrean people, “the overwhelming majority of them Christians had expressed a 
desire for unconditional union.” Id. at 71. 
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complete union.”135 The two distinct systems, federation and unitary, were wrongly perceived 
synonymous by the Emperor and his representatives.136 ML members repeatedly cried that the 
executive chief and his departments had simply respected orders of the Emperor in lieu of the 
Eritrean Constitution. This was not surprising as the executive chief was one of personalities who 
“had campaigned for speedy and complete absorption of Eritrea by Ethiopia.”137  
 On top of this, lack of good governance, dictatorship of the executive chief, and lack of 
commitment to respect and enforce the Eritrean Constitution compelled ML leaders to look for 
alternative means to redress repeated failure of the Eritrean Assembly to protect the interest of 
Muslim Eritreans by working to maintain the federation.138  There was a kind of subtle 
discrimination apparently targeting Muslims. One simple justification was the “exclusion of 
Muslims from vital departments.”139 Due to authoritarianism of the executive chief and wide 
spread nepotism, Muslim Eritreans experienced hard time and considered as second-class citizens 
in their own country.  
 The appointment of Asfaha WoldeMikael in effect intermingled the power of chief 
executive and deputy representative of federal council.140  After resignation of Tedla Bairu, the 
Assembly elected Asfaha Woldemikael who had been serving as a deputy representative of Federal 
                                                                                                                                               
134 Both the Ethiopia and UP had blurred understating of the meaning and actual working of federalism and unitary 
system. While the unionist party worked for ultimate complete integration with Ethiopia, the Ethiopian 
government “did not like the federal solution, but there […] were prepared to give it a fair chance. 
135 A speech from the Throne Delivered by the Representative of H.I. M to the Eritrean Assembly, April 27, 1953, 
RDC/BOX 1 ACC. No. 14002/EA/ADM Eritrean Assembly Minutes No. 144, Monday 27th April 1953 in Answar 
Seid Suleiman, Imagining the Nation: Assessing the Role and Function of the Eritrean Assembly in the Eritrean – 
Ethiopian Federation (1952 – 1962) 77 (2013) (Masters Thesis Leiden University, Netherlands Unpublished). See 
also Negash supra note 46 at 90. 
136 Id at 93. See also Answar Seid Suleiman, Imagining the Nation: Assessing the Role and Function of the Eritrean 
Assembly in the Eritrean – Ethiopian Federation (1952 – 1962) 77 (2013) (Masters Thesis Leiden University, 
Netherlands Unpublished). 
137 Negash supra note 46 at 90. 
138 Abraha Tessema, a political dissent views Tedila Bairu, “[…] as merely the stooge of the Emperor.” Id. at 87. 
139 Id. at 125.   There was widespread discrimination among Muslims and Christians.  Muslims for instance, were denied with 
business license.  (Id) The office of interior was filled only with Christians.  
140 In some cases Emperor’s representatives attempt to indulge in nomination of local election. Suleiman supra note 136 at 87. 
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council. In 1957 by the approval of the representative federal agent, Andergachew Messai, Asfaha 
formally started working in both offices contrary to the Eritrean Constitution.141  This indicates 
prevalence of conflict of interest between the interest of monarchy and the interest of Eritrean 
government, which weakened the federation. Moreover, during Asfaha’s election the Emperor’s 
Consul General stressed that it was not possible to draw a hard line between “Federalist” and 
“Unionist”.142 To the surprise of ML, Asfaha Woldemikael, at the beginning of his term proposed 
for abolition of Eritrean flag, substitution of Eritrean Seal with that of the Emperor and making 
Amharic as the official language.  The bill amending the Eritrean Constitution was adopted in 
1958.143   
 The sectarian attitude of Muslim League had some impact in the deterioration and ultimate 
demise of the federation.  While UP generally worked and assumed as unionist ML invoked 
federation because they were “always on the brink of breaking away from Eritrea and Ethiopia.”144 
In 1953 where maladministration, nepotism and authoritarianism at high time, ML considered all 
non-Muslim Eritreans favoring decisions and actions of the executive chief and the federal council. 
The “fight” between ML and UP which was primarily based on ideology rather than national 
interest, had its share for the ultimate failure of the federation.  
 Finally, after commencement of the session of second Assembly, political condition for 
efficacy of the federation was steadily changed, as barriers for complete political integration were 
weakened. The number of UP was increased in the Assembly, a unionist president and executive 
chief easily silenced ML and other federalist elements.  Representatives of ML and supporters of 
federation appealed to the UN, as the repeated petition to the Ethiopian Emperor did not change 
                                            
141 FO371/131292.BCA to BEAA. Sep. 26, 1958 cited in Negash supra note 46 at. 133. In last weeks of 1958 the Eritrean 
Constitution virtually ceased to work. Id.  
142 FO371/113520 BCA to BEAA, 11.8.55 cited in Federal at 112. 
143 Negash supra note 46 at 132. 
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facts on the ground.145  In the eve of complete disregard of the Eritrean Constitution, members of 
ML who were in exile, supported by Egypt set up an armed opposition forming Eritrean Liberation 
Front (ELF) in Cairo, Egypt.146  
 In May 1960 the Eritrean Assembly formally started dismantling the Constitution by 
changing federalist titles in a way revealing the State of Eritrea was formally marching toward one 
of the provinces of Ethiopia. Accordingly the title of chief executive was changed to chief 
administer, whereas the title of the Government was renamed as administration.147 The UP 
dominated Assembly easily approved constitutional change.148  Disregarding several student, 
opposition, civilian protests and demonstration against the move to abolish the Eritrean federation, 
the Eritrean Assembly unanimously voted to dissolve the federation thereby making Eritrea 14th 
administrative province of Ethiopia.149   
 
 5.6.4. Downfall of the Monarchy and Military Regimes: Independence of Eritrea 
 In early 1960s the ongoing rebellion against the government in Eritrea was intensified 
under the leadership and coordination of ELF.  It was further fueled in early 1970s, as a result of 
political turmoil due to Students’ Movement against the monarchial regime.  The ultimate removal 
of the monarchy by the military that usurped fruits of the Student Movement,150and the resultant 
political and social destabilization afforded a fertile ground to the liberation movement in Eritrea.  
                                                                                                                                               
144 Id. at  91 
145 One of the petitioners, Omar Kadi, after returning home from United States was charged and arrested. This 
intensified widespread demonstration and protest.  
146 See Hussien M. Adam, Eritrea, Somalia, Somaliland and the Horn of Africa, in AMARE TEKLE (ed.), 
ERITREA AND ETHIOPIA, FROM CONFLICT TO COOPERATION 145, 139 - 168(1994) 
147 Negash supra note 46 at 135. 
148 43 deputies voted for the constitutional change with 1absetention and no opposition.  Id.  
149 As prominent figure of the ML either exiled or jailed, on November 15, 1962 the UP dominated Assembly 
abolished the federation in procedural correct way.   See. Id. at 138.  
150 See Merera Gudina, Party Politics, political polarization and the Future of Ethiopian Democracy, A paper 
presented at the International Conference on African Dev’t , Center for African Dev’t Pol’y Res. WMU, 8/2007. 
http://scholarworks.wmich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1119&context=africancenter_icad_archive See  Selassie 
supra note 113 at 106.  
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 The 1974 Ethiopian Revolution had generated wide opposition movements and stimulated 
formation of numerous political parties.151  There was rampant extra-judicial killings and 
expropriation of personal properties including land and private buildings.152  Activists of political 
parties, especially member of EPRP were hunted by the military regime and summarily executed. 
The military that unexpectedly removed the monarchy and took power did not tolerate dissent of 
any kind. In fear of summary execution under the infamous campaign of Red Terror, members 
opposition groups, especially activists of EPRP either exiled or took part in armed struggle against 
the military regime.  
 Political instability, sense of insecurity and fear had motivated not only secessionist 
movements like ELF and other domestic rebellion groups, but also inspired external forces that had 
been looking for best moment to disintegrate Ethiopia. Somalia invaded Ethiopia with the 
aspiration to create a Greater Somalia by ceding certain territories that were occupied by ethnic 
Somalis.  
 Domestic political turbulence and external invasion had further strengthened ELF, which 
was already well organized, by the ideological and logistic backing from Arab nations.153 
Consequently, ELF quickly swelled by the influx of people marching in all directions in fear and 
opposition of aggressive military actions looking for safe haven or possibly involve in fight against 
the military regime. As a result, the Front was able to liberate western lowland territories, and 
afforded shelter and training to the fleeing opposition party members, former officials, students 
                                            
151 Student and intellectual centered political organization known as Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Party ( 
EPRP) was the most prominent one that started armed struggle in the cities and later conventional war in certain 
Amhara and Tigray peripheries, Ethiopian Democratic Unity (EDU)  MEISION, SEDED etc. Id.  
152Losing all they had, property owners left with limited options. Prolonged detention with the possibility of 
summary execution after surrendering everything they had or armed rebellion against the government. Rebellion 
also paved a way to get into safe haven in exile.  
153 Apart from Egypt and Saudi Arabia that supported ELF in the heydays of ELF several neighboring States such as 
Somalia, Sudan and Yemen assisted ELF in its fight against Ethiopia.  According to Hussien Adam, Yeman 
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and intellectual who risked their life. It was at this time that students and intellectuals of Tigray 
province joined EPLF to get military training and logistic support. As Shumet Sishagn witnesses, 
“The first group of TPLF fighters were trained in and launched from Eritrea. [EPLF] commanders 
initially played a prominent role in assuring the viability of the fledging insurgency.”154 
 In early1970s, due to internal conflict, ELF was split into factions from, in which a strong 
group known as Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) was formed.155 The friction initially 
arose on account of ideological grounds, as ELF was primarily dominated by the former ML 
activities, which were largely Muslims.156 ELF did not fully trust Christian highlanders including 
President Isias Afworki. This caused hostility, which led to the demise of ELF in 1981. Though 
dominant actors of EPLF, including the Isias Afwerki were Christians; unlike ELF, EPLF was a 
secular liberation front, which ended Islamic inspiration of ELF.  It then quickly gained ground in 
the northern Eritrea. After seven years of internal fighting, EPLF completely drove ELF from 
Eritrean territories and mobilized all its resource to fight against the military regime. TPLF’s 
assistance in fight against ELF was incredible. The cold war afforded a good moral and material 
support that tremendously empowered EPLF. The collaboration and powerful assistance of TPLF 
had further strengthened EPLF to liberate substantial territories of Eritrea from the Ethiopian 
                                                                                                                                               
transported U.S.S.R arms through Sudan to Eritrea and Somalia provided passport to the rebels.  See Adam supra 
note 147 at 146. 
154 Shumet Sishagn,  Book Review (Brothers at War: Making Sense of the Eritrean – Ethiopian War by Tekeste 
Negash and Kjetill Tronvoll (2000)) 7:3 NOR.EAS. AFR. STU.212-214 (2000). See also Selassie supra note 157 
at  104 
155 Kjetil Tronvoll, Borders of Violence-Boundaries of Identity: Demarcating the Eritrean Nation- State, 22:6 ISSN 
1043, 1037 – 1060 (1999). See als Girma W. Senbet, Perspectives on the Eritrean-Ethiopia Relations and 
Outcomes, ETHIOMEDIA.COM (NOV. 1 2003). 
156 ELF initially took Islam as a tool for mobilization of resources and agenda for struggle against domination by 
Christian Ethiopia.  Fighting on religious causes helped ELF to have aid from Iraq, Syria and other Muslim 
nations.  This historical backing for the formation of ELF was the major cause for friction with highland 
Christians who later formed EPLF. See Kalewongel Minale Gadamu, Ethiopia and Eritrea: The Quest for Peace 
and Normalization 35(2007) M. Phil THESIS   University of Tormso, Norway, (UNPUBLISHED). 
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military.157 As Shumet Sihsagn succinctly puts, “ […] EPLF won not only a potentially valuable 
military ally, but also unwavering supporter of Eritrean independence.”158 
 During heydays of TPLF, ELF claimed substantial portion of northern Tigray, far beyond 
Badme, belonged to Eritrea and established its militia administration, but TPLF silently allowed 
the move with a view to get training and logistic support.159 During fight between ELF and EPLF, 
TPLF assisted EPLF, as it was much closer to EPLF than ELF in terms of religion and blood and 
cultural affinity. After defeat of ELF by the joint effort of TPLF and EPLF, TPLF got ground to 
administer the borderland territories that were held by ELF. But later EPLF also posed boundary 
issue and demanded delineation, though it did not force TPLF to surrender the localities. TPLF 
convincingly argued that it lacked authority and appropriate documents to prove location of the 
true boundary line.160 Both TPLF and EPLF agreed to deal with the boundary issue after liberation 
thereby leaving boundary issue dormant.  
 Despite logistic and training support afforded to TPLF, especially in the early days, and 
TPLF’s support in fighting along EPLF when EPLF was in dire need for military help in 1983 
during Red Star Campaign,161 later tension and confrontations reigned.  Ideological difference, the 
issue of self-determination, differences in military tactics162, disparity in treatment of prisoners of 
war, et cetra are some of the grounds that made both parties to go in their own way.  But in 1988 
                                            
157 EPLF trained TPLF and supplied them resources to fight the military regime of Ethiopia.  See Negash and 
Tronvoll supra note 1 at17.  Though TPLF fighter assisted EPLF in critical moments when EPLF was highly 
weakened with military regime of Ethiopia, later disagreements arose.  There were tensions and irreconcilable 
ideological and tactical differences.. It is also said that the marriage between EPLF and TPLF was based on 
necessity, not love. Id. at. 21. 
158 See Sishagn supra note 153. See also Jon Young, The Tigray and Eritrean Peoples Liberations Fronts: a History 
of Tensions and Pragmatism 34 J. MOD. AFRI. STU. 105, 105 – 120 (1996).  
159 See Gedamu supra note 157 at 38. 
160 Id. at 39.In early 1970s ELF occasionally cross Tigray border pursuing Ethiopian Militia men, but for the purpose 
of acquiring military experience and fighting common enemy, TPLF did not invoke boundary line. See Young, 
supra note 160 at 160.  
161 Gedamu, supra note 157 at 38. 
162 Young supra note 160 at 108. 
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when the possibility of overthrowing appearing known, TPLF and EPLF reestablished their 
military alliance by four days negotiation in Khartoum, Sudan.163  
 Finally, as a result of famine, repression of military regime, and shortage of military 
supplies coupled with collapse of U.S.S.R, deteriorated the fighting capacity and determination of 
the military regime. On the contrary, EPLF and TPLF won abundant external and internal support, 
controlled substantial territories and weakened fighting ability of Dergue, which led Mengistu 
regime to fall. After Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam flew Zimbabwe for safe haven, the Ethiopian 
army in Eritrea lost hope and fled to Sudan and the Eritrean fighters were able to walk into Asmara 
while TPLF marched into Addis Ababa and quickly occupied the whole Ethiopia.  
 At the end of May 1991 Eritrea was completely liberated and EPLF took administration 
thereby heralding de facto independence. After two years of transition, as a part of formalizing 
Eritrea’s independence, a referendum was held that Eritreans overwhelmingly supported separation 
from Ethiopia. After de jure independence in May 24, 1993, EPLF was renamed as Peoples’ Front 
for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ). 
  But TPLF remained as a governing party in Tigray Regional States of Ethiopia though 
Tigray constituted as a federal State of Ethiopia, and a member of the coalition of Ethiopian 
Peoples’ Revolutionary Front (EPRDF). In early 1980s, due to apparent close collaboration 
between the Eritrean and Ethiopian parties most Ethiopians could not comprehend the basic 
distinction between TPLF and EPLF. Ideological differences and border issues between EPLF and 
TPLF was not publicly known and remained dormant.164  
                                            
163 Gedamu supra note 157 at 38.  
164 The boundary issue that was raised during liberation movement kept dormant until 1997.  It is true that both 
Parties had embarked on multifaceted task of maintaining peace and stability, before dealing with border issues. 
See Grima W. Senbet supra note 157. See also Gedamu supra note 157 at 39.  
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 After de facto independence of Eritrea, cooperation between Tigreans all over Ethiopia and 
Eritreans, either residing in Ethiopia or in Eritrea was so great. All barriers, apart from regular 
checkpoints at the border, were removed that enabled free movement of goods and people.  Some 
Eritreans or people of Eritrean origin had abused the privilege of free movement. For instance, 
fraudulent Eritrean traders used Ethiopian market to dump their duty free imports.165 It was 
believed that the TPLF dominated Ethiopian government facilitated venues for Eritreans in 
Ethiopia to take part in the referendum, and Ethiopia was first nation to recognize Eritrea’s 
independence even before the formal declaration of Eritrean independence.   
 With a view to create a smooth relationship that may ultimately lead into economic 
integration and political unity, the government of Ethiopia and Eritrea concluded numerous 
friendship agreements.  Both states had agreed to cooperate in “trade and commerce, health, 
education, tourism, environment, finance, science, foreign affairs and defense.”166 Further, the two 
States agreed to “harmonize exchange rate policies,”167 free movement of goods including re-
exporting goods imported another countries.168 Re-exporting Ethiopian goods to another country 
was prohibited. The two countries agreed to use Ethiopian currency (Birr), until Eritrea issues its 
own currency. The economic agreements, however, did not bear desired fruits, owing lack of 
institutional mechanisms to implement.   
 In contravention of the Friendship and Cooperation agreement, Eritrea started exporting 
Ethiopian coffee, which ranked Eritrea the 13th coffee exporter in the world though it did not have 
                                            
165 Some Eritrean traders imported commodities from Kenya stating that they use Ethiopia as only transit route.  In 
this way they enter into Ethiopia without paying import duty and then sell the stuff in Ethiopian market hurting 
legal Ethiopian traders.  
166 Gedamu supra note 157, at 39. 
167 Id.  
168 Ethiopia was the only foreign destination for light industrial products of Eritrea, but it was completely lost after the 
border conflict with Ethiopia. See Sally Healy, Eritrea’s  Economic Survival, Conference Proceeding, THE ROYAL 
INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, Apr. 20, 2007, 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Africa/200407eritrea.pdf  (Jan. 23, 2016). 
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coffee plant. Moreover, Eritrea issued its own currency without knowledge of Ethiopia 
disregarding provisions of Friendship and Cooperation Agreement, and sought sought Eritrean 
currency, Nakfa and the Ethiopian currency, the Birr, simultaneously to circulate in both 
countries.169 On top of this, there was disagreement on Port fee and price of oil that Ethiopia used 
to import from Assa refinery.  
 This motivated Ethiopia to look for other options. With a view protect its economy, 
Ethiopia changed its own currency note which rendered Birr notes in Eritrea void and required all 
transaction with Eritrea above 2000 Birr to be effected in Letter of Credit that can only be opened 
in hard currency like any third nation. This was strange to Eritrea. 
 In 1997 Ethiopia pursued a rebellion group called Afar Revolutionary Democratic United 
Front (ARDUF) and stationed at the elusive border. The rebellion group sheltered in Eritrea and 
had been creating havoc in Afar Regional State in Ethiopia.  Eritrea was upset by unilateral action 
of the Ethiopian military, and demanded explanation and demarcation of the whole disputed 
boundary. Both States have agreed to demarcate all the disputed boundaries and set up a joint 
boundary commission.  The Joint Border Commission, in turn, constituted a technical Sub 
Committee that would actually work the demarcation process under the supervision and guidance 
of the Joint Border Committee.   
 In the mean time, the Tigray Regional State had produced a regional map that included 
contested localities on Tigray side of Ethiopia. The Tigray map changed the old map by including 
disputed territories. It is not clear why Tigray has incorporated contested territory and released the 
map before the contested regions were not demarcated as it was agreed during the armed struggle 
between TPLF and EPLF in 1988.  
                                            
169  See Gedamu supra note 157. 
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 Surprisingly, while the Eritrean members of Joint Border Commission were in Addis 
Ababa to conduct a regular meeting, Eritrea moved its military personnel to the territories that 
were under Ethiopian administration. A group of military personnel that were fully armed 
attempted to enter into Badme. The militia at the checkpoint required the Group to disarm. An 
argument arose and each side fired on another. From both sides life was lost, but from the Eritrean 
side a senior military officer was killed.170  
 In summary, the people of Ethiopia and Eritrea are essentially “one” and inseparable. 
President Isias Afeworki admits this fact stating, “ [W]e cannot change the geographical and 
historical links that bind the peoples of the two countries.”171 The elusive Ethio-Eritrea boundary is 
a colonial creation, which has separated the inseparable people. The boundary was not only 
elusive, but was unilaterally altered by the Fascist Italy in 1935. The local people were not aware 
of the boundary treaties, neither the supposed boundary lines, as the boundary was not demarcated 
on the ground. Due to historic commingling of the two brotherly people it is not easy to set a clear 
separating line, as people had been moving in search for conducive environment. Unless 
renegotiated and an acceptable boundary line is drawn, any attempt to enforce colonial boundary 
line, in accordance with illusive boundary treaties, would continue to be futile. Bilateral dialogue 
and honest negotiation would also tackle socio-economic causes that trigger boundary issue as 
bargaining leverage.  
 
                                            
170 Subsequent actions by Eritrea, Ethiopia and international community will be discussed in the next chapter.  
171 Negash and Tronvoll supra note 1 at 37. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
  Ethiopia-Eritrea Border Conflict and Arbitration 
 
6.1.  Outbreak of “Border Conflict” 
 
  The sudden outbreak of Ethio-Eritrea violent border conflict has puzzled everyone, 
including citizens of the former friendly and interdependent nations, neighboring states, and the 
international community.1 The two former allies,2 Eritrean Peoples’ Liberation Front (hereinafter 
EPLF), renamed as Peoples’ Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) and Tigray Peoples’ 
Liberation Front (hereinafter TPLF), a core member in the coalition of Ethiopian Peoples 
Democratic Front (EPRDF) turned to be ruling parties after downfall of despotic communist 
regime (Dergue), had apparently magnificent relationship that was hailed by some as exemplary 
for peaceful co-existence in Africa.3 TPLF, had supported Eritrea’s quest for independence.  
                                            
  1 The late Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi was surprised by Eritrea’s unexpected military provocation and 
later invasion. After the invasion, Meles attempted to reach President Isaias Afwerki, by phone but at vain.  See Jon 
Abbink,Briefing Eritrea-Ethiopia Border, 97 AFRICA AFFAIRS 551, 551-565 (1998); TEKESTE NEGASH & 
KJETIL TRONVOLL, BROTHERS AT WAR, MAKING SENSE OF THE ERITREAN –ETHIOPIAN WAR, 
1(2000).  See also Kevin Hamilton, Beyond the Border War: The Ethio-Eritrean Conflict and International 
Mediation Efforts, 11 J. PUB. & INT’L AFFAIRS- PRINCETON 114, 113 – 136 ((2000) Available at; 
https://www.princeton.edu/jpia/past-issues-1/2000/7.pdf. (accessed 03/23/16 8:28 PM);  Nejib Jibril, The Binding 
Dilemma: From Bakassi to Badme – Making States Comply with Territorial Decisions of International Judicial 
Bodies, 19:3 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 640, 633 -675 (2003). See also Sally Healy and martin Plaut, Briefing Paper: 
Ethiopia and Eritrea: Allergic to Persuasion, CHATHAM HOUSE, AFRICA PROGRAM  AFP BP 07/01 ( 
January 2007). 
2 The Eritrean liberation group had assisted TPLF during early years of its foundation and in turn until 1985 TPLF 
fought in Eritrea on behalf of ELPF against the Communist Regime. It is generally admitted that TPLF fighters 
saved the EPLF from a possible demise in Sahle region where the Ethiopian military force was fighting with vigor. 
See Seyoum Yohannes, Eritrea-Ethiopia Arbitration: A Cure neither Based on Diagnosis nor Prognosis 6 MIZAN 
L. REV. 172, 163-199 (2012). See also Redie Bereketeab, Inter-State Conflicts in the Horn of Africa, HORN OF 
AFRICA JOURNAL 2 (2011), http://afrikansarvi.fi/issue2/25-artikkeli/62-inter-state-conflicts-in-the-horn-of-
africa accessed 03/23/16 4:57 PM).In Early 1990s some Ethiopians view both EPLF and TPLF as two sides of the 
same coin. See Leenco  Lata, The Ethiopia-Eritrea War, 30:97 REVIEW OF AFRICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY  
369, 369 - 388 (2003).    
3 Abebe T. Kahsay, Ethiopia’s Sovereign Right of Access to the Sea under International Law, (Jan. 01, 2007), (LL.M 
Thesis, School of Law, University of Georgia, (Unpublished)), Available at 
http://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1078&context=stu_llm  Leenco Lata remarks that 
Eritrean rules were seen behaving like co-rulers of Ethiopia.   
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Moreover, Ethiopia was the first country to recognize Eritrea’s independence even before formal 
declaration by the very State of Eritrea.4 
  In a situation where there was no explicit hostility, nor noticeable tension, it was hard to 
“believe” the news heralding sudden armed confrontation among the ‘allies,” as no assertive mind 
could fairly envision a destructive war to erupt in apparently peaceful setting. The then Ethiopian 
Prime Minister Meles Zenawi remarks: 
I really can’t make head or tail of this puzzling development. In fact I may have my own 
guesses but they cannot be satisfactory. As you all know there were certain 
misunderstandings between the two governments arising from measures taken after changes 
in currency on both sides. These were more or less certain misunderstandings even before this 
change, but it is very difficult for me to believe that the composite effect of all this would 
draw us into open conflict. This is why I still maintain I have no satisfactory answer for this 
baffling question.5 
 
Both nations were victims of the longest civil war in Africa that had claimed lives of tens of 
thousands citizens, and rendered the two nations among the poorest in all measures of development 
indicators. Given unhealed wounds of the civil war, it is inconceivable to go back into war, at least 
before exhausting all possibilities of peaceful resolution of disputes.6 Invoking an “ill-managed 
military skirmish”7 that happened as a result of the provocation of the armed Eritrean military 
                                            
4  Ethiopia formally accepted Eritrea’s independence even before Eritrea formally declared its independence. Some 
Ethiopians blame EPRDF/TPLF for its failure to protects Ethiopia’s interest by facilitating the Eritrean secession.  
(See Negash and Tronvoll, supra note 1 at 44). There was high public discourse that the inclusion of Art. 39 of the 
Constitution, which stipulates the right to secession was intended to legalize the Eritrean secession.  
5  ETV Amharic Program May 21, 1998; See also BBC Monitoring May 22, 1998 quoted in  Martin Plaut, 
Background to War from Friends to Foes, available at, http://www.ascleiden.nl/Pdf/paper1108459195.pdf  ( last 
accessed 02/25/16 10:38 AM).  See also Negash and Tronvoll who attest, “ The major Eritrean offensive came as a 
surprise to Ethiopian authorities in both Mekelle and Addis Ababa.”   Id at 1.  
6 Numerous sources speculate varied reasons for the sudden eruption of the war. The two former allies turned foes 
even during the battle against Dergue though they put aside their difference to fight their common enemy, heritage 
of neo patrimonial elite rule and lack of democracy and economic problems of Eritrea, see Abbink, supra note 1. 
As Khadiagala underlines, “Given the Wealth of formulas for resolving territorial tensions, escalation of the 
Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict makes clear a fundamental failure to construct institutions strong enough to stabilize 
authority.” Gilbert M. Khadiagala, Reflections on the Ethiopia –Eritrea Border Conflict, 23 FLETCHER F. 
WORLD ATT. 40, 39 – 58 (1999).  
7 Jon Abbnik, Law Against Reality? Contextualizing the Ethiopian – Eritrean Border Problem, in A. DE GUTTRY, 
H.H.G. POST AND G. VENTURINI (eds.), THE 1998 – 2000 WAR BETWEEEN ERITREAN AND 
ETHIOPIA147 (2009). 
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personnel8 at the town of Badme, a territory administrated by Tigray Region of Ethiopia, Eritrea 
deployed its combat battalion that was armed with tanks and heavy gunship “[launching] an 
offensive on several fronts in order to retake what they claimed to be Eritrean territories controlled 
by Ethiopia.”9  Ethiopia never expected armed confrontation with Eritrea, and demilitarized the 
shared border – apart from the local police that were armed with light weapons – there was no 
Ethiopian defense force in the vicinity. Consequently, the Eritrean army easily crossed the border 
and occupied Badme and its environs.10  
  Ethiopia labeled the Eritrean move as a blatant aggression and demanded immediate and 
unconditional withdrawal from all the occupied territories.11 In the mean time, Ethiopia moved its 
forces from other parts of the country and attempted to recapture the occupied territories, but it 
could not succeed, especially in the Western and Central regions, as Eritrean troops had already 
held major strategic positions, though Ethiopian troops got impressive successes, and restrained 
further move of Eritrean troops in the Eastern front. The Ethiopian Air Force bombed the Eritrean 
                                            
8  A small number of Eritrean military officers fully armed attempted to enter into Badme, a village under Ethiopian 
administration. Local police force required the Eritrean military personnel to disarm before entering into Ethiopia. 
The Eritrean team refused to disarm but attempted to enter the town of Badme by force that prompted shooting 
from both sides, which resulted in loss of life.  This was the immediate Casus Belli of border war.  See Sally Healy 
and Martin Plaut, The Ethiopian and Eritrea, Allergic to Persuasion, CHAT AM HOUSE Africa Program 3 
(2007). According to Negash and Tronvoll, the incursion from the Eritrean side was deliberate. (Negash and 
Tronvoll, supra note 1) “ […] the Eritrean government had expected such a reaction […] and had made military 
preparation accordingly.” Id. 
9 Id.  
10 Surprised by the unexpected but dangerous move of Eritrean military the then Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Meles 
Zanawi, attempted to reach President Isias Afework on phone but at vain. President Isia’s provocative act went 
well as planned and after arranging military occupation, he went abroad for tour. After failure of communication 
with President Isias Afeworki, the Ethiopian Prime Minister was forced to present the matter to the Ethiopian 
Parliament that declared war and ordered Ethiopian defense force to defend the country from Eritrean aggression. 
See Hayat Adem, Ethiopia- Eritrea: The Two Victimized Farmers,  JULY 18, 2015,  Available at AWAT.COM 
accessed 03/09/16 at 7:19: PM 
11 Khadiagala supra note 6 at 39. The Ethio-Eritrean Claims Commission clearly labeled the Eritrean act as 
aggression, contrary to the U.N Charter. See Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, Partial Award, Jus Ad Bellum – 
Ethiopia’s Claims 1-8 (Dec. 19, 2005) (Available at www.pca.org/upload/files/FINAL%20ET%20JAB.pdf ) The 
Security Council and Organization of African Union did not expressly termed it as aggression; but OAU’s fact-
finding ambassadorial Committee concluded stating, “ We have reached the conclusion that Badme town and its 
environs were administration by the Ethiopian authorities before May 12, 1998.” ALLAFRICA.COM OAU’s 
Facilitation and Eritrea’s Response, http://allafrica.com/stories/199808170040.html (Aug 17, 1998).   
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Air Force base in Asmara and the Eritrean jets responded by dropping cluster bombs on the 
civilian area and on an elementary school in Mekalle killing a number of Ayder Elementary School 
children, their parents and teachers.12  
  After occupying strategic locations and building “impenetrable” trenches, Eritrea offered 
for negotiation to resolve the apparent border dispute. Eritrea had applied the same tactics in 
Greater Hanish Island by occupying the Island and then offered for negation.13 Within short period 
of its existence, the State of Eritrea has exhibited the policy of “occupy and negotiate” in almost all 
provocative wars that it launched with the neighboring State.14 Jon Abbink attests the “occupy” 
and “negotiate” policy of Eritrea stating, “[Eritrea] first create[s] military facts on the ground and 
then call[s] for neutral third party [to] unconditional face to face negotiation.”15 While the 
Ethiopian conflict was outstanding, Eritrea occupied border territories of Djibouti, though it 
consistently denied occupation of Djiboutian territory.16 Eritrea had also border issues with Sudan 
though it did not move to the existent of occupation.17  As the Institute of Security Studies notes, “ 
Eritrea doe not have good relations with any of its neighbours.”18 According to Tronvoll, “All 
these countries have during the post-independence period accused Eritrea of initiating armed 
                                            
12 Eritrea took the responsibility for dropping cluster bombs on Ayder school stating it was mistake, but the repeated 
action of bombing at the same school contradicts with the apology. The second bombing targeted parents and local 
people who were attempting to help those injured and evacuating others. The fictitious apology was meant to 
mislead the international community purporting it to be a sudden happing. The deliberate repeated action cannot be 
an accident or poor skill. Yohannes Woldegebriela, Time to serve Justice for Poor Victims, ADDIS FORTUNE, 
Vol. 14 No. 719 ( Jan 19, 2014) Available at http://addisfortune.net/columns/time-to-serve-justice-for-poor-
victims/  Negash and Tronvoll, Brothers at war P. 1. 
13 Daniel J. Dzurek, Eritrea- Dispute Over the Hanish Islands, IBRU BOUNDARY AND SECURITY BULLETIN 
70 – 77 (1996). 
14 Woldegebriel supra note 12. 
15 Abbink, supra note 1 at 563 
16 It appears that Eritrea considers it has a right to take law by its own hand against any sovereign nation when it 
thinks a neighboring state held a territory that appeared to belong to Eritrea. Eritrea gives no room first to peaceful 
dispute resolution so that the other party prove its title on the territory. It is a public secret that Eritrea captured and 
killed Djiboutian troops and has been occupying its territories.  See AAAS, Djibouti and Eritrea Cross Border 
Conflict: 2008, Mar 11, 2015, available at, www.aaas.org/report/dkibouti-and-eritrea-cross-border-conflict-2008 
17 Kjetil Tronvoll, Borders of Violence – boundaries of identity: demarcating the Eritrean nation-state, 22 ETHNIC 
AND RACIAL STUDIES  1037, 1037 – 1060  (1999). 
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incursions and border violations, and of exhibiting an expansionist and aggressive foreign 
policy.”19  
  So far Eritrea has attempted to police neighboring States without giving a room for 
amicable solution to its perceived “violations.”  Aggressive and invasive character of Eritrea is 
apparent in President Afeworki illustration, “If […] my neighbor destroys my fence and there is 
nothing I can obtain by taking him to the magistrate, then I will be obliged to destroy his fence.”20  
(Emphasis mine.)  How Mr. Afeworki can speculate what a magistrate would judge to take his 
own action of policing? It is a basic rule of due process that an alleged “wrongdoer” has to be 
afforded with a chance to be heard. Needless to say, if an allegation is lodged before a magistrate, 
s/he will investigate whether the accused has committed the alleged “violation” and declare a 
possible remedy, but President Afeworki’s rule of self-help is contrary to the established principles 
of justice.    
  The fallacy of President Afeworki’s statement was exhibited in Eritrea/Yemen dispute over 
the Greater Hanish Island.21 The President wrongly perceived that the Island belonged to Eritrea 
and invaded it before attempting peaceful resolution. The “occupy and negotiate” policy had 
worked in Hanish Island though Yemen initially insisted Eritrea’s unilateral withdrawal as a 
precondition for negotiation, but later consented to judicial settlement while Eritrea occupied the 
Island by expelling Yemeni residents.22 The Eritrean claim was unjustified, and it was held that the 
Island belonged to Yemen.  
                                                                                                                                               
18 Berouk Mesfin, The Eritrea – Djibouti border dispute, ISS SITAUTION REPORT, (Sep. 15, 2008), Available at: 
https://www.africaportal.org/dspace/articles/eritrea-djibouti-border-dispute (last accessed 03/03/16). 
19 Tronovoll supra note 17. 
20 Id. at 1046. 
21 See Permanent Court of Arbitration, Eritrea/Yemen Award of Arbitration Tribunal in the First Stage of Proceeding 
dispute Available at, http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1160. 
22 Dzurek, supra note 13.  
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  Before the Hanish Island case was resolved, Eritrea invaded territories that were under 
Ethiopian administration for centuries and demanded negotiation.23  Ethiopia, however, 
consistently rejected any form of negotiation before Eritrea withdrew from the entire occupied 
territories and maintain status quo ante bellum.24  
  Numerous international actors had attempted to mediate the conflict before it reached into a 
full-fledged war. United States and Rwanda came up with a novel mediation proposal that had 
influenced and dominated subsequent mediation efforts.25 United States and Rwanda, expressing 
themselves as friends of Ethiopia and Eritrea, proposed a four-point Peace Plan.26 Status quo ante 
bellum was the most important component of the Plan. Ethiopia immediately accepted the Peace 
Plan, but Eritrea declined refusing to withdraw its troops from the occupied territories asserting its 
forces had “… only retook [the] land that was already theirs and could not retreat from it.”27  An 
assertion of Eritrean president reveals Eritrea’s determination to stay at the occupied territories 
despite international actors insistence or Ethiopia’s demand as a pre-condition for negotiation. 
President Isias Afeworki wrongly declared:  
Insisting on pulling out of Badme may be likened to insisting that the sun  [will] not rise in 
the morning. […] It is unthinkable.  It’s like telling the government in this country to migrate 
somewhere else with its own people and leave this land its sovereign territory to someone 
                                            
23 On Dec. 19, 2005 the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission declared that Eritrea “ […] violated Article 2 of the 
Charter of the United Nations by resorting to armed force on May 12th, 1998 and the immediately following days 
by attacking and occupying the town of Badme, then under peaceful administration by the Claimant [Ethiopia], as 
well as other territories in the Claimant’s  Tahtay Adiabo and Laclay Adiabo Weredas.”   EECC, Partial Award, 
Jus Ad Bellium – Ethiopia’s Claims 1-8 (2005), Available at http://www. Pca.org/upoad/files/FINAL%20JAB.pdf  
(Last accessed Jun 8, 2015). 
24 The then Ethiopian Foreign Minister formally demanded Eritrea’s unconditional withdrawal from the occupied 
territories before consideration of negotiation (Id). 25 Djibouti, Libya, Egypt, Uganda showed interest to mediate the conflict. The then Libyan leader Colonel Gadafi 
promised to send troops to disputed territories.  Most mediation proposals reflected national interests of the 
proposing States.  See Hamilton supra note 1 at 127. 
26 The first plan was a general one demanding both Ethiopia and Eritrea to agree on peaceful dispute resolution. Next, 
to agree on deployment of observers at Badme to oversee Eritrea’s withdrawal from territories occupied after May 
6, 1998. Thirdly, the two countries reach into agreement for binding delimitation and demarcation agreement and 
lastly to demilitarize the border region immediately. Id. at 45 
27 Abbink supra note 1 at 554. In short period of its sovereign existence, Eritrea displayed the policy of occupy and 
negotiate policy. This weird policy does not offer priority to peaceful resolution.  
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else who is threatening to use force. Morally it’s not acceptable. Physically it’s never going to 
happen.28 
 
  President Afeworki’s words reveal Eritrea’s firm-stand that it would not willingly withdrew 
from the occupied territories, but the international community did not stop attempting to convince 
both States to come to the negotiation table. While the then African Organization, OAU, IGAD, 
and other neighboring nations and international personalities were attempting to convince Eritrea 
to accept the United States – Rwanda Peace Plan, both of the countries “ […] pursued a massive 
buildup of force on the border [….]”29 In the mean time, both States deported huge number of 
civilian population under the guise of threat to national security.30   
  In early November 1998, OAU offered a “Framework Agreement” which was more 
elaborate, but in effect coincides with the United States/Rwanda Peace Plan, and later issued 
Modalities of implementation, and Technical Arrangement.31 The Framework Agreement required 
Eritrea to withdraw its troops from Badme and its environs, which was unacceptable to Eritrea.32  
In Eritrea’s defiance to keep status quo ante bellum, and Ethiopia’s rejection to negotiate before 
Eritrea withdrew from the “occupied territories”, in early February 1999 a devastating war broke 
                                            
28 President Isias Afwerki’s interview at EriTV, 8 July 1998 and BBC News, 1 June 1998, Tronvoll, supra note 17 at 
1040. 
29 Khadiagala, supra note 6.  
30 According to  Gystuen & Tronvoll, Eritrea deported 70,000 Ethiopians , and Ethiopia deported 75000 Eritreans or 
persons alleged voted for the Eritrean independence. See Gro Nutuen and Kjetil Tronvoll, 26 The Eritrean- 
Ethiopian Peace Agreement:  Exploring the Limits of Law, NORDISK TIDSSKRIFT FOR 
MENNESKERETTIGHETTER 19 2008. See also Khadiagala, supra note 6 at 49. 
31 MODALITIES FOR IMPELEMENTAITON OF THE OAU FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT ON THE 
SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE BETWEEN ETHIOPIA & ERITREA, 12 JULY 1999, and TECHNICAL 
ARRANGEMENTS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE OAU FRAMWORK AGREEMENT & ITS 
MODALITES, Appendix 13, Negash & Tronvoll, supra not 1 at 142.  
32 Recommendation 3 of Framework Agreement, Negash & Tronvoll, supra not 4 Appendix 7 at 122.  Eritrea rather 
raises serious of questions that appear in context counter response to the Framework Agreement. Questions like 
justification for Eritreans redeployment to the position before May 6, 1998, “whose redeployment is it?” and so 
forth see Appendix 8, Negash & Tronvoll, supra note 1.  Appendix 8 regarding Points of Clarification Raised by 
Eritrea On the OAU Framework Agreement. See Negash & Tronvoll, supra not 1 at 125.  
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out and Ethiopia was able to secure Badme – the flash point of dispute and its environs.33 After 
suffering an unexpected defeat at Badme, the next day Eritrea declared acceptance of OAU 
“Framework Agreement.”34  However, it was not a genuine acceptance; it was simply tactical 
game, as Eritrea refused to surrender villages that were not yet liberated by Ethiopia.  
  Eritrea disregarded Ethiopia’s plea for complete maintenance of status quo ante bellum in 
all occupied regions but also defied OAU’s Framework Agreement.35 As the Framework 
Agreement required Eritrea to withdraw from “Badme and its environs” Eritrea played a word 
game and asserted that the Framework Agreement did not require withdrawal from other territories 
that were occupied after May 6, 1998. This was non-sense to Ethiopia, as its forces had already 
liberated Badme making huge sacrifice. At this point, technically, both States have accepted the 
Peace Framework, but Ethiopia refused to sign ceasefire asserting Eritrea’s reluctance to withdraw 
its troops from the remaining occupied territories.36  
  In response to the Ethiopia’s full-scale war in all directions to liberate the rest of the 
occupied villages, the Security Council passed a resolution forcing both States to accept ceasefire 
and withdraw troops from all the contested territories.37 This was the moment that Eritrea was 
losing ground, and immediately accepted the resolution, but Ethiopia declined to abide by the 
Security Council Resolution, claiming it had already paid enormous human and economic costs 
                                            
33 Eritrea’s unexpected defeat at Badme surprised even Eritreans who claimed Ethiopia’s human wave that 
overwhelmed and overpowered Eritrean defense force that were holding a well dug trench, in which dead Eritrean 
troops were buried. See Hamilton supra note 1 at 118. 
34 Though Eritrea expressed its acceptance of Framework Agreement, it took provisions selectively. It stated that the 
Framework required redeployment from Badme and environs and Eritrea no more in the stated area and required 
demarcation while occupying other areas.  Ethiopian foreign minister released a press Release claiming that 
Eritrea’s acceptance was not honest and play of game.  
35 Fiona Lortan, The Ethiopia-Eritrea Conflict: A Fragile Peace, 9:4 AFRICAN SECURITY REVIEW 2 (2000). 
36 Id at 1. 
37 S.C. Res.1297 U.N. Doc. S/RES/1297 ((May 12, 2000) The Resolutions required both Ethiopia and Eritrea to stop 
war and withdrew their troops from the disputed territories. 
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due to Eritrea’s defiance to keep status quo ante bellum.38 The Security Council, however, 
imposed arms embargo on both of the States.39 In short span of time Ethiopia liberated all the 
occupied territories, and entered deep into Eritrea beyond the contested territories and seized 
strategic hills for the purpose of defense.40  
 
  6.2. The Algiers Peace Agreement 
  After liberating all the territories that were occupied after May 6, 1998 incidence, and 
maintaining defensive position, Ethiopia announced accomplishment of its military objectives and 
demanded international guarantee to accept ceasefire and withdraw its troops from uncontested 
territories of Eritrea.41 Eritrea, in turn, refused to accept ceasefire, it had been demanding while 
occupying Ethiopian territories, conditioning Ethiopia’s withdrawal from its territories that were 
occupied in June 2000. However, bearing the brunt of war, enduring pressing issues of huge 
displaced and deported citizens, suffering from economic effects of the prolonged war, and due to 
continued pressure from international actors, Eritrea consented to ceasefire, thereby signing a 
peace agreement known as “Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities” on June 18, 2000 in Algiers, 
Algeria.42   
                                            
38 Eritrea in its turn blamed Ethiopia claiming that its intent was territorial expansion. Stating that “Ethiopia’s Intent 
on Waging War: Peace was Never on its Agenda.” It further stated that “Eritrea’s acceptance of the OAU 
framework has now exposed Ethiopia’s bluff.” Press Statement of 2march 2, 1999 from the Eritrean Foreign 
Ministry Accepting the OAU Framework Agreement & Explaining the Continuation of the War. Appendix 10, 
Negash and Tronvoll, supra note 1 at 133.  
39 S.C. Res.1298 U.N. Doc. S/RES/1298 ((May 17, 2000) 
40 Lortan supra note 35 at 5. See also Kievan E. Uchehara Understating African Relationship: The Case of Eritrea – 
Ethiopia Border Dispute, &:1 INT’L J. OF SOC.  INQUIREY 66, 63 – 78 (2014).  
41 Id. at 6 
42 AGREEMENT ON CESSATION OF HOSTILTIES BETWEEN THE GOVENEMT OF THE FEDERAL 
DEMOCTRACIT REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF ERIREA, JUNE 
18, 2000, ALGIERS, ALGERIA.  The most important aspect of this agreement was deployment of observation 
mission and coordination commission to facilitate and facilitate implementation of peace agreement, and 
establishment of buffer zone of 25 Kms within Eritrean territory and repatriation of troops of both States. See also 
Uchehara supra note 40 at 68. 
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The then President of Algeria, who was chairman of OAU at the time, played a great role in 
overall negotiation process. The Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities had leveled ground for 
conclusion of subsequent agreements. Cessation of Hostility was built on three pillars:43 First, 
Parties have agreed to resolve dispute peacefully in accordance with the principles of OAU 
Charter.  Second, they have consented to reject use of force as a solution to resolve dispute. Lastly, 
the Parties have expressed their commitment to respect borders existing at independence in 
accordance with the 1964 Cairo Resolution. This means the Parties will respect colonial 
boundaries as delimited by the colonial treaties.44  
  By signing the Agreement on Cessation on Hostilities the Parties have reaffirmed 
acceptance of OAU’s Framework Agreement and Modalities for its implementation, which were 
endorsed by the Assembly of Heads of State and Governments in 35 Session of OAU that was held 
in Algiers, Algeria from 12 -14 July 1999.45  
  Parties have agreed to immediately cease hostilities just after signing the Agreement on 
Cessation of Hostiles, which set a 25 Kilometers buffer zone within Eritrean territory (Art. 12). 
While Eritrean civilians could resettle in the buffer zone, its armed forces were not allowed to 
enter into the buffer zone.  To monitor implementation of the Agreement and delimitation and 
demarcation process both parties agreed for deployment of Peace Keeping Mission. The Peace 
Keeping Mission was mandated to monitor: “cessation of hostilities”, redeployment of Ethiopian 
troops from Eritrean territories that were occupied for defensive strategy, “observance of security 
commitments agreed by both Parties”, and the respect of buffer zone from military incursion. 46    
In accordance with Art. 5 of the Agreement, the mandate of Peacekeeping Mission suspected to 
                                            
43 Id.  
44 Id.  
45 Id. at Preamble.  
46 AGREEMENT CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES  supra note 42 Art. 14(b).   
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end after boundaries of two States delimited and demarcated completely. The Framework 
Agreement provided 6 months time frame for completion of delimitation and demarcation. This 
timeframe work was too short even to understand the complex boundary setting.  
  The Algiers Agreement was concluded at a moment that Ethiopia held a strong position 
removing Eritrean troops from all the invaded territories, but Ethiopia did not require modification 
on the initial OAU Framework Agreement. The only temporary advantage that was claimed by the 
Ethiopian negotiators was impeding Eritrea to sit for negotiation and the formation of Temporary 
Security Zone inside Eritrea. The Algiers Agreement cemented the permanence and full 
implementation of the cessation of military hostilities. 
  The Algiers Agreement heralded formation of arbitration tribunals under the auspices of 
Permanent Court of Arbitration.47 The important task of delineating boundary was entrusted to 
Eritrea--Ethiopia Boundary Commission (hereinafter EEBC) while deciding on immediate effects 
of war and declaring compensation was the power of Eritrea - Ethiopia Claims Commission 
(herein after EECC). It was empowered to decide on the compensation to be awarded to redress the 
loss that the two nations have suffered as a result of the conflict.  
  As this study primarily is concerned with problems associated with boundary delineation, 
borderline, EECC’s venture appears out of context. EEBC was manned by five reputed 
international lawyers and assisted by experts having wide range of experience in setting 
international boundary delineation. Both states had appointed arbitrators of their choice while the 
United Nations chose the chairperson. The Commission set its internal procedure accordance with 
Permanent Court of Arbitration. 
 
                                            
47 Agreement Between the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Government of the 
State of Eritrea (Peace Agreement,) Ethi-Eri, Dec, 12, 2000, 40 I.L.M. 260 (2001). See also Jibril supra note 2.  
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6.2.1. Legal Authority to Arbitrate:  The Governing Law  
  Determination of governing law, procedures to be followed, and the scope of power of 
arbitrators is very important in international arbitration.48  In accordance with Art. 4(2) of the 
Algiers Agreement, EEBC was conferred with authority to settle the boundary dispute in 
accordance with pertinent colonial treaties of 1900, 1902, 1908, and applicable international 
law.49 The Algiers Agreement expressly excluded the equitable doctrine of ex aequo et bono,50 and 
has stamped finality and absolute binding nature of the decision.51 Before dealing with the arbitral 
disposition, brief assessment of laws that have been applied by EEBC is pertinent.   
 
6.2.1.1. Colonial Treaties 
 
  As pinpointed in the foregoing chapter, three colonial treaties were concluded to legally 
separate Eritrea from Ethiopia. After defeated in the battle of Adwa Italy concluded peace and 
friendship treaty with Minilik II that followed by three successive boundary treaties. In modern 
sense it is hard to take the colonial “treaties” of single provision or combination of names of 
seasonal rivers that were linked by hyphen as treaties. The “notes” were not only elusive and hard 
to implement, but also repeatedly ignored by the dominant party- Italy. The Ethiopian people 
doubt and often question EPRDF’s commitment to resolve boundary dispute in accordance with 
the defunct colonial treaties.  Thus, it is imperative to assess the validity and consequences of 
colonial treaties of 1900, 1902, and 1902. 
                                            
48 In accordance with Art. 4(11) of the Algiers Agreement, EEBC adopted its own procedures under the auspices of 
1992 Permanent Court  of Arbitration Option Rules for Arbitrating Disputes Between Two States. Accordingly, the 
Parties were required to submit their case simultaneously and all decisions made by majority vote.  
49  Ross Hebert, The End of the Eritrean Exception? SOUTH AFRICA INSTITUE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 
COUNTRY REPORT No. 8 2(2002). In the 1902 Treaty, Great Britain was also involved as former colony, Sudan, 
which bordered Eritrea and Ethiopia.  
50 The reason why Ethiopia consented to exclude the equitable doctrine of ex aequo et bono is not clear. The most 
important reason that Ethiopia tries to justify for reconsideration of the award was demarcation on the basis of 
delimitation would create harsh consequences by dividing family and ethnic groups. The equitable doctrine would 
have empowered the EEBC to regard geographic and geo-ethnic considerations.  
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6.2.1.1.1.  Legal Status of Colonial Treaties: Were the colonial treaties valid and      
                 enforceable? 
 
   It is true that most colonial African treaties were shame and never coincided with facts on 
the ground, but the Ethiopian case was very different.  First, the treaties were presented for 
signature after Ethiopia reversed Italian aggression by humiliating the colonial power. The war 
was a result of a deceptive treaty that attempted to make Ethiopia under Italian protectorate.52 
There no doubt that the Ethiopian signatories were fully aware of the fact that Italian colonial 
agents could not be trusted and an offer for treaty often backed by some kind of subtle motive.  
The other peculiar characteristic of colonial treaties with respect to Ethiopia was the fact that Italy 
invaded Ethiopia disregarding the shame treaties and redrew a new boundary line.53 In 1935 Italy 
invaded Ethiopia and mingled Ethiopian territories with Italian East African Empire. After five 
years of resistance movement, at the end of WWII, all the territories that were occupied by Italy 
were liberated. Moreover, in 1947 by the Paris Peace Treaty, Italy expressly renounced any right, 
claim or influence it had created in Ethiopia.54  
  This has effectively nullified the colonial treaties and vitiated the supposed boundary lines. 
After ten years of British trusteeship, Eritrea was reunited with Ethiopia by the U.N. mandated 
federation. In October 4, 1950 Haile Selassie I formally annulled the supposed boundary line 
                                                                                                                                               
51 Algiers Agreement Art. 5 (17). 
52  The Italian version of Art. 17 of the Wuchale Treaty did not match with the Amharic version of the same treaty. 
While the Amharic version afforded option to Ethiopia to have Italian assistance whenever needed, the Italian 
version stated that Ethiopia could only make foreign relationship through Italy.  This practically makes Ethiopia 
under Italian protectorate. As result, Italy informed European powers that they could not directly contact with 
Ethiopia. For details see W.B. Stern, The Treaty Background of the Italo-Ethiopian Dispute, 30 AM. J. INT’L L.  
191, 189 – 203 ( 1936). 
53 Regarding history of Ethio-Eritrean boundary, see Negussay Ayele, On Ethiopia’s Legitimate Claim to its Natural 
Seashores, ETHIOMEDIA.COM, (Sep. 26, 2000) Available at 
http://www.ethiopians.com/Views/Negussay_NaturalSeaShores.htm (accessed 03/23/16). 
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between Ethiopia and Eritrea declaring, “Mereb river no more separate brothers,” thereby formally 
declared colonial the treaties and the boundary line the treaties supposed to create null and void.  
Later in 1962 the Eritrean federation was abolished and Eritrea become one of the provinces of 
Ethiopia.  The Eritrean Assembly by following a legally correct procedure, voted for abolition of 
the federation. Abolition of the federation was in line with initial goals of the Unionist Party that 
had the agenda of mingling Eritrea with Ethiopian. After downfall of the monarchial regime, the 
Communist military government redrew Eritrean boundary by splitting Eritrea into two: Special 
Autonomous Region of Eritrea and Assab Administrative region.  
  After all these changes in the Eritrean boundary setting why Ethiopian authorities 
consented to abide by the defunct colonial treaties to redefine the Ethio-Eritrean boundary? 
Nowhere in the EEBC’s delimitation decision Ethiopia challenged the validity and enforceability 
of illusive colonial treaties that were trashed away by the colonial power itself.55 The treaties may 
support Eritrea’s claim at the Ethiopian cost. The Ethiopian silence on invalidity of colonial 
treaties and consent to respect long abandoned and illusive colonial boundary line is puzzling.  
  As pointed out in the foregoing chapters, EPLF requested TPLF for delineation of 
boundaries on the basis of colonial treaties, but TPLF postponed it. After 1998 United States and 
Rwanda suggested boundary dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea to be resolved in accordance 
with the colonial treaties and principles of international law. OAU’s Framework Agreement also 
makes the same reference. As pointed out in the foregoing chapters, accepting colonial boundaries 
                                                                                                                                               
54 Section VII ( Articles 33 – 38) of the Paris Peace Treaty of February 1947 that was concluded between Italy and 
Allied powers and associates like Ethiopia spells out rights of Ethiopia vis-à-vis colonial Italy. Accordingly, Italy 
renounced “all claims to special interests or influence in Ethiopia.” (Art. 34).  
55 It is submitted that this study does not challenge Eritrea’s independence, as it is the choice of people of Eritrea. The 
author does not agree with any coercive act triggering to vitiate the choice of Eritrean people. As a result of 
erroneous political decision the people of Ethiopia and Eritrea had paid unnecessary cost that has been inflicting 
pain. The current generation has to work to mitigate the effect of old wrongs and pave a way for future fraternity of 
the people. It is equally submitted that Ethiopia’s interest has to be protected. Any attempt to gain at the expense of 
the other cannot create a lasting peace.  
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as it was on the actual date of independence was one of the core principles of OAU that was 
specifically affirmed by the Cairo Resolution of 1964.  The United States/Rwanda proposal for 
maintaining status quo ante bellum was important condition for peace negotiation, which aligned 
with the Ethiopia’s quest, but Ethiopia unconditionally accepted the Peace Plan, and OAU’s 
Framework Agreement that mirrored United States/Rwanda Peace Plan without challenging the 
reference to the colonial treaties. Further Modalities for implementation of the Framework 
Agreement and Technical Arrangement also state colonial treaties as authorities for setting Ethio-
Eritrean boundary. 56  
  The clarification question on Technical Arrangement posed by Ethiopia reflects Ethiopia’s 
interest to abide by the colonial treaties as binding law governing Ethiopian Eritrean boundary line. 
The question specifically queries the reason for omission of expression “pertinent colonial treaties 
and international law.”57 Eritrea, on the other hand, appeared to be not sure of Ethiopia’s 
acceptance of the colonial treaties. This can be inferred from the Eritrea’s question forwarded to 
OAU. The fifth question that was submitted to OAU states: 
              5. Regarding colonial treaties 
• Has the OAU ascertained that both sides recognize and respect the colonial boundary 
between the two countries as defined by the established colonial treaties? 
• If this is the case, can this be affirmed through an agreement between the two Parties? 
• What is the meaning of the clause “international law applicable to the colonial treaties?” 
What is the precise interpretation of the OAU and UN Charters concerning colonial 
treaties?58 
                                            
56 Art. 11 of OAU’s Technical Arrangement states, “The delimitation and demarcation process will be done on the 
basis of pertinent colonial treaties and applicable international law.” (Emphasis mine). Paragraph V of the 
Preamble of the Technical arrangement refers to the 1964 Cairo Declaration regarding determination of African 
colonial boundaries. Article 4 of the Algiers Agreement specifically states the three colonial treaties and pertinent 
international law to resolve the boundary conflict.  
57 QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY ETHIOPIA TO THE OAU FOR CLARRIFICATION OF THE TECHNICAL 
ARRANGEMENTS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE OAU FRAMWORK AGREEMENT & ITS 
MODALITES, APPENDIX 15, Negash and Tronvoll, supra note 1 at151. 
58 Points of Clarification Raised by Eritrea on the OAU Framework Agreement that was handed over to the Secretary 
General of OAU during the meeting with the President of Eritrea in Asmara on 12 December 1998 as a follow –up 
to the Ouagadougou Meeting, 6- 7 November 1998)  Negash and Tronvoll, supra note 1 Appendix 8 at 125.  
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  Reference to the colonial boundary and elusive colonial treaties undoubtedly affords undue 
advantage to Eritrea. Italy had expansionist motive as it’s guiding policy was taking more land and 
additional territories, if not possible to occupy the whole Ethiopia. Italy induced the Ethiopian king 
by offering arms, or gifts of money to sign elusive treaties to get more territories though the 
treaties and the boundary lines that the treaties meant to create were unknown to the local people, 
as the boundary line was not set on the ground. Thus, though elusive the treaties did not set the 
actual boundary line on the ground colonial treaties believed to afford more territories to Eritrea.59 
In this scenario President Isias Afeworki’s move to ascertain the intention of Ethiopia was well 
calculated.  
  Despite Ethiopia’s unchallenged acceptance of colonial treaties, ascertainment of legality 
and enforceability of the treaties appears and the legal status of colonial boundaries is vital for 
feature peace negotiation and settlement of boundary line. In the preceding section we will briefly 
assess the validity and binding nature of the colonial treaties in line with accepted practices of 
international law.  
 
6.2.1.2. Assessing Validity of Colonial Treaties in Light of Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties   
 
  In contemporary world, Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties of 1969 (hereinafter 
VCLT) sets forth rules governing validity and enforceability of treaties. As a rule all written 
treaties are presumably valid and enforceable.60 Contracting States, however, are free to attach any 
condition or additional formality for validity and enforceability of treaties. Ratification, 
                                            
59 Eritrea had been arguing that Ethio-Eritrea boundary was clearly define by the colonial treaties. In reality, however, 
colonial treaties were not only elusive substantial portion of the boundary was not fully delimited and totally not 
demarcated. ( Malcolm N Shaw, Title control, and Closure? The experience of the Eritrean- Ethiopia Boundary 
Commission, 56 ICLQ  756, 755 – 796 (2007)  
60 Art. 2(1)(a) Vienna Convention on Law of Treaty requires only writing as a formality requirement.  Thus, oral 
agreements between states cannot be termed as treaty.  
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registration and depository are important procedural requirements of treaty that may affect the 
validity & enforceability of treaties. For instance, in accordance with Art. 102 of VCLT, all 
contemporary treaties shall be registered in the U.N. registry, but unregistered treaty is not invalid. 
However, a non-registered treaty cannot be enforced in international courts.  
  VCLT, of 1969  sets out rules regarding vices that can vitiate the validity and enforceability 
treaties.61 The vices that can taint enforceability of treaties are almost similar to vice that can 
render ordinary contracts defective and voidable. In almost all legal systems, error, duress, fraud, 
or illegality make contracts void or voidable depending upon the nature of vice.62 Thus, rules 
governing validity and enforceability of contracts, mutatis mutandis, are applicable to treaties. 
Some authors label this comparable effect of vices on treaties as contractualization of treaty.63 
Thus, as do defective contracts, a defective treaty may be void or voidable depending up on the 
nature of vice. Art. 48 of VCLT declare a treaty tainted by error may be invalidated at the request 
of party who consented erroneously. Art. 49 of VCLT sets forth the effect of fraud on treaties. The 
effect of fraud on treaties and contracts is identical – the treaty or the contract may be invalidated 
at the option of the victim of fraud. Unlike contracts, a treaty may be invalidated on account of 
corruption. Corruption may induce a representative to enter into unfair treaty or may induce 
conclusion of a treaty otherwise the representative may not consent. Corruption, of course may fall 
under category of fraud. Thus, a treaty tainted by corruption may be invalidated at the request of 
the victim of corrupt practices.64  
                                            
61 See Articles 48 – 53 of VIENNA CONVENITON ON LAW OF TREATY, available at 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201155/volume-1155-I-18232-English.pdf 
62 See  Lantera Nadew Anebo, Void Agreements and Voidable Contracts: The Need to Elucidate Ambiguities of their 
Effect, 2:1  MIZAN L. REV. 91 -109 (2008). 
63  U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, Vienna, Austria, DOC A/CONF: 39/C.1/SR.40 March  (26  - May 24, 
1968 ) Available, http://legal.un.org/diplomaticconferences/lawoftreaties-1969/vol/english/1st_sess.pdf 
64 U.N. Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties Art. 50  May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N. T.S.  331 
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  Art. 51 declare the effect of duress on treaties. In treaties coercion may take two forms. 
One a representative of nation may be personally coerced to enter into treaty or a nation may be 
coerced to conclude a treaty under threat of war. Unlike ordinary contracts, a treaty stained by 
coercion cannot produce any legal effect (void ab initio). In a way similar to illegality of contracts, 
a treaty that is contrary to jus cogens may be void (Art. 53 of VCLT). 
  Akin to vices, the effect of breach on contracts mutatis mutandis applicable to treaties. 
Breach entitles the other party to cancel a treaty. In ordinary contract, if the contract canceled, 
parties should be restituted to the position they were, as if the contract never been concluded.  In 
some case restitution may not be possible or cancellation may affect the interest of third parties in 
good faith.  In such a case, the act should remain valid.  
  Italo - Ethiopian treaty of early 19th century appears stained with variety of vices. First, the 
treaties were vitiated by deceit. After being defeated in battle of Aduwa, Italy approached Minilik 
II to conclude a boundary treaty with a view to create a lasting peace. But in fact this was not the 
true intent of Italy. Italy never intended to live as a good neighbor with Ethiopia. Concealing its 
expansionist motives Italy repeatedly cheated Emperor Minilik II by offering arms and money.65 
Take, for instance, the 1902 Treaty that was conclude between Italy, British and Ethiopia. Before 
conclusion of the treaty on May 15, 1902, in November 2014, Great Britain and Italy concluded a 
secret arrangement to take Kunama territories of Ethiopia. Hiding the true intent, the great powers 
conspired to cheat Minilik II under the guise of negotiation.66 This proves how colonial treaties 
were tainted by fraud. The Wuchale Treaty was also another fraudulent act that ultimately took 
                                            
65 In 1887 even when Minilik II was not coroneted as king of kings, Italy promised it would not take any Ethiopian 
territory (Art. 3 of the October 20, 1870 Treaty of Friendship and Alliance) and the boundary between Ethiopia and 
Italian colony of Eritrea lied south of Asmara which was in very north to the present boundary.  See.Stern, supra 
note 52 at 190 
66 See EEBC para 5.32. On November 22, 1901 Great Britain and Italian agents deliberated to “work together to 
obtain from Emperor Menelik in return for extension of  the Abyssinian boundary, a zone of territory to the east of 
the Toduluc- Maiteb line, which will give to Erythrea the whole of the Kunama tribe up to the Mareb.” (Id ). 
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lives of several Italians. As pointed out elsewhere, though Minilik II reversed invasion by winning 
Italy in the battle of Aduwa, there was no guarantee that Italy might not come back. Had Minilik II 
refused to accept the offer for boundary treaty, Italy would have used force and taken more 
territory or would have occupied the whole territory.  Therefore, in fear of implied and possible 
war, Minilik II had to sign on the boundary treaty. Thus, there was element of coercion. However, 
there was no apparent ground to prove it with a view to invoke violation of erga omens.  
  A close look at the pertinent treaties reveals the most important factor that has vitiated 
colonial treaties was breach by the dominant party- Italy. Italy utterly ignored the treaty by 
invading Ethiopia thereby occupying the whole Ethiopian territory. In 1935 Italy mingled Ethiopia 
with its East Africa colonies - Eritrea and Italian Somaliland. In 1941 Ethiopia regained its 
independence after Ethiopian patriots in support of Great Britain defeated Italy. Thus, as a result of 
fundamental breach colonial treaties were rendered dead. In 1950 Haile Selassie I formally 
declared the treaty and the boundary null and void by stating “Mereb no more separate 
brothers.”67 (Emphasis added). As Conforti and Labella, succinctly put, “ if a state formally 
denounces a treaty, it brings out certainly and definitely the fact that in its view the treaty is not 
applicable or no longer applicable as a result of its being invalid or terminated.”68 Therefore, it is 
fair to label the colonial treaties were dead by the Italian invasion and Ethiopia’s declaration of 
invalidity.69  
  However, during negotiation effort in 1998 OAU, United States and Rwanda pointed to the 
colonial treaties as guiding authorities in defining the Ethio-Eritrean boundary. For a reason not 
explicit, the Ethiopian government did not challenge the move to revive the already dead colonial 
                                            
67 Within a month of issuing an order declaring nullity of colonial treaties, Emperor Haile Selassie declared the 
statement while crossing Mereb  to visit Eritrea on Octber 4, 1952.  
68 Benedetto Conforti and Angelo Labella, Invalidity  and Termination of treaties: The Role of National Courts, 1 
EUR.J. INT’L LAW  505, 44-66 (1990).  
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treaties.70 In some cases Ethiopia expressly demanded colonial treaties to be mentioned as 
governing laws. As pointed out above, Eritrea was not sure that Ethiopia would agree to be bound 
by the colonial treaties and expressly requested OAU regarding Ethiopian view of the treaties.  
Ultimately after winning the war, and losing tens thousands of Ethiopians, Ethiopia agreed to be 
bound by the colonial treaties of early 19th century that obviously favored expansionist Italy. Now, 
therefore, it is hard, if not impossible, to challenge the binding effect of old treaties, as the dead 
treaties have revived by Algiers Agreement.  
 
6.2.1.3.    Effects of Nullity of Colonial Treaties on the Boundary Line. 
  Nullity of the colonial treaties is not doubtful; but the question is whether the treaties were 
executed or the actual borderline was created as a result of the treaties. As it is succinctly stated in 
the earlier chapters of this Dissertation, boundary making involves two major stages: Delimitation 
and demarcation. Accomplishment of these two vital steps of boundary crystalizes the boundary 
line and signals execution of treaty. After creation of the boundary line, the treaties assumed 
accomplished their purpose, and may only be resorted to ascertain boundary line in case of 
confusion or conflict. Therefore, if we take the Ethio-Eritrean boundary was actually drawn by the 
colonial treaties, subsequent nullity of the treaties will have no effect. In Eritrea/Yemen Case, it 
was declared that boundary treaties confer title to the territory and “ […] establish an objective 
territorial regime valid erga omnes.”71  As pointed out in Libya/Chad Case, boundary treaties 
                                                                                                                                               
69 Order No. 6, 1952, see EEBC para 2.10 which states, “On 11 September 1952, Ethiopia declared null and void the 
Treaties of 1900, 1902 and 1908.” 
70 The treaties were invalid as a result of unilateral action of Italy. By ignoring the “Treaties” Italy invaded Ethiopia 
in 1935 and occupied for 5 years mingling both Ethiopia and Eritrea. Then at the end of the WWII, UN recognized 
Ethiopia’s right to sea by federating Eritrea to Ethiopia. Thus, the colonial treaties were modified by the later UN 
Resolution. See Nigussay Ayele supra note 53. Professor Ayele asserts obsolescence of colonial treaties as a result 
of Italian invasion of 1935 and subsequent merger of the two countries. See also Kehsay Supra note 3. 
71 Shaw supra note 59 at 761. 
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create a borderline that “[…] will continue even if the treaty in question itself ceases to apply.”72 
This postulation accords with the principle of stability of boundary line.73 Therefore, once a 
boundary is created, it should remain in tact and should be clearly marked on the ground to avoid 
confusion and conflict. In case of boundary conflict, boundary treaties are the most important 
evidences justifying an exact location of boundary.74 The principle of stability of boundary is 
applicable only when an actual boundary line is created.  It is doubtful whether the colonial treaties 
had actual created Ethio-Ethiopian boundary line. The supposed boundary line substantially not 
delimited and totally not demarcated.  
 
6.2.1. 4. Conflicting Views in Setting Boundary Line in Each Sector: The EEBC Dilemma 
  This Section presents a brief overview of problems associated with EEBC’s delimitation 
and demarcation decision. EEBC endeavored to fill treaty lacunae by constructing treaty wordings 
and resorting to external sources like colonial reports, notes, private memorandums, and non-treaty 
maps, which further complicated boundary-making process. Even though confronted with 
numerous conflicting situations, EEBC never attempted to ascertain facts on the ground. As a 
result, the supposed boundary remained elusive and unacceptable. Moreover, the delimitation 
decision left certain areas and facts to be considered during actual physical demarcation stage, but 
never fulfilled due to non-cooperation of the Parties.  Consequently, by ignoring its promises for 
actual boundary making during physical demarcation, EEBC declared virtual demarcation with a 
view to end its mandate. The purpose of this Section is not to define a correct boundary line, but to 
show problems associated with colonial treaties and EEB’s decision with a view to stress the need 
for dialogue to draw an acceptable boundary line. 
                                            
72  Id.  See also CASE CONCERNING THE TERRITORIAL DISPUTE, LIBYA ARAB JAMAHIRYA/CHAD, 
(FEB.3, 1994), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/83/6897.pdf  
73 Shaw supra note 59. 
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6.2.1.4.1.   The Western Sector 
  The western sector of Ethio-Eritrean boundary was delineated twice. First, the 1900 Treaty 
initially set the Western boundary line to commence from Tomat at the juncture of Setit river and 
Anglo Egyptians Sudan boarder moving upwards to Todluc at the very north, then to Mai Ambessa 
and Mereb river. Had this treaty were not modified, there would be no issue on “Badme” – the 
flash point of 1998 destructive war. But Great Britain and Italy made a secret arrangement in 
Rome to take more Ethiopian territory.75 This secret plan had resulted in alteration of the 1900 
Treaty in the Western Sector. The 1902 was a tripartite treaty which defined boundaries of Sudan, 
Ethiopia and Eritrea. The modified treaty states the Western Terminus to commence from Um 
Hager (some times “Hajer”), later maps and other documents state the starting point Khor Royan, a 
river that joins Setit at the Sudan border.76 The boundary then runs eastward following river course 
of Setit. After short distance of 20 Km, there was a river called  “Maiteb” that exactly matches the 
treaty river that appears commencing from Setit river flowing northwards deep into the Eritrean 
territory. If this appears the a treaty river called “Maiteb”, as Ethiopia claims, then the next point 
of connection will be Mai Ambessa that can be connected by a straight line.77 This position is so 
clear and undoubtedly places “Badme” sometimes referred as “Yirga Triangle” and its environs 
within Ethiopian territory.  Two Italian maps and 1923 Ethiopian map substantiate this claim. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
74 Id. 
75 On November 22, 1901 Great Britain and Italy concluded a confidential arrangement to “work together in concert 
to obtain from Emperor Minilik in return for this extension of the Abyssinian boundary, a zone of territory to the 
east of the Todluc Maiteb line, which will give to Erythrea the whole of the Kunama tribe up to the Mareb.” See, 
EEBC Decision Regarding Delimitation of the Border between Eritrea and Ethiopia, 2002 iLM 1057 UN 
Documents S/2002/423, (Apr. 15, 2002) para. 5.32 
76 Id. (point 1) at para 5.07.  Adjustment of boundary line from Um Hager to  Royan was made by the agreement of 
February 18, 1903.  Id. at para 5.9. “This agreement was confirmed by a further Sudan – Eritrea agreement of 
February 1, 1916. Id. at Para 5.10.  Ethiopia accepted this agreement in 1972 by exchange of note of July 18, 1972. 
; Id. at para 5.11 at 59.  
77 In absence of contrary stipulation, connecting boundary points by a straight line is an accepted international 
experience.  As there is no treaty declaration how to connect the Ethiopia Eritrean boundary points, it is legal to 
draw a straight line between boundary points.  
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  This line of interpretation, though literally based on 1902 Treaty wordings, was not 
acceptable to Eritrea, as it relied on Italian manipulative and expansionist conducts that were 
manifested in several colonial documents including numerous maps that were unilaterally drawn 
by Italian cartographers and Italian agencies.78 In addition to the colonial maps, Eritrea presented 
several colonial reports, comments, notes, and telegrams that were unknown to Ethiopia.79 On 
Ethiopian side, due to poor archival preservation and destruction of monarchial institutions by Italy 
during the five years of occupation no document that could assist treaty interpretation was found.  
  To determine the sovereignty over location Badme, resolution of conflicting views arising 
from 1902 is imperative. The important conflict arising from 1902 Treaty was diverging locations 
and varied expressions of River “Maiteb.” The Amharic version of 1902 Treaty captions River 
“Maiteb,” as “Maiten.”80 Eritrea seizes this confusion, and argues that the treaty river that links the 
boundary line to Mai Ambessa was not actually “Maiteb,” but “ Mai Tenne” which is located at the 
very easterly south near Tomsa. As pointed out in the preceding chapter, the 1902 Treaty is the 
                                            
78 de Chaurand map of 1894,  Mai Daro map ( the map that was referred by the report of the Italian negotiator, Major 
Ciccodicola  May 16 and June 28, 1902),  a sketch Map between Great Britain and Ethiopia defining Anglo 
Egyptian Sudan and Ethiopian border which of courses applied the an identical caption to the River “Maiteb” ( Id. 
para 5.18), the map of Anglo Egyptian Sudan of 1901 the so called Talbot-Colli map,  the 1904 Italian Carta 
Dimostrativa (sometimes called Prinetti map) which doubts the Ethiopian assertion of “Maiteb” at point 3, 
“Ombrega” sheet of the Carta Dimostrativa produced by te Istituto Geografico Militare in 1903, Gubernatorial 
Decree 1903, Comando del Corpe di Stato Maggiore map of 1904, Checchi map 1904 ( para 5.57), Miani map of 
1905 ( para 5.58), Martini reports of 1906, the only map that was drawn by an Italian institute but supported 
Ethiopian position. See Id. Para 5.58), Martinin report of 1907, Italian map of 1907 ( para 5.63, Concessions map of 
1909, Pizzolato report of 1929, Zolit report of 1929 (Id. para 5. 68, Denti di pirjano report of 1932 (Id. para 5.75). 
79 Major Ciccodicola’s report of May 16, 1902 that referred to the Mai Daro sketch was accepted by EEBC and later 
one referred just like treaty map. EEBC termed this sketch as a map convincing that the Ethiopian line of “Maiteb” 
at point 3 argument was wrong. Eritrea produced several reports that Major Ciccodicola to colonial governor of 
Eritrea and several reports and suggestions that the Eritrean governor, Martini, telegrammed to Italy were produced 
as evidences as proof for treaty location of the river “Maiteb” or misunderstanding regarding the name or location of 
river “Maiteb”. 
80 No one exactly knows the source of confusion. The only possible justification can be unfamiliarity of the 
geography of the area either by the Ethiopian government and colonial powers.  It is hard to prove an exact name 
and location. Different names of rivers used at different locations. Take, for instance, the case of Setit river. At the 
Sudanese border river is captioned as Setit where at the center it is known as Sitona where the very South is 
Tekeze.  
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most confusing treaty as it uses the name of a river called “Maiteb” which, inexplicably, attributed 
to numerous tributaries in varied nomenclature.  
  The first treaty river that was captioned as “Maiteb” is located at the very west at the 
juncture of Setit river. Through the river course of Setit, “the new frontier follows [Setit] river its 
junction with Maiteb.”81  A river known as “Mai Tenne” is located 87 km further east than the 
western “Maiteb”.  The Mai Daro sketch that Ciccodicola attached to this report states “Maiteb” as 
“Meeteb” adding another confusion. EEBC remarks, “ The fact that Mai Daro map spelled the 
river as “Meeteb” does not appear to the Commission to affect the situation, for Ciccodicola 
appears to have equated “Maiteb” with “Meeteb.”82 While Ethiopia claims that the very western 
“Maiteb” was the river mentioned in the 1902 Treaty, Eritrea initially argued that it was “Mai 
Tenne” from which the boundary line connected by a straight line to Mai Ambessa and then 
follows Mereb River courses to the easterly direction.  
  But later Eritrea changed this stance and asserted that the boundary line runs from Setit 
Tomsa (at point 6) to Mai Ambessa. Eritrea also “ […] suggested that the original Treaty reference 
to the “Maietb” was actually to the Sittona (Point 4).” Several other earlier or later maps have also 
used different nomenclature. De Chaurand Map of 1894, an Italian geographer, applies the name 
Maitebbe–Meeteb while the later map of Mai Daro states “Meeeteb” but all at different locations.  
  EEBC gave unnecessary authentication to the unilateral sketch that was referred by reports 
of the Italian negotiator, Major Ciccodicola, to Martine, the governor of Eritrea and latter’s report 
to the Italian legislator. Moreover, EEBC attested that Mai Daro sketch was known to Minilik II 
during negotiation. This assertion raises questions on Ethiopian side. First, it is simply a unilateral 
                                            
81 Art. I(II) of 1902 Treaty. The Amharic version of the 1902 Treaty states “Maiten” while the English version of the 
treaty calls it “Maiteb”.  
82 See Id. paras 5.22 and 5.23 EEBC p. 63.  The Commission took Ciccodicola’s remarks as authority that revealed 
the intention of negotiators. (Id. para 5.23) 
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report that was known to Ethiopia. Second, if Minilik II had accepted it, why not the sketch was 
not attached to the treaty? Finally, how EEBC accepts unilateral statements of Italian authorities as 
proof for common intention of Parties? It appears contrary to the general principles of law of 
evidence to accept a document written by a party unilaterally as evidence in favor of the writer.83 
As this fact cannot be disproved by Ethiopia, it appears unfair. This makes EEBC’s decision 
unrealistic which will remain as a stabling block for future peaceful coexistence and good 
neighborhood of the two brotherly nations of Ethiopia and Eritrea. EEBC’s biased stand regarding 
Ethiopian claim can be read from the expression it mentioned in para 5.65.  In this case Ethiopia 
presented a map of 1923, which depicted Setit – Mareb link as running from western Maiteb to 
Mai Ambessa exactly as Ethiopia claims. EEBC stated this map as “the so called Haile Selassie 
map” of 1923. Why “the so called” expression which never been so even in the case of private, 
reports, or comments?  
Professor Abbnic surmises that the takings of both Ethiopia and Eritrea are wrong. To 
Professor Abbink a real Maiteb would be the one that reflects local facts.  In the words of Abbink: 
Eritrea pretentiously claimed that the ‘Maiten’ stream, due east, was the “Maieteb” of the 
1902 Treaty (see EEBC 2002:14). Ethiopia, equally pretentiously, claimed that the ‘real’ 
Maiteb was located far in the west, about 20 Kms. east of the town of Umm Hager. The 
names were indeed on the old maps (there are at least three ‘Maitbs’ or Meetebs), but both 
claims were wrong.  Looking at the available maps and the confusion on geographical names, 
the question of deciding on where the ‘real’ Maiteb is located is up to a certain extent 
arbitrary. There was no compelling logic in the extant documents for the Commission to 
follow.  This fact made it all the more important look at actualities, feelings of belong of the 
local population, affectivities, etc.  that evolved in the last 50 years especially since the end of 
Italian occupation in 1941.84  
 
                                            
83 As Eritrea now stands at the shoes of Italy invoking all the privileges Italy had at the moment, citation of 
documents unilaterally written and archived by Italy should not be accepted in a way favoring Eritrea.  84 Jon Abbink, Badme and The Ethiopian-Eritrean Conflict: Back To Square One?, ETHIOMEDIA.COM, FEB 
2003. Professor Abbink surmises that EEBC could have made an acceptable decision if it considered ethno 
geographic facts on the ground.  The decision even created a worse scenario by spoiling the already established 
boundary. EEBC could have gone beyond the confusing treaty following the “applicable international law ” to 
ascertain the true meaning. For a reason not clear enough the Commission opted to follow the Italian assertion. In 
the words of Abbink, “ Remarkably, the Commission incomprehensibly took over the Tomsa point from the 
Italians, who had unilaterally claimed it in the 1930s.” Id.  
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To Ethiopia, the Eritrean line of argument is absolutely wrong. The beginning from the 
Sudanese border is not hard to comprehend and there is no disparity, at least, until the beginning of 
the “Maieteb” that Ethiopia argues for. By ignoring the “Maieteb” that could be seen after 20 Kms 
from the Sudanese border, Eritrea simply followed lines of Setit river to the Tomsa point to the 
south wards. Eritrea stood at Italian expansionist position of 1930s – an expansionist position that 
Italy attempted to justify its expansionist stance before moving to occupy the whole Ethiopian 
territory.85  EEBC was influenced by the bulk of colonial archives that Italy unilaterally produced 
and opted to follow the Eritrean line of argument rather than making neutral investigation to know 
the real treaty junction that contractants referred to Maieteb. Conflicting spots that may be viewed 
as treaty junction could have been cured with though investigation of facts on the ground. Study of 
historical facts and changes that took place since conclusion of the treaty would fairly indicate a 
possible boundary point.  
  The other problem related to 1902 Treaty was allocation of Kunama tribe to Eritrea.  As 
has been mentioned elsewhere in this work, Kunama are indigenous people that were repeatedly 
vacated from their land after arrival of Semitic people from South Arabia. Kunama had been 
repeatedly moving to the uninhabitable territories that powerful people would not claim. Denti di 
Pirjano report of 1932 proves this assertion. The report describs Mai Ten in some detail and 
indicates finding of “ […] the ruins of a destroyed [K]unama village at a point which would appear 
to lie east of the Eritrean claim line.  While clearly evidencing the absence there of [K]unama at 
that time, it does suggest that [K]unama had lived there earlier.”86 The 1902 treaty had objective of 
                                            
85 Id.  As Gbenga Oduntan rightly remarks, “ Italian colonial policy and maneuvers was one of the duplicity and 
gradual encroachment.” See  GBENGA ODUNTAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BOUNDARY 
DISPUTES IN AFRICA 187(2015).  
86 Id. at para 5.76  
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allocating Kunama that had an elusive and unsettled borderline, to Eritrea.87 As a result, 
delimitation of  Kunama land was postponed but never done.88 This has impact on the reasoning of 
the EEBC that appears to be Eritrean legal team brief in which EEBC justified to move the treaty 
“Maiteb” to the Sittona under the guise of nomenclature of “Meeteb”.  
  EEBC came across three Italian maps that coincided with the Ethiopian map of 1923, 
which affirmed the Ethiopian claim i.e. correctness of the western Maiteb, it did not give any 
weight.89 Moreover, EEBC repeatedly expressed that Ethiopia did not object colonial actions, 
suggestions, and unilateral maps of Italy.90 Fairly thinking Ethiopia had no possibility to know 
unilateral actions (reports, memos, maps, suggestions, comments of Eritrean governors) and 
intentions of Italy or its agencies operating from Eritrea. Moreover, EEBC did not consider 
Ethiopia’s situation at the time.  Was Ethiopia’s silence for unpublished thoughts deemed as 
acceptance?  
  In 1920s, when Ethiopian governors increasingly become conscious about Italian 
manipulations, Ethiopia asserted and fought any military or private intrusion into the territories in 
Yirga Triangle or territories that EEBC ceded to Eritrea as a result treaty interpretation.91 As 
pointed out in paragraph 5.74 of EEBC’s delimitation decision, Ethiopian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs formally requested Eritrean authorities to stop illegal intrusion to Adiabo that killed 
                                            
87 This is implicit in Garasellassie’s letter that was addressed to Maritin, Eritrean governor in which he expressed his 
view regarding Kunama land. According to Garasellassie, “Cunama is a name that we generally apply to all of the 
Baria villages.”87 Baria is a tribe to the very north in Eritrea. May be Garasellassie took Kunama land was far way 
from the actual Kunama land.   
88 As clearly expressed in para. 5.34 EEBC reference to Kunama tribe involves two prong action. One determination 
of boundaries of Kunama which is not easy then determining boundaries of Ethiopia and Eritrea. If the first step 
skipped or cannot be done, the next stage also fails.  
89 EEBC remarked, “It has noted that three early Italian maps how the Ethiopian claim line, as does not Ethiopian 
map of 1923.” ( EEBC supra note 69, Para 5.88)  
90  Id. at para 5.88  in which EEBC remarked “ There is no record of any timely Ethiopian objection to these maps.” 
91 As EEBC pointed out, Ethiopia did not fully administer or claimed its authority over the whole territory until 
western Maiteb. ( See Id. at para 5.93 – 5.95  EEBC also pointed out that Ethiopia exercised its authority only 1/5 
of the claimed territory. Given economic development, communication and technological backwardness, it was not 
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Ethiopian citizens at Mai Tani.92  In 1931 – 1932 there was incident in area of Mochiti, which is in 
Yirga Traiangle that EEBC views within Eritrea’s claim line.93 At the time, Ethiopia sought 
Eritrean authorities to withdraw from Mochiti and Gongoma.94  Also sporadic friction happened at 
Acqua Morchiti.95  In 1920’s Ethiopians repeatedly requested for demarcation of the border that 
fell into deaf ears.96 These clashes, and requests to cease and decease “illegal intrusion” proves 
Ethiopia’s rejection of Italy’s move.  
  Most importantly, EEBC has failed to say a word on effect of 1935 Italian invasion and 
nullity of earlier treaties and redrawing internal administrative boundary line. Italy after occupying 
Ethiopia, it mingled its East African colonies. In this situation should it be fair to refer to the failed 
colonial treaties and elusive boundary lines it sought to draw?  
 
6.2.1.4.2.    The Central Sector 
  The 1900 Treaty covers the Central Sector starting from the last end of Western Sector at 
Mai Ambessa. It is noticeable that the 1902 Treaty has modified the first part of the 1900 Treaty. 
In this Section we will briefly deal with the supposed boundary line in between Mai Ambessa, 
Mareb, Belesa and Muna until it is linked by the 1908 Treaty of Eastern Sector. Central Sector, 
like the Western Sector of the borderline, is a contentious boundary regime.  
  As pointed out in the foregoing Chapters, the 1900 Treaty was a note of one page in which 
only a single provision meant to define Central Sector of Ethio-Eritrean boundary. The single 
provision merely mentions supposed boundary rivers.  Thus the Central boundary line was 
                                                                                                                                               
easy to reach all its territories.  Italy was advanced at the time and had all possibilities to patrol and control all 
territories including Ethiopia. ( Id. at para 5.93). 
92 Id. at Para 5.74. 
93 Id. at Para 5.76. 
94 Id.  
95 Id.at  para 5.94. 
96 See Id. at paras 5.66,  Para 5.72  
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assumed to follow “Mareb”, “Belessa”, and end at the juncture of  “Muna”.97 While “Mareb” starts 
at the conjunction of Mai Ambessa, the end of supposed river course of Muna is a perplexing task 
– there was river called Muna in the vicinity. In Irob regions, for example, the boundary line 
marked by River Muna has been strongly condemned, as the local people do not know a river 
called “Muna.” It is either non-existent or captioned by another name.  The traditional 
administrative boundary between territories currently making Eritrea and Tigray was River Mereb. 
Territories beyond River Mereb captioned as Medri Bahir (a name used by Abyssinians before 
Italian colonization). The original version of 1900 Treaty appears to reflect the traditional 
territories of Medire Bahir.  As a result, during setting boundaries of Eritrea, Emperor Minilik II 
sought the boundary line to be deep north in Eritrea’s territory, but Italy offered a gift of 5,000,000 
that silenced the Emperor to accept the boundary line at Mareb, Belessa and Muna water courses.98  
  Central boundary line is marked by river course of Mai Ambessa, Mareb, and Belesa. “The 
identity and courses of  Mareb, the location of its confluence with the Mai Ambessa, and the 
location of its confluence with the Belesa, are all agreed by the Parties.”99 This is a de facto 
(traditional administrative) boundary between Agame district of Tigray and Acchale Guzai district 
of the former Medire Bahir (renamed as Eritrea by Italy). As a result of long recognition of Mareb, 
Belesa as Boundary Rivers, there is no apparent dispute in this part of the Central Sector.  
As pinpointed above, the most important problem of Central Section of Ethio-Eritrean boundary is 
“nomenclature for various stretches of relevant waterways, in particular the Belesa and the 
Muna.”100 The changing nomenclature coupled with scanty maps that were based on limited 
geographic information and documentary references compounded the problem. The 1900 Treaty 
                                            
97 This coincides with provisional boundary agreement that was entered for building peace after the battle of Adwa. 
Article IV of the Peace Agreement of October 1896 states “ […] provisional frontier, determined by the courses of 
the Mareb, Belesa, and Mouna Rivers.”  (Id. at para 4.6.).  
98  Id. at Para 4.7. 
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defines boundary line to follow watercourses of Belesa-Muna but identification of an intended 
watercourse that may be considered as boundary lines is an uphill task. Settlement of the intended 
watercourse that may be taken as Belesa will definitely help resolve the dispute. Resolution of the 
issue involving an actual watercourse of Belesa and identifying a river captioned as Muna are 
crucial to delimit boundaries of central sector. It will not only resolves sovereignty over Badme but 
also would resolves Irob issue.  
  The Treaty Map shows Belesa flowing to easterly direction.101 It also shows the two 
unnamed small rivers that flow to the direction of the river Belesa; one flowing from south toward 
Belsa while the other one from east. Despite the map that shows no tributary flowing from north to 
Belesa, in fact there are several tributaries flowing from northeast to Belesa.102 The other 
complexity is modern maps depict two rivers that may be viewed as Belesa.103 Each party chose a 
river that supports its claim. EEBC captioned these rivers as: Belesa A, Belesa B and Belesa C. 
Modern maps also show several unnamed small rivers flowing northwards to Belesa from south.  
  Eritrea claims Belesa B as a tributary to actual Belesa (Belesa A as designated by EEBC). 
Ethiopia, however, strongly argues that Belesa A is the tributary of actual Belesa ( i.e. Belesa B). 
EEBC has accepted Ethiopia’s assertion.(Para 4.22). Thus, Belesa A is southern tributary of the 
actual Belesa (Designated by EEBC as Belesa B) (para 4.18)  As described in paragraph 4.23 the 
treaty map shows a small tributary to Belesa B, which was not named in the  treaty map or de 
chaurands’ map.  Ethiopia “identifies” this tributary as Sur. ( Para 4.23)  EEBC designates as Belesa 
C.  Later EEBC took this tributary as “[…] continuation of the boundary line [….]” (Para 4.23). 
Though the treaty map is silent, modern maps depict several tributaries to Belesa C. The treaty 
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map instead goes overland to River Muna.  However, EEBC decided,  “[…] Treaty Boundary 
follows the line of the most southerly of the small tributaries of the Belesa C. On modern mapping, 
the tributary has its source close to the modern town of Zalambessa.” 104 
  The next issue relates to location and identity of River Muna. Both contending Parties 
agree the fact that the treaty reference to “[…] the boundary line in this sector […] cannot be 
literally correct.” (Para 4.25).  The most perplexing problem with regard to River Muna is 
disagreement by the Parties regarding identity of the very river – Muna (Para 4.26). While the 
treaty map refers to Mai Muna and de Chaurand map captions it as Maj Mena which flow East 
South arising from south of Barachit until it reaches Endeli and Ragali (Para 4.27).  
  As the Treaty Map either omits or “contains inconsistent indications,” 105 Ethiopia views a 
river designated as Mai Muna as Endeli and the river depicted in the Treaty Map as Mai Muna as 
BerBero Gedo (Para 4.28). As a result of the dilemma, EEBC has used both of the names of the 
river suggested by Ethiopia and Eritrea simultaneously. Ethiopia proves persistent confusion over 
river “Muna” in 1900 Treaty as follows:   
(i) Ciccodicola, the principal Italian negotiator, recorded in 1903 that “the Endeli, a 
tributary of the Muna, [had ben] designated to him[i.e., Emperor Menelik] as waters 
of the Muna, “ and that it was on that basis that the Emperor had signed the 1900 
Treaty; 
(ii) In January 1904 the Italian Governor of Eritrea noted in his diary that “[o]ur mistake 
is to have confused it [the Muna] with the Endeli, “a confusion which Ethiopia 
suggests shows that the Parties intended the boundary to follow the northernmost 
branch of the Endeli system, thereby leaving the Irob district to Ethiopia.  
(iii) The Italian Boundary Commission of 1904 […] was unable to find a river clearly 
identified as the “Muna.”  […] expressed considerable uncertainty in its attempt to 
identify the Berbero Gado as the river corresponding to the “Muna”106 
 
Consequently, Ethiopia strongly argues that Irob woreda as part of Agame, but Eritrea denies.107  
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Ethiopia’s assertion is based on facts on the ground. At a location designated as Muna actually we 
have Endelli. The river course marked on the map is actually Berbero Gedo. Eritrea, however, 
stick to the wording of colonial treaty or unilateral maps.  To Eritrea a river identified on the map 
as “T mai Muna” with its head water south of Barachit, constituted the boundary and that there 
was a river with the name in the place so that this river was the boundary.”108 EEBC preferred to 
the Eritrean line of argument, which disregards facts on the ground and adjudged taking literal 
wordings of treaty. It concluded, “Parties had agreed to a treaty which referred to the Muna and 
that the treaty map showed a boundary line following a river designated as Muna, following from 
south of Barachit running generally east toward to Salt Lake.”109 
  The last issue that EEBC decided on regarding Central Sector was is the eastern terminal 
point. As usual there was disagreement on this point. Eritrea argues, “Muna ends at the confluence 
with the Endeli (located at the village of Massolae, at point 27 (para 4.45).  Eritrea further asserts 
that Endeli turns northeast and becomes Ragali in which the river continues southeast to Djibouti. 
(para 4.45). Surprisingly, the 1900 Treaty or the accompanying map, nor the 1908 treaties does not 
clearly reveal the terminal point at Massolae.  In fact, Massole is located within 60 kms distance as 
stated in 1908 Treaty but both River Muna and the boundary line extends beyond Massolae. (para. 
4.47). Thus, Massolae’s apparent location within 60 Km scope cannot be a ground to conclude 
Central Sectors ends at Massolae. Ethiopia, however, argues that the river that may be termed as 
‘Muna’ continues to the town of Ragali and then the terminal point lies. Therefore, EEBC did not 
accept Eritrea’s line of argument regarding the end of 1900 Treaty and the beginning of 1908 
Treaty, as the Treaty map depicts that the river captioned as Muna continued toward eastward and 
terminated at Salt Lake. (4.49). Taking note of contemporary situation and based on 1900 Treaty 
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and accompanying map EEBC decides that boundary line “follows Ragali at point 29 until reaches 
its terminus at the Salt Lake.”110 
 
6.2.1.4.3.   The Eastern Sector 
  The 1908 Treaty sets the Eastern Sector of Ethio-Eritrean boundary. The Eastern Sector 
runs, “ From the most easterly point of the frontier established […] by the Treaty of the 10th July, 
1900, the boundary continues south-east, parallel to and at a distance of 60 kilometers from the 
coast [.…]”111 The Treaty of 1908 has deprived Ethiopia’s historical access to sea. It may be 
surprising to know that Emperor Minilik II had suggested the 60 Km from coast “formula” to serve 
as “modus vivendi” to set the eastern sector of Ethio-Eritrean boundary.112 It is plausibly wrong to 
suggest that Minilik II deliberately acted in a way affecting Ethiopia’s interest. It is true Ethiopia 
needs sea access and there is no reason to give away its land without any consideration.  On 
Ethiopian side there is still unsettled issue:  why Minilik II had negotiated to give Ethiopia’s right 
of sea access way? The 1908 treaty does not supply any rationale for setting the boundary line at 
the stated spot and all other justifications may be speculations. Among the various intelligent 
guesses, Italian subtle influence will take forefront. As a result of this treaty Ethiopia has been 
paying unnecessary cost.113 
  The 1908 Treaty has some special features that were not stipulated in prior boundary 
treaties. First, unlike the prior treaties, the 1908 Treaty applies geometric boundary delineation 
method. As we have observed above, both 1900 and 1902 Treaties apply natural boundary making 
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methods by using rivers, mountains or lakes, but 1908 treaty declares mathematical rule for 
delineating easterly boundary. Second, unlike prior boundary treaties, the 1908 Treaty is not a 
treaty of single provision – it has six provisions.  Thirdly, the 1908 Treaty makes consideration of 
geographic facts on the ground and attempts to keep socio-economic relationship among the 
borderland residents from both sides. Thus, the 1908 Treaty not only makes boundary line, but also 
declares rules that meant to regulate continuity of historical relationships among the borderland 
people that were split by the artificial borderline. It also stipulates mechanisms of dispute 
resolution.  
  The Eastern Sector of Ethio-Eritrean boundary commences from the end of the Central 
Sector – that is Salt Lake and ends at the northwestern end of the Djibouti border.  Eritrea argues 
that the 1908 treaty has clearly set boundary and demanded only demarcation in accordance with 
the modus vivendi. However, EEBC did not accept this assertion stating that there were several 
issues that need to be settled before the actual demarcation. First, as the boundary measurement 
has to start from coast, a spot that may be taken as coast has to be settled.  Second, an exact point 
at which the boundary line terminates has to be agreed or decided. Finally, the supposed boundary 
line was not demarcated for long time and the delimitation is not complete in accordance to the 
wordings of the treaty that require consideration of facts on the ground. 
  The term “Coast” may be asserted to include islands in which case the boundary line may 
be set at the Red Sea but Ethiopia  “[…] abandoned its conception of the coast as including islands 
and submitted in its concluding argument [….]”114 Thus, the term “Coast” has to be understood “ 
the continent itself.”115 This aligns with the Eritrea’s position. EEBC has decided to implement the 
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114 EEBC supra note 69 para 6.19. 
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Eastern Sector by taking satellite image of the coastline of Eritrea and then computing up to 60 Km 
inland.116  
  With Regard to the Eastern Sector EEBC did not accept Parties contention of subsequent 
acts that could potentially modify the treaty boundary.  Almost all of the Eritrea’s contentions fell 
within the scope of geometric boundary delineation. The calculation of the mathematical boundary 
begins from the coast to point 31 and it proceeds in the same way until reaches to the western edge 
of Ethio-Djibouti boundary at point 41.  
  In conclusion, EEBC has heavily relied on the unilateral Italian maps, colonial reports, 
comments and memos to ascertain elusive treaty wordings, confusing and unavailable or changing 
river designations. Ethiopia persistently argued against undue reliance on colonial reports, memos 
or unilateral maps that did not coincide with treaty wordings, especially in the Western Sector. 
While the 1902 Treaty expresses the boundary follows river “Maiteb” at the juncture of Setit, 
EEBC considered unilateral Italian maps and other personal notes, like Ciccordicola’s report, and 
memorandums of Martine, the then governor of Eritrea, regarding Western Sector and to find out 
intention of parties.  The maps, reports or memos or comments may reflect Italy’s intention but not 
necessarily common thoughts of the Parties. Similarly in the Central Sector various tributaries 
were not considered in the treaty and EEBC troubled to find out a river that may taken as Belessa. 
Though EEBC took a mid way approach to decide the treaty river Belesa B which flows to 
unavailable or a wrong river called Muna.  
  These confusions led to the delimitation of unacceptable boundary line that has staled 
demarcation or led EEBC to get out of the case at the back door by declaring the most confusing 
and unintended demarcation – virtual demarcation.  There are several issues that were pending to 
be decided during actual physical demarcation.  For instance EEBC remarked, “ the Commission 
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holds that the determination of the boundary within rivers must be deferred until the demarcation 
stage.”117 With regard to the specification of coordinates at the Eastern Sector EEBC again 
concludes, “All coordinates will be recalculated and made more precise during the demarcation as 
the Commission acquires the additional necessary information.”118 A commentator familiar with 
Ethio-Eritrean situation remarks, “[…] in view of highly relevant social and historical aspects of 
the boundary issue, the EEBC decision is not the best that could have been made, and may in fact 
have perpetuated the conflict between the two countries.”119  EEBC’s decision has not met the goal 
of Algiers Agreement.  It has not normalized relationship; we have still antagonism, fear, and 
threat of armed confrontation. Jon Abbink concludes, “[…] it seems that there are flaws in 
[EEBC’s] judgment.”120 He further notes, “Some claim that the EEBC missed a great opportunity 
to bring the resolution of the conflict a decisive step forward.”121 Others, however, view that given 
the mandate envisaged in Algiers Agreement, EEBC did “ […] best that could be made on the 
basis of the pertinent colonial treaties and applicable international law.”122 Whatever the 
justification be, in reality, the Ethio-Eritrea issue is not solved yet; the key to unlock the deadlock 
at the hand of the both nations. 
 
6.2.1.1.2    Applicable International Law 
  In addition to the three colonial treaties, EEBC was authorized by the Parties to consider 
the “applicable international law”.   The Algiers Agreement has no provision defining the meaning 
and scope of “Applicable International Law,” but Ethiopia later, in the midst of hearing 
unsuccessfully attempted to limit the scope of “Applicable International Law” to the interpretation 
                                            
117 EEBC supra note 69, Para 7.2.  
118 Id. at 101.  
119  Abbink, supra note 7 at 142.  
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121  EEBC purely relied on elusive colonial treaties by ignoring “applicable international law. Jon Abbink remarks, “ 
From the purely legal point of view this is also a puzzling feature.” views this ignorance “ Id. at 146.   
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of treaties.  EEBC, however, did not accept this contention. EEBC afforded an expanded 
connotation to the notion as defined in Botswana/Namibia Case. 123 In this Case, Contesting 
Parties requested ICJ to determine the dispute in accordance with Anglo – German Treaty of July 
1890 and the rules of and principles of international law. The Court, however, declared that the 
meaning of principles of international law was not merely confined to interpretation of treaty 
wordings. Similarly, EEBC concluded that the expression, “Applicable International Law” meant 
rules of international law applicable to resolve border dispute “[…] in particular, the rules relating 
to the effect of conduct of the parties.”124 It includes, all doctrines, practices, conventions, 
customary laws and international law precedents.  
  Though EEBC was expressly barred from application of ex aequo et bono (what it thinks 
merely “just and fair”) or cannot simply be guided by its conscience, the belief and understanding 
of a member had huge impact in resolving dispute. Confronted with dilemma, in several instance 
the arbitrators resorted to their belief, stating “the Commission believes.…” The exclusion of the 
doctrine of “ex aequo et bono” actually was not helpful, as it justified EEBC to turn blind eyes 
whatever injustice happens due the supposed boundary line. EEBC’s boundary line would divide 
family, ethnic groups that have been living together from the time immemorial. Take, for instance, 
the case of Irob people who have decided to fight EEBC’s delimitation decision that would divide 
them.  
  Generally, under the authority of “applicable international law” EEBC was not confined to 
the rules of interpretation of treaty provisions, but was empowered to apply both substantive and 
procedural law doctrines of international law, including but not limited to, the accepted 
international principles of international law like, principles of estoppel, the notion of critical date, 
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principles of determining boundaries following rivers,125 the doctrine of uti possidetis, 
international precedents, the rule of effectivity, the doctrine of contemporaneity, and subsequent 
conduct of parties and so forth.  
  As both Parties do not contest regarding the coverage the three colonial treaties cover the 
whole boundary between Ethiopia and Eritrea, EEBC rightly gave priority to the colonial treaties 
before resorting to international law.  An applicable international law may come into play only 
when the treaties fail to draw a clear boundary line. Put simply, resort international law may be 
made only to fill treaty lacunae, or facts on the ground or the borderline was changed by the 
subsequent act of parities. Thus, “[…] relevant treaties had to be examined first, and only then 
would recourse be made to the rules of general international in order to see if provisions of the 
treaties needed to be modified.”126  When words or phrases in the treaties appear vague or hold 
varied meaning, EEBC had authority to ascertain the meaning of treaty wordings by assessing the 
intention of parties in accordance with the principles of international law.  
  In accordance with ordinary rules of interpretation, if literal interpretation of words, 
phrases or statements is not helpful to ascertain meaning, the tribunal may assess common 
intention of parties at the time of conclusion of treaty. The tribunal will not simply search for 
intention of one of the parties to a treaty, as it may lead into a wrong conclusion, as the intention or 
assertion of one party may not necessarily be acceptable to the other party. It may be easy to find 
out of the motives of one of the parties, but it cannot prove common intent. Needless to say, 
assessment of intention of one the Parties to the treaty is contrary to the accepted rules of 
interpretation of laws and would lead into a wrong conclusion. 
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  In accordance with the international law doctrine of contemporaneity, treaties should be 
interpreted “ […] by reference to the circumstances prevailing when the treaty was concluded.”127 
Socio-economic facts, names, meaning of words, outlooks and so forth prevailing at the time of 
conclusion of treaty should be taken into account.  For example, most Ethiopians, at present 
question why Emperor Minlik II consented to the biased colonial treaties, or concluded treaties 
with Italy to separate Ethiopian territories? A response to these questions if based on current facts 
would lead into condemnation. To respond correctly, we have to put ourselves into early 19th 
century Ethiopia and assess the overwhelming pressure from European side on largely unexposed 
African tribal chiefs. Similarly, “ The determination of the meaning and effect of a geographical 
names used in a treaty, whether of a palace or of a rive, depends upon the contemporary 
understating of the location to which that name related at the time of the treaty.”128  
  A treaty may be modified by express words or by subsequent conduct of parties or one of 
the parties with implied or express approval of the other party. Assessment of subsequent conduct 
of parities is vital as it may amend the treaty provisions by conduct ascertainable to both parties. 
Silence of a party, where an overt act that is contrary to the treaty took place, may be taken as 
implied approval. As EEBC has quoted from Permanent Court of International Justice, in assessing 
subsequent conduct the most important consideration is, “ […] whether the Parties by their conduct 
have altered or impaired their rights.”129 In Ethiopia and Eritrea case, numerous subsequent 
conduct that had huge impact on the colonial treaties may be cited. The Italian invasion of 1935 
was the most notorious one that has trashed all of the treaties. Moreover, the treaties were not 
known to the local people and previously unoccupied regions like Badme were settled by the local 
people who never assumed the territory belonged to some one else. After Eritrea’s federation to 
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Ethiopia, the treaties were formally rendered null and void, which was not opposed by the Eritrean 
parliament.130  
   Subsequent contrary conduct by one of the party’s can be taken as variation of the terms of 
treaty if the other party takes no action. Even the case of Badme is disputable, assuming it was on 
the Eritrean side, in 1950 Ras Mengesha of Tigray developed Badme plains for commercial 
agriculture and agricultural workers and laborers settled therein without any objections from, 
Eritreans parties or any organ acting on behalf of Eritrea. This may be taken as an instance of 
modification of treaty provision by one of the parties.  As summed by ICJ in Temple Case if 
subsequent conduct of a party “[…] which it was reasonable to expect that the other would 
expressly have rejected if it had disagreed with it, the Court concluded that the later was estopped 
or precluded from challenging the validity and effect of the conduct of the first.”131  The arbitration 
agreement between Egypt and Israel often referred, as Taba Case132 is another situation illustrating 
variation of treaty by subsequent conduct. In this case pillars were erected at a spot contrary from 
treaty wordings but for a long period there was no objection. This was taken as tacit acceptance 
and parties later estopped from challenging the variation.  
  EEBC has also considered effectivite’s, actual display of sovereignty, as a ground that may 
alter treaty provisions. For determination of actual display of sovereignty determination of critical 
date is vital. In the case of Ethiopian and Eritrean boundary, the question is the critical date in 
which Italy took sovereignty over the territories delineated by the colonial treaties.  If signature on 
boundary treaty creates boundary line irrespective of demarcation, it may be taken colonial treaties 
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had already created in Addis Ababa. This assertion may not necessarily true in all circumstances. 
Sometimes, enforcement of treaties may be attached with some conditions of important procedural 
requirement. Take, for instance, the need for ratification or registration of treaties for its finality. In 
these cases, a treaty cannot automatically create boundary line until the stated condition is met or 
procedural requirement’s satisfied.  
  Colonial treaties that supposed to define Ethio-Eritrean boundary, were not only vague but 
were also incomplete. In numerous instances the treaties deferred boundary making to later date 
for consideration of local facts, which was never done until EEBC’s decision in April, 2002.133 For 
instance, EEBC summed that “[…] each of these boundaries was, to varying degrees, not fully 
delimited.”134 The boundary was not only fully and clearly delimited, but also totally not 
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river boundary by reference to coordinates. The Parties also declared deferment of river line determination to 
demarcation stage (Id. para 7.2. – 7.3) which is not done so far. Regarding determination of actual boundary line in 
the vicinity of Tserona EEBC summed that a precise boundary line “[…] to be determined more precisely during 
he demarcation,” which still not done. (See Id.  para 8.1 iv)  Similarly,  EEBC concludes, “ The current outer edge 
of Zalambessa will be determined more precisely during the demarcation” (Id. para 8.1 vi). However, it was never 
determined. Finally, the Commission concluded, “ All coordinates will be recalculated and made more precise 
during the demarcation as the Commission acquires the additional necessary information.” (Id. para 8. 3)  But 
never done  
134 EEBC in Para 2.7.  For instance, the English translation of Amharic version of Art. iii of 1902 Treaty is a clear 
instance.  It states: 
 The boundary between the junction of the Mai Ten and Setit to the junction of Mereb and Mai Anbessa will be 
decided after representative of the Italian government and the Ethiopian government look into the question and 
reach agreement. 
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demarcated. It was with this understanding that EEBC was conferred with the authority to delimit 
and demarcate the boundary.  However, any argument that claims total absence of borderline 
between Ethiopia and Eritrea cannot hold water. As each region in Ethiopia has its known 
boundary line, there is a clear line of separation that has been accepted to borderland residents. 
This is a clear and undisputable boundary line but colonial treaties have distorted it.135  
   As repeatedly pinpointed, the Ethio-Eritrean colonial treaties were concluded in Addis 
Ababa, but nothing was done on the actual border until the eve of WWII in 1935 in which Italy 
occupied the whole Ethiopian territories including territories stated in the colonial treaties. EEBC 
concluded that colonial treaties were crystalized in 1935 when Italy invaded the whole Ethiopia 
and actually took control of the whole Ethiopian territories.  
  Determination of the critical date is very important in international boundary making. In 
the case African States that liberated from colonial yoke, a critical date for determination of 
boundary is the date of independence.136 OAU’s Framework Agreement, and the Algiers 
Agreement pointed to the Cairo Resolution of 1964 for determination of boundary. In Eritrean 
case, the situation is very complicated. After Eritrea was liberated from Italian occupation it was 
held under British trusteeship for ten years until 1952 and later Eritrea federated to Ethiopia and 
Haile Selassie declared that Mereb no more separate brothers and the traditional boundary (Mereb) 
was changed into internal boundary.  After Eritrea’s reunion with Ethiopia in 1962 boundary issue 
was totally dead and all Ethiopian territories were mingled.  Internal administrative boundaries 
were redrawn during the military regime. After 30 years of war Eritrea got def acto independence 
in 1991 and de jure independence in 1993.  Until May 1991 Eritrea was never been independent. 
                                                                                                                                               
And also para 5.42 states,  “ The details of the line between the Sittona, the river they actually had in mind, and the 
Mareb wee, however, left for later delimitation. No formal delimitation was ever carried out.” (Emphasis added.) 
(Id. at para. 5.42.). 
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The Framework Agreements and Algiers Agreement point to the date of independence, but did not 
mention the actual date of independence, apart from reference to the OAU’s Resolution of 1964. 
Stating all events that happened since 1935 and concluding that all these events did not change the 
boundary line, stating, “[…] the Commission can perceive nothing in that chain of developments 
that has had the effect of altering the boundary between the parties.  The boundary of 1935 remains 
the boundary of today.”137  
  Until 1950 Badme plains were vacant. As there was more land than the number of people 
that may be interested to use it, no one needed it. But in 1950 the development of commercial 
agriculture necessitated use of vacant lands. Accordingly the then governor of Tigray operated 
commercial agriculture in Badme plains thereby initiating the settlement of Ethiopians. This may 
be taken as an actual display of authority that was never challenged.  
  Even if the treaty or its interpretation on account of unsettled nomenclature of rivers put the 
town of Badme on Eritrean side, the rule of effectivites or subsequent conduct should have been 
prevailed. Effectivities reveal the true intention of the parties.  As EEBC remarks:  
“There is no set standard of duration and intensity of such activity.  Its effect depends on the 
nature of the terrain and the extent of its population, the period during which it has been 
carried on the extent of any contradictory conduct (including protest) of the opposing State. 
The conduct of one Party must be measured against that of the other. Eventually, but not 
necessarily so, the legal result may be to vary a boundary established by a treaty.138 
 
  With regard to Badme Ethiopia presented tremendous evidence proving effectivites’ but 
never been considered as important evidence. Rather EEBC hunted unilateral comments, reports, 
maps and memos that were authored by colonial Italy, which led into a wrong decision that cannot 
be accepted unless modified through constructive dialogue.  
                                                                                                                                               
135 The borderland resident of both states for sure cognizant of the true borderline. If this line of making an acceptable 
borderline a stable boundary line may be drawn.  
136 Shaw supra note 59 at 759. 
137 EEBC supra note 69, paras 5.90 – 5.91. 
138 Id.  Para 3. 29. 
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6.3.    The Arbitration Award and Consequences 
  After declaration of the delimitation decision on April 13, 2002, there was confusion and 
misunderstanding, as the award did not clearly specify the actual location of Badme. As a result, 
both Parties declared success and happily accepted the award.139  Later Ethiopia learnt that Badme 
was awarded to Eritrea. After realizing the contours of the award, Ethiopia formally requested for 
reconsideration of the delimitation decision with a view to avoid catastrophic effects on the 
borderland residents that have been residing on the borderland for centuries. Ethiopia contends that 
EEBC awarded some of the territories that were never been under Ethiopian administration to 
Ethiopia, and wrongly allocated Ethiopian territories to Eritrea thereby dividing families, ethnic 
groups, villages and towns.140 Consequently, Ethiopia has concluded that demarcation on the basis 
of literal terms of the delimitation would trigger greater evil that may generate a catastrophic 
effect.  The Boundary Commission, however, has rejected Ethiopia’s request for reconsideration 
stating it was beyond mandate, unless Eritrea so consents. Eritrea expressly denied any form of 
revision or reconsideration and started campaigning to pressurize Ethiopia respect terms of the 
Algiers Agreement or face sanction.    
The two states have virtually declined cooperation with the Boundary Commission though 
cooperation was one of the terms of the Algiers Agreement.141 Ethiopia almost stopped working 
with the Commission since its request for reconsideration was expressly rejected. Eritrea in its 
turn, not only failed to respond to the Boundary Commission’s repeated request, but also restricted 
                                            
139 There was celebration in Addis Ababa as it was declared on the mass media that Ethiopia won the case taking 
Badme. Later it was understood that the AU representative who took part during the declaration of the decision 
sent a message to AU headquarter that Badme was on the Ethiopian Side. As Badme was not expressed on the 
delimitation map, it was really confusing.  According to Healy & Plauti, “ […] the 125 page Delimitation Decision 
with accompanying maps, was dense and difficult for a layperson to absorb.” See Healy & Plauti supra note 8. 
140 Take, for instance, the case of Tsorena and Fort Cadona that never been under Ethiopia but later allocated to 
Eritrea as Ethiopia formally admitted these cities never been under Ethiopian administration and not Ethiopian 
territories.   
141Id. 
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movement of UNMEE that has been monitoring the buffer zone thereby breaching the Algiers 
Agreement on Cessation Hostilities.142 
Despite lack of cooperation from the parties, EEBC attempted to demarcate the Eastern 
boundary.143 Ethiopia declined to comment on the proposed boundary map on the Eastern sector. 
EEBC took Ethiopia’s silence as acceptance and concluded the boundary point determination was 
final. Ethiopia accepted the boundary points and “[…] approved the Commission’s method of 
demarcation.” 144 In accordance with the Algiers Agreement EEBC had to carryout an actual 
demarcation sector by sector and pillar building in Eastern Sector has to be completed.  But Eritrea 
refused to allow the actual demarcation stating, “[…] no demarcation should take place in any part 
unless it was absolutely clear that demarcation would take place in all parts in accordance with the 
Commission’s delimitation decision.”145 As a result, the actual physical demarcation on the 
planned Eastern region was stalled.  In Central and Western sectors Ethiopia refused to allow 
demarcation demanding negotiated settlement with a view to draw a borderline that takes interest 
of borderland people.146 
After the effort to demarcate the border was failed, EEBC issued directive on November 
27, 2006 that the Commission cannot remain in existence indefinitely147 and proposed Parties 
reach into agreement for actual demarcation threatening, otherwise, to consider the boundary as “ 
                                            
142 Id. para. 15.  
143 See VICTOR PRESCOTT AND GILLIAN D. TRIGGS, INTERNATIONAL FRONTIERS AND BOUNDAREIS, 
LAW, POLITICS, AND GEOGRAPHY, I, 141(2008). 
144 STATEMENT OF EEBC, supra note 139 Para. 15.  
145 Id.  
146 As reported by the Chief surveyor Ethiopia declined to allow demarcation in the Badme and Irob vicinities while 
supporting demarcation in other areas. ERITREA-ETHIOPIA BOUNDARY COMMSSION, ELEVENTH 
REPORT Annex I to STATEMENT OF EEBC November 27, 2006, Available at http://www.pca-
cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1150  
147 The Commission based its decision on the Court of Arbitration in the Beagles Channel Case in which one of the 
parties to the case refused to cooperate. In Beagles Channel Case it was concluded that, “ It is not admissible that, 
because of the total non-cooperation of one of the Parties, contrary to its obligation under a valid Award, the Court 
should be compelled to remain indefinitely in existence in a state of suspended animation.” 52 International Law 
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[…] automatically stand as demarcated by the boundary points [….]”148 The Parties could not 
agree for the actual demarcation as required by the Commission within the one year time frame 
and the Commission declared that, “[…] boundary will automatically stand as demarcated by the 
boundary points listed … and that the mandate of the Commission can then be regarded as 
fulfilled.’ ”149 (Emphasis added).  Eritrea has accepted the virtual demarcation while Ethiopia 
rejected it, stating a mere legal fiction. 150 Eritrea views that the boundary issue has been resolved 
by the virtual demarcation and asserts that Ethiopia illegally occupies sovereign territories of 
Eritrea and demands immediate and unconditional surrender.  Ethiopia, on the other hand, argues 
that the boundary issue is not yet settled as the boundary is not yet marked on the ground in 
accordance with the Algiers Agreement and has been pleading for dialogue to settle to issue.  
  Later, due to the overwhelming international pressure, Ethiopia accepted the arbitration 
award “in principle”.  To Ethiopia this does not mean attachment of condition, but it has a positive 
element, which aims to cure apparent defects within EEBC’s award that may hinder future 
relationship and peaceful coexistence. It is a plea for negotiated settlement to address some of the 
crucial blockades that would absolutely thwart peaceful settlement of dispute. Ethiopia, therefore, 
strongly believes that ambiguous terms of the colonial treaties have caused the unfair delimitation 
decision that is hard or impossible to implement on the ground. Unless the obvious anomalies that 
would generate irreparable damage are fixed in advance through constructive dialogue, peace 
cannot prevail in the region. Plainly speaking, Ethiopia expresses its acceptance of the delimitation 
decision but insists for making a true boundary line that is acceptable to borderland residents of 
                                                                                                                                               
Reports 284 noted by ERITREA – ETHIOPIA BOUNDARY COMMISSION STATEMENT BY THE 
COMMISSION  Nov. 27, 2006, Available at http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1150 . 
148 ERITREA-ETHIOPIA BOUNDARY COMMSSION, TWENTY – SIXTH REPORT, Annex II Report of the 
Secretary –General on Ethiopia and Eritrea, UN Doc s/2008/40, Available at http://www.pca-
cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1150 . 
149 ERITREA – ETHIOPIA BOUNDARY COMMISSION STATEMENT of 27 November 2006; Id. Para 22. 
150 EEBC supra note 147 para. 3. 
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both nations with a view to reduce harsh consequences by considering “[…] the human and 
physical geography through the study of facts on the ground,”151 and thereby build peaceful 
coexistence and normalize relationship. But Eritrea has rejected any form of dialogue and demands 
Ethiopia to comply with the “final and binding” decision as it is.  
Nowadays, it has not been uncommon to notice Eritrean authorities, Eritrean diaspora,152 
and even some dignitaries demanding Ethiopia’s ‘immediate’ withdrawal from border areas that 
were awarded to Eritrea.153 President Isaias Afeworki has echoed Hank Cohen’s proposal, which 
demands Ethiopia to “accept symbolic initial takeover by Eritrea of border territories awarded by 
EEBC followed by the same day opening of dialogue….”154 It is not clear what the former United 
States assistant secretary of state for Africa meant by a “symbolic initial takeover”. Similarly, 
Ambassador David Shinn, though fully aware of the ‘drama’ behind the boundary question tends 
to suggest, Ethiopia to “give up control over Badme.”155  
                                            
151 See STATEMENT OF EEBC November 27, 2006 Para 7. Available at http://www.pca-
cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1150  
152 Rahel Weldeab, Peace Requires Ethiopia’s Withdrawal from Sovereign Eritrean Territory, TESFANEWS, 
http://www.tesfanews.net/end-occupation-peace-requires-ethiopias-withdrawal-from-sovereign-eritrean-territory/ 
(Last visited Apr. 22, 2015).  
153 See Hank Cohen, Time to bring Eritrea in from the Cold, AFRICAN ARGUMENT, Dec. 16, 2013, 
http://africanarguments.org/2013/12/16/time-to-bring-eritrea-in-from-the-cold-by-hank-cohen/Last visited Feb. 11, 
2015). See Dire tube, Eritrea’s request for border demarcation rejected by AU members states, Feb. 7, 2015, 
http://www.diretube.com/articles/read-au-member-states-eritrea’s-request-for-border-demarcation-rejected-by-au-
member-states_8226.html#.VN5W5RY8Eb0   (Last visited Feb. 14, 2015).   
154 Id. 
155 David Shinn, Time to Bring Eritrea in from the Cold ( But it’s Harder than it Sounds, AFRICAN 
ARGUMENT,(Jan. 13, 2014), http://africanarguments.org/2014/01/13/time-to-bring-eritrea-in-from-the-cold-but-
its-harder-than-it-sounds-by-david-shinn/ (Last visited Feb. 11, 2015).  Ambassador Shinn, pinpoints some of the 
possible causes that have triggered the war as follows: Ethiopia’s refusal to allow Eritrea to freely transact with 
Ethiopia by using local currency, but Ethiopia issued a new paper note, which rendered the old birr notes that were 
in Eritrea useless, Ethiopia’s refusal to buy more share of oil from Assab refinery, and thereby making the refinery 
uneconomical and subsequent closure which in turn demanded Eritrea to buy oil through its own hard currency, 
superiority complexity among Eritreans purporting more educated and industrialized and so forth. For detailed 
analysis of socio-economic and political reasons behind the Ethio-Eritrean border conflict. See also Hamilton supra 
note 1 at 114. 
 340 
This appears awkward for various reasons. Apart from a mere “demarcation” on the map, 
an exact territorial limit of both nations is not yet actually set on the ground.156 No monument or 
pillar has been emplaced on the boundary line that supposed to separate the contested territories so 
far. On account of both Parties failure to cooperate with EEBC for actual physical demarcation, 
EEBC has declared a virtual demarcation. A virtual demarcation, which is a mere supposition of 
demarcation, simply assumes geographic coordinate157 on the map as pillars or monuments on the 
ground. In reality nothing has been done on the actual borderline. As Ethiopia claims it, a virtual 
demarcation is simply a fictional demarcation and a legal nonsense.158 Ethiopia, as a result, has 
been strongly insisting for an actual demarcation in order the demarcation to be legally binding.159  
As a matter of fact, a virtual demarcation serves no different purpose other than the very map. The 
geographic coordinates (boundary points) on the map can guide an actual point on which a 
boundary pillar to be emplaced, but assuming the points as monument or pillar makes no sense, as 
nothing is noticeable on the ground to avoid confusion and conflict. Kathleen Claussen rightly 
captioned a boundary line delineated by virtual demarcation as an “invisible border.”160 Needless 
to say, an invisible border is an uncertain border that cannot meet the objectives of a defined 
border. 
To Ethiopia the virtual demarcation is a simple assumption of demarcation, which has 
never changed facts on the borderland – still the borderland residents do not know the line of 
                                            
156 As Jon Abbnik rightly remarks, “ […] despite the important and painstaking work done by the five ‘neutral’ 
international law expert on the EEBC no workable decision has been reached.” Abbink  supra 7 note at 141. 
157 These are boundary points on the map which normally indicate locations in accordance with boundary markers 
supposed to be emplaced.  But these points ( coordinates) “[… ] are not necessarily final and the Commission may 
be have to adjust or vary them in the course of demarcation. Only final demarcation map will be definitive.” EEBC 
supra note 69 para 2.16.  
158 Gro Nytuen and Kjetil Tronvoll, The Eritrean- Ethiopian Peace Agreement:  Exploring the Limits of Law, 
NORDISK TIDSSKRIFT FOR MENNESKERETTIGHETTER19,  16-37 (2008).  
159 Id.  
160 Kathleen Caussen, Invisible Bordrs: Mapping out Virtual Law,  37 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 257 -278 (2008 
- 2009). 
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separation in accordance with the EEBC’s delimitation award. Thus, until the boundary line is 
clearly set on the ground, definitely, the confusion and tension will continue. On the contrary, 
Eritrea has been campaigning in all international forums demanding Ethiopia to surrender the 
territories awarded by the EEBC invoking the virtual demarcation. It alleges that Ethiopia occupies 
“Sovereign territories of Eritrea,” and pleas for unconditional surrender. Now a new issue has 
emerged: whether Ethiopia occupies Eritrea’s “sovereign territories,” and should surrender them 
before sitting for negotiation.  
In absence of a visible sign or mark on the borderline, how far should Ethiopia pullback its 
forces and surrender a territory to Eritrea, if at all a territory has to be surrendered? On the same 
token, in a situation where the Boundary Commission has phased out, who will convert the 
geographic coordinates on the map into the actual border on the ground to surrender a portion of 
territory? Eritrea? Ethiopia? Or a third party named by Eritrea and Ethiopia? In this dubious 
boundary setting is it not fallacious to argue or demand Ethiopia to surrender an ‘Eritrean 
sovereign territory”? 
Ethiopia has been holding the contested territories from the time immemorial, apart from 
temporary moments that it lost possession of the territories during brief Eritrean invasion, but 
regained them in June 2000. It is hard to conclude that Ethiopia occupies Eritrea’s “sovereign 
territory” and surrender them. Ethiopia has been holding the territories since the time immemorial 
notwithstanding the illusive colonial treaties and expansionist tendencies of colonial power.  
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6.4. Possible Remedies to Unlock the Deadlock   
 
6.4.1.  The Need to Resolve Latent causes that Instigated the Border Dispute 
  It is rightly said that understating an actual problem is half of the solution.161 The journey 
of identifying of an actual problem, however, may not simple. Given long rooted relationship and 
conflicting situation, it may be a perplexing task, but in fact it is a significant step in an effort to 
build a lasting peace that will normalize relationship.162  An actual problem may be colored by 
numerous apparent problems that may complicate resolution. Contending parties may hide a real 
issue that instigates side issues that may be legally claimed until the other party consents to deal 
with the latent cause. The side issues may be easily resolved but that will not end conflict. Side 
issues are simply bargaining leverages that may veil an actual problem and make resolution hard or 
impossible to achieve.  
  Turning to the Ethio-Eritrean border conflict of 1998 one may invoke several related issues 
that may have initiated the border conflict. Why the two nations that have suffered from the 
longest civil war, and battling to get out of poverty again plunged into a destructive war while the 
previous wound has not yet properly cured? Why the two previous allies who fought their common 
enemy turned guns against each other? Specifically, why Eritrea deployed its combat battalion 
armed with tanks and missiles to the disputed regions before exhausting all possible avenues of 
                                            
161 Albert Einstein is often quoted for his notorious formula of solving problem. It may appear unbelievable but he 
spent lion’s share of his time in studying the true nature and causes of a problem ( if he had an hour to resolve a 
problem, he would spend 55 minutes in defining the problem and applies only five minutes in finding solution) and 
spent little in devising a solution. (See Lifemind.com regarding Einstein’s Secret to Amazing Problem Solving ( 
and 10 Specific Ways You can use it), available at https://litemind.com/problem-definition/) 
162 A mere attempt to resolve a border dispute may be a temporary solution, just like prescription of a pain killer that 
cannot remedy the very source of pain that require a curing medicine.   
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peaceful dispute resolution? Why the already constituted Joint Border Commission denied fair 
chance to resolve border dispute?163 
   As President of Eritrea, Isias Afeworki remarks, “It is very difficult to easily find an 
answer,” to all these questions.164   Similarly, Ted Dagne when reporting to the United States 
Congress rightly remakes, “ The real reason behind the out break of fighting is murky at best.”165 
Close look at the flash point of border war and number of lives perished therein and economic lose 
the nations have endured makes the war non-sense, unless it was backed by a bigger undisclosed 
agenda. Badme is an insignificant barren land having no oil or endowed with other significant 
economic resources.166  If blessed with rain, Badme plain can only be used for agriculture from 
which few quintals of sorghum may be harvested. Otherwise, Badme is not a tourist attraction 
center, nor historical conservation site.167 It is really puzzling to loose huge number of lives and 
spend massive resources in fighting for a barren land. Why Eritrea opted for armed confrontation 
disregarding possibilities of peaceful resolution for any issues it had harbored? This is a question 
often asked than answered.  
   Prime Minister Meles Zenawi explained Ethiopia’s justification for plunging into the war.  
In the words of Melese, “ For us Badme is nothing but the principles behind invading Badme is 
                                            
163 The Joint Border Commission that comprised highest officials of both States who were conversant with all socio-
economic and political facts but did little to resolve the apparent border conflict after two years of deliberation.  
Jean-Louis Pennou  points complexity of Ethio-Eritrea dispute stating, “ […] it is unclear whether this committee 
even succeeded in establishing a completer list of the ‘disputed areas.” Jean-Louis Peninou, The Ethiopian – 
Eritrean Border Conflict, IBR Boundary & Security Bulletin 46(1998).  
164 President Isias Afwork remarked this during an interview with Washington post, on June 17, 1998, quoted in Plaut 
supra note 5.  
165 Ted Dagne, The Ethio-Eritrean Conflict, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, order code RL 30598 July 2000.  See 
also LEENCO LATA, (ed.), THE SEARCH FOR PEACE: THE CONFLICT BETWEEN ETHIOPIA AND 
ERITREA, PROCEEDINGS OF SCHOLARLY CONFERENCE ON ETHIOPIA-ERITREA CONFLICT 8 
(2006). 
166 Khalidiagala  supra note 6 at 41.  
167 A journalist who visited Badme after reoccupation by Eritrea labeled it as, “ [ …] a broken stone table-land with 
few wells, but in lucky retainer years can be persuaded after torn-bush and prickly –pear have been cleared by 
bulldozer [….] It is a dusty one-street place sited on a slight eminence , and consisting of crude huts [….]”  For 
detailed description of Badme, see Margart Fielding, “ Bad time in Badme: bitter warfare continues along the 
Eritrean –Ethiopian border, IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin, Spring 1999, quoted in Plaut supra note 5.  
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everything. For what is at stake in Badme is not a piece of real estate but a cardinal principle of 
international law.”168 Prime Minister justifies Ethiopia’s involvement in the war for the purpose of 
averting the invasion.  Thus, he justifies Ethiopia’s involvement in the war as self-defense.  It has 
the duty to defend its people and its territory against foreign aggression. Otherwise Ethiopia’s 
existence as a State would be meaningless. As pointed out else where Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims 
Commission (EECC) Eritrea invaded Ethiopia and occupied territories that were under Ethiopian 
administration.169  
  To find out an acceptable solution and normalize relationship assessment of possible causes 
that may have prompted the border war appears imperative.170 As Khadiagala pinpoints, African 
border wars “spring from antagonisms that often have no relationship to the common border.”171 
(Emphasis added). In Ethio-Eritrean case, there were “[…] myriad unresolved problems […] 
rupture-ranging from the nature of political institutions, economic development, currencies and 
trade to Ethiopia’s lack of direct sea access [….] ”172 Thus, unless causes of antagonism are 
properly addressed and cured , any attempt to resolve border conflict ( the symptom) would be 
waste. Touval’s remarks in this regard need to be quoted. To Touval: 
The primary conflict between governments may have had a variety of causes: personal 
antagonism between leaders, competition in the African arena, one government’s support of 
opposition groups against another government and a chain of mutual suspicion and 
subversion. When such relations lead to border disputes, these disputes are inadvertent by 
products, or systems, of another conflict. At the same time, boundary claims that arise in this 
manner may serve as a lever for the exertion of pressure intended to extract concessions in 
matters unrelated to the boundary.173 (Emphasis added). 
 
                                            
168 “Report of the meeting between Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and the OAU Committee of Ambassadors on the 
Peaceful Resolution of the Conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea,  20 July 1998, Chronology of the Ethiop-Eritrea 
Conflict and Basic document, WALTA INFORMATIONATION CENTER 2001, quoted in Plaut supra note 5. 
169 ERITREA – ETHIOPIA PARTIAL AWARD, IUS AD BELLUM, ETHIOPIA’S CLAIMS 1 – 8, (Dec. 19, 2005), 
available at htt://www.pca-cpa.org.2006.iLM.430 
170 Needless to say, the best curing medicine can be prescribed if and only if the nature and cause of disease is known.   
171 Khadiagala, supra note 6 at 41.  
172  Id. at 52 
173 SAADIA TOUVAL, THE BOUDNARY POLITICS OF INDEPENDENT AFRICA, 40 (1972), quoted in 
Khadiagala supra  note 6 at 52.   
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   Pre-war actions that were perpetrated by both nations, the sudden outbreak of the war 
without any form of warning and lack of attempt to resolve issues peacefully, and subsequent 
decisions taken by Ethiopia and Eritrea, may offer clues to find out latent causes of the conflict 
that will enable to devise a “curing” resolution and turn life back to into normal state.174  As 
pointed out elsewhere, the border conflict quickly flared up and alarmed not only international 
community but also the people of Eritrea and Ethiopia.175 Brief overview of some of the actions 
and decisions taken by Ethiopia and Eritrea will suggest possible causes that may have triggered 
the apparent border conflict. Numerous research works and political actors conclude the actual 
cause of Ethio-Eritrea conflict was not really border issue.176  Thus, the border conflict was simply 
a bargaining leverage that cannot be resolved and normalize relationship unless concealed issues 
have been solved.  
 
 
                                            
174 The collaboration between the governing parties of both nations during fight against Communist Regime, intimacy 
of leaders of two nations, historical ties and strong socio economic dependence makes “border” cause of the 
destructive war unacceptable. Consequently it was usual to observe speculation of multifaceted rationale for the 
outbreak of war in May 1998. For more detailed political, ideological and economic rationale for the May 1998 
Ethio-Eritrean war see Michael WoldeMariam, Why Ethiopia Won’t Back down on Eritrean Border, AFRICAN 
ARGUMENTS, May 23, 2013, http://africanarguments.org/2012/05/23/the-bad-news-over-badme-why-ethiopia-
won’t-back-down-on-eritrean-border-by-michael-woldemariam/  (accessed 02/25/16 10:31 AM) 
175 It is true that border question was not a new issue.  In heydays of armed struggle ELF claimed territories upto 
shirero, which TLF did not agree with ELF but allowed ELF to administer the claimed area with intent to benefit 
from necessities of sustenance from ELF.  In 1983 EPLF formally claimed border demarcation in joint meeting of 
EPLF and TPLF in Khartoum. At the time TPLF convincingly justified that it lacked legitimacy and supporting 
documents to deal with border demarcation and the issue was postponed until the downfall of Dergue. Surprising, 
after downfall of Dergue border issue was disregarded. EPLF did not claim border demarcation during de facto 
independence from 1991 – 1993 and even after de jure independence until unresolved economic issues were 
activated after issue of Eritrean currency. The most important consideration after de jure independence was 
economic cooperation. In September 1993 Eritrea and Ethiopia concluded economic cooperation agreement 
including regulation of exchange rate, inflation control, economic transactions investment by citizens of both 
nations.  The economic cooperation and friendship agreement was not fruitful on account of lack of strong 
institution for monitoring and enforcement of the economic and friendship agreement. Then when the desired 
economic objectives failed, the issue of border activated.  See Gedamu, Ethiopia and Eritrea: The Quest for 
Peace and Normalizations, (M. Phil Thesis, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Tromso, Norway 40(2008) 
(Unpublished)  
176Martin Paut in his online article states, “[…] the war remains something of mystery to military analysts and 
historians.” See Martin Plaut, supra note 5. 
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6.4.1.1. Economic Reasons behind the Border Conflict 
  There is no disagreement about the pre-war strong socio-economic relationship between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea. Successive economic integration agreements were concluded between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea.177 As Khadiagala attests, “ […] Ethiopia remained the principal supplier to 
Eritrea of food, revenues related transshipments through the ports and jobs to nearly 300,000 
Eritreans.”178  Until 1998, there was little restriction on goods imported from and exported to 
Eritrea.179 The only limitation, though not respected by Eritrea, was re-exporting Ethiopian 
products to third country. Eritrea, however, did not respect this minimum restriction by exporting 
Ethiopian coffee to third countries that has jeopardized Ethiopia’s interest for hard currency.180 All 
pre-war economic agreements “had largely benefited” Eritrea and Eritreans “at the expense of 
Ethiopia.”181 Consequently, before eruption of the border dispute, Ethiopians had publicly blamed 
the Ethiopian Government for affording undue protection to Eritrea and Eritreans.182  But the 
Ethiopian Government did not take any serious action. 
  In addition to the aggressive nature of leadership and government, Eritrea had the ambition 
of making the Red Sea State as an African Singapore.183 Eritrea aspired to model its economic 
policy on Singaporean mode of export based economic system.184 Ethiopia was market for 60- 
                                            
177  On September 27, 1993 Ethiopia and Eritrea entered into 25 protocols most stipulated with economic cooperation.  
Harmonizing exchange rate policies, and interest rate, money stock and control of inflation were some of the core 
points of the economic cooperation protocol. See Negash & Tronvoll, supra note 1 at 31. 
178 Khadiagala supra note 6  at , 43. 
179 Richard Cornwell, Ethiopia and Eritrea: Fratricidal Conflict in the Horn of Africa, SEC. REV. (1998). 
180 See Seyoum Yohannes, supra note 2 at 174.  
181 Khadiagala supra note  6  at , 43. 
182 Trace C. Lasley, We Saw Not Clearly Nor Understood: The Economic Background of the Ethiopian –Eritrean 
War, 5 KALEIDSCOPE 71, 66-75   (2015). Though the 1991 – 1993 economic treaties concluded with Eritrea 
states about reciprocity, actually economic transactions and political actions favored Ethiopia and Eritreans. While 
the Eritrean Government expelled about 150,000 Ethiopians from 1991 – 1992, confiscating everything they had 
produced, the Ethiopian Government did not defend them.  (Id.)   
183 LEENCO LATA, (ed.), THE SEARCH FOR PEACE: THE CONFLICT BETWEEN ETHIOPIA AND ERITREA, 
PROCEEDINGS OF SCHOLARLY CONFERENCE ON ETHIOPIA-ERITREA CONFLICT 10 ( 2006). 
184 Eritrea had been exporting Ethiopian coffee by purchasing from Ethiopian local market with local in local 
currency thereby earning hard currency. See Seyoum Yohannes, supra note 2 at 174. In generally, Eritreans had 
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70% of Eritrean factory products.185 Though the Ethiopian law and economic policy state 
otherwise, Eritrean business freely traded in Ethiopia alike to Ethiopian businesses. In turn, 
Eritrean businessmen and consumers freely transacted Ethiopian agricultural products including 
coffee and teff. To further smooth the way to Eritrean businessmen, Eritrea formally sought 
Ethiopia to open its doors to Eritrean businessmen residing in to trade or invest in Ethiopia alike to 
Ethiopians.186  
  Contrary to the expectation of Eritrean Government, Ethiopia instead of relying on 
Eritrea’s old and light industry products, has been working to develop its own industry.187 
Numerous factories and light industries were built in Tigray and Addis Ababa. Pharmaceutical, 
cement, textile, car assembly and so forth were started to mushroom, especially in Tigray Ethiopia. 
Ethiopia’s attention toward industrialization appears another reason that has irritated Eritrea. 
Industrialization of Tigray region of Ethiopia supposed to obstruct Eritrea’s plan to control 
Ethiopia’s market. This would dwindle the demand for Eritrean products and curb movement of 
Tigrean cheap labor. Ethiopia’s fast economic growth, and special privileges that were reserved a 
to Ethiopian investors was another economic measure that thought to hinder Eritrean economic 
goals. This was a huge disappointment to Eritrea and it could not reap the benefit of growing 
Ethiopian economy and wide market to boost its economic ambitions.  As Negash and Tronvoll 
succinctly put, “ Eritrea felt that it was effectively shut out of Ethiopian Economy.”188  
                                                                                                                                               
been enjoying undue economic advantage from Ethiopia. Ethiopian people at the time widely felt that the current 
Ethiopian government had been helping Eritrea to enrich itself at the expense of Ethiopia.  
185  Negash and Tronvoll supra note 1 at 41.  See also Gedamu supra note 73.        
186  The Ethiopian investment law declares certain fields of investments were only reserved to Ethiopians. To make 
use of the privileges afforded to Ethiopian businessmen and investors, Eritrea formally asked Ethiopia for non-
differential treatment of Ethiopians and residents Eritreans, but this was not acceptable to Ethiopia.  The minutes 
of meetings of Joint Technical Committee that was held in 1996 disclose Eritreans formal request Ethiopia to 
open trade and investment without restriction to resident Eritreans.  See Negash & Tronvoll, supra note 1 at 32.  
187 Due to Italian colonialism Eritrea had relatively better light industries.  Ethiopia was a nearly 100% destination for 
nearly all Eritrean export products.” (Adem, supra note 10.  
188 Negah & Tronvoll supra note 1 at 33. 
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  The economic rationale behind the border conflict cannot be complete without reference to 
currency issue. The immediate cause that quickly spoiled Ethio-Eritrean relationship and triggered 
border war of 1998 was issuance of the new Eritrean currency (known as Nakfa) in November 
1997. Until that time Eritrea had been using Ethiopian currency (known as Birr) as legal tender.189  
With a view to regulate its own macro economic system and as expression of sovereignty Eritrea 
issued its own currency, and put it into circulation in equal value to the Ethiopian currency (the 
Birr) without knowledge of Ethiopia. However, “Eritrea wanted Nakfa without losing all the 
benefits and advantages it used to enjoy when it was using the Birr.”190  Immediately after Eritrea 
issued its own currency, Ethiopia, changed its old Birr note with a view to protect its economy 
from overflow of currency notes from Eritrea.191 Eritrea had intention to use both currencies side 
by side in both countries in parity.192  But this was not acceptable to Ethiopia, as it could not 
manage its macro economic policy in divergent monetary and exchange policy, which would put 
Ethiopian economy in danger.193  After introduction of Nakfa, Ethiopia moved to avoid common 
use of both currencies by issuing its own which rendered old birr notes in Eritrea worthless.194  
                                            
189 This was done in accordance with agreement reached between EPLF and EPRDF/TPLF. The two war time allies 
agreed to use the Ethiopian currency (Birr) in both countries, Ethiopia to use Eritrean ports for free and run Assab 
oil refinery. (See Id. at 35. At the time of liberation of Eritrea the former Ethiopian banks in Eritrea were empty 
and EPRDF gave 150,000,000 Birr.  (See Adem supra note 10.  This money was neither loan nor gift.  At that 
time, though de facto independent, in legal sense part of Ethiopia until formally declared its independence in 
1993. Then Eritrea borrowed three billion Birr from Ethiopian banks.  Eritrean business had been borrowing from 
Ethiopian banks like any other Ethiopian. ( Id)  See also Negah & Tronvoll supra note 1 at 34,  
190 Adem supra note 10.  
191 See Negah & Tronvoll supra note 1 at 36. According to the research report submitted to Congress, issuance of 
Nakfa and subsequent actions Ethiopia took were immediate causes of may 1998 war. See Ted Dagne, The Ethio-
Eritrean Conflict, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, order code RL 30598 July 2000. 
192 Adem supra note 10.  
193 Due to non-application of the September 1993 protocol, a common exchange rate, economic and investment 
policy was not devised.  The exchange rate of birr for dollar in Eritrea and Ethiopia was different. This drained 
Ethiopian dollar supply to Eritrea. This put Eritrea and Eritrean businessmen at advantageous position  
194 Eritrea required Ethiopia to exchange old birr note that were in Ethiopia in hard currency. Ethiopia suggested 
action to be taken in accordance with advice of IMF taking experience of other similar international situation and this 
suggestion was accepted by Eritrea. See Adem, supra note 10. 
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  Moreover, Ethiopia took additional economic measure that required Eritrean traders to 
make all imports of exceeding 2000 Birr in hard currency through letter of credit.195 Furthermore, 
Ethiopia stopped purchasing petroleum from Assab refinery, as it was expensive because Eritrea 
used to add cost of investment on the refinery to the price of oil. Ethiopia also started using 
alternative ports for its import and export. According to Plauti these series of economic measures 
“[…] have rekindled old animosities between the ruling groups of both countries, eroding their 
willingness to compromise or negotiate over disagreement.”196  
  Thus, after issue of Nakifa, the Ethiopian government took series of economic policy 
changes vis-à-vis Eritrea that upset Isias Afeworki’s government and promoted the border issue as 
a bargaining leverage. Trace Lasley observes effects of issuance and circulation Nakfa and 
subsequent effects as follows:  
The Nakfa was circulated without any clear agreement as to how the currency would trade. 
Ethiopia had little time to prepare for the sudden introduction of the Nakfa and as a result 
erected significant hurdles for exchange. The new barriers that were created in response to the 
Nakfa proved too much for Eritrea to bear. The Nakfa was issued while Eritrea was at the 
height of its dependence on Ethiopian market. Ethiopia’s response to the Nakfa further 
frustrated Eritreans until they felt no recourse but to settle their harbored grievance with 
force.197  
 
  Quick Economic measures that Ethiopia took after issues of Nakfa were absolutely 
contrary to the Eritrean plan and caused enormous hardship to Eritrea and Ethiopia, which in turn, 
stirred the border conflict.198  Khadiagala observes:  
[…] The currency conflict caused considerable economic hardships for both states, as the 
hard currency transactions raised the costs of Eritrean ports for Ethiopians and food supplied 
for Eritrea. The deteriorating economic relationship heightened the political temperature and 
ignited the border conflict.”199 
 
                                            
195 See Negah & Tronvoll supra note 1 at 36. 
196Plaut, supra note 5. 
197 Lasley, supra note 180. 
198 See  Tim Ito, Ethiopia-Eritrea: A Troubled Relationship, WASHINGTON POST, MARCH 1999  Available at 
www.Washington post. Com  ( accessed 03/09/16 8:30 PM). 
199 Khadiagala supra note 6 at 43 
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The price of teff in Eritrea tripled and the price of salt that Ethiopia used to import from 
Eritrea went up. According to Negash and Tronvoll, “ […] the new trade policy created a barrier 
between the two countries that had never existed before.”200 At a time ports fees were increasing 
by the unilateral decision of Eritrea, Ethiopia had to look for alternative options.  This was a huge 
blow to Eritrea, as it would lose free money in the form of port service fees.201 A commentator 
notes, “[…] Ethiopia decried paying for most of the investment cost for the refinery as well as 
paying in hard currency for use of Eritrean port services.”202 This prompted Ethiopia to use 
Djibouti port alternatively.  
  After long silence, President Isias Afeworki, responded how the new Ethiopian economic 
and trade policy was unacceptable. He argued that the Ethiopian policy draws a new wall between 
Eritrean and Ethiopians, which Eritrea rejects.  He viewed that the new Ethiopian policies were 
mistake and would defeat a long common history that would “[…] have adverse effects on relation 
between the two people.”203 To President Isias Afeworki, Ethiopia’s economic policy against 
Eritrean turned to be discriminatory which aimed to prevent Eritrea from participating in Ethiopian 
economy and the requirement for Letter of Credit (LC) targeted at protecting mushrooming 
Ethiopian industry against competition with Eritrean industry products. Finally, the President 
remarked that the trade protocols of 1993 “[…] had reached a dead end.”204  Mr. Afeworki 
promised that Eritrea would look into alternative solutions205, but was not whether the alternatives 
he mentions was possibility of forcing Ethiopia to accept Eritrea’s options under the guise of 
unsettled border issue.  
                                            
200  Negash & Tronvoll supra note 1 at 37.  
201 Id. at 43 
202 Khadigala, supra note 6 at 43.  
203 Negah & Tronvoll supra note 1 at 37 
204 Id.   
205  Id.  
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  Eritrea lost its ambition of developing its economy by leaning toward Ethiopia resources 
and market.  This had motivated Eritrea to force Ethiopia to accept Eritrea’s demand, be it 
currency, border, market, investment issues. Eritrea wrongly calculated and exceedingly relied on 
power of its military personnel and hardware to make Ethiopia kneel to its demands.  Thus, border 
issue was a side issue that was calculated as bargaining leverage. A political analyst comments:  
The border issue showed itself not to be the cause, but rather a symptom of political and 
economic tensions and a dramatic arena for the two parties to demonstrate their capacity to 
cause trouble and embarrassment for the other.206 
 
 Excessive attention on side issue, the drawing a borderline, while the latent issue remains 
unsettled appears ineffective. To achieve real peace and normalize relationship, therefore, the two 
contending Parties should be willing to sit down deliberate for negotiated settlement for all of the 
socio-political and economic hurdles.  As we briefly saw, economic issue was the most important 
cause that has ignited the border conflict. Conflict over economy can be expressed in range of 
assertions.  It may be restricting market access, building competing firms, charging exorbitant fees 
and taxes, protecting domestic investment and trade, currency issue and so forth. Economic cause 
of Eritrean conflict can be inferred from Eritrea’s attempt to destroy pharmaceutical plant in 
Adigrat207 and the move to cut major high way route to Djibouti port.   
 
6.4.1.2. Past Troubled Relationship between TPLF and EPLF and Superiority Complex 
  TPLF, the most dominant force in the coalition of Ethiopia’s governing party, EPRDF, was 
hugely assisted by EPLF.208 The first twenty TPLF members trained in Eritrea. The two senior 
EPLF fighters later joined TPLF fighters.209 Initially for all logistic and training needs TPLF 
                                            
206 Khadiagala, supra note 6 at 46.  
207 Negah & Tronvoll supra note 1. 
208 Khadiagala  supra note 6 at  42. 
209 Mehari Haile and Yemane Kidane transferred to TPLF. (Paut supra note 5).  
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totally relied on EPLF.210 TPLF in turn fought with EPLF against their common enemy (the 
Ethiopian military regime) on Eritrean land at a time EPLF was badly needed military help. In 
1983 after conclusion of war with Somalia, the Ethiopian government moved almost all the 
fighting forces and resources to Eritrea to destroy EPLF once and for all under Red Star Campaign. 
At this crucial time, TPLF dispatched thousands of fighters that reportedly saved EPLF.211  
   In another instance, EPLF deployed TPLF’s trainees to fight for EPLF without 
authorization of TPLF Central Committee. This created some gap between the two groups. As a 
result, TPLF fighter withdrew from Eritrea and concentrated on fighting on Tigray land.  EPLF 
considered TPLF as naïve in terms of fighting tactic and political ideology. Consequently, EPLF 
closed TPLF’s radio transmission from Eritrea.212 In hard time during 1984 drought while aid had 
been pouring to save life in TPLF controlled part of Tigray, EPLF closed a corridor that TPLF had 
been using to transport goods from Sudan.  As a result, TPLF had to face hard time and reroute all 
supplies by devising another route at the conjunction of Tigray and Sudan border.213  
  As pointed out elsewhere there were ideological and tactical differences between TPLF and 
EPLF.  EPLF opposed TPLF ideology of the right of nations and nationalities to self-determination 
up to secession. Both TPLF and EPLF were communist in ideology but in varying degree and 
different version. While TPLF followed Albanian model of communism EPLF chose Soviet 
version.214 This ideological difference may reveal disparity in policy direction, but cannot be a 
ground that promoted the border war. It, however, shades some light regarding the troubled 
relationship between two factions.  
                                            
210 Id.  
211 See Ghidey Zeratsion, The Ideological and political Causes of the Ethio-Eritrean War: Insider’s View  (A paper 
president at the International Conference on Ethio-Eritrean  Crises, Amsterdam, July 24, 1999).   
212  See Ted Dagne, The Ethio-Eritrean Conflict, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, order code RL 30598 10 ( 2000). 
213 Dagne supra note 188 at 10. 
214  See Id.  
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While the two factions were rebel forces, EPLF insisted TPLF for border demarcation on 
the basis of colonial treaties. TPLF, however, required postponement of border issue until the end 
of civil war to concentrate on battle with the Military Regime, and on account of lack of legitimacy 
and supporting documents that would prove the true borderline.215 One may ask why EPLF 
worried about border demarcation at a time it controlled only Eritrean peripheries and desert 
regions? During civil war border was important because EPLF used to force Eritrean youth for 
recruitment from the Eritrean territories.  To escape from forced recruitment some Eritrean youth 
used to get refugee at the territories held by TPLF including Badme. Thus, with view to recruit 
fighters, determination of borderline was needed.  In 1988 TPLF and EPLF made tactical alliance 
in four days meeting in Khartoum. This had expedited Dergue’s removal.  
 
6.4.1.3. Over Confidence on Military Power to Resolve Presumed Conflict  
  In terms of size of territory and population, Eritrea is a small country, which may be less 
than one-tenth of Ethiopia, but Eritrean rebels were able to fight for 30 years resisting and later 
demolishing a powerful military force.  At the time Ethiopia had the biggest army in Africa and 
was assisted by latest military hardware, but could not wipe out rebellion groups. The Ethiopian 
army was not only superior in training and number of fighters, but had a powerful air force that 
assisted the ground force. Eritrean rebels did not have fighter jets, but were able to destroy the 
Ethiopian military in certain key fronts and ultimately liberated the whole Eritrea. As pointed out 
above, TPLF forces assisted the Eritrean rebels in critical moments, and it was TPLF and other 
allied Ethiopian forces that led to the ultimate demise of Dergue by occupying almost all the 
northern Ethiopia and marched towards Addis Ababa. President Mengistu fled when TPLF forces 
                                            
215  On the same token ELF claimed border issue before its ultimate demise. At the time ELF had been working with 
TLF – predecessor of TPLF.  At the time ELF stationed in Badme area and claimed it as Eritrean territory. TLF, 
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were near Addis Ababa. TPLF forces were more powerful, committed, and tactically, in guerilla 
warfare superior to EPLF forces. But this truth was not acceptable to Eritrean elites.  
  Eritrea, supposedly, believed that it can defeat any force and relied on its veteran fighters to 
resolve any potential and presumed dispute by military action. During armed struggle against 
military regime EPLF followed the strategy of holding military trench and defend its enemy. Prior 
holding of a defensive position makes easier to defend and renders an enemy to pay high cost.  
Eritrea has a military policy of occupy defensive position and request for negotiation. Eritrea 
exhibited this occupy and negotiate policy against all of its neighbors including Yemen.   
  As pointed out in the foregoing chapters, Eritrea suddenly invaded Hanish Island and 
demanded negotiation with Yemen. This makes Eritrea in superior position as any attempt to repel 
forces already held defensive position would make the other party to pay huge cost or accept 
wishes of Eritrea. Eritrea applied the same tactic against Sudan, Djibouti and later Ethiopia. On 
May 12, 1998 Eritrea suddenly deployed its highly armed forces at Badme, which had been under 
Ethiopian administration for several decades. After occupying Badme and its environs and 
demanded negation with Ethiopia on Eritrean terms. Eritrea also invaded Djibouti and has been 
occupying a swath of Djiboutian territory. Djibouti’s invasion supposedly targeted at revenging 
Djibouti for cooperating with Ethiopia by allowing port access.  
 
6.4.1.4. The Bada Conflict of 1997 
  As pointed out in the previous chapters, the Ethio-Eritrean borderline has disintegrated 
Afar ethnic group. The group often disregards borderline and maintains its traditional relationship 
with kinship in the other side of the border.  When the situation restrains comingling, the group 
fights it. Though not implemented on the ground, the 1908 treaty between Italy and Ethiopia 
                                                                                                                                               
however, did not agree with ELF’s conclusion but allowed ELF to administer Badme area with a view to lose 
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required border delineation to be done in way it would allow Afar ethnic group to continue their 
traditional relationship including cattle grazing in the other side of the border.  
  Political actors in each side of the border have been abusing this historic right for political 
ends. In 1997 rebels of Afar Revolutionary Democratic United Front (ARDUF) that was camped in 
Afar territory of Eritrea repeatedly created havoc in northern Ethiopia, in Afar region of Ethiopia. 
As a result of armed rebellion, it was hard for Ethiopia to use its resources and tourist sites in the 
northern Ethiopia.216 In July 1997, pursuing ARDUF rebels, Ethiopian defense forces entered Adi 
Murug, an Eritrean territory without securing permission from Eritrea.  Given friendship and 
apparent alliance with Eritrea at the time, Ethiopian forces act was in good faith for the sole 
purpose of restraining disturbing rebels that stationed in Eritrea. This can be understood from 
Prime Minister Meles’s letter written in response to President Isias Afworki’s request for personal 
consideration of the matter.217 President Isias Afeworki wrote two letters demanding investigation 
of the matter.218 Now it appears that behind ARDUF’s incursion there was a big motive, which 
was not known to the Ethiopian government and the international community.219   
  Eritrea claims that the May 6, 1998 incidence was a consequence of July 1997 
unauthorized border crossing by the Ethiopian armed forces. However, Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims 
                                                                                                                                               
training and logistic support.  (Gedamu supra note 173 at 39) 
216 For instance, in 2008 ARDUF fighters that have been sheltering in Eritrea crossed the border and kidnapped and 
killed tourists at Artale area of Afar region. The rebels took some of the tourists to Eritrean and finally released 
them.  
217 Appendix 3 Negash & Tronvoll, supra note 1,at 116.    
218 Id. at 115 – 116.  
219 The is was the time that economic wrangling between Ethiopia and Eritrea already started that culminated at 
issuing Nakfa and restrictive measures on Ethiopian use of port and some economic measures were being 
implemented by Ethiopia. According to Negash and Tronvoll, “ By mid August 1997 there were dead lock in most 
of the issues. There were no agreement on free circulation of currencies. Eritrea rejected Ethiopians proposal for 
cross border trades.” ( Negash & Tronvoll supra note 1 at  36.) In As Eritrea could not legally claim some of the 
presumed “rights”, it had to move subtle destructive military measure that thought would convince Ethiopia to 
come to Eritrean terms.  The two successive letters that were written by President Isias to Prime Minister Meles 
depict some unusual message. It was of course strange for two close relatives and comrades to follow formal letter 
instead of easily accessible phone call. Thus the provocative act of ARDUF appear a kind of Badme formula that 
was devised by President Afeworki but Prime Minister Meles did not see in that way.  
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Commission did not accept this contention.  EECC summed that Eritrean act of May 12, 1998 was 
an act of invasion contrary to the Charter of UN.220  
  This incidence prompted the need for border demarcation and formation of Joint Border 
Commission from both States. The Joint Border Commission comprised highest government 
officials including Eritrean Defense Minister. The Joint Border Commission set up a technical sub 
committee that constituted experts to actually deal with border issue.221 As there was no genuine 
stand on President Isias Afewroki’s part to work out the border issue, the work of the Joint Border 
Commission was also a mere propaganda tool that could not solve the actual problem. The May 6, 
1998 accident happened when the Eritrean delegation was on its way for the schedule meeting on 
May 8, 1998 in Addis Ababa. The Commission held its first meeting on May 8, 1998 but suddenly 
checked out from their hotel on May 9, 1998 abandoning the scheduled meeting on account of 
Eritrea’s move for invading Ethiopia.   
 
6.4.1.5. The Tigray Map that Apparently included Contested Regions 
  After a month of Adi Murug’s incidence, Tigray Regional State published a regional map 
with assistance of GTZ. The regional maps included all contested border territories including Adi 
Murug.  It is not clear why the Tigray Regional State considered unsettled territories as part of 
Tigray. The very motive of for issuing the map was as elementary school teaching aid.   Though 
Federal Government did not involve in drawing the regional map, the Federal Government did not 
take any action against the map. Eritrea never attempted to the presumed issue on Tigray map 
amicably. 
                                            
220  EECC supra note 167. 
221 The May 6, 1998 incidences surfaced while the Joint Border Commission schedule for meeting  in Addis Ababa 
on May 8, 1998.  The May 6, incidence occurred at Badme while the Eritrean Team was on Journey to Addis 
Ababa. Even after occurrence of the May incidence at Badme the Commission conducted one day meeting at 
Addis Ababa and the next day was schedule to be held at 10:00 AM. While Ethiopian escort time arrived at the 
hotel where the Ethiopian team located, the team already checked out and flied to Eritrea. 
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  For Eritrea the map marked huge implication – the intention of Ethiopia to unilaterally take 
action against the contested territories before the Joint Border Commission decides the border 
issue. This map was presented to EEBC has Ethiopia’s intent to unilaterally draw the boundary 
line.  
6.4.1.6.    Dictatorial Nature of Leadership and Suppressive Policy 
  In most African States, personality of leader determines the nature of government and 
national policy. Eritrean and Ethiopian leaders were emerged from long period battle against the 
repressive military government. Their confidence is generally built in military power. A 
commentator portrays President Isias Afeworki as leader who is, “ Endowed with a battle-
hardened military and self-confidence, [he] seem[s] ready […] to ‘boost Eritrea’s identity at every 
opportunity.”222 The victory over the then Africa’s superior military, and the initial logistics and 
military superiority of EPLF over TPLF has shaped, “Self image of Eritrea’s leadership.”223 
President Isias Afeworki’s over confidence and reliance on its military power has contributed for 
disturbance of regional peace.  
  Thus, personal character of President Isias Afeworki and his leadership policy has its share 
for the sudden eruption of border conflict. A Situation Report of Institute of Security Report 
describes personal character of President Isias Afeworki, as aggressive by nature and abhors 
negotiated settlement and concession.224  A quote from ISS Situation Report attests:  
“[President Isias Afeworki has …] distaste for compromise and diplomacy, both which he 
considers weaknesses.   [He] has shown a relish for intrigues and displayed an extraordinary 
taste for undercover maneuvers with wide regional repercussions in relations with 
neighboring states. His militaristic or trigger-happy pattern of behavior in foreign relations 
has transpired over an extended period. […] The misguided policy that he loves to call 
‘forward policy’ has not been conducive to the building of a stable regional security in the 
                                            
222 Khadiagala, supra note 6 at 43. 
223 Ulf Terlinden & Tobias Debiel, Deceptive Hope for Peace?  The Horn of Africa Between Crisis Diplomacy and 
Obstacles to development, PEACE, CONFLICT AND DEV’T  Issue Four April 2004, Available at 
www.bradford.ac.uk - social-science 
224  Mesfin, supra note 18. 
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Horn of Africa. President Issayas has thus established a reputation and record for toughness 
and ruthlessness, trying to alter borders by force, willing to got to war for what he perceives 
to be Eritrea’s interest, regardless of the outcome of past confrontations.” 225 
 
  As noted elsewhere at the beginning of this Chapter, President Isias Afeworki’s own words 
also reveal how his leadership policy has shaped Eritrea’s invasive character. President Afewerki 
illustrates, “If […] my neighbor destroys my fence and there is nothing I can obtain by taking him 
to the magistrate, then I will be obliged to destroy his fence.”226  (Emphasis mine.)  As repeatedly 
pointed out, guided by militaristic doctrines President Isaias Afeworki, has unleashed his fighters 
against all neighboring States before giving any room for peaceful means of dispute resolution. As 
ISS proves, to President Afeworki, negotiated settlement and compromise is defeat or weakness. 
This in turn implies that resolution of Ethio-Eritrea dispute may not possibly be resolved while 
President is in power, unless he makes policy U turn, or changes his authoritarian conduct. 
  Failure of multitude of international mediation efforts to avert Ethio-Eritrean war 
demonstrates uncompromising nature of President Afework’s attitude. President Isias Afeworki 
had ignored mediation efforts of OAU, United States, and Rwanda, which required to withdraw its 
troops from territories occupied after May 6, 1998 incidence. However, after Ethiopian forces 
ejected Eritrean troops from Badme and its environs, President Afeworki immediately declared 
acceptance of OAU Framework Agreement. He disclosed the same attitude after Ethiopia liberated 
all its territories and entered deep into Eritrea. This characteristic of President Afeworki suggests 
the weight and moment he affords to peaceful resolution. President Afeworki resorts to peaceful 
deposition only after all means of military solution fails to work.  
                                            
225 Id.  
226  Tronvoll supra note 16 at 1046. 
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  A nation lead by autocratic leader is necessarily undemocratic, this in turn, can be source of 
conflict.227 Undemocratic nations generally rely on coercion as a means of resolution of dispute. 
“Autocratic and ideologically rigid nature of the political regime”228 of both Ethiopia and Eritrea 
has direct effect on negotiated settlement of disputes. Though the Ethiopian government often 
blamed for suppression of dissent and restriction and imprisonment of journalists and diminishing 
political playground for opposition parties, the Eritrean case is worse. Eritrea generally neglects 
democratic values having repugnance to western traditions. It trashed a draft constitution and 
guided by personal impulses of the President. Opposition party system generally banned, there is 
no prospect for any kind of election. The nature of government of Eritrea, therefore, has direct 
effect on the Ethio-Eritrean border war. Khadiagala, aptly observes, “Given the wealth of formulas 
for resolving territorial tension, escalation of the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict makes clear a 
fundamental failure to construct institutions strong enough to stabilize authority.”229 
  Eritrea’s “virulent nationalism to bolster domestic authority”230 was another reason for 
eruption of border war. As pinpointed elsewhere, Italian colonialism and its objective of using 
Eritrea as spring board to occupy Ethiopia and other regions of Africa, has shaped Eritrea in a way 
it to be different from Ethiopia. During the fifty years time Eritreans had served in Italian armed 
forces that served in Libya, Somalia and in Ethiopia. In Ethiopia, Eritrean soldiers were more 
important to Italy as they have common culture, religion and in same cases language. Eritreans 
served as pacifying forces to Italy. They were salaried personnel that had huge impact in shaping 
consciousness. Eritrea had modern infrastructure including asphalted roads and rail way. There 
were numerous Italian residents that engaged in business, trade and agriculture. In addition to 
                                            
227  A symposium held by Ethiopian and Eritrean intellectuals underline undemocratic nature of Eritrean and Ethiopian 
regimes was the major cause that has triggered the current conflict and long standing conflict between Eritrea and 
Ethiopia since monarchial times. See Leeta, supra note 183 at 9.  
228 Abbink, supra note 7 at 144  
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serving in the military, Eritrean people had ample job opportunities. At that time the people of 
northern Ethiopia used to go Eritrea to serve in low paid jobs like serving as domestic maids and in 
other low profile jobs that Eritreans were not willing to work.  This presumably has created ethic 
superiority complexity and boosts Eritrean false appearance of superiority.  Even before Eritrean 
federation to Ethiopia, during federation and after abolition of federation, Eritreans were the most 
privileged people in Ethiopia. Colonization boosted their exposure to modernization before the rest 
of Ethiopia. There were more educated Eritreans to serve in Ethiopian government offices, 
benefited from opportunities that Ethiopia could make available to citizens. This apparently made 
Eritreans different from people from other regions of Ethiopia.  
  The people of Tigray, on the contrary, were the most disadvantaged people in Ethiopian 
history. Tigray economy was not only undeveloped but also repeatedly jeopardized by the 
successive wars. Most wars including the first and second Italian invasions were fought in Tigrary 
land. At a time Ethiopian warriors lacked sufficient logistics to feed. The entire burden was on the 
people of Tigray.  They had to feed the warriors voluntarily or involuntarily.  After finishing their 
own resources, the warriors had to raid cattle of their brothers in Tigray.  On top of this, as the rest 
of Ethiopia, Tigrary had no infrastructure and seriously underdeveloped. Since Italian occupation 
of Eritrea, laborers from Tigray had been serving Eritreans in low profile jobs. This has boosted 
the feeling of Eritrean superiority and chauvinism, narrow nationalism. The Eritrean government’s 
false assumption of trans-border nationalism and the interest to boost domestic authority, as 
liberator of Eritrea from backward Ethiopia, was another reason that motivated for use of force.   
  To sum up, after long journey of political suppression, dictatorship, unending military 
conscription, and economic misery as a result of wrong calculation of the government of State of 
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Eritrea against Ethiopia under the guise of border issue. Now it appears that the Eritrean people 
could not withstand the burnt of dictatorship and unending suppression. However, little attempt has 
been made to change the nature of leadership and government.231  In Ethiopia, the split of powerful 
founders and involvement of several non-TPLF allies have mitigated the dictatorial role of TPLF, 
the Eritrean counterpart remained in tact without any form of check and balance. In Eritrea overall 
power has been entrusted on the President. It appears no meaningful decision and action can be 
taken unless it sprang from the President. 
   To resolve the current border or other real issues with Ethiopia, the President has to change 
his aggressive and uncompromising personality, which is unlikely, or the President has to be 
changed and give way to progressive Eritrean elites. Political elites largely concern for power 
retention and narrow nationalism more than long-term benefits of their citizens. They either carry 
out shame election for the purpose of political consumption or conduct no election, as if they were 
created to lead their people. While the former may describe Ethiopian situation, there is no election 
for peaceful democratic transition in Eritrea. This makes the possibility of settling border dispute 
unlikely in short term. Ethiopia’s occasional threat to remove the President further complicates the 
situation.  All options should be left to the people of Eritrea.  
 
6.4.2.   The Need to Appreciate the Changing Nature of Borders and Mandatory Trans 
border Cooperation          
  
  This is an era where the world is moving toward cooperation and integration to withstand 
uncontrollable effects of globalization. In some cases, the tide of globalization compels 
                                            
231 Instead of fighting dictatorial regime to change it or change its nature, everybody, including high ranking 
government authorities, including ministers, military officials and ambassadors migrate out of Eritrea. Tens and 
thousands of Eritrean migrate despite shoot and kill policy of the government. Currently about 250 Eritreans daily 
march to Ethiopia. Ethiopia has granted scholarship to 1500 Eritreans who have academic qualification to join 
Ethiopian colleges.  
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unrestricted contact and integration. The advancement of digital technology has enabled cross 
border interaction, trans-boundary commerce, global terrorism, cybercrime and so forth, that may 
not be contained by the border wall or detected by border guards. Global cooperation and 
integration is not an option, but a necessary effect of globalization that would enable nations resist 
undesirable consequences (byproducts or side effects) of globalization. Though some challenges 
are still apparent, European Union has already changed the nature of boundaries substantial 
member states from barrier to bridges. One of the important motto of African border program is to 
change African borders from barriers to bridges.  The current Ethio-Eritrean condition points 
innumerable possibilities that diverge with actors of globalization.232  
   In Africa Regional Economic Communities are moving toward economic and political 
integration by issuing one passport to its citizens with the ultimate goal of free movement of goods 
and service thereby changing borders from barriers to points of contact. As Khadiagala rightly 
remarks:  
In contemporary Africa, borders are […] continually subverted by deepening 
cosmopolitanism, globalization and the civilizational logic of economic integration.  Such 
integration denudes the attractiveness of frontiers as political and economic objects and 
denies the salience of sovereignty. By permitting the mobility of factors of production for 
wealth creation, economic integration restrains border conflict, enlarging the institutional 
framework for problem solving.233 
 
In addition to the global and African border tide touching Ethiopia and Eritrea, the colonial 
boundary has separated the two intertwined people that always aspire for unlimited comingling.  
There is interest from both sides to change barrier effect of border.  Border closure does not serve 
interest of common people of Ethiopia and Eritrea. But the now for all effects and purposes the 
two nations are in deadlock.  To building good neighborhood, the deadlock has to be unlocked. 
This assumption may appear unrealistic, but it is possible. The question may be how? At this stage 
                                            
232 There is concern ‘[…] for power retention and narrow nationalisms overpowered the still underdeveloped 
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to talk about transforming Ethio-Eritrean border into point of contact is really impossible. 
Currently borderland of both nations is manned with forces that are ready to kill each other and 
controlled by machines that are armed with missiles, which can destroy thousands of lives again.   
  The impasse may be unlocked if the leader of both nations are committed build peace in the 
region by drawing an acceptable borderline through compromise. They should set their mind that 
at any point in the future the two nations will freely move across the border. The leader should be 
directed by the long plan of unavoidable integration. To accelerate the inevitable integration, the 
leaders should be willing to sit for honest constructive and dialogue rather than playing a legal 
game and media campaign. The borderland people, elders and neighboring states of both nations 
undoubtedly are aware of the true boundaries. Absolute reliance on the elusive colonial treaties and 
unfair decisions will not help the people of both nations.   
  As Ethiopia publicly declared that Tsorena and Fort Cadorna were not Ethiopian towns, 
Eritrea should be honest rather than attempting to benefit from elusive colonial treaties and 
unrealistic EEBC decisions. The two nations should make negotiated settlement that would best 
meet the rights and interest of both nations. After political decision and directions are designed, a 
joint border commission may carry out the actual border setting. A borderline that takes historical 
relations, to the extend possible aligns with border treaties and that takes actual interest of 
borderland residents would create good neighborhood.  A good neighborhood in turn would 
perpetuate peace and boost cooperation that would ultimately make barrier nature of border walls 
effect less thereby changing the nature of border from barrier to bridges. Borders lands will turn 
into points of contact and center for cooperation thereby reunite the two brotherly people. If the 
people of two nations move freely like Europeans in the Schengen area, the difference between 
                                                                                                                                               
opportunities for economic integration.” Khadiagla supra note 6 at 52.   
233 Id. at 40 
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being an Ethiopian and Eritrean will be a matter of politics simply to elect and be elected in their 
respective nations.  If the economic integration finally leads into political integration all 
differences will fade away by itself and Ethiopia and Eritrea will turn into a situation they were 
before colonial foots landed in Africa.  
 
6.4.3.  Political Commitment and Determination to Resolve Dispute Constructively 
  To achieve a real resolution, contending Parties’ determination and commitment is 
paramount. This process demands high political commitment that is non-extent at the moment. If 
there is real interest to build peace between two States, dispute resolution will be easier. Generally 
there is no unresolvable dispute. The only problem, however, is willingness and interest of leaders 
to resolve disputes peacefully on give and take basis.  No one disagrees with the assertion, had 
there been commitment and determination to resolve dispute, the May 1998 war would never been 
erupted and tens and thousands of lives would have been saved. Leaders of both States should 
prioritize public interest beyond their own selfish personal interest and honor. Needless to say 
public interest does not favor war and destruction while it is possible to resolve disputes amicably. 
   As attempted to prove in the foregoing Sections, the May 1998 border conflict was simply 
a bargaining leverage that was unexpectedly flared up but had been boiling by the unresolved 
socio-economic and political divergences. Dealing only with border delineation issues by ignoring 
pressing socio-economic issues may not produce a desired result. This appears the most important 
cause for the current impasse. The question would be how to deal with all of the issues at the same 
time. If there is political commitment and willingness, nothing is impossible. All the issue may be 
resolve all disputes side by side. Therefore, before dealing with issues, mediation should focus on 
ascertaining willingness and determination of contending Parties to resolve the dispute amicably, 
compromising interests.  
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  If all issues should be dealt side by side, numerous committees may be constituted to 
address issues simultaneously.   A Joint Border Commission may be reconstituted with a view to 
deal with border issues. A high level committee for reviving and implementing the September 
1993 Friendship and Cooperation Agreement should be reconstituted.  Currency, port, investment 
and trade issues should be resolved while border delineation is going on. Resolution on main 
issues would expedite border delimitation and demarcation.  
  The recommendation may be hard to accept, especially to Eritrea, but honest and peaceful 
resolution would best satisfy public interest, and enhance welfare of people of the two States. If the 
political leaders of both nations really love their people, should be willing to sit together around 
negotiation table and find out solution for their own problems. It will avoid animosity and hatred 
that will, in turn, stimulate cooperation and integration, which in turn, will expedite the effort of 
building peace in the Horn of Africa.  
 
6.4.4.  Set Borderline in a way Acceptable to Borderland Resident   
  Any decision or action that is contrary to the reality known to the borderland residents of 
both States cannot create peace and stability in the disputed areas.  Local people are aware of the 
true lines that actually separate them.  Reliance on reality would bring a better solution than simply 
wrangling with vague colonial treaties and unrealistic personal sketches. Both nations should 
approve a boundary line that is acceptable to the borderland residents, as there is no reason to 
argue to the contrary. It is true that colonial border delineation was purely Italian initiative and 
favored them and supported their expansionist policy. Eritrea, as a successor of the Italian rights 
and interest may opt for strict application of the colonial treaties, colonial maps that were drawn 
unilaterally by Italians. This move proved to be unacceptable to the Ethiopian borderland residents 
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like Irob. If border setting is a temporary solution that would be will be changed, why Eritrea stuck 
to the unrealistic and elusive colonial treaties? Jon Abbink makes a powerful remark as follows:  
‘[…] the issue of the boundary appears to be an eminently political issue, hinging on the 
future relations between two countries so closely connected in social, cultural and historical 
terms. It suggests that – baring another big war – only a mature, democratically supported 
political solution, to be reached through negotiation and consultation of local populations as 
to self-determination, can bring about stability, and that any legal judgment or arbitration 
must in some way encourage that political aspect.234  
 
   As the nature of borders soon to be changed into bridges and points of contact, there is no 
need to rely on vague provisions of the colonial treaties and attempt to take territories in a way not 
acceptable to borderland residents.  
   In drawing acceptable borderline, borderland residents should play an active role. They 
should be afforded with fair chance of deciding their own fate to join anyone of the States they 
choose. In a situation where not possible to clearly determine an actual borderline, both states and 
should be ready to compromise using traditional dispute settlement mechanism. In a cooperative 
environment division of ethnic groups does not matter, as it will not have long-term effect. The 
Joint Border Commission should be willing to recognize reasonable decisions of borderland 
residents. Borderland residents, including Kunama, Irob or Afar should understand that borderline 
is a temporary solution. It will be practically insignificant as people from both sides can freely 
interact. Setting an acceptable boundary line would expedite AU’s Border Program that aims at 
changing barrier nature of borders into bridges.   
 
6.4.5.  The Need to Resolve Disputes though Dialogue 
  Now Eritrea has been campaigning in all international forums demanding Ethiopia to 
surrender territories awarded by EEBC.  As attempted to point out above, elusive treaty wordings 
of 1900, 1902, and 1908 colonial treaty that did not match with the facts on the ground that stained 
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EEBC’s delimitation decision. A measure that EEBC took to cure ambiguities in the treaties and 
treaty map, has further complicated boundary making. In search of intention of the Parties, EEBC 
relied on maps unilaterally drawn by Italians or Italian agencies, which were not available to 
Ethiopia. Similarly, private notes, memos, reports and comments of Italian colonial authorities, 
which were not known or embody the Ethiopian version of intent, influenced EEBC’s decision. It 
is puzzling to take a note of governor of Eritrea or report of Italian negotiator to ascertain intention 
of the parties to fill treaty lacunae.  
  As a result of these procedural and factual anomalies, EEBC decided in accordance with 
the presumed intention of Italy that favored for Eritrea. In some cases EEBC’s award even 
widened the gap between the two countries. As discussed in detail in foregoing chapter, at the 
juncture of Setit and Maiteb the borderline goes northeast to the confluence of Mareb. Italian maps 
disclosed at least four rivers that may be viewed as Maiteb. Ethiopia contends that the first Maiteb 
as a treaty Maiteb that situated at the 20 Km distance from Sudanese borderline. There were other 
rivers that have link to Setit in the South East. The Belesa confusion and the non-existent river 
called Muna appear to render EEBC’s award nonsense. With full awareness of these confusing 
river nomenclatures, EEBC did not attempt to ascertain actually facts on the ground.  Modern 
satellite images are assistive but cannot “communicate” changes took place since making of the 
treaties, and regarding changes in river nomenclature, changes in actual geographic conditions or 
disclose changing nature of geographic history.  
  Historical facts including changes in river nomenclature, diversion or dry up of tributaries 
or actual or changed geographic realties supposedly best known to the borderland people of two 
sides of border. The borderland people were unaware of what was going on in respect of them not 
only in colonial time, but also in new era where they were supposed to know a decision that will 
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impact their lives permanently. Though EEBC had no mandate to report its actions and finding or 
investigations to the borderland plan, it missed the chance to make the decision realistic and solve 
the actual problem instead of complicating the matter basing its disposition on theoretical 
hypothesis in The Hague.  Borderland residents did not know the conclusion of separating treaties, 
but they know the actual separating line. The very objective of EEBC was to settle dispute by 
awarding a decision that would actually resolve dispute. With this end EEBC should have used 
avenues that would supply honest and unbiased facts. There were ample possibilities to cross 
check facts across border by filtering supposedly biased data transparently, but EEBC did not give 
room for empirical observation.   
  With little and unreliable geographic data Italian agents and, especially Emperor Minilik II 
who lacked the possibility and means to know actual facts on the grounds, concluded the colonial 
treaties at a far distance, in Addis Ababa. Emperor Minilik supposedly signed on a draft treaty 
presented by Italian agents. Moreover, by ignoring the supposed treaties Italy invaded Ethiopia and 
redraw boundary. This unilateral action has rendered the treaties dead.235. It is not clear why 
Ethiopia submitted itself to abide by the already dead colonial treaties.236  
  Enforcement of the treaties in colonial sense appears contradicting with EEBC’s other 
position. Both Ethiopia and Eritrea suggested that the boundary dispute to be resolved in 
accordance with Cairo Resolution of 1964, which declared respect to colonial boundary line.  
                                            
235 Negussay Ayele, Reflections on Border Regimes and Colonial Treaties on the Horn,  ETHIOMEDIA.COM     
(June 17, 2000) , Available at, http://www.mediaethiopia.com/Negussay_On_TheWar.htm ( accessed 03/23/16). See 
also Ayele, supra note 53. 
236 In Ethiopia this is very politically sensitive issue and it is almost impossible to get empirical data. Where there is 
no clear answer varied speculations and intelligent guesses often posed. In this case first chance may be given to 
EPRDF’s political addenda. TPLF from the onset believed that Minilik II betrayed Eritrea and its boundaries were set 
by the colonial Italy. This assumption was built by ELF and later followed by EPLF. TPLF supposedly molded by 
EPLF’s propaganda, and accepted EPLF’s assertion without change. This stand has blinded EPRDF elites to invoke 
the dead colonial treaties and the boundary line the treaties sought to draw.  TPLF’s stand vis-à-vis colonial treaties 
did not safeguard Ethiopia’s national interest, but EPRDF disregarded national interest for sake of its political 
commitment even before the Algiers Agreement. As has been pointed out elsewhere, Prime Minister Mele  Zenawi 
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EEBC decided that the Cairo Resolution of OAU was not applicable to the case at hand. If so on 
what basis EEBC has applied colonial treaties, maps, reports, comments and so on?  It appears 
contradiction in terms. Given confusions in EEBC decision, treaty wordings, and confusing legal 
status of treaties, it would be fair to modify the delimitation decision in mutually acceptable way to 
building good neighborhood and make lasting peace and stability.  
  Moreover, the boundary is not yet demarcated in accordance with Algiers Agreement. 
Confronted with the deadlock and noncooperation of both Parties, EEBC has declared virtual 
demarcation. As pointed out elsewhere, in its delimitation decision EEBC time and again pledged 
that geographic facts would be considered during demarcation.  Virtual demarcation thus fails to 
satisfy these promises. In general, it is possible to suggest that the boundary is not clearly defined.  
It is yet porous and if demarcated in accordance with literal wordings of EEBC’s delimitation 
decision, the borderline would split families, town and villages that have been living together for 
centuries.  Learning facts of the EEBC’s award the people of Irob have petitioned to the 
international community and have been pressing the Ethiopian government not to honor EEBC’s 
delimitation decision. This stressful pressure has huge impact on Ethiopia’s refusal to cooperate in 
demarcation of Central and Western Sectors.  
  Due to international pressure and commitment to respect international treaty Ethiopia 
accepted the delimitation decision in principle and has been demanding dialogue to draw an 
acceptable boundary line.  Even if Ethiopia accepts the virtual demarcation, an actual point that 
Ethiopia has to surrender is not yet marked on the ground.  All these demand honest and 
constructive dialogue and political commitment to resolve conflict. The dialogue had to be not 
merely to set a dividing line, but it should gear toward resolving all presumed and potential 
                                                                                                                                               
had been invoking reference to colonial treaties before accepting Modalities and Technical arrangement for 
implementation of OAU’s Framework Agreement. ( See Appendix 15, Negash &Tronvoll supra note 1 at 151. 
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disputes with the ultimate goals of smoothing ground for creating good neighborhood.  Building a 
lasting peace and normalization of relationship requires resolution of all disputes through honest 
bilateral dialogue for the interest of the two brotherly people of Ethiopia and Eritrea.  
  Ethiopia has already declared its intent to resolve all disputes with Eritrea through honest 
bilateral dialogue. Now it is time to Eritrea to take the same initiative.  The people of both nations 
will tremendously benefit from negotiated settlement. It will not only resolve the border issue but 
also will re-establish socio-economic ties. Eritrea undoubtedly will benefit from big Ethiopian 
market and Ethiopia will able to use Eritrean ports, which will add income to Eritrea.237 Currently 
Ethiopia has been paying to Djibouti, Sudan and in the future when Ethiopia uses Mombasa port to 
Kenya. Both Kenyan and Sudanese ports are far away and add extra transportation cost and 
Djibouti port could not efficiently accommodate Ethiopian import and export. Eritrea will also 
benefit from Ethiopian products that it cannot get elsewhere. Like teff, coffee, and other special 
agricultural products that Eritrean people used to import from Ethiopia. Though currently 
Ethiopian factory products are increasing beyond local needs, Eritrean special products, can also 
exported to Ethiopia.  
  In conclusion, in socio-ethnically intertwined people of Ethiopia and Eritrea, it is not 
simple enough to draw a clear dividing line. To install a lasting peace among the intermixed people 
all disputes should be resolved constructively through honest bilateral dialogue with the objective 
of normalizing relationship and reunite the two brotherly people again.  But EEBC’s decision has 
failed to attain this goal. As a political commentator rightly remarks, “[…] in view of highly 
relevant social and historical aspects of the boundary issue, the EEBC Decision is not the best that 
could have been made, and may in fact have perpetuated the conflict between the two 
                                            
237  As a result of the border war Ethiopia routed all its important export traffic to Djibouti. Consequently “Eritrea lost 
hundreds of millions of dollars in annual revenue [….]” See Mesfin, supra note 18. 
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countries.”238. EEBC’s decision “[…] might be acceptable purely in legal terms but “defeats its 
own purpose.” [Emphasis added).239 The decision rather has complicated all possibilities of future 
amicable resolution. Eritrea has been invoking the decision as propaganda to pressurize Ethiopia 
that further complicates possibilities of future amicable resolution. Mere reliance on elusive EEBC 
decision and Eritrea’s dishonest media campaign cannot resolve the issue. Both Parties should be 
willing to resolve all disputes through bilateral negotiation.  
 
                                            
238 Abbnik  supra  note 7 at 142.  
239 Id at 143. The Award fails to attain the mandate of normalization of relationship as it would split families and 
strongly intertwined ethnic group that never viewed themselves as Eritreans and have been residing in the locality for 
centuries. They don’t have any intention to vacate from their land nor like to Eritreans.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
 
7.1.  Conclusionary Remarks 
 
 We are in the era of globalization where uncontrollable trans-border actors, and 
multinational entities have been moving to “liberate” the world from the confines of border walls 
thereby creating a borderless globe. As pointed out in Chapter Two of this Dissertation, in the 21st 
century border walls appear failing to contain invisible forces or powerful global actors, and 
properly discharge their traditional function of restraining “others.”1 Needless to say, confinement 
within the bounds of border walls is on the verge of being obsolete. In a virtually interlinked 
world, an incident happening elsewhere, or an action perpetrated in one part of the globe, for good 
or bad, shakes the entire world. Consequently, global community has been cautiously watching 
activities and happenings elsewhere to take a countervailing measure.  
 For instance, United States or other global powers cannot keep quiet while Africa is being 
messed with acts of terrorism, as an act of terror may not stop at its origin. Similarly, global 
community has concern over environmental pollution, actions triggering global warming, or 
financial regulation that may affect economic or financial interest of everyone. Global connectivity 
is not simply limited to international financial sector, climate change, terrorism or cyber attacks 
that can bypass any border wall. The contemporary world has been witnessing the emergence of 
powerful multinational private companies that do not respect border walls.2  
                                            
1 The current territorial state tendency to bar mobility via huge border wall barrier and invisible intruders that can 
bypass the border wall or other global actors, like multinational companies that abhor border wall can be solved by 
designing a working solution to address the contradictory global reality vis-à-vis borders.  For brief discussion on 
effects of globalization on borderlines see Section 2.4.3. 
2 For instance, search engine giant, Google, Social media companies, virtual markets like Amazon are in effect global 
companies that operate everywhere irrespective of national borders.  
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Moreover, nowadays, human needs extend beyond the limits of bordered territories.  In 21st 
century walled territory policy does not best satisfy the needs and aspirations of the new 
generation, neither enhances the wellbeing of the public.  The new generation has interest to get 
mingled with global citizens freely. Each nation or territory naturally endowed with unique 
geographic, and socio-economic resources that would make life more confortable and enjoyable. 
Unrestrained movement of people, goods and services will definitely cut cost and make life more 
pleasant. Being cognizant of side effects of the traditional borderline, and attracted by the positive 
effects of unrestricted movement of its citizens, Europe has effectively changed its internal 
borderlines from barriers to bridges in Schengen area. Even though filtering quality of Schengen 
area is not well advanced to completely contain “others” like illegal flow of immigrants and 
potential terrorist, the benefit of changing the nature of borders from barriers to bridges outweighs 
its restraining effects.  
With a view to smoothly regulate effects of globalization and enhance welfare of Africans 
by changing the traditional role of borders and avoid borderline conflicts or address ongoing 
conflicts, AU has devised a special program called African Union Border Program (AUBP) with a 
motto of changing the nature of African borders from barriers to bridges. It is generally believed 
that AUBP will eventually address Africa’s quest for peace, but currently the young Program not 
only suffers from financial, institutional or manpower constraints, but also has been overwhelmed 
with widespread border induced conflicts.  
Present-day Africa is literally free but colonial footprints are still apparent in variety of 
sectors, including borderlands. African borderlines are colonial creations that still divide nations, 
nationalities, ethnic groups and in some cases families. Africa’s natural borderline development 
was thwarted by the infamous Berlin Conference of 1884 -1885, which partitioned Africa among 
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European powers in complete disregard of geographic, ethnographic, linguistic, and cultural 
determinants. As result, the intertwined people of Africa have been disintegrated into multiple 
states. Ironically, after restoration of independence, founding fathers of African umbrella 
organization – OAU - cherished the “sanctity” of colonial boundaries, suppressing Kwame 
Nkrumah’s vision of forming United Sates of Africa by removing divisive colonial boundaries 
thereby reuniting Africans.  
It is understandable that founders of OAU had feared the anticipated effects of 
unmanageable conflict that supposed to erupt through out the continent.  Prioritizing continental 
unity through a strong umbrella organization was a good option, but complete ignorance of 
revisionist objectives was a historic mistake.3 As a result, Africa has missed the best chance of 
rooting out the root cause of conflict. Some authors and international tribunals tend to conclude 
that by adopting the Cairo declaration of 1964, OAU had accepted the principle of uti possidetis 
juris that had avoided territorial or boundary conflict among the newly freed nations of Spanish 
Latin America, African situation was completely different.4  Unlike Spanish Latin America, Africa 
was colonized by several competing European powers that prioritized their interest in complete 
disregard of benefits and wishes of Africans, but African brothers should not have ignored the 
interest of their fellow Africans.  
Complete ignorance of objectives of Kwame Nkrumah’s to redraw African boundaries in a 
way acceptable to Africans was not only motivated by fear of opening Pandora’s Box in which 
                                            
3 Before the signature on OAU’s charter actually dry, in early 1964 a devastating border war erupted in the Horn of Africa 
between Ethiopia and Somalia, and in north between Morocco and Algeria.  This motivated founding father’s of OAU to 
expressly declare acceptance of colonial boundaries “whether they are good or bad,” in First Summit of OAU, in 1964. The 
idea of keeping colonial boundaries or changing them with w view to reintegrate Africa had divided Pan Africans into two 
camps: the unionist and statist camps. The Unionist Camp propagated immediate political integration of Africa by 
abolishing colonial boundaries, the Statist group vigorously argued to keep colonial boundaries.  ( For details on this topic, 
see Section 4.3 of this Dissertation).  
4 For brief discussion on application of uti possidetis rule in Africa and implications of ICJ decision of Burkina Faso/Mali 
Case see 3.4.1 and with regard to consideration of the  principle of uti possidetis in Africa see 4.3 of this Dissertation.  
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supposedly mass of unmanageable conflict locked in, but geared to ward achieving power and 
more territory at the expense of millions of Africans. One of the founding fathers of OAU, Haile 
Selassie I, for example, suggested Africans to accept colonial boundaries, as they were, whether 
the boundaries were “good or bad”.5   It is plausible that Emperor Haile Selassie had interest to 
maintain sovereignty over the Somali region of Ethiopia that Somalia had been requesting to unit 
with their Somali kinsmen.  Similarly, redrawing colonial boundaries was not acceptable to Kenya 
because Somalia had been demanding the Somali ethnic group in the northern Kenya to be ceded 
to Somalia. The then president of Mali and Mauritania vigorously argued against revision colonial 
boundary to meet their own similar private power interest.  
The decision to honor colonial boundary line in fact did not suppress territorial or boundary 
conflict, as it was supposed. Since heydays of OAU, Africa has been experiencing brutal border 
conflicts. In this regard President Chadly of Algeria view, which portrays colonial boundaries as 
“delayed action bombs left by colonialism,” is not an exaggeration.6 Put simply, devastating 
boundary wars and conflicts have been not uncommon in Africa.  Most political commentators 
agree that vague and divisive colonial boundary laws and policies take lion’s share of African 
interstate conflict. As pointed out elsewhere in this study, boundary issues are by nature very 
sensitive that can quickly flare up into armed confrontation. 
Though Ethio-Eritrea border conflict was stirred up by multifaceted socio-economic 
causes, elusive colonial boundary line that was supposed to be drawn by the colonial treaties of 
1900, 1902, and 1908 prompted the most ferocious war in 21st Africa. The war was suddenly 
erupted, and quickly flared up consuming lives of 70 – 100,000 people, has destroyed vast amount 
of property, displaced millions from their homes, and above all strained relationship of the 
brotherly people of Ethiopia and Eritrea.  
                                            
5 See details in Section  4.3  of this Dissertation.  
6 See J.R.V. PRESCOTT, POLITICAL FRONTIERS AND BOUNDARIES, 254(1987). 
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   Terms of the colonial treaties were extremely vague to set a clear and acceptable boundary 
line on the ground. As pointed out in Chapter 6, the treaties were not only vague, but also named 
inexistent or wrong boundary rivers a boundary marks. This rendered boundary-making business 
almost impossible. In other cases, several rivers were captioned in the same name.7 The main river 
course and tributaries found to be indistinguishable.  
  Confronted with unsolvable scenario, the arbitration tribunal had resorted to unilateral 
colonial reports, notes, memorandums and third party maps that were not known to Ethiopia. This 
has further complicated boundary setting and the boundary line delimited by EEBC was 
completely unacceptable to Ethiopia, as it would further divide families, towns, villages, and 
ethnic groups that have been living together for centuries. Some of the villages that were never 
claimed by Ethiopia were awarded to Ethiopia, and villages that were never been under Eritrea 
administration were allotted to Eritrea. In refusal of both nations to cooperate with EEBC, it 
adopted a virtual demarcation thereby declaring Ethio-Eritrea boundary line stood demarcated on 
geographic coordinates (boundary points), and ended its business.  But nothing has been done on 
the supposed borderline – no pillar, beacon or other kind of mark has been emplaced on the 
ground.  
  Now the boundary line is still elusive but Eritrea has been campaigning in all forums to 
pressurize Ethiopia to surrender an uncertain territory that was “fictionally” delineated by virtual 
demarcation. Even if Ethiopia is willing to give up the contested territories, an actual line of 
separation is not yet set on the ground. Thus, unless an actual boundary line is drawn on the 
ground through bilateral dialogue, the contested territories are practically undeliverable. As EEBC 
is not available to complete the delineation through actual physical demarcation, the only possible 
option available is to reach at negotiated settlement either by forming a joint border commission 
that will complete border making. With this view in mind, Ethiopia has been insisting Eritrea to 
resolve the issue through bilateral dialogue, but Eritrea has refused opting for strict adherence to 
                                            
7 Take, for example, the case of River Maiteb in Setiti juncture. While the treaty names the river from which a straright line 
drawn to Mai Ambessa as Maiteb, there were other confusing nomenclature as Maiten, Meeteb, or Mi Tene. As a result of 
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the EEBC’s impracticable legalistic approach demanding Ethiopia to surrender territories that were 
awarded by the delimitation decision. As a result, the two brotherly nations are completely locked 
up by the no war no peace policy that has rendered borderland residents to pursue uncertain future. 
  Honest dialogue will not only enable setting a boundary line on the ground, but also will 
certainly facilitate resolution of latent disputes that have triggered the border conflict.8 As pointed 
out in the foregoing chapters, the border issue was simply a bargaining leverage. Numerous 
political and legal analysts and commentator have observed that Eritrea had provoked the 
boundary war with intent for force Ethiopia to meet certain economic, monetary, and investment 
expectations that Ethiopia failed to honor.  Unless these issues are resolved, mere attempt to settle 
border conflict, therefore, may not necessarily create a lasting peace and normalize relationship.  
Mere reliance on colonial boundary laws or policies, therefore, may not be helpful to recreate 
brotherhood and normalize relationship with a view to build good neighborhood. 
  Hence, border delineation by itself is not an ultimate goal. It is simply a means that would 
take the brotherly people Ethiopia and Eritrea into the situation they were before colonial boots 
were landed in the area. An acceptable boundary line and resolution of conflict situations will 
build brotherhood. Normalization of relationship, brotherhood and cooperation will make the 
traditional functions of border wall practically in significant, which would possibly lead into 
economic and political integration in line with the objectives of AUBP.  
Drawing an acceptable borderline is not an easy task but its fruits are suit.  An acceptable 
borderline will perpetuate peace, create good neighborhood, and contribute for rebuilding the sense 
of brotherhood by avoiding animosity and mistrust.9  Peaceful coexistence, coupled with the 
effects of globalization, therefore, would stimulate economic and political integration that would 
ultimately remove restraining effects border wall. This will effectuate AU’s Border Program that 
                                                                                                                                               
confusion in river nomenclature a large swathe of territory including the flash point of 1998 border conflict was awarded to 
Eritrea. The ward was unacceptable to the Ethiopian people, as they know for sure the truth.   
8 LEENCO LATA, (ed.), THE SEARCH FOR PEACE: THE CONFLICT BETWEEN ETHIOPIA AND ERITREA, 
PROCEEDINGS OF SCHOLARLY CONFERENCE ON ETHIOPIA-ERITREA CONFLICT 8 ( 2006). 
 378 
aims to change the nature of borders from barriers to bridges that will enable everyone to freely 
move all over Africa. Economic or political integration would be easy to achieve if barrier nature 
of African borders is changed. This will, in turn, realize Gadafi’s dream of creating United States 
of Africa.  
 
7.2. Recommendations 
 
  7.2.1.  Ethiopia and Eritrea 
  As pointed out elsewhere just before the outbreak of the border conflict president Isias 
Afeworki remarked that common history and socio economic link between the people of Ethiopia 
and Eritrea make it impossible to build a border wall that would permanently separate the two 
intermingled people. It is true alienation would not benefit either nation. Therefore, leaders of both 
nations should work toward normalization of relation and rebuild brotherhood. This can only be 
achieved if and only if all outstanding issues at are resolved. With a view to settle either border, 
economic, investment or socio-political issues, both States should be willing to sit together and 
negotiate.   
  At this time it appears that the highest level of political authorities are not in a position to 
sit together and draw a road map that would take them into a negotiated settlement Thus, third 
party mediation appears vital. AUBP or a team constituted by AU can offer meditation. If 
mediators succeed in convincing highest political authority of both nations to resolve all issue with 
a view to enhance welfare of their people, political authorities can meet together and declare their 
determination and political commitment to resolve all issues.  
                                                                                                                                               
9 The adage, “Good Fences make good neighbors” in this regard works. See Robert Frost, “ Mending Wall” stated the 
phrase, “Good Fences make good neighbor.” The poet is available at:  http://allpoetry.com/Mending-Wall. Last 
accessed 01/30/15. 
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  Depending upon category or nature of issues, couple of committee may be organized in 
ministerial level. Permanent Joint Border Commission may be set up to redraw borderline.  
Experts from both nations, AUBP or UN, may assist the Joint Border Commission.  Another 
Committee may handle economic, monetary or investment issues.  Further Committee that work 
for resolution of socio-political issues may also be organized. AUBP may play supervision and 
consultancy role in each Committee.  AUBP may also play vital role in finding sources of funding, 
if the whole process appears to be beyond financial capacity of both nations.  
 
7.2.2.   African Union 
As mapped by the 35 Algiers Conference, African Union should be guided by the long-
term goals of political and economic integration of Africa. Commencement of AUBP is a wise 
move to resolve African border conflicts. Venturing to resolve actual conflicts is important, but 
may not by itself anchor Africa to the planned destiny -- economic or political integration. AUBP 
should rather aggressively work toward preventing border related conflicts. This requires a 
proactive approach, which demands AUBP to push member States of AU to catalogue all 
boundary lines and resolve all potential conflicts in advance and draw acceptable borderline.  Each 
Member State, therefore, should set up a permanent Joint Border Commission that creates 
catalogue of national border, supervise each borderline, clear borderline or rebuild border pillars, if 
needed. United States and Canada International Border Commission, for instance, works 
permanently and reports to their respective State Department. This has built peace between the two 
neighboring states. If Africa follows the same mechanism, all conflict situation would be resolved 
before it reaches into armed confrontation.  It is understandable that border management requires 
huge resources, but is wise idea to spend for conflict prevention than financing killer wars that 
 380 
consume not only economic resources but also human life. This process would avoid colonial 
footprints or mitigate harsh effects or colonial border policy.  
In addition to conflict prevention, and conflict managing, AUBP is expected to work 
towards integration of Africa. AUBP should closely work with regional economic communities 
that work toward economic and political integration of member states. Integration of regional 
economic community will ultimately lead into continual integration. The process of integrating 
Africa appears started with issuance of African passport that was declared today (April 6, 2016). 
The new African passport at the beginning will be issued to leaders of member states will follow to 
ordinary African citizens. The Passport will further reduce barrier effects of African borders. In 
accordance with the regulation issuing African Passport, any African can stay 30 days in any 
Member States without the need to get visa. Issuance of continental visa proves that African Union 
is moving toward realization of Kwame Nkrumah’s vision of forming United States of Africa.  
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